365bet娱乐

Arthapatti as a source of knowledge consists in the supposition of some unperceived fact in order to explain a given fact. When a given or perceived fact cannot be explained without some other fact we have to presuppose or postulate the existence of this other fact even though we do not perceive it. A phenomenon is presented to our experience and we find that there is a seeming contradiction involved in it. We try to get over this contradiction by supposing some other fact which explains away the contradiction. The given fact which is to be explained is called the upapadya, and that which explains it is called the upapadaka. Hence here we proceed from the knowledge of something to be explained to the knowledge of that which explains it, i.e. from the consequence to the ground.' Thus when a man who is growing fat says that he fasts, we find an apparent contradiction between his increasing fatness and his fasting. We get out of this contradiction by the supposition that the man cats at night, because a man who fasts at day cannot grow fat unless he takes food at night. Or, a man, who is living, is not found in his house. To explain the absence of the man from his house we suppose that he is somewhere outside his house, because a living man cannot be absent from his house unless he lives outside it. According to the Advaita Vedanta and the Bhatta Mimamsa, 1 Upapadyajnanena upapadakajnanam arthapattih. etc., Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. V. Arthapattirapi drstah sruto va 'rtho'nyatha nopapadyata ityarthakalpana, Sastradipika, P. 76. 46-(0.P. 103)

arthapatti is a separate source of knowledge, because it gives us a knowledge of facts which cannot be otherwise explained. It cannot be explained by perception, since the fact known through arthupatti is not perceived by us. That the fat man eats at night is not a matter of perception for us. Nor can we explain this knowledge by inference. According to the Advaitins, arthapatti is not an inference. It cannot be reduced to anvayi inference, because there is no anveya or agreement in presence between fatness and eating at night as between smoke and fire. We cannot say that wherever there is fatness there is eating at night, just as we can say that wherever there is smoke there is fire. Nor can arthapatti be reduced to vyatircki inference, because there is no such thing as vyatireki inference. Further, the direct report of our consciousness is against the supposition that arthapatti is an inference. In anuvyavasaya or introspection of the knowledge by arthapatti we do not feel to have inferred' anything, but simply to have supposed or presumed something in order to explain something else.' The Naiyayikas, Sankhyas and others object to the above view of arthapalli as a separate source of knowledge. According to the Naiyayikas, arthapatti may be reduced to an inference of the vyatireki type. It is not indeed an anvayi inference in which the major premise expresses a positive relation of agreement in presence between the middle and the major term, e.g. 'whenever there is fatness, there is eating at night.' On the other hand, it is a vyatireki inference in which the major premise expresses a universal relation between the absence of the major and the absence of the middle. Thus the above example of arthapatti may be reduced to the following syllogism: A man who does not eat at night while fasting by day This man who fasts at day is fat; is not fat; . This man is not a man who does not eat at night, i.e. he eats at night. 1 Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. V.

s arthapatti may thus be reduced to vyatireki inference, the Naiyayikas refuse to acknowledge it as a separate source of knowledge. So also the Sankhya philosophers explain arthapatti as a form of inference. Taking the second example of arthapatti given above, Vacaspati points out that it can be reduced to the following inference: If a living individual is absent somewhere, he is present elsewhere; Devadatta who is living is absent from home ; He is somewhere outside his home. Here a man's existence outside his home is inferred from ' his absence from home' as the linga or the middle term. There is a relation of vyapti or universal concomitance between a man's presence somewhere and his absence elsewhere. Every man finds this to be true in his own case. Hence when we know the one from the other we simply infer it from its linga or universal concomitant, just as we infer fire from smoke.* The Bhatta Mimamsakas expose the futility of the attempt to reduce arthapatti to inference. They point out certain fundamental differences between inference and arthapatti, which make it impossible for us to reduce either of them to the other. It may seem at first view that inference and arthapalti involve the same process of reasoning. In arthapatti we pass from the knowledge of an observed phenomenon to that of an unobserved phenomenon without which it cannot be explained. In inference also we pass from the observed smoke to the unobserved fire as that which alone explains the smoke. But a closer view of the matter reveals certain important and unmistakable differences between the two. In inference we proceed from the gamaka or the evidentiary fact to the gamya or the evidenced fact, while in arthapatti we pass from the gamya or the fact to be evidenced and explained to the gamaka or that 1 Yastu na ratrau bhunkte nasau divabhunjanatve sati pino, etc., Tarkabhasa, P. 15. * Evamarthapattirapi na pramanantaram...yada khalvavyapakah sannekatra nasti tadanyatrasti, etc., Tattvakaumudi, p. 46.

which evidences and explains it. Again, in arthapatti we are confronted with an apparent conflict between two facts, e.g. a man's fatness and fasting by day, or, a man being alive and yet absent from home. In order to resolve this conflict we have to presuppose or postulate another fact, namely, that the man cats at night, or that the man has gone out. So long as we do not make this supposition we are in doubt as to whether the man really fasts, or whether he really exists or not. Such doubtful facts cannot be the linga or the middle term of any valid inference. In arthapatti we get over this state of doubt and conflict by supposing something which explains them away. Hence while in inference we pass from an undoubted fact (niscita gamaka) to its invariable concomitant, in arthapatti we proceed from a doubtful fact (samdigdha gamaka) to something which explains it and saves us from the doubt.' Finally if arthapatti is to be reduced to inference, we must show what the linga or the middle term of that inference is. When we argue that Devadatta exists outside his house because he is living and yet absent from home, we cannot take mere absence from home' as the middle term, for the man may be dead and cease to exist at all. Nor can we say that 'living' is the middle term, because a living man may exist inside his house. Nor again can it be said that Devadatta's 'living together with his absence in the house' is the middle term from which we infer his existence outside the house. In an inference we first know the linga or the middle term and then, through it, the lingi or the major term. The two are not known together, but one after the other. In the case of Devadatta, however, we cannot connect his living with his absence from the house except through the idea of his existence outside the house. Hence to know the alleged middle term, namely, 'his living together with his absence from the house' is just to know his existence outside the house. This being known along with the alleged middle term, there f 鈥� Syadevam, yadyanupapannam gamakam syat, iha tu yannopapadyate tadeva gamyam...yatha canumane niscitam gamakam, evamarthapattau samdigdhari gamakamiti, etc., Sastradipika, pp. 76-77.

remains nothing more to be inferred from it. So arthapatti is not the inference of the major term from the middle term, but the presupposition of one fact in order to explain another, in which is involved a seeming contradiction.' The Bhatta Mimamsakas next discuss the question of reducing inference to arthapaiti. It may be said that if we accept arthapatti as a separate source of knowledge, there is no more any necessity of recognising inference as a different source of knowledge. Inference may be shown to be the same as arthapatti for we can analyse an inference in the following way. When I see smoke in the hill, I think that if there were no fire, this smoke would be unaccounted for. Therefore, either there is no smoke in the hill or the universal proposition, 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire,' is false. But neither of the alternatives can be accepted. The universal proposition has been established with rigorous certainty and the smoke is an object of perception. Hence the apparent contradiction is resolved by the supposition that there is fire. Thus inference becomes identical with arthapatti. To this the Bhattas reply that inference may be said to be arthapatti only if we admit that the universal proposition was not previously known by inference. In certain instances we know that smoke is related to fire. From this we infer that all smoke is related to fire. It cannot be said that without the universal proposition our knowledge of the relation between smoke and fire in certain instances involves a contradiction which is resolved by the postulation of it. Hence the knowledge of the universal proposition requires to be explained by inference as a separate source of knowledge. Now we are to observe that arthapatti as explained above is an independent pramana like perception, inference and the 2 1 Na tavadgrhabhavamatram lingan mrte'pi sambhavat, na jivanamatram grhe'pi sadbhavat, ato jivanasamsrsto grhabhavo lingamiti vaktavyam, prathamam ca lingamavagamya pascallingyanumanena bhavitavyam...atra ca na bahirbhavavagamamantarena grhabhavo jivanam ca samsrstam pratyetum sakyate virodhat, etc., Sastradipika, p. 78. 2 Syadevam yadi sarvadhumavatamagnimattvamanumanadanyenavagatam syat, etc., Sastradipika, p. 79.

rest. It cannot be reduced to inference as the Naiyayikas and the Sankhyas endeavour to do. The reason for this, however, is not, as the Advaitins suppose, that there is no such thing as vyatireki inference, to which arthapatti may possibly be reduced. The Advaita Vedantins lose their case against those who prove that vyatireki is a genuine type of inference, or reduce arthapatti to some other kind of inference like the hypothetical-categorical or the disjunctive-categorical syllogism. The real reason is, as the Bhattas point out, that arthapatti cannot be reduced to any kind of inference. The fundamental condition of all inference is the relation of vyapti or invariable concomitance between the major and the middle term. In every inference the conclusion follows from a universal proposition which is the result of a previous induction. The knowledge of the universal proposition is derived from the uncontradicted experience of agreement in presence or in absence between the iniddle and the major terin. In any inference we apply a universal proposition, which is already known, to a particular case. To reduce arthapatti to inference we must, therefore, show that here our knowledge of the unobserved fact follows from a universal proposition which is already known by induction. The Naiyayikas and others would say that the knowledge given by arthapatli does follow from certain universal propositions. That Devadatta eats at night follows from the universal proposition, "A man who does not eat at night while fasting by day is not fat." Similarly, the fact that he is out follows from the proposition, "A living man is either at home or out of it." But these propositions are not cases of real vyapti or induction. They are not generalisations from the particular facts of experience. The universal proposition, "Wherever there is smoke there is fire," is derived from the particular instances of their co-existence. So also, the proposition, Wherever there is no fire there is no smoke," is derived from the particular instances of their agreement in absence. But we have no previous experiences of the agreement in absence between eating at night and fatness. We have previous experiences of the con- "

comitance between eating and fatness or between their absence. Hence to explain the apparent contradiction between fatness and absence of cating by day we have to suppose that there is eating at night. Our knowledge of the fact that Devadatta eats at night does not follow from any universal proposition which is already known, because there is here no universal proposition at all. It is the result of an attempt to correlate his fatness with the absence of eating by day-a process of reasoning which is different from that involved in inference. Similarly, the proposition, 'A living man is either at home or out of it,' is not a generalisation from particular instances of the concomitance between a man's absence from home and presence outside. We cannot say that the one co-exists with the other, just as smoke co-exists with fire. Hence we cannot deduce our knowledge of the fact that Devadatta is out from any such universal proposition. Rather, it follows in the wake of any attempt to reconcile the facts that Devadatta lives and yet he does not live in the house. In fact, the so-called universal proposition is itself a statement of the conclusion in general terms and cannot really explain it. Hence arthapatti is not a form of inference, but a separate source of knowledge.