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Inference is supported by all the systems of Indian philosophy except Carvakas. It is a distinct branch of knowledge. The word inference (anumana) is used to indicate two components viz. inferential cognition (anumiti) and the instrument of inferential cognition (anumiti karana). In this way, when the word inference stands for an abstraction, it means inferential cognition and when it stands for the instrument, it means a source of inferential cognition. Inference is indirectly accepted as an independent means of knowledge even by Carvakas who deny to accept it since the rejection of inference by 61. indriyarthasannikarsah karanam. Tarkabhasa p. 37. savikalpakajnanam avantara-vyaparah. Tarkabhasa p.38. 62. 63. The Epistemology of the Prabhakara school of Purva Mimamsa p.62.

110 Carvakas itself implies the acceptance of inference by them because the rejection is through the inference itself. Anumana literally means such knowledge that follows some other knowledge. It is the knowledge of an object due to a previous knowledge of some sign or mark.64 In anumana, we arrive at the knowledge of an object through the medium of two acts of knowledge or propositions. The term anumana is derived from anu followed by the root ma with the suffix lyut. Mana means an apprehension or a way of apprehension of an object and the prefix anu denotes after. So, the result of such knowledge is called anumiti which is the knowledge of an object due to a previous knowledge. Hence, inferential knowledge is produced not by direct apprehension but by means of some other knowledge. The "other" is interpreted in different ways as perceptive knowledge of probans. All systems of Indian philosophy agree in holding that anumana is a process of arriving at truth not by direct observation but by means of the knowledge of vyapti or a universal relation between two things. Different Views on Inference 鈥� Carvaka View The Carvakas reject the validity of anumana. The author of the Mahabharata mentions that the Carvakas do not treat anumana and agama as pramanas. It is stated that both anumana and agama are based on pratyaksa and 64. mitena lingena lingino 'rthasya pascanmanamanumanam. Vatsyayana-bhashya under Nyayasutra 1.1.3.

111 therefore the Carvakas do not consider them as a source of valid knowledge." 65 The author of the epic also states that these philosophers do not recognize anumana as pramana for another important reason. The reason is that they cannot assert the validity of the vyapti or the invariable concomitance which 66 plays the most significant part in case of inference. The materialists do not consider this vyapti as infallible. Therefore, the author of the Mahabharata observes, the materialists do not recognize anumana as a pramana. 67 Actually it is not always possible to attain the correct knowledge of something with anumana. Similar is the case of upamana ect. But the fact cannot be denied that one cannot totally dispense with anumana in his practical life. Sometimes it is found that pratyaksa alone does not serve the purpose. Udayanacarya, the author of Nyaya-kusumanjali observes that if a Carvaka depends entirely on pratyasa he will invite his own miseries due to his dogmatic view. According to the author when a Carvaka will go away to a remote place by leaving his wife and children at home, naturally he will be unable to perceive them from that place. Thus, according to their own standpoint, they will be non-existent to him and hence he will have to lament for their loss. 08 A section of later Carvakas probably realized this problem. 65. 68 pratyaksam hyetayormulam .......na kincana. Mahabharata Santiparva, pp. 218-227. 66.. Ibid. pp. 218-226 67. anumanena yad gatyadidarsanam tadapi asati laksane jnapake hetau ...vyadhicaradarsanat... na kimapi, Naisadha-carita on Mahabharata 68. darsanadasayam bhavaniscaya... sokavikalovikroset - Nyaya-kusumanjali p.355.

112 Therefore, Gunaratna contents that the Carvakas recognize anumana also as pramana for practical purposes. He says that these philosophers agree to accept such an inference only as is urgently necessary for proving the existence of fire on a hill with the help of a column of smoke. But they do not recognize such extra-sensory inference (alaukika anumana) as is commonly accepted by some other philosophers to establish the existence of heaven, adrsta ect.69 According to Purandara also the Carvakas recognize laukika anumana or popular inference as a pramana. 70 The Bauddha View According to the Bauddhas inference is an independent source of valid knowledge. Dharmakirti is of the view that inference is the cognition of the 71 inferable from the mark having a three-fold character. The three characteristics of a sign or mark are (1) its presence in the paksa, (2) presence in the sapaksa and (3) absence from the vipaksa. The inclusion of the word 'anumeya' in the definition makes it opens to the charge of circularity. There is no mention of invariable concomitance. According to Dinnaga, there are two means of knowledge viz., perception and inference. With these two sources, two corresponding 69. carvakair lokayatranirvahena pramanam dhumadyanumanamisyate 70. etc.-Saddarsana-samuccaya p.475. purandarastvaha lokapasiddham anumanam carvakairapisyata eva...Kamalasila; Tattvasamgraha p.526. 71. trirupallingad yadanumeye jnanam tadanumanam. Nyayabindu 2.3.

113 objects viz., the particular and the universal are realized The universals are cognized by inference and particulars by the perception. The Jaina View 72 According to the Jainas, inference is the knowledge of the major term derived from the knowledge of the middle term. Fire is inferred from smoke. Smoke is the middle term, and fire is the major term. Anumana is based on vyapti derived from induction (tarka). Vyapti is the invariable concomitance between the middle and the major term. In inference there are three terms viz. the middle term (hetu or sadhya), the major term (sadhya) and the minor term (paksa). The middle term is that which is definitely known to be inseparably connected with the major term. If the major term does not exist, the middle term cannot exist. If the middle term exists, the major term must also exist. This is the only mark of middle term. Samkhya-Yoga View of Anumana The most authentic work on Samkhya system, the Samkhya-karika of Isvarakrsna defines anumana as the knowledge derived from sign or signate. 73 Vacaspati Misra explains the definition elaborately. He states that linga means pervaded (vyapya) and lingi means pervasive (vyapaka). 74 These may, in other words, be called probans and probandum. He states that in wording of Samkhya-karika probans and probandum stand for inferential knowledge. Thus, inferential knowledge arises through the knowledge that probans like smoke is pervaded and 72. Pramana-samuccaya 2.1. 73. ...trividhamanumanamakhyatam/tallingalingipurvakam...// Samkhya-karika 5. 74. lingam vyapyam lingi vyapakam.- Samkhya-tattva-kaumudi under Samkhya-karika, k-5.

114 75 probandum like fire is pervasive. " Kapila defines inference as the knowledge of the invariably associated (vyapaka) through the knowledge of invariable association. Kapila's definition of inference, it appears, is in terms of inferential knowledge of which invariable association serves as a cause. The Samkhya-karika takes the division into three as well purvavat (a priory), sesavat (a posteriori) and samanyatodrsta (commonly seen). The definition of anumana in the Yoga system is found in the Yogabhasya of Vyasa. He defines inference as the modification of citta brought about by the relation which exists in the objects of homogeneous nature and does not exist in the objects of heterogeneous nature and ascertains chiefly the generic nature of an object. Vedanta View 77 78 In the Vedanta system, inference is that which is produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is its instrumental cause. When there is the knowledge that the minor term possesses the attribute as in the proposition 'the hill is smoky' and also an awakening of the mental impression 75. 76. dhumadirvyapya vahnyadirvyapaka. Ibid. pratibandhasadrsah pratibadhajnanamanumanam. Samkhyasutra 1.100. 77. anumeyasya tulya jatiyesu anuvrttau bhinnajatiyebhya vyavrttah 78. sambandho yastadvisaya samanyavadharana pradhana vrttiranumanam. Yogabhasya 1.7. anumitipramakaranamanumanam. anumitisca vyaptijnanatvena vyaptijnanajanya. Vedanta-paribhasa pp. 129-130.

115 due to previous presentative knowledge in the form 'Smoke is invariably accompanied by fire', there results the inference 'the hill is on fire'. According to Advaita Vedanta, inference is of one kind. It is anvayi and depends upon the agreement in presence between the probans and the probandum. The Advaitins admit inference for one's own sake and inference for others. The former is caused by sub-conscious impression of vyapti. The latter consists of three members which may be either proposition, reason and example or example, application and conclusion. 79 Mimamsa View of inference According to Sabara the definition of anumana is that when a certain 80 fixed relation has been known to subsist between two things, so that if we perceive any one of these things we have an idea of the other thing, this later cognition is called inferential knowledge. Kumarila Bhatta explains the compound jnatasambandhasya in four alternative ways, viz. (1) as referring to a person who knows the invariable relation between two things, e.g. smoke and fire, or (2) as referring to the substratum where the relationship, e.g. of smoke and fire is apprehended, (3) as referring simply to a known relationship or (4) as referring to both the linga and lingin together. Smoke and fire are parts (ekadesa) of a logical whole. 81 Prabhakara on the other hand, holds that the word jnatasambandhasya qualifies the term ekadesa in the compound 79. Indian Philosophy Vol. II. p.494. 80. anumanam jnatasambandhasyaikadesadarsanat ekadesantare 'sannikrste'rthe buddhih. Shabara-bhasya under MSu. 1.1.5. 81. Slokavartika anumana, 2-3.

116 ekadesadarsanat and refers to that whose invariable concomitance with 82 another is known. Thus, though there are points of difference between Bhatta and Prabhakara Schools of thought, a comprehensive definition of anumana can be found out from the Mimamsa standpoints based on Sabara's definition of anumana in the following form - anumana is the knowledge of thing, not in contact with the sense-organs from the perception of another object when an invariable relation is known to hold between them. Vaisesika View of Anumana Kanada, founder of Vaisesika system, holds that anumana is the knowledge of probandum derived from the knowledge of probans. Prasastapada defines anumana as the knowledge which results from apprehension of a sign (linga). He explains linga as that which is related to the probandum and which has co-presence and co-absence with the probandum. According to Vaisesika, the knowledge of anumana is derived from the mark, from which the existence of the probandum is inferred as its effect, or cause or conjunct or antagonist. From the heavy rainfall in the source of a river, flood in the river is inferred From smoke the existence of fire is inferred From the infuriated serpent, the existence of a mongoose hidden behind a bush is inferred Thus, it can be said that mark is the means of inference which is based upon the relations of causality, conjunction etc. 82. jnatahsambandhaniyamo yasya, tasya ekadesasya darsanadeka desantare sannikrste'arthe ya buddhih. Prakarana-pancika p.196

117 Nyaya View of Anumana The Nyaya system makes valuable contribution to inference. According to Naiyayikas, anumana is the knowledge of an object through the medium of the knowledge of some mark by virtue of a relation of invariable concomitance between the two. Gautama does not define anumana. 83 He simply holds that inference presupposes perception. It is of three types. Vatsyayana, a well known exposition of Gautama's Nyayasutra deals with the etymological aspect of the term anumana and states that it is the knowledge of 84 lingi arising after the knowledge of linga. According to Vatsyayana "no inference can follow from the absence of perception." Only when the observer has perceived fire and smoke to be related to each other, he is able to infer the existence of the fire and on the next occasion he perceives smoke. Inference, 85 according to Udyotakara, is the argument from sign as aided by remembrance or the knowledge which is preceded by the perception of the middle term and remembrance of its invariable concomitance with major term. * According to Jayanta, the cognition of the probandum which is not perceived after the 83. 86 atha tatpurvakam trividham anumanam purvavacchesavat samanyatodrstam ca. Nyayasutra 1.1.5 84. 85. 86. lingalinginoh sambandhyayor darsanena lingasmrtiravisambadhyate. smrtya lingadarsanena capratyakso'rtho'numiyate. Vatsyayana-bhashya under Nyayasutra 1.1.5. Vatsyayana-bhashya under Nyayasutra 2.1.31. smrtyanugrhito lingaparamarsonumanam. Nyayaviveka 1.1.5.

118 apprehension of proban combined with recollection of the law of invariable concomitance is called inference.87 Bhasarvarjna in his Nyayasara defines its "inseparable connection inference as the means of knowing a thing beyond the range of senses through (samavaya sambandha) with another thing" which lies within their range. Gangesa 88, following Sivaditya 89 defines inferential knowledge as knowledge produced by other knowledge. According to Annambhatta, the uncommon condition (karana) of 'anumiti' is 'anumana". 'Anumiti' is the cognition resulting from 'paramarsa'. 'Paramarsa' is the cognition of a 'subject (paksa)' as having something (viz. a 'hetu') which is characterized by 'vyapti' (of the probandum); e.g. the cognition like, 'the hill has smoke which is characterized by the vyapti of fire'. The cognition resulting from it like 'the hill has fire' is 'anumiti"." 90 The Nyaya writers prefer to treat anumana just after pratyaksa as the former is greatly dependent (upajivaka) on the latter which thus, becomes upajivya; and the propriety of treating inference after perception is explained by the relation upajivyopajivakabhava. Anumiti is the inferential cognition of the form 'The mountain has fire', which arises after going through certain reasoning processes. The mountain in which fire is inferred is called paksa or subject. Fire, which is the thing inferred is called sadhya or probandum. 87. Nyayamanjari p.98 88. Tattvacintamani II. p.2. 89. Saptapadarthi 146. 90. Tarkasamgraha 49.

119 Smoke which was observed as coming from the mountain, causes the inference to be drawn through a knowledge of its invariable concomitance with fire and so becomes linga or hetu or sadhana or probans (reason). The invariable concomitance between the sadhya and sadhana is called vyapti, and with reference to vyapti, sadhya becomes vyapaka (pervasive or of greater extent) and sadhana becomes vyapya (pervaded or of less extent). The three terms paksa, sadhya and hetu correspond to the minor, major and middle terms of the Aristotlean system. The Nyaya anumana depends on the relation between hetu and sadhya technically called vyapti. Kesava Misra's View According to Kesava Misra, subsumptive reflection or paramarsa of 91 the reason (linga) is called inference." The derivative meaning of anumana is that through which something is inferred It is through subsumptive reflection that something is inferred Therefore, such a reflection becomes inference; and that is the knowledge of smoke etc. in the subject; because that is the instrument for inferential cognition (anumiti). Such a cognition is the knowledge of fire etc. in the subject and its instrument is the knowledge of the presence of smoke etc. Reason (linga) is that which causes a thing to be known by the strength of invariable concomitance (vyapti); e.g. smoke is the reason for inferring fire. According to Cinnambhatta, reason or linga is that which makes } 91. lingaparamarso 'numanam. Tarkabhasa p.58.

120 us ascertain the latent thing which may be the vyapti itself.92 Kesava Misra says that a reason is that which causes a thing to be known by the strength of invariable concomitance (vyapti); e.g. smoke is the reason for fire. It is in this manner. The invariable co-existence in the form 'where there is smoke there is fire' is vyapti. 93 When that is grasped smoke makes known the presence of fire. Because it causes the inference of fire through the strength of vyapti, smoke becomes linga for inferring fire. The third knowledge of linga is lingaparamarsa. For instance, in the kitchen etc. one sees repeatedly smoke in association with fire and through these repeated perceptions he makes out a natural relation (between) the two in the form 'where there is smoke there exist fire'. The cognition of smoke in the kitchen, while ascertaining the invariable concomitance of smoke with the fire is the first step. The cognition of smoke in the subject, mountain etc, is the second step. After that (seeing smoke in the mountain) one recollects the invariable concomitance and then subsumes as follows this mountain has smoke which is invariably ** concomitant with fire", and this cognition is the third step. This third step should necessarily be accepted Otherwise our knowledge will end at the cognition 'where there is smoke there is fire'. But, this alone cannot prove the presence of fire in the mountain. Therefore here also it is necessary to accept a cognition of smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire. This cognition is what is called lingaparamarsa. This being the direct instrument of anumiti linamartham gamayatiti lingasabdo. Tarkabhasa-prakasika p.130. 92. 93. Tarkabhasa p. 58.

121 is anumana or inference. From this, inferential cognition of the form "this mountain has fire" arises. Kesava Misra after explaining vyapti begins to explain how paramarsa becomes the third step in the process of inference and incidentally mentions another definition of vyapti as a natural relation. It means not brought about by ---adventitious circumstances - anaupadhika - and this requires an explanation as to what upadhi is. If repeated observation leads one to know the relation vyapti, the relation 'whatever is Maitri's child, must be dark' will also be valid and similar to that between smoke and fire, as observing over and over again is common in both cases. But, it is not; because the relation between Maitri's child and dark complexion is not a natural one, but one brought about by an adventitious circumstance, such a circumstance being the effect of Maitris* feeding upon certain kinds of vegetables etc. This causal circumstance (which is purely adventitious or accidental) is what is called upadhi.94 There is no such upadhi in the relation between smoke and fire." If there is one, it is effective or ineffective in vitiating the relationship. If it is ineffective it need not be suspected to exist; and an effective one, it present, should be noticeable. Where there is an upadhi it is always noticed; for instance (i) in the relation of fire with smoke contact with wet fuel; (ii) in the relation of slaughter with 94. 95. Tarkabhasa p. 63 nanu maitritanayatvasamatvayoh sambandhe yathopadhirasti tatha dhumadhumadhvajayoh sambandhe kimupadhirasti / neti / Tarkabhasa-prakasika p.134.

122 causing sin, prohibition; and (iii) in the relation of being Maitri's child with dark complexion, the effect of vegetable feeding, are observed as upadhis. Whereas in the co-existence of smoke with fire no upadhi in noticed By actual sense-perception aided by the above ratiocination and by the fact of its non-apprehension, the non-existence upadhi is determined Here, vyapti between smoke and fire is determined by this sense-perception alone which makes us know the co-existence between the two and which is aided by the impression of the knowledge that there is no upadhi. Therefore, the relation between smoke and fire is a natural one and not produced by any upadhi. Such a natural relation (untainted by upadhi) is called vyapti. Kesava Misra says that the first cognition of smoke in the kitchen does not become the cause for inferring fire. Because at that time the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire has not been determined; and only after that has been ascertained inferential cognition can arise. In that case, when once the invariable concomitance has been ascertained one cannot infer fire in the kitchen itself. Because, there is no doubt, as fire is actually seen there; and only that thing the existence of which is doubted becomes an object of inference. To give strength on this view Kesava Misra mentions Vatsyayana's view. 96 Divisions of Anumana In Indian philosophy, anumana has been classified in various ways, for example, (a) purvavat, sesavat and samanyatodrsta, (b) kevalanvayi, 96. nanupalabdhe na nirnite 'rthe nyayah pravartate. api tu sandigdhe'rthe. Vatsyayana-bhashya 1.1.1.

123 kevalavyatireki and anvayavyatireki, (c) svartha and parartha and (d) vita and avita. " 97 The Samkhya-karika refers to the division of anumana into three kinds³ i.e. purvavat, sesavat and samanyatodrsta. The purvavat is that in which an effect is inferred from its cause, e.g. from the rise of cloud it is inferred that it will rain. The sesavat is that in which the cause is inferred from its effect, e.g. seeing the water of river as different from that in the past, as also the fullness of the river, i.e. stream and the swiftness of the current, it is inferred that it had rained The samanyatodrsta is illustrated as the perception of something at some other place is caused by movement, as the sun is observed at different places. Therefore, it is inferred that there is movement of the sun, though imperceptible. Vacaspati Misra has given two divisions of purvavat anumana i.e. vita and avita. But this division is not found in other text of SamkhyaYoga. Gautama mentions these three divisions of anumana in his Nyayasutra 98 Vatsyayana offers two alternative explanations of the nature of purvavat etc. He suggested that it is a type of inference in which out of two things one that is not perceived is inferred from the perception of the other on the basis of a former perception of both of these things together, e.g. inference of unperceived fire from perceived smoke on the basis of previous perception of fire and smoke together. Regarding sesavat, Vatsyayana states that it may also 97. trividhamanumanamakhyatam. Samkhya-karika k.5. 98. atha tatpurvakam trividhamanumanam purvavacchesavat samanyatodrstanca. Nyayasutra 1.1.5.

124 signify as remainder. There could be many possibilities with regard to the explanation of a fact. When all the possibilities except one are rejected, the remaining one is cognized through the means of sesavat inference, e.g. sound is distinct from the categories of generality, individuality and inherence. Samanyatodrsta, according to Vatsyayana, is an inference in which the relation between the antecedent and the concequent, not being a matter of perception, is established On the ground of an abstract similarity with something else e.g.inference of soul on the basis of the fact that desire, etc. are qualities and those qualities must abide in some substance namely the self. Uddyotakara is the first first logician to introduce kevalanvayi, kevalavyatireki and anvayavyatireki as the varieties of inference. If a 100 99 middle term is positively related to the major term it is called kevalanvayi. If the middle term is negatively related to the major term it is called kevalavyatireki. If the middle term is positively and negatively related to the major term in an inference then it is called anvayavyatireki. In the case of kevalanvayi the vyapti is affirmative only and there is no possibility of counter example. For example, man is mortal, because he is born. In the case of kevalavyatireki the vyapti is negative only and there is no possibility of homogeneous example, e.g. the cloth does not differ from threads, because it is of the nature of threads. In this case, there is no possibility of homogeneous 99. Samkhya-yoga Epistemology p.175. 100. trividhamiti anvayi vyatireki anvayavyatirekiceti. Nyayavartika 1.1.5.

125 instance. In the case of anvayavyatireki the vyapti can be stated in both the forms. An instance of this kind of inference is fire through smoke. The most commonly recognized kinds of inference are svarthanumana (the inference for oneself) and pararthanumana (the inference for other). In the inference for oneself, the inferential cognition is deduced for one's own benefit from the premises recalled to the mind. In the case of inference for others, it is deduced for the benefit of another person from premises presented to him. In earlier philosophical works, this division of inference was observed by Dinnaga, Prasastapada and Siddhasenadivakara. In the sutras there is no mention of these forms of inference. In Nyayasutra also it is not found. But, latter naiyayikas, like Annambhatta, Kesava Misra etc. accept these divisions of anumana. The inference for others which is a syllogism has to be presented in language and this has to be done only to convince others. There are five members in Nyaya syllogism. These members are proposition (pratijna), which is a logical statement which is to be proved; reason (hetu), which states the reason for the establishment of the proposition; example (udaharana) which gives the universal concomitance together with an example; application (upanaya) of the universal concomitance to the present case and conclusion (nigamana) which is drawn from the preceding propositions. 101 Kesava Misra also accepts these divisions of anumana in Tarkabhasa According to Kesava Misra the former i.e. svarthanumana is that by which 101. pratijnahetudaharanopanayanigamananyavayavah. Nyayasutra 1.1.32.

126 鈫� one gets convinced in his own mind. For example, after ascertaining vyapti between smoke and fire in the kitchen etc. by the special perception, if one happens to go near a mountain and sees an unbroken line of smoke, issuing from the mountain and reaching to the skies, he doubts the existence of fire there and immediately recollects the vyapti, 'where there is smoke there is fire', through the impression that gets aroused by the sight of smoke. Then he makes sure that such a smoke exists in the subject before him and thereby concludes in the mind that there is fire in the mountain also. This is called svarthanumana.102 In pararthanumana, one puts forth a five membered syllogism to carry conviction to another. The five members of syllogisms are, pratijna - the mountain has fire, hetu - because it emits smoke, udaharana all that emits smoke, contains fire, as the kitchen, upanaya - this mountain is like that (i.e. emits smoke concomitant with fire), nigamana contains fire' 103 therefore it Here, in the above mentioned syllogism the presence of fire in the hill is the probandum (sadhya), that which is to be proved or inferred The presence of smoke is the reason (hetu or sadhan). This reason is of affirmative-negative kind, in as much as it has invariable concomitance with fire both in the affirmative and negative manner. For example, 'where there is 102. Tarkabhasa pp 70-71. 103. Ibid. p.71

127 smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen' is the affirmative type of vyapti, for in the kitchen the presence of smoke and fire are observed directly. Similarly, 'where there is no fire there is no smoke as well, as in a lake' is the negative type of vyapti, for in the lake the absence of both fire and smoke are observed Thus, Kesava Misra explains two forms of pervasion (vyapti) - positive and negative. Positive pervasion is, where the probans is, there the probandum is. The negative pervasion is - where the probandum is absent the probans also is absent. Then he states the rule that what is the pervaded (vyapya) in positive pervasion is the pervader (vyapaka) in the negative pervasion. He explains exclusively positive probans (kevalanvayin) and exclusively negative probans (kevalavyatirekin). As an example of exclusively negative probans he gives the example: the living body has within it a soul, because of life. That which is without a soul cannot have life, as a jar. "This living body is not like this, therefore it is not that". Here, in the living body the presence of soul is sadhya or probandum and presence of breath etc. is the reason. This reason has only negative concomitance, as there exists no affirmative concomitance. According to Kesava Misra, the definition of perception involves an exclusively negative probans. All definitions involve exclusively negative probans. 104 Another type of probans is exclusively positive. In this form of probans, there is no negative instance. The example of exclusively positive pervasion is the usual example, so we do not explain it here. Then there are 104. DNPSC. p.355.

128 inferences involving positive- negative probans. This is the case of ordinary inferences, say of fire from smoke. In such cases, the probans has five characteristics: 1) the probans must be absent from where the probandum is known to be absent (vipakse asatta); 2) the probans must be present where the probandum is known to be present (sapakse-satta); 3) the probans must be present in the locus of the inference (paksa-dharmatva); 4) the probans must not be contradicted (abadhita-visayatva); and 5) the probans must not have another probans proving the opposite of the conclusion (asatpratipaksatva). Then Kesava Misra points out that an inference has two parts pervasion and being present in the locus of inference (vyapti and paksadharmata). By pervasion, only a probandum in general is established The other property of the probans, namely its presents in the locus of the inference proves a special probandum present in the same locus. In the case of positive-negative inferences, the probans must have the five characteristics; otherwise there will be fallacies where there is no proper probans. There can only apparent probans (hetvabhasa). In the case of only positive probans, the probans will have four characteristics. As there is no negative instance, the probans cannot be absent. So also in the case of exclusively negative probans, there will be only four characteristics of the probans. As there is no positive instance where the probandum is known to be present, the presence of the probans there will not be possible. Then Kesava Misra defines the three terms, paksa, sapaksa and vipaksa. The paksa is the locus of inference where the presence of the

129 probandum is doubtful. The positive instance (sapaksa) is where the probandum is known to be present. The negative instance (vipaksa) is where the probandum is known to be absent. It is to be noted here that only the definition of the locus of inference (paksa) is old fashioned After that Kesava Misra proceeds to hetvabhasa. A probans becomes its opposite if it fails to satisfy any one of the five conditions, such as existence in the subject etc. Because it appears to be like a valid reason by virtue of conforming to only some of those conditions, it is called hetvabhasa, one resembling like a valid reason. They are five kinds : (i) Asiddha - the unfounded or unknown reason. The reason which is not invariably concomitant with the probandum or that it does not exist in the subject, that reason is to be taken as the unknown reason. This type of reason is of three forms: (a) asrayasiddha, that reason whose subject is unknown, e.g. the sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus, similar to one in the pond. Here the subject, sky-lotus is a non-existing thing and so unknown. (b) svarupasiddha - that reason whose very form is not to exist in the subject. An example of svarupasiddha is 'sound is transitory because it is visible like a pot.' Here visibility is the reason, but that is quite unknown in sound as it is only audible. (c) vyapyatvasiddha that reason which has its invariable concomitance with the probandum unfounded It happens in two ways- (1) When the reason does not coexist with the probandum and (2) When it is related to the probandum through an adventitious circumstance (upadhi). An instance of the first kind is 'whatever exists is momentary like clouds; sound -

130 and other things do exist (and so are momentary). Here, 'sound and other things constitute the subject, 'momentariness' is the probandum and 'existence' is the probans. There is no proof to ascertain the invariable concomitance between 'existence' and 'momentariness'. The second form of vyapyatvasiddha is this, Killing in a sacrifice causes demerit because it is an 105 act of killing, just like killing outside sacrifices'. In this case, 'killing as such is not a cause for demerit; but the fact of being prohibited by scriptures' is the cause for demerit. So, 'prohibitedness' acts as upadhi in this case. (ii) Viruddha- The contradictory reason. It is that which has invariable concomitance with the negation of the probandum; e.g. sound is eternal because, it is a product, like ether. The fact of being a product is actually concomitant with non-eternality, the opposite of the probandum here. What is produced is always non-eternal and not-eternal. Therefore the reason 'being a product' becomes a contradictory one. (iii) Anaikantika - The inconstant or straying reason. It is of two kinds, the common strayer and the peculiar strayer. That which is present in all the three paksa, sapaksa and vipaksa, is the common strayer; e.g. (in the syllogism) sound is eternal because it is cognizable, the reason cognisability exists in all eternal and non-eternal things. That reason which is absent from 105. ahimsa paramo dharmastvadharmah praninam vadhah... Tarkabhasa-prakasika p.154.

131 both sapaksa and vipaksa but exists only in the paksa, becomes the peculiar strayer, as (in the syllogism) 'earth is eternal because it has smell the reason smell does not exist in any sapaksa or vipaksa, but exists only in earth (paksa). (iv) Prakaranasama - The counterbalanced or opposing reason is that which is opposed by another reason which proves the existence of the opposite of the proposed probandum. For example, sound is non eternal as it is devoid of all qualities of eternal things. This is opposed by 'sound is eternal because it is devoid of all qualities of eternal things.' This is also called satpratipaksa one having an adversary. (v) Kalatyayapadista - The stultified or belated reason. It occurs when the opposite of the proposed probandum is known to exist in the subject by any other more trust-worthy means of cognition. It is called badhita also. For example, the syllogism, 'fire is not hot, because it is a product like water'. Here, the probandum proposed to be proved by the reason 'being a product' is 'absent of heat'. But its opposite 'presence of heat' in the subject is already ascertained through perception, as heat is experienced through tactile perception. The Grounds of anumana Vyapti and Paksadharmata are the grounds for the operation of inference. Smoke is perceived on the hill and the fire is inferred But inference takes place only when the universal relation between smoke and fire is already known. This relation is called vyapti, 106. 106. between the middle and major term is yatra yatra dhumah tatra tatra agnih iti sahacaryaniyamah vyapti. Tarkasamgraha 59.

132 the important for the operation of inference. But the conclusion drawn in inference follows from both vyapti and paksadharmata jointly. The presence of the middle term in the minor term is called paksadharmata. The knowledge of paksadharmata as qualified by vyapti is called paramarsa. According to the Bhattas, invariable concomitance is a natural relation and the state of being natural is the absence of the state of being devoid of eliminable condition (upadhi). 107 Kesava Misra also accepts this view regarding vyapti. He says that the relation between smoke and fire is natural i.e. devoid of any upadhi. Upadhi literally means an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition is always an unnecessary condition.