Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
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External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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210
NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
' potness' in the present pot that serves the purpose of contact
(膩satti) between sense and all other pots. The knowledge of the
universal (s膩m膩nyaj帽膩na) is here the medium of sense-object
contact, by which we have a perception of all pots when one
is perceived. It may be objected here that s膩m膩nyalak峁峁嘺
perception would make each of us omniscient. If all the objects
of a class are known with the perception of any of them, we
should know all knowable objects when we perceive anything
of the world as belonging to the class of knowables. The
Naiy膩yikas reply that in s膩m膩nyalak峁峁嘺 we perceive only one
member of a class as an individual with its specific and generic
properties, while the other members are known as possessing the
generic property or the universal alone. Hence we cannot
expect to have that full and detailed knowledge of all things,
which is implied by omniscience.
That samanyalak峁峁嘺 is a type of real perception is
supported by the Naiy膩yikas on the following grounds. With-
out it we cannot explain the knowledge of universal propositions
(vy膩pti), which is presupposed in inference. How do we know
that all smokes are related to fire? We cannot know this if our
perception be limited to particular smokes, for any number of
particulars will not make up the universal. Hence we must
admit that while perceiving one smoke as related to fire, we
perceive all smokes, through the universal 'smokeness,' as so
related. It cannot be said that it is unnecessary to assume that
we perceive all smokes as related to fire, because we cannot
even doubt if all smokes are related to fire or not, unless all
smokes are somehow presented to us when we do perceive one
as related to fire.虏 Again without s膩m膩nyalak峁峁嘺 we cannot
explain negative judgments of perception like this cloth is not
a pot,' 'this is not a cow,' etc. To say that 'this is not a cow'
is to know the class of cows, i.e. all cows. This can be known
only if when perceiving one cow we perceive all other cows
through the universal 'cowness' as perceived in the present
1 * 膧sattir膩艣ray膩峁嚹佱箖 tu s膩m膩nyaj帽膩nami峁ate, etc., BP. and SM., 64-65.
2 T.C., II, pp. 290f. ; SM. 65.
