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Abhava may be taken to mean either contrast or noncognition. In the first sense it means a relation of contrast or antithesis between two things as between existence and non-existence.' When there is such a relation of contrast or contradiction between two things, then from the existence of the one we may know the non-existence of the other and vice versa. Thus from the non-existence of rain we know the existence of some contact of the clouds with high winds which prevent rainfall. It is on account of the obstruction offered by high winds that rain drops do not fall to the ground, as they otherwise would by the force of gravity. The Naiyayikas hold 1 Abhavo virodhi, abhutam bhutasya, etc., Nyaya-Bhasya, 2. 2. 1.

that this argument from non-existence to existence is really a form of inference, because it is based on a uniform relation of concomitance between two opposite or contradictory things. Two contradictory objects are so related to one another that the existence of the one implies the non-existence of the other and vice versa. Hence abhava or non-existence as a source of knowledge is to be included within inference.' The Vaisesikas also reduce abhava to inference. According to them, the non-existence of the effect indicates the non-existence of the cause, just as its existence indicates the existence of the cause. Hence abkava or non-existence gives us the knowledge of that which is uniformly related to it, like the linga or the middle term of an inference. The argument based on abhava or non-existence is thus really a kind of anumana or inference. 3 1 Later Naiyayikas take abhava to mean the absence of cognition and not the relation of contrast or opposition between two things. " In this sense abhava coincides with anupalabdhi or non-cognition. According to the Bhatta Mimamsa and the Advaita Vedanta, anupalabdhi is an independent pramana or source of knowledge. It is the unique cause of such presentative knowledge of non-existence as is not due to inference or any other kind of knowledge. Thus the non-existence of a jar on the table which I see before me is known from the absence of its cognition or its non-perception (anupalabdhi). I judge that the jar does not exist on the table because it is not perceived, while I know that it would have been perceived if it existed there. This knowledge of non-existence cannot be explained by inference, since it is not brought about by the knowledge of vyapti or a universal relation between two terms. It cannot be said that the non-existence of the jar is inferred from its non-perception which is known to be universally 1 Ibid. 2 Nyayakandali, p. 225; Vaisesika-Sutra, 9. 2. 1. * Tarkabhasa, p. 15 : Nyayalilavati, p. 57. 鈫� Jnanakaranajanyabhavanubhavasadharanakaranamanupalabdhirupam manam, Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. VI. pra-

related to non-existence. The knowledge of a universal relation between non-perception and non-existence requires a previous knowledge of non-existence as such, which cannot be given by any inference.' Nor can we explain the knowledge of the jar's non-existence by comparison (upamana) or testimony, since it is not due to any knowledge of similarity or of words and sentences. Hence to explain the direct knowledge of the jar's non-existence we have to recognise anupalabdhi or non-perception as a separate and independent source of knowledge. All non-perception, however, does not prove the nonexistence of what is not perceived. We cannot perceive such supersensible entities as dharma and adharma, ether and atom. Yet we do not judge them to be non-existent. Non-perception gives us the knowledge of the non-existence of such objects as should have been perceived if they existed. If a thing should be perceived under certain circumstances, then its non-perception under those circumstances is a proof of its non-existence. It is this appropriate non-perception (yogyanupalabdhi) that is the source of our knowledge of non-existence. * The Naiyayikas, Sankhyas and others controvert the above view of anupalabdhi as an independent source of the knowledge of non-existence. According to them, such knowledge does not require anupalabdhi as a separate source of knowledge, but is a special case of perception. Just as we perceive the existence of objects, so also we can perceive their non-existence under certain conditions. When there is a jar on the table before me I perceive its existence through a direct contact between my senses and the object, jar. Hence the existence of the jar is directly perceived by me. But when there is no jar on the same table, I perceive its absence or non-existence as a characteristic of the table. The The table is characterised by the absence of the jar. Hence the absence of 1 Napyanumeyah, ajnatena tena kasyacillingasya sambandhagrahanasam bhavat, Sastradipika, p. 87. 2 Vedanta-paribhasa & Sastradipika, ibid. 3 Evamabhavo 'pi pratyaksameva, Tattvakaumudi, p. 50. 47-(O.P. 103)

the jar comes in contact with my senses through being adjectival (visesana) to the table which is in direct contact with the senses. So when I directly perceive the table, I indirectly perceive the absence of the jar on it. This perception of the absence or non-existence of a thing, however, requires two negative conditions, namely, the non-perception (anupalambha) of that thing and the hypothetical reasoning (tarka) that if it existed it would have been perceived like the table. Before we come to know the absence of the jar on the table we must be sure of the fact that we do not perceive it there. Further, we must be sure that all the conditions that are necessary for its perception are present at the time when it is not perceived. The absence of the jar is perceived by me when I do not perceive it on the table but know that it would have been perceived if it existed there. The non-existence of the jar is thus known by means of perception when it is combined with the nonperception of the jar and the hypothetical reasoning about its existence. ' That this knowledge of non-existence is a form of perception is directly felt by us. We are immediately aware of the fact that the non-existence of a jar on the table is directly known or perceived by us. Anupalabdhi or non-perception of the jar is a negative condition of the perception, and not the source of our knowledge of its non-existence. If non-perception be taken as a source of knowledge, then it must be either cognised by some other non-perception or not cognised at all. On the first alternative we are landed in the fallacy of argumentum ad infinitum. On the second, non-perception becomes identical with perception, since, like perception, it is knowledge which is not produced by any other knowledge. Hence the Naiyayikas conclude that non-perception is not a separate source of knowledge, but a special case of perception." We have already seen how the knowledge of non-existence, which is not due to inference or any other kind of reasoning, Tarkasahakarinanupalambhasanathena pratyaksenaiva bhavagrahanat, Tarkabhasa, p. 15. 2 Abhavapratyaksasyanubhavikatvadanupalambho'pi na pramanantaram, etc., Siddhanta-muktavali, p. 502.

cannot be explained by perception. A negative fact like the non-existence of a jar is not a sensible fact like the existence of the table. We do not understand how our senses can come in contact with the absence of a thing. A man says at noon that nobody came to his house in the morning. Here we cannot suppose any contact between sense and nobody. It cannot be said that we perceive the non-existence of a thing as a characteristic or quality of the locus in which it is non-existent. To know a certain locus as characterised by the absence of an object is to know beforehand what absence or non-existence is. Hence our primary knowledge of non-existence cannot be a perception of it as the quality of any locus, like the red colour of a rose. Nor can it be said that we are immediately aware of the fact that the non-existence of a thing is perceived. What we immediately know is that we do not perceive a thing in a certain place. This absence of perception gives us the knowledge of its non-existence. The Naiyayikas practically admit this when they take non-perception as the antecedent condition of the perception of non-existence. If to perceive the non-existence of a thing we are to make sure that we do not perceive it under favourable circumstances, then we are to say that it is the absence of perception that assures us of the thing's nonexistence. Hence we conclude that anupalabdhi or non-perception should be recognised as a separate source of knowledge to explain our primary cognition of the non-existence of objects.