Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 382 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
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External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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OTHER SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE 307 comitance between eating and fatness or between their absence.
Hence to explain the apparent contradiction between fatness
and absence of cating by day we have to suppose that there is
eating at night. Our knowledge of the fact that Devadatta eats
at night does not follow from any universal proposition which
is already known, because there is here no universal proposition
at all. It is the result of an attempt to correlate his fatness
with the absence of eating by day-a process of reasoning
which is different from that involved in inference. Similarly,
the proposition, 'A living man is either at home or out of it,' is
not a generalisation from particular instances of the concomi-
tance between a man's absence from home and presence outside.
We cannot say that the one co-exists with the other, just as
smoke co-exists with fire. Hence we cannot deduce our know-
ledge of the fact that Devadatta is out from any such universal
proposition. Rather, it follows in the wake of any attempt
to reconcile the facts that Devadatta lives and yet he does not
live in the house. In fact, the so-called universal proposi-
tion is itself a statement of the conclusion in general terms and
cannot really explain it. Hence arthapatti is not a form of
inference, but a separate source of knowledge.
3. AbhÄva and anupalabdhi as sources of knowledge
AbhÄva may
be taken to mean either contrast or non-
cognition. In the first sense it means a relation of contrast
or antithesis between two things as between existence and
non-existence.' When there is such a relation of contrast or
contradiction between two things, then from the existence of
the one we may know the non-existence of the other and vice
versa. Thus from the non-existence of rain we know the exist-
ence of some contact of the clouds with high winds which
prevent rainfall. It is on account of the obstruction offered by
high winds that rain drops do not fall to the ground, as they
otherwise would by the force of gravity. The NaiyÄyikas hold
1 Abhavo virodhī, abhūta� bhūtasya, etc., NB., 2. 2. 1.
