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302
NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
arth膩patti is a separate source of knowledge, because it gives
us a knowledge of facts which cannot be otherwise explained.
It cannot be explained by perception, since the fact known
through arthupatti is not perceived by us. That the fat man
eats at night is not a matter of perception for us. Nor can we
explain this knowledge by inference. According to the Advai-
tins, arth膩patti is not an inference. It cannot be reduced to
anvayi inference, because there is no anveya or agreement in
presence between fatness and eating at night as between smoke
and fire. We cannot say that wherever there is fatness there
is eating at night, just as we can say that wherever there is
smoke there is fire. Nor can arth膩patti be reduced to vyatircki
inference, because there is no such thing as vyatireki inference.
Further, the direct report of our consciousness is against the
supposition that arth膩patti is an inference. In anuvyavasaya
or introspection of the knowledge by arthapatti we do not feel
to have inferred' anything, but simply to have supposed or
presumed something in order to explain something else.'
The Naiyayikas, S盲nkhyas and others object to the above
view of arthapalli as a separate source of knowledge. Accord-
ing to the Naiy膩yikas, arth膩patti may be reduced to an inference
of the vyatireki type. It is not indeed an anvayi inference in
which the major premise expresses a positive relation of agree-
ment in presence between the middle and the major term, e.g.
'whenever there is fatness, there is eating at night.' On the other
hand, it is a vyatireki inference in which the major premise
expresses a universal relation between the absence of the major
and the absence of the middle. Thus the above example of
arth膩patti may be reduced to the following syllogism:
A man who does not eat at night while fasting by day
This man who fasts at day is fat;
is not fat;
. This man is not a man who does not eat at night, i.e.
he eats at night.
1 VP., Ch. V.