Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 230 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
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External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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EXTRAORDINARY PERCEPTION
2II
and perceived cow. Further, we cannot explain the voluntary
effort to attain a pleasure without the help of s膩m膩nyalak峁峁嘺.
To strive consciously for a pleasure is somehow to know it as
something to be, but not yet, experienced. But how can we know
a pleasure which we have not yet had? This is possible if, when
experiencing one pleasure, we know all pleasures through the uni-
versal pleasurableness' as belonging to the perceived pleasure.'
The Ny膩ya view of s膩m膩nyalak峁峁嘺 has been severely
criticised and finally rejected by the Vedanta. According to it,
s膩m膩nya or the universal is a group of essential and common
attributes belonging to a number of individuals. While the
universal, as such, may be perceived along with the perception
of an individual, it does not give us a perception of all the
individuals possessing the same universal. Nor is there any
valid ground to believe that in perceiving one individual we
must perceive all other individuals of the same class. Thus in
inference, say of fire from smoke, it is sufficient if we know
' smokeness' as related to 'fireness.' It is not at all necessary
for us to know that all smokes are related to fire. If all were
known, then there would be no need for any inference in a
particular case. Similarly, the negative judgment 'this is not
a cow' is quite possible if we only know what' cowness' is
and not what all cows are. So, too, there may be a conscious
pursuit of some future pleasure if the pursuer knows it to be
similar to his previously experienced pleasures. For this, there
need not be a s膩m膩nyalak峁峁嘺 perception of all pleasures when
one is actually perceived.鉂�
Now we are to observe that the reality of samanya-
lak峁峁嘺 as a type of perception depends on the presentative
knowledge, if any, of a class of things. If there is any such know-
ledge with regard to a whole class of things, we have to admit
s膩m膩nyalak峁峁嘺 as a type of genuine perception. It is pointed
out by the Naiy膩yikas that any knowledge of the genus or the
class does not justify us in believing in s膩m膩nyalak峁峁嘺. To
1 Ibid., pp. 283-90.
2 Vide Advaitasiddhi, pp. 137-39.
