365bet娱乐

122
causing sin, prohibition; and (iii) in the relation of being Maitri's child with
dark complexion, the effect of vegetable feeding, are observed as up膩dhis.
Whereas in the co-existence of smoke with fire no upadhi in noticed. By
actual sense-perception aided by the above ratiocination and by the fact of its
non-apprehension, the non-existence up膩dhi is determined. Here, vy膩pti
between smoke and fire is determined by this sense-perception alone which
makes us know the co-existence between the two and which is aided by the
impression of the knowledge that there is no upadhi. Therefore, the relation
between smoke and fire is a natural one and not produced by any upadhi. Such
a natural relation (untainted by upadhi) is called vyapti. Kesava Misra says
that the first cognition of smoke in the kitchen does not become the cause for
inferring fire. Because at that time the invariable concomitance between
smoke and fire has not been determined; and only after that has been
ascertained inferential cognition can arise. In that case, when once the
invariable concomitance has been ascertained one cannot infer fire in the
kitchen itself. Because, there is no doubt, as fire is actually seen there; and
only that thing the existence of which is doubted becomes an object of
inference. To give strength on this view Kesava Misra mentions V盲tsyayana's
view.
96 Divisions of Anum膩na
In Indian philosophy, anumana has been classified in various ways, for
example, (a) p奴rvavat, se峁�avat and samanyatod峁泂ta, (b) keval膩nvayi,
96.
n膩nupalabdhe na nirnite 'rthe nyayah pravartate. api tu
sandigdhe始rthe. VB. 1.1.1.