365bet娱乐

To understand the position of Sripati among the commentators of Badarayana, we have first to determine the place of Badarayana in the Hindu philosophic system. Though the philosophical spirit is found markedly developed in the Rig-Veda, its most brilliant literary exposition is to be found in the Upanishads (700-500 B.C.). Jacobi has suggested that the Lokayata, Samkhya and Yoga philosophies had definitely developed by 300 B.C., though not the others. This view, however, based as it is on the mention made of them in the Arthasastra, has not won universal acceptance. Thus Dr. Keith, who suggests circa 300 A.D. for the Arthasastra, a date later than the

period proposed by others, is rather inclined to the view that we should, in the state of our present knowledge, "content ourselves with the belief that between the dates of the chief Upanishads and the third and fourth century. A.D., there proceeded an active stream of investigation, which we have only in its final form." After the period of the Upanishads, the task of systematizing the ideas of the earlier thinkers was gradually taken up and in course of time erected into definite systems of thought-called Darsanas each taught in a philosophic school, in which there was a regular succession of teachers, who expounded and possibly developed its particular body of doctrine. After this development had gone on for some time, the desire to fix in a definitive form the doctrines of the school should have exhibited itself, which should have led to the composition of the Sutras. These Sutras have been framed on the principle of concise aphoristic rules, which were intended to be committed to memory. A common purpose ran through the whole of the Sutras of a particular school, and this was from the first taught by oral exposition. When this exposition ceased-long after the Sutras were framed -attempts were made to crystallize the traditionary teaching in written comments. The oldest comments which have come down to us contain internal evidence that they do not represent an unbroken tradition that had been regularly handed down from teacher to teacher from the original exposition. Later arose independent works within each school, which, while recognizing the authority of the Sutras pertaining to it and conceding that in them lay its essential doctrines, sought the privilege of expounding their contents, without, however, contradicting them. According to Dr. Keith, the Sutras of the different schools -the Purva-Mimamsa, the Uttara-Mimamsa, the Nyaya 8 8 Dr. S. Das Gupta, in his History of Indian Philosophy, page 68, derives the word Mimamsa from man, to think-rational conclusions. Apte derives it thus: mi, to measure and man, to inquire. A more satisfactory derivation seems to be from mi, to fix; and ma, to measure, mark off or limit. Ma in its causative

and the Vaiseshika-should have been redacted at a time when they were yet in close contact with each other, and for this reason, there is no real chance of determining their dates even relatively. In his view, they probably were composed, as they stand, at "no very great distance of time from one another Jacobi, however, thinks that the Purva-Mimamsa and the Vaiseshika are, perhaps, the oldest, while the Nyaya and the Brahma-Sutras were composed after the nihilitic school of Buddhism but before the Vijnanavadin idealism, say between 200 and 450 A.D. The Yoga-Sutras, he assigns, on the other hand, to the period after the Vijnanavada School and the Samkhya to a later date. Dr. Keith suggests that Jacobi has post-dated the nihilistic Buddhist School by a century with the result that he has had to post-date the Vijnanavada School also by a century. He suggests "the fourth century at latest" to the Vijnanavada School. Dr. Dasgupta, whose view is not accepted by Dr. Keith, thinks that the Mimamsa-Sutras were probably written about 200 B.C., while the Nyaya-Sutras existed in some form as early as the fourth century B.C., though he suggests that some at least of the present Sutras were written some time in the second century A.D. As the Brahma-Sutras of Badaramake allusions to the Vaiseshika doctrines and not to yana Mimamsa form means to cause to be measured; to mete out. would thus mean the measure by which proof is measured out. Madhva in his Anuvyakhyana derives it thus: miyate aneneti manam, the measure by which we measure the proof (see Anuvyakhyana, I. 1). Madhva quotes in the same work the Smriti text: manaryayaistu tatsiddhyai mimamsa meya shodhanam (Ibid., 1. 1). What is proof? Where there is doubt, trying to completely remove it is prama. The lakshanas of words should be made known and the doubt removed completely. That is prama or pramana. This is set out in Brahma Tarka. Srinivasa Tirtha in his commentary on Vyasaraya's Nyayamrita quotes Madhvacharya's definition Mimamsa meya shodhanam and explains the word meya as meaning aparoksha gnanarthatvena sakshat vishaya kartavyam, i.e., making visible by the aid of evidence (from the Sruti) that which is not visible to the naked eye.

Nyaya, Mr. Bodas suggests that the Vaiseshika-Sutras should have been written before the Brahma-Sutras, while the Nyaya-Sutras came later. Dr. Dasgupta thinks that the Vaiseshika-Sutras were written before Charaka (80 A.D.), for the latter not only quotes these Sutras but the whole foundation of his medical physics is based on the Vaiseshika physics. He, indeed, holds that there are weighty grounds for supposing that the Vaiseshika-Sutras are probably pre-Buddhistic. Dr. Dasgupta has argued that the Vaiseshika is really an old school of Mimamsa, older than that represented in the Mimamsa-Sutras. Whether this is so or not, there is some ground for the belief that while the subject-matter of the Purva-Mimamsa is from the nature of what it deals with considerably old, the Sutras in which that subject-matter came to be cast, are contemporaneous with the Sutras of the UttaraMimamsa. That these two sets of Sutras-Purva and Uttara are nearly of the same date may also be inferred from the fact that three out of the six leading teachers whose names are mentioned in the Uttara-Mimamsa Dr. Keith, who appear also in the Purva-Mimamsa. notes this point, also suggests that these works are, since they mention the views of the authors whose names are attached to them, the products of the schools named after them rather than of themselves. While the topics treated in the Purva-Mimamsa are referred to in the Uttara-Mimamsa, the latter never refers to the Sutras of the Purva-Mimamsa. Again, the views of certain of the teachers mentioned in the Purva-Mimamsa on topics covered by the Uttara-Mimamsa are given in 'the latternotably of Jaimini himself and of Atreya-which shows that the opinions of these teachers were held in high esteem on questions pertaining to the most crucial problems of the Uttara-Mimamsa. This fact conclusively proves that quite apart from the nature of the topics dealt with in the Purva-Mimamsa and Uttara-Mimamsa Sutras, the great teachers mentioned in them were interested in the topics of both the Mimamsas and that

the division of the Sutras into Purva and Uttara was one dictated by the necessities of the situation. In the one case, it was the reconciliation of Vedic texts bearing on sacrificial rites, and in the other of Upanishadic doctrines touching on the relationship between Jiva and Brahman. In the one philosophy is subordinated to ritualism, in the other ritualism is subordinated to philosophy. They seek each other's aid to achieve their own objectives; the one does not deny the right of the other to its own individual existence or to expounding its own individual philosophy, however slight or great it might be. Though inter-related in one sense, they are, in another sense, independent of each other. Both pre-suppose systematic enquiries, though the one deals with ritual and the other with Brahman knowledge and the means to attain it. The commentators of the one show a mastery of the other which is eminently impressive and some of them have written commentaries on both. Do the two Mimamsas form one whole? The question whether the two Mimamsas should be treated as parts of one whole is one on which a difference of opinion prevails. In commenting on Brahma Sutras I.1.1, Sankara says that the word atha, then, denotes immediate sequence or anantharya and not adhikara or beginning of a new topic. It presupposes something antecedent. The antecedent, according to Sankara, is Sadhana Chatushtaya, the four-fold discipline of viveka, vairagya, satasampat and mumukshatva. It is only when a person has passed through this discipline that he is entitled to enquire into Brahman. The word atha therefore declares, according to Sankara, that Brahma-jijnasa is subsequent to the acquisition of this four-fold discipline. The word, accordingly, does not, in his opinion, refer to the Purva-Mimamsa. If these four conditions exist, a man may engage in Brahmajijnasa, either before or after entering on an enquiry with active religious duty as set forth in the Purva-Mimamsa. The word atah, therefore, which follows atha, premises,

according to Sankara, the reason for the jijnasa. The reason is that the fruit of all actions is transitory. Good actions lead to heaven, but heaven itself is transitory. The knowledge of Brahman gives final release. Thus, the highest that the Purva-Mimamsa can point to as attainable is held to fall far too short of what is required for final absolution. Ramanuja takes a different view. To him also the word atha indicates sequence. But the antecedent condition, according to him, is the study of the Karmakanda, or ritualism of the Veda. After the understanding of works, the jijnasa into Brahma follows. The word atha indicates that the subject of jijnasa is Brahman. The person who has followed the Karmakanda knows that the fruit of mere works is limited and hence his desire to know Brahman for obtaining final release. His view is that since the fruit of works as taught in the PurvaMimamsa is limited and transitory, and that of the knowledge of Brahman as taught in the Uttara-Mimamsa is unlimited and eternal, Brahman should be known after the knowledge of works has previously taken place. According to Ramanuja, the Purva-Mimamsa of Jaimini and the UttaraMimamsa of Badarayana form one body of doctrine which should be studied in their due order. This view of Ramanuja has been elaborated by later Vishishtadvaita writers. Thus in the Adhikarana Sararthadipika by Mangacharya Srinivasa Suri, a disciple of Samarapungavacharya of Vadulagotra, we have this point the oneness of the Mimamsa as a Sastra force. The work provides us with a summary of the contents of the various Prakaranas - or the topical subdivisions of the two Mimamsas - and shows clearly their interdependence. (See Madras D.C. Skt. X, No. 4853.) Similarly in the Purvottara Mimamsaka-Kanthyam, we have the oneness of the two Mimamsas put forth in great detail. (See ibid., Nos. 4930 and 4931.) Srikantha is even more explicit than Ramanuja. He says that the word atha denotes succession and not mere commencement or auspiciousness. The latter is the view of Madhva and the - - urged with great

former of Vignanabhikshu. The pre-requisite, according to Srikantha, is a knowledge of the Karmakanda. After a study of the Vedas, one should enquire into Dharma as taught in the Purva-Mimamsa and then into Brahman. The Karma and Gnana conjointly produce release; hence first Karma should be learnt and then the Vedanta. Para-Brahman should be enquired into after completing the enquiry into Dharma. Atah gives the reason. As Dharma has been investigated, therefore one should investigate Brahman to obtain final release. Vallabha's view is directly opposed to that of Sankara. According to Vallabha, atha denotes the commencement of a new topic (adhikara). He says that Karma should precede Brahmajijnasa; knowledge of Brahman does not, in his view, result in cessation of activity. Even jivanmuktas perform, he says, all Karmas. In fact, the Karmas performed by the knowers of Brahman alone are such as lead to purely good results. Nimbarka takes a similar view. According to him a person who has read the Veda and whose mind has been assailed by doubts as to the fruits of actions and who therefore has studied the Purva-Mimamsa in order to remove such doubts and has thereby obtained a clear idea of Karma, its nature, the proper method of performing it and its fruits and whose mind has been drawn away from them by their transitory character, should try to acquire a knowledge of the Brahman. It will thus be seen that except Sankara, most of the commentators agree in interpreting I.1.1. as meaning that a previous study of the Purva-Mimamsa is necessary before the Uttara-Mimamsa can be taken up, both forming one complete whole. View of Sankara. Even Sankara, it will be seen, does not entirely taboo the Purva-Mimamsa; he only suggests that it might or might not be studied, as its inadequacy for obtaining final release makes its previous study unnecessary. Sankara elsewhere puts forward the same view. Despite this, attempts have been made to reconcile these two apparently irreconcilable

systems of philosophy, notably by Suresvaracharya in his Sambandha-Vartika, which is an expansion, as it were, of the introductory part of Sankara's commentary written on the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad with the set purpose of showing the connection that exists between the two Mimamsa parts. Sankara, in this commentary, states that the chapter on rituals is intended to point out special means for him who, knowing that there is a soul in relation to a future body, seeks particular means to attain the desired and to avoid the undesired, as affecting such future body. Later, he adds that the use of knowledge in connection with the ritual of the horse-sacrifice is that those who are not accorded the privilege of performing it, can yet attain its reward by the knowledge in question as declared by the Sruti by such texts as "by knowledge or by ritual" and "this too wins the worlds". It cannot be said that the knowledge is only with reference to the rite, for the words of the Sruti "whosoever does the horse-sacrifice or who knows it as such," are alternative, and occur in a context dealing with knowledge. Since, even in the case of other rites, active acquisition is spoken of, it is evident that their fruit can be got from knowledge. And the horse-sacrifice is the highest of all rites, for it has for its fruit the attainment of the unmanifest (samashti) or the manifest (vyashti) self. Further, its enunciation here at the beginning of the science of self is intended to show that ail rites conduce to births and deaths. Srutis speak of the fruit being hunger, which is the same as death. It cannot be said that regularly prescribed rites do not produce fruit with a view to births and deaths, for Srutis speak in general terms of the fruit of all actions. (See Sankara's Commentary on the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, Introductory part). View of Suresvara. Suresvara suggests that ritual is an indirect means to liberation, since it purifies the soul and helps towards the acquisition of knowledge. Suresvara says that the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad declares that the fruit of the

horse-sacrifice can be obtained by the mere knowledge of it by those who are privileged to perform it. This knowledge cannot be said to be included in the ritual itself, since the Srutis speak of rituals and knowledge as alternative means. An equal reward is obtained by the doer of rituals who performs the horse-sacrifice itself; the declaration of fruit is not a mere explanatory passage, much more than so as it is specifically prescribed. If (says the opponent) no more than this is your explanation of the context, then the object is easily gained even if it occurred in the ritual portion of the Srutis. Tell me then why this passage should occur in the knowledge portion. It is as an incentive to the acquisition of knowledge that it is declared that horse-sacrifice, though the greatest of sacrifices and though combined with knowledge of itself, is nevertheless productive of bondage (births and deaths). How else can aspirants of liberation strive to know the self,-people who have known only too well the meanness of the fruits derived from all rituals and who do not seek any means other than the knowledge of the self? "You may freely say that the fruit of all rites with special objects is bondage; but since necessary rites have no fruit why not say that their fruit is liberation? Not so; for Srutis speak of all rites in general as bearing fruit. Further, passages like "By rites one attains the world of the manes refer to the fruit of necessary rites alone. If it be said that, since they have fruits, necessary rites are also rites with special objects, we say it is not so; for necessary rites have purification as their aim while the aim of rites with special objects is the enjoyment of pleasure. There is purification even in rites with special objects, but that is for the sole sake of securing enjoyment. For the Kingdom of Indra cannot be enjoyed with the body of a man or of a pig. Since in the case of necessary rites, purification is most important, the enjoyment of fruit is not contradictory thereto. But, in comparison with the purification of intellect, enjoyment is considered perishable. For this reason and by virtue of passages like "This self" etc., people try to know the " "}

supreme state by the contemplation of Sruti passages and by renouncing all worldly attachment. Regularly prescribed rites render only indirect help by way of purifying the mind, being not inconsistent with the knowledge of self. But they are not direct means like the knowledge of self. They therefore who, giving up all rites and free from attachment, throw off all taints such as passion etc., and direct their intellect to the Supreme Self, realize their own self within themselves (Sambandha-Vartika, stanzas 1133-1134). Suresvara thus shows an advance on Sankara, developing as he does the view that ritual is a means of liberation, though not so effective as knowledge. This view nearly approximates to the Dvaita position that Karma must lead to Gnana; rather that Karma which does not lead to Gnana is no Karma. According to Madhva, Uttara-Mimamsa is part of Maha-Mimamsa (see Madhva's Commentary on Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, VI, 3). Madhva quoting in his Gitatatparya the undermentioned Sruti text, suggests that Mimamsa is of three different kinds : Mimamsa trividha prokta Brahmi daivicha karmiki Brahma tarkancha Mimamsam Seveta gnana siddhaye Vaidika gnana vairupyat Nanyat seveta panditaha || iti || This suggests that Mimamsa is of three kinds : Brahma Mimamsa, Daiva Mimamsa and Karma Mimamsa. These (three different) mimamsas should be studied through the Brahma Tarka method in order to realize the true knowledge. The true knowledge of Veda consists in knowing all these diverse phases of knowledge. No other method should be had recourse to by a wise man. Madhva holds that the three kinds of Mimamsa should be reckoned as Traividya. He who does not accept this Traividya cannot be called a Vedavadi. He who adopts the Traividya, realizes Parama Vishnu. Thus, it would seem, according to Madhva, that these three kinds should be treated together.

Evidently their interpretation should be on the basis of Tattu samanvayat. If this be so, Jaimini Sutras should be held to be subject to the same mode of interpretation, for they are part of the Traividya. The word Mimamsa seems to have the derivative meaning of intensification or individualization in the text Aththatha anandasya mimamsa bhavati (Taittiriya Upanishad, II, 8, quoted by Madhva in his Commentary on Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, III, 4). Truth underlying the modern view. There thus seems some ground for Jacobi's suggestion that the two Mimamsas are interrelated, though this cannot mean, especially when we remember the Sabarabhashya and the commentaries of Prabhakara and Kumarila Bhatta on it, that the Purva-Mimamsa-Sutras have not a philosophy of their own. The interpretation of Brahma Sutras I. 1. 1 above-mentioned pre-supposes a connection between the two Mimamsas, though such connection need not necessarily deny to either its own philosophy. This mode of approach may possibly reconcile the views of Dr. Keith with those of Jacobi on this point. The position taken by the earliest commentators known on the PurvaMimamsa-Sutras helps to confirm this view. Thus of the three early commentators, leaving out of account Hari and Bhartramitra, of whom little is known, the Vrittikara, who is quoted by Sabarasvamin (I. 1. 5) introduces discussions as to the validity of knowledge and its different forms, though the Sutras themselves do not go much beyond exalting the Vedic injunctions as the source of the necessary knowledge and deny the validity of perception for the purpose of the knowledge of Dharma. Dr. Keith even suggests that it is legitimate to resume that the Vrittikara indulged also in metaphysical discussions. The Vrittikara has been assigned by Dr. Keith to a date not later than the fourth century A.D., though, if we have to put back the Purva-Mimamsa-Sutras themselves to a date much earlier than 200 A.D., we may have to refer the Vrittikara also to a date proportionately earlier.

" Sabarasvamin, who evidently came shortly after the Vrittikara and drew largely on his writings, discusses at length the nature of the soul, though he is usually laconic when dealing with the Sutras themselves. About his time the Mimamsa enters, in the words of Dr. Keith, "into the whole field of philosophy, while maintaining its primary duty of expounding the rules by which the rituals can be reconstructed from the Brahmanas and the Samhitas. Sabarasvamin was commented upon by a Vartikakara who is referred to by Prabhakara. Prabhakara probably lived about the seventh century A.D., and was anterior in date to Kumarila, who criticises him in his works (I. 2. 31; I. 3. 2; 1. 4. 1). Dr. Keith has adduced satisfactory reasons against the traditionary statement that Kumarila was the guru of Prabhakara and that they were contemporaries. According to him, at least half a century, if not a century, separated Prabhakara from Kumarila. The suggestion, however, that the Brihati, "the great commentary on Sabarasvamin's Bhashya, seems to have passed comparatively early into oblivion is not quite borne out by the evidence available. There is hardly any doubt that for long after the time of Sankara, the Mimamsa-Sutras as commented upon by Sabarasvamin and elaborated by his commentator Prabhakara in his Brihati, were actively studied in Southern India, special grants of land being made for its propagation. Thus in a lithic record, dated in the third year of the Chola King Parakesarivarman, "who took the head of the Pandya,". identified with Aditya Karikala II, who ruled about the middle of the tenth century A.D.,-we are told that the " 9 " " The term Vartikakara denotes literally the writer of an explanatory gloss which explains the meaning of that which is said, of that which is left unsaid, and of that which is imperfectly said. A work that explains what is said or but imperfectly said and supplies omissions is termed a Vartika. The term is particularly applied to the explanatory rules of Katyayana on Panini's Sutras. Accordingly, Katyayana is commonly known as Vartikakara. Here, of course, the Vartikakara is a different person. 8

grant of land by a village assembly functioning in the present Kumbakonam taluk, Tanjore district, was made as a bhattavritti to those who expounded the Prabhakaram in the Nagesvara temple at Kumbakonam, where the inscription can still be seen (Madras Epigraphy Report , No. 233 of 1911).10 Kumarila Bhatta, often styled merely Bhatta, the more famous commentator, has still a large following in the modern South Kanara district. His followers call themselves Bhattas and their philosophy goes by the name of Bhatta-mata. The chief point to note in regard to Prabhakara and Kumarila. Bhatta is that they both agree with Sabarasvamin in holding that the individual soul, though derived from the absolute Brahman, has an independent existence for ever thereafter. They thus not only declare that the jiva is inmortal but also definitely reject the theory of Maya. So far about the Purva-Mimamsa-Sutras and their relation to the Uttara-Mimamsa-Sutras.