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In the next adhikarana鈥擨办蝉丑补迟测补诲丑颈办补谤补苍补尘鈥�Sripati suggests that Badarayana refutes (nirakarana) the Sankhya-dvaita-mata (ie., the Sankhya-dvaita doctrine). Just as a magnet draws to itself the needle by its power of attraction, so Brahman draws to himself the pradhana (i.e., world) as he himself is the sole author of creation, etc. Agreeably to this maxim, Badarayana repudiates in this Adhikarana the doctrine of Sankhya-dvaita and establishes that the Brahman under discussion is no other than Mahesvara, who is both the cause and the effect of the creation of the universe. This Adhikarana consists of eight Sutras from the 5 th to the 12 th. In Ikshaternasabdam, 1. 1. 5, it is enunciated that Brahman undergoes no change; Prakriti only undergoes change, just as earth does in the hands of a potter. So Brahman controls Pradhana by his power. The chief cause for the creation of the universe is (Para) Brahman. Pradhana, Prakriti, etc., are only materials for him in connection with creation, protection and destruction. Brahma, Vishnu and others are ever ready to work according to the will of Parasiva (Brahman). In the next Sutra (1. 1. 6) Gaunaschennatmasabdat, the word atma, says Sripati, denotes that Pradhana must be looked upon as subordinate (to Brahman) and neither as independent nor as capable of acting of its own freewill just as a servant is never independent of his master, even though he is granted any amount of power and influence. So Pradhana, even though it is described in terms of atma, cannot be independent of Paramesvara. In 1. 1. 7, Tan nishtasya mokshopadesat, Sripati refutes both the Dvaita and Visishtadvaita doctrines. Sripati calls Dvaita as ghatapatavat asamsprushta bhedavada matam. 104 404 In the Tatvasankhyana of Anandatirtha, the following occurs-Duhkha sprushtam tadassprushtam iti dvaidheva chetanam | Nityaduhkha Ramanyetu sprushta duhkhasamstasah | Sprushta duhkha samastascha asamsprushta iti dvidha Deva rishi pitru pa nara iti muktastu panchadha Sripati's description is a short one based

410 : INTRODUCTION Sripati describes Visishtadvaita as danda dandivat angangivat samsrushta bheda vada matam. The doctrine holds danda and dandi and anga and angi (body and its members) as a composite whole though they are seen separate by the eye. Sripati after refuting these two doctrines establishes that there is no difference between the jiva and (Para) Brahman. In 1. 1. 8, Heyatva vachanachcha, Sripati tries to establish that none other than Parasiva Brahman could claim to be the cause of creation. The Pradhana (i.e., Prakriti) cannot claim to be its cause as it is lifeless (jada) and can only be a material for Brahman. Here he uses two nyayas (1) Sthularundhati nyaya and (2) Sakha chandra nyaya. Pradhana is only a material to locate the action of Brahman as being the cause in creation. In 1. 1. 9, Pratigna virodhat, it is suggested that Pradhana cannot be made a cause because it is only jada, i.e., a lifeless thing in which no life (chetana) can be imagined. Hence it cannot claim the description of sat. In 1. 1. 10, Svapyayat, Sripati endeavours to show that Pradhana cannot claim to be the cause of destruction. Parasiva Brahman only is the chief cause of laya (or destruction) in the same way as he is the Creator. Parasiva Brahman is always in the heart of the jiva in sukshma form and causes sleep of a very profound kind (sushupti). The jiva finds its temporary station in ParaBrahman during profound sleep (sushuptau Sankare laya iti) and returns to the world after it awakes. In 1. 1. 11, Gati samanyat, Sripati points out that Parasiva Brahman is evidently on this text of Anandatirtha. Sripati's description may be thus translated:-Those disputants who hold that ghata and pata (.e., jug and cloth) are quite different from each other, so different that they do not touch each other at any point. Anandatirtha's text says:- " The unafflicted and the afflicted are the two eternal kinds among the chetanas (souls). Rama (ie., Lakshmi) is never afflicted even in the least; as regards others they are all afflicted, more or less to a degree. Among the afflicted, they are divided into the least touched and the most touched. The least touched are five in number the gods, sages, ancestors, kings and good men who are eternal muktas (i.e., the eternally blessed)." [These are least afflicted by reason of their very subordination to (Para) Brahman.]

above three deities Brahma, Indra and Upendra and also Chandra, Dinendra and others and that he is the Chief and Supreme Lord over all and the author of Srishti, Sthiti and Laya as well as the creator of the deities. He quotes the Mahanarayanopanishad and states that though Narayana is said to have been the only one above all-that there was neither Brahma, Isa nor Agni nor the Sky nor the Moon nor this world at first, yet, according to the Kaivalya, Kathavalli and Sivadvaita Prakasika and the Atharva Upanishad, Parasiva Brahman alone is the Lord above all, the others being his mere subordinates, tied up with the bondage of Maya. Sripati quotes in this connection the Bhagavad-Gita and the Atharvopanishad. In 1. 1. 12, Srutatvachcha, Sripati suggests that all the Upanishads and Vedas prove that Parasiva Brahman alone is discussed in the Sutras and that as he is the One above all, should be understood and realized as the great cause of Srishti, Sthiti and Laya. And this realization is the result of meditation. He quotes the Svetasvatara, the Mahimna, the Saiva Purana, the Skanda and the SivaGita for establishing this position and inpresses it by referring to the Sthularundhati nyaya and the Pravaha samudra nyaya. According to the Mahimna, there are three kinds of yoga, viz., Sankhya, Pasupata and Vaishnava. Each of these three, though they denote different ways of meditation, through different principles, in their final stages, where these three methods meet in regard to the realization of Brahman, they are one and the same just as all rivers. finally find their way to the sea. Sripati once again dissents from the view that Brahman is attributeless (nirvisesha) and refutes that doctrine and warns mumukshus against it (Sruti sutra viruddhatvat na mumukshu grahyam). As it is opposed to Sruti and Sutra, he says such a view must not be accepted by those who are desirous of realizing the Brahman. Here, in this Sutra, he once again controverts the Advaita view that Brahman is nirvisesha. Sripati says that the statement that prapancha is false, goes without proof; when the cause is to establish an effect, the world being an effect, it goes without

cause, if Brahman is nirvisesha. If Brahman is nirvisesha, then the world goes without a cause. But the effect, i.e., the world, is seen. So, there is here a contradiction. Thus the Nirvisesha vada ends in contradiction (bhanga prasangah). Passing on to the next Adhikarana, the Anandamayadhikaranam, Sripati, commenting on 1. 1. 13, Anandamayobhyasat, states that in this Sutra Brahman who is in the jiva and who appears himself different from the jiva finally exhibits himself as all one. Sripati points out that the jiva is never different from Brahman and he is always anandamayah. He quotes the Chchandogya Upanishad, Apastamba sutra and Svetasvatara Upanishad and endeavours to prove that the sthula sarira which stands as a different encasement (kosa) of the jiva, finally destroys itself and the jiva, being part of Brahman, becomes Brahman (Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati).05 The prefix mait in the Sutra indicates the transformation in its several stages of the jiva, such as annamaya, pranamaya, manomaya, vijnanamaya and anandamaya, and finally transforms itself into Brahmasvarupa, which is the anandamaya stage. Reaching this is Mukti. Ananda being Brahman, the jiva will finally attain the state of Anandamaya Brahman. Largely in the Vedanta, Siva is represented to be Parabrahman. Anandamaya is no other than Parasiva Brahman. This is the meaning of the Sutra: no other should be said to be Anandamaya except Parasiva. He is rasa among the rasas, Raso vai sah. After joining the Brahman of rasas, the jiva becomes Ananda-so says the (Chchandogya) Upanishad. Brahmanah Sivasyaiva Anandasabdo nirnitah. (To Siva is applicable both Ananda and Brahma sabdas.) The jiva, from its sthula sarira stage, undergoes a series of developments and transformations until it becomes Brahman. Sripati proves on the strength of the Nisreni nyaya, Sakha chandra nyaya and Sthularundhati nyaya that the jiva becomes 405 Mundaka-upanishad , III. 2. 9.

finally the Anandamaya Brahman. Therefore meditation must continuously be carried out until the jiva is transferred into the Ananda stage-Sa eko Brahmana Anandah.408 According to the Hamsopanishad and Kaivalya, Katha and Tattiriya, the jiva, having cast off its different destructive (nasvara) envelopments, will attain to the state of Paramasiva and become one with him, according to the Bhramara-kita nyaya, just as the kita becomes the Bhramara by constant, unbroken meditation on the latter. The external sheaths that encase the jiva are just like so many earthly coverings (mrunmaya ghata ityadivat), which are liable to undergo change and destruction (vikararthakatvameva). Commenting on the next Sutra (1. 1. 14), Vikarasabdannetichennaprachuryat, Sripati enquires if anandamaya is to be understood as similarly capable of undergoing further transformation into something else, it should not be so. Because on account of the power of rendering abundant, in fact, abundant to an unlimited extent, the state of ananda, which is the characteristic of Paramesvara, to which state the jiva transforms itself. Sripati says that as the jiva advances in acquiring more and more ananda, the sorrows and other like characteristics attaching to the jiva will lessen and lessen and finally disappear. The chetana should not be understood to be on the same footing as the earth, which has to undergo many changes, until it assumes the form of a jug, for earth is only a lifeless thing. Next commenting on 1. 1. 16, Taddhetu vyapadesachcha, Sripati remarks that in this world a learned man makes another learned; the wealthy man man makes another wealthy; and the self-shining sun and other heavenly bodies make others (on whom their rays fall) to shine. In the same way, Paramesvara, who is Anandamaya, having given ananda to all the jivas, when they are in perfect sleep, makes them feel ananda. 406 Taittiriya-upanishad , II. 8.

In that state (sushupti), Paramesvara is the cause for all the ananda and he is the agent (karta). Therefore it follows that Anandamaya, who gave the jiva all the ananda, is no other than Parasiva, who is the chief cause (hetu). If indeed, Brahman is nirvisesha (attributeless), then, the granting or securing of ananda, transforming one into Anandamayatva is not possible. If it is said, adopting the reasoning of the Purvacharya (Sankara) that the mere allegation (adhyaropa, attributing wrongly what is not existent) that the world was created without its being truly existent (nishprapancham prapanchitam) only for the purpose of vyavahara (for argument's sake), and that Brahman cannot be held responsible for transforming the jiva into the state of Anandamaya, then, we say that it is not so. In that case, we will have to understand vyavahara as meaning truly existing and capable of development into a transformed condition after the lapse of time (kalantara). Then the doubt arises whether prapancha is of the character of sat or of asat or incapable of interpretation being a combination of sat and asat. It is not the first; because at what distance of time, however short, two irreconcilable things like ghata and pata can reconcile themselves into one cannot be conceived of by us with any degree of certainty. If we go on trying to establish that there is a common relation between two irreconcilable things, to bring about a reconciliation between them within a particular limit of time, then it is to be understood. that such an argument is employed for the time being in terms so as to satisfy only the purpose of the argument (vaibhashika) and not as a matter of truth. Being incapable of establishing the absolute non-existence of mithyatva (vyavahara being used), it (the argument) ends in contradicting its own siddhanta (svasiddhanta virodhah). Mithyatva is a thing which is said to exist in that space and time and counteracting all existence. This finally opposes his own argument and the doctrine held by him (i.e., Purvacharya) ends in ativyapti-an unwarranted

stretch beyond the starting point (of the argument). Nor can it be the second. Being himself the well-known and the indescribable and consisting of sat and asat (sadasadatmaka) and containing the qualities of both sadasad, such a curious thing is unknown (aprasiddheh). Nor can it be said of Brahman, that he is different from sat or asat and comprising of the characteristics of sat and asat. If Brahman is said to consist of sat and asat combined, then also ativyapti occurs. If it is said that Brahman is absolutely one, consisting of sat, then it follows that he is different from the combined characteristics of sat and asat. Then he can only be said to consist of purely sat. If Brahman is said to consist only of sat, without any admixture of asat, then there can be no kind of asat of even the smallest quantity in him. If he should consist of asat in him, then ativyapti follows. Therefore, correct knowledge of Brahman is realized when he is understood to be free from asat and only as consisting of sat in him. Even then if Brahman is understood to be devoid of Dharma, then again ativyapti follows in Brahman. But it is said that for the very reason that Brahman is devoid of Dharma, it should not be said that results in ativyapti, i.e., is an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman. Because the argument becomes unreasonable and ends in unjust conclusion. No conclusion, unless free from faulty inferences, can be considered as final and one capable of realizing Brahmatva. So far as there is a decided and correct knowledge regarding the characteristics of Brahman, so far only is Brahman readily realized. The knowledge of Brahman and the realization (of Brahman) are never separated from each other. This is our belief (matam). There is no ativyapti in such a realization of Brahman. So long as Brahman is seen in so many different forms of existence, it is not possible to describe Brahman in all the characteristics of the several forms in which he is seen. For example, in texts like Tattvamasi etc., hundreds of patently

contradictory expressions are to be found not easily reconcilable. And therefore if Brahman is to be considered as abheda and absolutely one, then it is not possible to easily reconcile all such contradictory expressions found in the Srutis; for, even if the expressions are intended to convey the idea of bheda, just as between ghata and pata, then also it is not possible to avoid ativyapti. While things are patently different, to say that they are one and undivided is to land the argument in ativyapti. Even though silver is seen in the conch-shell, to say that it is not silver but a mere illusory thing that appears like silver is to say that there is no definite description of what is seen. Even though the eye sees objects with several characteristics, to deny that it has no characteristics, is to harm the siddhanta sought to be established. Indeed, when we see an article made of silver, we call it "This is made of silver"; thereby we mean that it could not be a thing made of anything else but silver. There is no reason why we should doubt it to be any other thing. Again, when we see another article of a different form and made of silver, we call it "This article is made of silver". Though the two articles are different in form, they are made of the same metal silver, and there can be no bhranti (mistake) in regard about it. We cannot say that for the mere reason of change of form the substance also is different. Similarly, Brahman who exhibits himself in several forms is the same in substance. Thereby the argument that Brahman is devoid of attributes ends in defeat, according to the Sruti text Neha nanasti kinchana 407 which means that Brahman is never void of attributes. If so, by a contradictory argument (vyaghatancha) Brahman ends in apasiddhanta (in an erroneous conclusion). A Brahman devoid of attributes (nirvisesha Brahman) is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, an object which is without any attribute cannot be exactly expressed 407 Chch. Uba., VI. 2.

in any form of its existence. In such a state, Brahman goes without any description, just as a ghata, which which it could has not been formed into any shape by be described. Then, it is to be said that the ghata appears to be of a black colour (nilo ghatah), whereby no comprehension of the object is realized. Now, bhranti is never preventable. An object which appears to the sight cannot be wrongly mistaken to be any other than what it is actually seen to be and consist of those attributes. We cannot describe a thing that has not been actually seen. A matter which is possessed of a particular characteristic cannot be stated to be no matter at all; for it is capable of undergoing changes from one form into another. Similarly Brahman who is the Atman and who takes on several forms to the sight, cannot be said to be devoid of such characteristics (lakshanas). If we do not admit the existing characteristics as we see in them, such as the ghata in our sight, reading its colour, etc., then we will be forming a wrong conclusion by a wrong mode of argument. We cannot disprove our sight when we clearly come into contact with a particular object; nor can we think of any other object when we have a particular one before us. There can never be any difference between the observations that we make in an object and the actual characteristics that they display. If we did so, we would be making wrong conclusions just as assuming danda and purusha wrongly as (indicating) one (object) only-(i.e., without distinguishing between the two). But If Then such a contradictory argument is to be understood as indicating the non-existence of either. such a thing in Brahman is damaging (dushtam). Brahman is to be conceived of in the form of an inexpressible one and as possessing characteristics which are contradictory to each other, unless such contradictions exist in him, such a Brahman possessed of Sadasadvilakshana cannot be actually realized or supposed to exist. In your (Purvacharya's) opinion if such a contradiction cannot be removed or reconciled, Brahman 27 F

is not clearly established and Brahman, therefore, becomes something else and ends in ativyapti. Accordingly we cannot be prevented from deciding that Brahman can be anything but what you decide him to be-i.e., one possessing a character indescribable and composed of both sat and asat. The characteristics of sat and asat which, by your argument, you attribute to Brahman, can never be spoken of as nirvisesha characteristics. Taking sat and asat on the whole, it is easily arrived at that Brahman is full of attributes, such as a ghatakalasa which consists of a combination of ghata, pata, etc. It follows, therefore, that what you said to be abhinna and adhyasa and just as the appearance of silver in the conch-shell is all untrue and proves only the Brahman with attributes. The belief that Brahman is distinguished by viseshana or attributive characteristics cannot be said to limit his unlimited (visishta) qualities; even if you say so, he is not affected by your so limiting his characteristics.