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366
NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
rest. It cannot be reduced to inference as the Naiy膩yikas and
the Sankhyas endeavour to do. The reason for this, however,
is not, as the Advaitins suppose, that there is no such thing as
vyatireki inference, to which arth盲patti may possibly be
reduced. The Advaita Ved膩ntins lose their case against those
who prove that vyatireki is a genuine type of inference, or
reduce arth膩patti to some other kind of inference like the hypo-
thetical-categorical or the disjunctive-categorical syllogism.
The real reason is, as the Bh膩峁�峁璦s point out, that arth膩patti
cannot be reduced to any kind of inference. The fundamental
condition of all inference is the relation of vyapti or invariable
concomitance between the major and the middle term. In
every inference the conclusion follows from a universal proposi-
tion which is the result of a previous induction. The knowledge
of the universal proposition is derived from the uncontradicted
experience of agreement in presence or in absence between the
iniddle and the major terin. In any inference we apply a uni-
versal proposition, which is already known, to a particular case.
To reduce arth膩patti to inference we must, therefore, show that
here our knowledge of the unobserved fact follows from a
universal proposition which is already known by induction.
The Naiy膩yikas and others would say that the knowledge given
by arth膩patli does follow from certain universal propositions.
That Devadatta eats at night follows from the universal pro-
position, "A man who does not eat at night while fasting by
day is not fat." Similarly, the fact that he is out follows from
the proposition, "A living man is either at home or out of it."
But these propositions are not cases of real vy膩pti or induction.
They are not generalisations from the particular facts of experi-
ence. The universal proposition, "Wherever there is smoke
there is fire," is derived from the particular instances of their
co-existence. So also, the proposition, Wherever there is no
fire there is no smoke," is derived from the particular instances
of their agreement in absence. But we have no previous
experiences of the agreement in absence between eating at
night and fatness. We have previous experiences of the con-
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