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EXTRAORDINARY PERCEPTION 217 construct it out of them. And when by observation and experi-
ment we find that the universal or class-essence is related to
something, we know at once that all the members of the class.
are related to that thing. According to the Naiy膩yikas, it is
the perception of the whole of a class as related to an attribute,
which is simultaneous with the perception of the class-essence
as so related. To distinguish it from ordinary sense perception
they call it alaukika or extraordinary perception. If this bc,
as it very likely is, so, what is known as inductive inference
may be reduced to the Naiy膩yika's s膩m膩nyalak峁�a峁嘺 perception
in the sense of intuition of a general proposition through the
knowledge of the class-essence or the universal.'
1 Some Western logicians fully realise the futility of all induction as a
form of valid inference. They do not, however, so clearly realise the implica-
tion of this futility. If there is no form of inductive inference, there can be
no such thing as inductive inference in logic. If this be admitted. as it
should be, then the problem of generalisation takes a different form. A
generalisation is no longer a matter of inference, but is to be explained by
way of intuition. That our knowledge of general principles is intuitive will
be admitted by many. But very few, if any, will admit that an empirical
generalisation also is a matter of intuition based on the knowledge of class-
essences or universals. Some Western logicians, however, seem to tend towards
this view when they try to establish a general proposition on the ground of
the knowledge of "important resemblances" or "common properties" or "class-
characters" of things. Consider, for example, the following statements from
Dr. Stebbing: 'Such classes as swans and men differ from such classes as
scarlet things and sour things in the fact that every member of the class swan,
for instance, has several properties in common with all the other members,
whereas the members of the class scarlet things have few properties in common
which are not also possessed by things that are not scarlet. Such classes
as swans are called by Mill, 鈥渘atural kinds." 'Simple enumeration is not,
then, to be regarded as a process simply of counting; it is a counting of
instances recognised as having certain properties in common. The inference
is dependent upon recognition of resemblances.' (A Modern Introduction to
Logic, pp. 248-49.) 'It is the fact that certain properties are found together
that makes class-names so useful. If we know that there is a set of properties
such that no member of the set is ever found without other members of the
set, then we have a basis for inference. It is because this appears to be the
case with natural kinds that generalisation about natural kinds, such as crows,
acids, men, seems to be plausible.' (Op. cit., p. 251.) "As Mr. Keynes points
out: "Scientific method, indeed, is mainly devoted to discovering means of so
heightening the known analogy that we may dispense as far as possible with
the methods of pure induction.' (Op. cit., p. 256.) Cf. also Latta and
Macbeth, The Elements of Logic, p. 268.
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