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In the ancient school of the Nyaya we do not meet with the distinction between laukika or ordinary and alaukika or extraordinary perception. This distinction appears in the modern Nyaya beginning with Gangesa. In laukika or ordinary perception there is a normal sense-contact with objects present to sense. In alaukika perception, however, the objects are not actually present to sense, but are conveyed to it through an extraordinary medium. In it there is a special kind of senseobject contact (alaukika-sannikarsa). Extraordinary perception is of three kinds, namely, samanyalaksana, jnanalaksana and yogaja. Samanyalaksana is the perception of a whole class of objects through the generic property (samanya) perceived in any individual member of that class. Thus when we perceive something as a pot we judge it as belonging to the class of pots. But to know that the thing belongs to the class of pots is also to know all other pots belonging to the same class. To say that 'this is a pot' is to know, by implication, what all other pots are. Hence in perceiving one thing as a pot we perceive all other pots. But the other pots are not present to sense in the same way in which one is present. How then can there be any perception of the other pots? If there is to be any perception of the other pots, they must be in some sort of contact (sannikarsa) with our sense. According to the Naiyayikas, when we perceive one pot we perceive the universal potness' as its defining property. It is this perception of the universal 27-(O.P. 103)

' potness' in the present pot that serves the purpose of contact (asatti) between sense and all other pots. The knowledge of the universal (samanyajnana) is here the medium of sense-object contact, by which we have a perception of all pots when one is perceived. It may be objected here that samanyalaksana perception would make each of us omniscient. If all the objects of a class are known with the perception of any of them, we should know all knowable objects when we perceive anything of the world as belonging to the class of knowables. The Naiyayikas reply that in samanyalaksana we perceive only one member of a class as an individual with its specific and generic properties, while the other members are known as possessing the generic property or the universal alone. Hence we cannot expect to have that full and detailed knowledge of all things, which is implied by omniscience. That samanyalaksana is a type of real perception is supported by the Naiyayikas on the following grounds. Without it we cannot explain the knowledge of universal propositions (vyapti), which is presupposed in inference. How do we know that all smokes are related to fire? We cannot know this if our perception be limited to particular smokes, for any number of particulars will not make up the universal. Hence we must admit that while perceiving one smoke as related to fire, we perceive all smokes, through the universal 'smokeness,' as so related. It cannot be said that it is unnecessary to assume that we perceive all smokes as related to fire, because we cannot even doubt if all smokes are related to fire or not, unless all smokes are somehow presented to us when we do perceive one as related to fire.² Again without samanyalaksana we cannot explain negative judgments of perception like this cloth is not a pot,' 'this is not a cow,' etc. To say that 'this is not a cow' is to know the class of cows, i.e. all cows. This can be known only if when perceiving one cow we perceive all other cows through the universal 'cowness' as perceived in the present 1 * Asattirasrayanam tu samanyajnanamisyate, etc., Bhasapariccheda and Siddhanta-muktavali, 64-65. 2 T.C., II, pp. 290 f. ; Siddhanta-muktavali 65.

and perceived cow. Further, we cannot explain the voluntary effort to attain a pleasure without the help of samanyalaksana. To strive consciously for a pleasure is somehow to know it as something to be, but not yet, experienced. But how can we know a pleasure which we have not yet had? This is possible if, when experiencing one pleasure, we know all pleasures through the universal pleasurableness' as belonging to the perceived pleasure.' The Nyaya view of samanyalaksana has been severely criticised and finally rejected by the Vedanta. According to it, samanya or the universal is a group of essential and common attributes belonging to a number of individuals. While the universal, as such, may be perceived along with the perception of an individual, it does not give us a perception of all the individuals possessing the same universal. Nor is there any valid ground to believe that in perceiving one individual we must perceive all other individuals of the same class. Thus in inference, say of fire from smoke, it is sufficient if we know ' smokeness' as related to 'fireness.' It is not at all necessary for us to know that all smokes are related to fire. If all were known, then there would be no need for any inference in a particular case. Similarly, the negative judgment 'this is not a cow' is quite possible if we only know what' cowness' is and not what all cows are. So, too, there may be a conscious pursuit of some future pleasure if the pursuer knows it to be similar to his previously experienced pleasures. For this, there need not be a samanyalaksana perception of all pleasures when one is actually perceived.鉂� Now we are to observe that the reality of samanyalaksana as a type of perception depends on the presentative knowledge, if any, of a class of things. If there is any such knowledge with regard to a whole class of things, we have to admit samanyalaksana as a type of genuine perception. It is pointed out by the Naiyayikas that any knowledge of the genus or the class does not justify us in believing in samanyalaksana. To 1 Ibid., pp. 283-90. 2 Vide Advaitasiddhi, pp. 137-39.

know the general character of an atom is to have only a conceptual knowledge (manasabodha) of all atoms. Similarly, we may think of the class of pots in a dark room. But that does not mean that we have a presentation of all pots through any sense for which we require the help of a samanyalaksana perception. It is only when in perceiving some individual object there is the presentation of the class of objects to which it belongs that we have to admit samanyalaksana to explain the presentative knowledge of that class. Hence the crucial question is this: Is there any presentative or direct knowledge of a class of things? The Naiyayikas contend that there is such a knowledge and seek to prove it on such grounds as we have explained above. Before we come to these we may state the following facts as more or less non-controversial. When I know an individual as belonging to a certain class I know the universal or class-essence underlying it. To know the universal, however, is to know a character or group of characters which belongs to all the members of the class. So in knowing the universal I know all the individuals of that class-past, present and future as participating in that universal. To know a horse as horse is to know horseness, and to know horseness is to know that it belongs to all horses, or to know all horses as possessing it. Again, a knowledge of the class seems to be implied in any generalisation. When from such particular cases as 'A is mortal,' 'B is mortal,' 'C is mortal,' and so on, we conclude that all men are mortal,' we somehow know that mortality is true of the class of men. Now the question is: How do we know anything about the whole of a class of things from the observation of some of its members? In other words, how do we get general propositions from the observation of particular facts? In Western logic this is explained by inductive inference." The Naiyayikas, however, hold that the knowledge of the class or the general proposition is given by perception of an extraVide Mill, A System of Logic; Stebbing, Logic in Practice, pp. 19-20.

ordinary kind. The Vedantins, on the other hand, argue that a generalisation is the statement of an invariable relation between universals and that it is known through the observation of their concomitance in one or more instances. Thus the general proposition all men are mortal,' or 'whatever is smoky is fiery' is the expression of an invariable relation between manhood and mortality, or smokeness and fireness. We have a knowledge of such general propositions when in any particular instance we find manhood to be related to mortality, or smokeness to fireness. The Vedanta view of generalisation thus corresponds to what is known as intuitive induction in Western logic and is explained as a "process by means of which we apprehend a particular instance as exemplifying an abstract generalization," as when 'from the apprehension of this red patch as being darker than that pink patch we may know immediately that every such red patch (i.e. redness) is darker than every such pink patch (i.e. pinkness).' It seems to me that while the abstract principles of mathematics may be taken as statements of necessary relations between certain universal concepts, all our empirical generalisations, including those here given, are truths about classes of things. In fact, such principles are what may be better called the necessary laws of thought rather than truths about any universal that has a denotative reference to a class of things. But, if we take the above cases as abstract generalisations exemplified in particular instances, we do not understand how they can be called, as some Western logicians have called them," intuitive induction." If by such induction we are to mean "the immediate apprehension of an axiom by means of its exemplification in a particular instance," we must admit that there is no room for any induction or inference or reasoning in it. If we have an immediate knowledge of anything, there is no need for any inference or reasoning with regard to it. A description of such knowledge as " intuitive induction seems to me to be no less " 1 Vide Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic, p. 243.

objectionable than a description of it as "perceptual inference.' If, however, by intuitive induction " we mean the intuitive knowledge of a general principle through a particular instance, we should make it plain that such instance is not the basis of an inference with the regard to the general principle. Rather, the general principle is apprehended along with the particular instance, although an explicit statement of it may be separated from the latter by an interval of time. To guard against a possible misunderstanding, therefore, it is better to characterise our knowledge of the general principles of logic and mathematics as intuition than to call it an "intuitive induction.""" Our ordinary generalisations, however, are different from the abstract principles of logic and mathematics. While the latter are truths about certain universal concepts, the former are truths about classes of things. When we lay down the proposition all men are mortal,' or 'all smoky objects are fiery,' what we really want to convey is, not that there is a necessary relation between manhood and mortality, or between smokeness and fireness, but that mortality is true of the class of men, or that all smokes are connected with fire. Such propositions are empirical generalisations in the sense that these are assertions about whole classes of things, which are true, and that these are arrived at from observation of particular instances. But what is the nature of the process of knowledge that is involved when we generalise from 'some' to 'all' in a logically valid way? Is it any kind of induction? If so, it must be either perfect induction' or Induction by Simple Enumeration.' A perfect induction' is one in which 'from the consideration of each of the members of a limited class we pass to a generalisation concerning all the members of that class.' This is exemplified when on examining every boy of a class one says " " 1 This is really admitted by Dr. Stebbing although there seems to be some wavering at certain places. Cf. "Thus we may be said to see the general principle in apprehending the particular case." "The intuition is of the form but it relates to the material exemplified in the form" (italics mine). -A Modern Introduction to Logic, pp. 96-97, 244.

"all the boys of this class are intelligent." With regard to this Stebbing' says: 'Mr. Johnson has suggested the convenient name summary induction for this mode of inference, and that it is certainly a more appropriate name than " perfect induction.' It seems to me that both the names are equally inappropriate, and that for the same reason. A summary of a number " of observed facts is not an induction at all. To call it an induction, be it perfect or summary, is to misjudge its epistemic character as inferential. If on examining every patient in a sick-room a physician says "all the patients in this room have got fever," then his judgment is not to be described as an induction or inference in any sense. It is but a memorysynthesis like the one we have when we understand the meaning of a sentence by a synthesis of its constituent words and their meanings as that is effected by memory. Hence our knowledge of a general proposition like all men are mortal cannot be called a "perfect induction," even if it were possible for us to examine all men. But that is not possible as a matter of fact, since in man we have, not a limited, but an unlimited class that has " an infinite number of members." Let us next consider whether an empirical generalisation like all men are mortal' can be explained by "Induction by Simple Enumeration." "Generalisation from a number of examined instances which are not assumed to constitute all the instances of the given class is now usually known by the name ' Induction by Simple Enumeration.' " Such induction may, therefore, be put in this form: 'A, B, C are mortal; therefore, all men are mortal.' But this is not a form of valid inference. It obviously violates the general rule of inference that we must not go beyond the evidence, since in this inference the conclusion makes a statement about all men on the ground of what is observed in some men. Further, if it were a form of valid inference, it would validate any argument that might be put in this form, just as the forms of deduction guarantee the validity 1 A Modern Introduction to Logic, p. 244. 2 Op. Cit., p. 245.

of a reasoning that may be put in any of them. While, however, we accept the argument all men are mortal, because A, B, C are mortal,' we do not acquiesce in the propositon' all men are white, because A, B, C are white.' But why? If we examine the two arguments we shall see that the distinction between them is this. In the first, mortality which is found in some men is predicated of all men. In the second, whiteness. which is observed in some men is predicated of all men. But then, we find A, B, C to be mortal, not because they are A, B, C, but because they are men. On the contrary, we know that A, B, C are white because they are A, B, C, and not simply because they are men as such. This means that while mortality is related to the essential nature of A, B, C, whiteness is not so related to them. That individual men like A, B, C possess a certain essential common nature which is to be found in all men is borne out by the fact that we put together all men into the class 'man' and exclude all other animals from that class. If, then, we find that mortality is related to the essential nature of some men, we know that all men must be mortal. That is, we know all men to be mortal when we know that mortality belongs to the essential nature of some men like A, B, C. But the first knowledge does not follow from the second. To know mortality to be related to the essential nature of some men is just to know that it is related to all men or the class of men. What is related to the essential nature of some men must be related to all men' is a truth which is known directly or immediately, and for which we require no inference or reasoning. Hence our knowledge about the whole class is here an intuitive knowledge due to the knowledge of the class-essence or the universal. It cannot be said that the knowledge of the class-essence or the universal is got by inductive inference. The latter presupposes the former and so cannot be the ground of it. It seems to me that the universal, underlying a class of things is either directly known or never known. Observation of and experiment on things help us to find or discover the universal that is in them, but not to make or

construct it out of them. And when by observation and experiment we find that the universal or class-essence is related to something, we know at once that all the members of the class. are related to that thing. According to the Naiyayikas, it is the perception of the whole of a class as related to an attribute, which is simultaneous with the perception of the class-essence as so related. To distinguish it from ordinary sense perception they call it alaukika or extraordinary perception. If this bc, as it very likely is, so, what is known as inductive inference may be reduced to the Naiyayika's samanyalaksana perception in the sense of intuition of a general proposition through the knowledge of the class-essence or the universal.' 1 Some Western logicians fully realise the futility of all induction as a form of valid inference. They do not, however, so clearly realise the implication of this futility. If there is no form of inductive inference, there can be no such thing as inductive inference in logic. If this be admitted. as it should be, then the problem of generalisation takes a different form. A generalisation is no longer a matter of inference, but is to be explained by way of intuition. That our knowledge of general principles is intuitive will be admitted by many. But very few, if any, will admit that an empirical generalisation also is a matter of intuition based on the knowledge of classessences or universals. Some Western logicians, however, seem to tend towards this view when they try to establish a general proposition on the ground of the knowledge of "important resemblances" or "common properties" or "classcharacters" of things. Consider, for example, the following statements from Dr. Stebbing: 'Such classes as swans and men differ from such classes as scarlet things and sour things in the fact that every member of the class swan, for instance, has several properties in common with all the other members, whereas the members of the class scarlet things have few properties in common which are not also possessed by things that are not scarlet. Such classes as swans are called by Mill, "natural kinds." 'Simple enumeration is not, then, to be regarded as a process simply of counting; it is a counting of instances recognised as having certain properties in common. The inference is dependent upon recognition of resemblances.' (A Modern Introduction to Logic, pp. 248-49.) 'It is the fact that certain properties are found together that makes class-names so useful. If we know that there is a set of properties such that no member of the set is ever found without other members of the set, then we have a basis for inference. It is because this appears to be the case with natural kinds that generalisation about natural kinds, such as crows, acids, men, seems to be plausible.' (Op. cit., p. 251.) "As Mr. Keynes points out: "Scientific method, indeed, is mainly devoted to discovering means of so heightening the known analogy that we may dispense as far as possible with the methods of pure induction.' (Op. cit., p. 256.) Cf. also Latta and Macbeth, The Elements of Logic, p. 268. 28-(0.P. 103) "

The Naiyayikas further point out that without the perception of the whole of a class of things the problem of generalisation cannot even arise. If, when perceiving a particular smoke as related to fire, we ask are all smokes related to fire?' it is because the class of smokes is somehow presented to us. It cannot be said that we merely think of all smokes as a concept or general idea, and that there is no presentation or direct experience of them. We can think of such particular smokes as were previously experienced by us. But the idea of particular smokes always falls short of the smokes. And there cannot be any idea of the class of smokes without a corresponding direct experience of it. It is only when, in perceiving one smoke as related to fire, all smokes are presented to us through the perception of the class-essence smokeness,' that we can legitimately ask the question: Are class of smokes or all all smokes or the class of smokes related to fire? Hence we conclude that samanyalaksana is a type of genuine perception. It should, however, be borne in mind that we have not such a perception whenever we perceive any individual possessing a class-essence. It is only when the perception of the class-essence of an individual has a direct reference to the class of things to which it belongs that we have to admit a samanyalaksana perception of that class of things through the perception of the class-essence. In what cases other than those mentioned above there is such a reference is a matter of phenomenological observation which we need not discuss here.