Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 233 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
233 (of 404)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
Download the PDF file of the original publication
214
NYÄ€YA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
"
"
objectionable than a description of it as "perceptual inference.'
If, however, by intuitive induction " we mean the intuitive
knowledge of a general principle through a particular instance,
we should make it plain that such instance is not the basis of
an inference with the regard to the general principle. Rather,
the general principle is apprehended along with the particular
instance, although an explicit statement of it may be separated
from the latter by an interval of time. To guard against a
possible misunderstanding, therefore, it is better to characterise
our knowledge of the general principles of logic and mathe-
matics as intuition than to call it an "intuitive induction."""
Our ordinary generalisations, however, are different from
the abstract principles of logic and mathematics. While the
latter are truths about certain universal concepts, the former
are truths about classes of things. When we lay down the pro-
position all men are mortal,' or 'all smoky objects are fiery,'
what we really want to convey is, not that there is a necessary
relation between manhood and mortality, or between smoke-
ness and fireness, but that mortality is true of the class of men,
or that all smokes are connected with fire. Such propositions
are empirical generalisations in the sense that these are assertions
about whole classes of things, which are true, and that these
are arrived at from observation of particular instances. But
what is the nature of the process of knowledge that is involved
when we generalise from 'some' to 'all' in a logically valid
way? Is it any kind of induction? If so, it must be either
perfect induction' or Induction by Simple Enumeration.'
A perfect induction' is one in which 'from the consideration
of each of the members of a limited class we pass to a genera-
lisation concerning all the members of that class.' This is
exemplified when on examining every boy of a class one says
"
"
1 This is really admitted by Dr. Stebbing although there seems to be
some wavering at certain places. Cf. "Thus we may be said to see the
general principle in apprehending the particular case." "The intuition is of
the form but it relates to the material exemplified in the form" (italics mine).
-A Modern Introduction to Logic, pp. 96-97, 244.
