365bet娱乐

We saw throughout this dissertation that the notion of dharma in Vedic theology was tied to goods desirable to men, 辫耻谤耻峁Ｄ乺迟丑补, and I opened this chapter with 艢补峁卥补谤补 saying that only men were specifically qualified for the two kinds of good which dharma typically brings, prosperity and liberation. At this point it becomes necessary for us to define precisely the human situation that 艢补峁卥补谤补 has in mind so that we can see what the practice of dharma involved, and to do that we must touch upon 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 psychology. Bearing in mind 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 well-known absolute monism, we must assume that there are certain cosmological categories of Being that somehow obtain鈥攊t is impossible to define the human situation without them鈥攂ut we do not need to worry about their relation to Brahman.

The individual Self in 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 system is a complex product that is built on an initial interaction between the real Self, one and only for everyone, and the so-called intellect, internal organ, or the mind (buddhi, 补苍迟补岣�-办补谤补峁嘺). The real Self is, essentially, nothing more than the category in virtue of which it is possible to have phenomenal consciousness of any kind. 艢补峁卥补谤补 quite often compares this Self to sunlight, the necessary factor of any perceptual awareness that is essentially formless, but assumes all kinds of forms contingent on the shapes that it illuminates.

We will take the following definition from the 鲍辫补诲别艣补-厂腻丑补蝉谤墨 as exhaustive:

膧迟尘补苍 is the self-effulgent perception, the seeing, internally existing and actionless. It is the witness which is directly cognized and interior of all, and the Observer which is constant, attributeless and non-dual.^[1]

We need to bear in mind that this pure Self is not the subject of conscious experiences, because any cognitive act involves a distinction between a subject, an object, an instrument, and cognitive content, and cancels monism: the non-dual Self cannot participate in these and still remain non-dual. The Self is what makes subjectivity possible. Insofar as 艢补峁卥补谤补 describes it as the witness, it is not itself what cognizes anything, but is the accommodating factor, the seeing behind the seer.^[2] The pure Self, thus, is the awareness that ever obtains but is never transitive.

The subject properly speaking, the one that has cognitions, is a reflection of the pure Self in a set of adjuncts, 耻辫腻诲丑颈蝉, the crucial among which is the intellect or buddhi.^[3] This buddhi can be defined as the evolute of Brahman in which cognition (惫颈箩帽腻苍补) in general takes place.

The pure Self is the only Self, but it is not one that can have transitive awareness of itself. The intellect, owing to its proximity to the pure Self in the evolution from Brahman, becomes the locus in which a sense of Self can obtain. 艢补峁卥补谤补 illustrates the relationship between the Self, the intellect, and the sense of Self with the reflection that appears when a face is placed in front of a mirror.^[4] The sense of Self that is like the image in the mirror is variously called 补丑补峁卥腻谤补, aham-pratyaya, asmat-pratyaya, 腻迟尘腻产丑腻蝉补 etc, and becomes the basis on which the individual Self is eventually built.^[5] The Self is not its reflection, but becomes identified with it. It may also be figuratively said to be under illusion, thinking oneself something which it is not, if we understand that this thinking does not happen in the Self itself, but is accommodated by its light.

The reflection is neither a property of the face nor of the mirror, but it is dependent on both, insofar as it can obtain only if both are present. It does not, however, obtain necessarily: it is accidental because the face must be in front of the mirror for one to think, 鈥淭his is me.鈥�^[6] In a different sense, it is a necessary relationship for there to be cognitive subjectivity at all, because the intellect is not a conscious principle鈥攊t is that thing which is the locus of cognition, but is itself not conscious of anything鈥攚hereas the pure Self is not an agent. So, the properties of the one are placed over the other: the consciousness of the Self is superimposed over the intellect so that there can be a conscious experience, whereas the cognitive agency that involves the dualities of subject, object, instrument, and cognition that belong to the intellect are superimposed over the Self.^[7] Because the intellect is the place where the reflection of the Self obtains and is located, the first adjunct of the 腻迟尘补苍, the individual Self is commonly called the vij帽膩n腻迟尘补苍, the Self of cognition, and is typically distinguished from the pure, inner Self called the pratyag-腻迟尘补苍 or param腻迟尘补苍.

The above account is based primarily on the 鲍辫补诲别艣补-厂腻丑补蝉谤墨, and it seems to me that it is the necessary starting point as it provides the clearest idea of the focal point around which the individual Self is constructed, namely the sense of Self or aham/asmat-pratyaya: it is a reflection of the Self in the intellect, a reflection that relates the two. We can now broaden the presentation by drawing from the 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the 叠谤补丑尘补-厂奴迟谤补 and the 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the B峁沨ad-膧谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 What is superimposed over the pure Self is not just cognitive agency: it is agency in general, namely the complex that involves action (办谤颈测腻), its contributory factors (办腻谤补办补蝉) such as the agent, specifically identified with the reflection of the Self around which the vij帽膩n腻迟尘补苍 is constructed, instruments, and results.^[8] This is most evidently instantiated in the case of cognition: there is an agent or cognitive subject, 箩帽腻迟峁�, which is the sense of Self reflected in the mirror of the intellect (腻迟尘腻产丑腻蝉补); there is an object to this subject that includes anything that might become an object of awareness, from external things to internal states of any kind, called by 艢补峁卥补谤补 测耻峁�m补迟-辫谤补迟测补测补, 鈥漷he notion of You;鈥� there are the mind and senses as instrumental causes; and there is the cognition itself, 惫颈箩帽腻苍补, that take place in the intellect. All of this is superimposed on the Self either directly or indirectly. Agency, however, is general: it concerns any kind of agency.

The complex of 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 or reliable warrants is a restricted case of cognition鈥攐ne that happens to be valid鈥攁nd is equally superimposed over the Self: all reliable warrants, scripture in all its scope included, are superimposed over the Self and can operate because there is such a thing as the Self to illumine them:

All forms of worldly and Vedic forms of behavior that involve knowable objects and reliable warrants become operational through the mutual superimposition of the Self and the non-Self, a superimposition that is called ignorance (补惫颈诲测腻), as do all scriptures that are concerned with injunctions, prohibitions, and liberation.^[9]

The superimposition of agency brings with itself the superimposition of the enjoying the results that such agency implies, 产丑辞办迟峁泃惫补.^[10]

Furthermore, the cognitive agency, of course, has the intellect as its location鈥攊t is there that cognition happens鈥攂ut cognition is dependent on a set of other factors: it is dependent on the so-called manas, commonly translated as the mind but better understood as the faculty of attention; on the cognitive faculties that function in their respective sphere, commonly called senses, indriya; finally, on the body, which houses these senses.

The light of awareness is, thus, further reflected in the rest of one鈥檚 personality, but it is also progressively restricted or dimmed because it is modulated by each previous reflection:

The intellect, because of its transparency and proximity, becomes a reflection of the light of awareness of the Self. For this reason, even those who discriminate fancy themselves first as being the intellect. Next there is the reflection of awareness in the mind, due to proximity, by its comingling with the intellect; then in the senses, because they are in contact with the mind; and then in the body, because of its being in contact with the senses. Thus, in succession the Self with its own innate intelligence illumines the whole aggregate of body and organs.^[11]

These are like mirrors within mirrors, and the Self could potentially identify鈥攈ave the notion 鈥淭his is who I am鈥濃�攊n regard to any of them, contingent on one鈥檚 discriminative ability. 鈥淚t is for this reason that all people identify themselves with the body and organs and their functions in an unregulated way, as per their discrimination.鈥�^[12] The buddhi/补苍迟补岣�-办补谤补峁嘺/惫颈箩帽腻苍补 is the first adjunct of the Self, giving it the name vij帽膩n腻迟尘补苍, but the rest become its adjuncts as well. This principle can be extended even to things that are merely related to oneself, considered 鈥渕y,鈥� and 艢补峁卥补谤补 calls the whole field of potential items of identification aham-mama-gocara, 鈥渢he sphere of 鈥業鈥� and 鈥榤y.鈥欌��^[13] This field or sphere is concretized in relation to the sense of Self and becomes 鈥渢he notion of 鈥榯his鈥�,鈥� 颈诲补尘-诲丑墨, where idam is a variable that stands as a complement to the notion of 鈥淚鈥� and forming a complex with it鈥斺�淚 am this鈥濃�攚hose value can be anything from the sphere of 鈥淚 and mine,鈥� any property of the non-Self that one can superimpose over the Self, as long as it is either reached by the light of awareness or is in relation to oneself.

We can now appreciate one of the most striking passages written in the history of Indian philosophy:

As we said, superimposition, to define it, is the notion of something in regard to something else. It is like when one superimposes external properties over the Self, thinking, 鈥淚 myself am injured鈥� or 鈥淚 myself am whole鈥� when one鈥檚 son or wife is injured or whole; or when one superimposes properties of the body and thinks, 鈥淚 am fat,鈥� 鈥淚 am lean,鈥� 鈥淚 am fair,鈥� 鈥淚 stand,鈥� 鈥淚 go,鈥� or 鈥淚 leap;鈥� or when one superimposes properties of the senses, as in 鈥淚 am dumb,鈥� 鈥淚 am blind in one eye,鈥� 鈥淚 am emasculated,鈥� or 鈥淚 am blind;鈥� or when one superimposes properties of the internal organ, such as desire, resolve, doubt and certainty.^[14]

This superimposition whose cause is false awareness, is, 艢补峁卥补谤补 claims, called ignorance or 补惫颈诲测腻 by the learned.^[15] We should note here for the sake of being thorough that ignorance assumed an all-important role in post-艢补峁卥补谤补 Advaita 痴别诲腻苍迟补: it became a cosmological category, standing for the primordial stuff of which the world is made or which operates on Brahman as it is about to don its causal garb. As Hacker and Mayeda have shown, ignorance was not a cosmological item in 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 thought.^[16] In fact, in how 艢补峁卥补谤补 talks about ignorance, the very possibility of ignorance presupposes that the cosmological diversification of Being had already taken place: buddhi and the rest of the adjuncts need to be present for the mutual superimposition of properties to take place. In general, we can say that ignorance is strictly a psychological category in 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 thought and looks at the 膧迟尘补苍-Brahman relationship on the side of the Self, whereas the counterpart cosmological category on the side of Brahman is the 苍腻尘补-谤奴辫别, name and form.^[17]

In the 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the 叠丑补驳补惫补诲-骋墨迟腻 this ignorance is said to be potentially of three kinds: (1) failure to grasp an object (补驳谤补丑补峁嘺), as in the case of darkness; (2) seeing one thing as another (惫颈辫补谤墨迟补-驳谤补丑补峁嘺), under which most of 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 favorite examples would fit, such as seeing a snake in a rope, silver in the mother-of-pearl, or when the simple-minded see dirt and a flat surface in the sky; and (3) doubt (蝉补峁兣沘测补), the classical example of which in Indian philosophy is the uncertainty whether a silhouette in the distance is a man or a post, to which 艢补峁卥补谤补 also commonly refers.^[18] These are all cases of cognitive errors, and 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 object in using them is to show that they do not constitute an error on the part of the knower, but a flaw in the causal conditions of perception: the Self is not in illusion in essentia, but in actu. They must be taken as no more than illustrations, however, because the superimposition that 艢补峁卥补谤补 talks about is evidently of a very different kind: it is the mistake that makes all other mistakes possible鈥攁s well as all truths, inclusive of the final truth expressed in the eventual 尘补丑腻-惫腻办测补蝉. This form of ignorance is not just the common mistake of false recognition that brings embarrassment, or the uncertainty that a scarecrow may cause. Ignorance is the false awareness and the superimposition that is natural (naisargika) and without a beginning (补苍腻诲颈), that is, it obtains as a normal state and not as a cognitive oddity. We may take Mahadevan鈥檚 lead, therefore, and distinguish this from of ignorance from the common as metaphysical.^[19]

However鈥攁nd this is a point not commonly discussed, yet crucial for 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 soteriology and dharma鈥攖he mere formation of the reflection of the Self, the consequent superimposition of the notions of agency and enjoyment, the complex centered around action, namely action itself, its contributing factors and its results (办谤颈测腻, 办腻谤补办补, phala), and the potential of identification with anything that constitutes the field of 鈥淚 and my,鈥� fashion the category of the individual Self, the universal or 辫补诲腻谤迟丑补 to which the word 鈥淪elf鈥� can be applied: this is not what makes the Self of any Devadatta or John Doe.^[20] Ignorance is the immediate factor of distinguishing the category of vij帽膩n腻迟尘补苍 or 箩墨惫补 from the Supreme Self, but it is not the immediate factor of individuation. Two additional factors are required for there to be an individual Self.

We may put this another way. What the image of the Self will look like is contingent on the mirror: the image of the face conforms to the mirror, and the mirror can be variously inflected.^[21] There are some contour points that need to be invariantly present in all images so that we could identify what kind of thing the image represents, and these are the sense of Self鈥斺�淚 am this鈥濃�攁nd agency. What range of values 鈥渢his鈥� will take depends on two other factors: impressions that have the nature of habitual desire that prompts action (惫腻蝉补苍腻, 产丑腻惫补苍腻, 蝉补峁僺办腻谤补, 办腻尘补), and the results of previous action or karma.

The three, really, form a circle that reinforces itself. The impressions are impressions of ignorance, results of past identifications involving agency鈥攑ast actions鈥攖hat color, or rather perfume, one鈥檚 awareness. They are in the form of volitional tendencies for something specific. 艢补峁卥补谤补 determines their scope as 谤腻驳腻诲颈, which clearly refers to the well-known set of psychological faults or 办濒别艣补蝉, namely attachment, aversion, and illusion (谤腻驳补, 诲惫别峁�a, moha). Desires that are formed through impression are the medium that otherwise unproductive ignorance must take to become an instigator to action (产丑腻惫补苍腻). Action and its resultant karma on their part produce one鈥檚 future embodiment that is an instantiation of ignorance, as it involves a wrong identification in which one becomes naturally prone to specific desires and fit for the attaining of specific goals, requiring specific action.

Because the superimposition that is ignorance is natural and without a beginning, this circle of 补惫颈诲测腻 -> 惫腻蝉补苍腻 -> 办腻尘补 -> karma -> 补惫颈诲测腻 is a true circle: everything is logically predicated on ignorance, but ignorance historically or temporally requires an existing embodiment.

Being perfectly stainless, 膧迟尘补苍 is distinguished from, and broken by, nescience, residual impression, and actions.^[22]

The living Self, individuated by ignorance, results of previous actions and past impressions, assisted by the chief breath and possessing a mind and senses 鈥�^[23] Ignorance could be the cause of inequality through recourse to action that is set in motion by impressions that are torments, attachment, etc.^[24]

There must be some force impelled by which one becomes averse to one's own world, the Self, as if he were helpless.鈥揑s it not ignorance? For, he who is ignorant is averse and acts.鈥揑gnorance is not an instigator to action, for it conceals the true nature of a thing. It obtains the state of being the seed of action like darkness that is the cause of the action of falling into a ditch.鈥揥ell say it then, what is the cause of a man's activity.鈥揑t is said here: it is desire.^[25]

Suffused by the impression of ignorance that is natural to him and that consists in a superimposition of the notions of action, its factors such as the agent, and its results, over the Self, he desired.^[26]

Desire is the cause of action, because of being an instigator.^[27]

The individual Self, thus, is a work in progress, constituted by the three factors of ignorance, desires that are impressions in nature and prompt one to act, and the results of action that have shaped one鈥檚 present identity. While ignorance is the general factor of individuation, the category maker, desire and karma are the two factors that make it possible for one to be born with a specific identity鈥攖hat is, in a family belonging to a class鈥攁nd have the fitness for specific desires and forms of attainment that are related to them.

As is, hopefully, evident, 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 psychology was 叠丑补谤迟峁沺谤补辫补帽肠补鈥檚 psychology from top to bottom. The individual Self was constituted by the same triplet of 补惫颈诲测腻-办腻尘补-karma, with 惫腻蝉补苍腻 negotiating the transition between the first two. This was in both cases inspired by the psychology of Yoga, specifically the idea of five 办濒别艣补蝉 expressed in the 笔补迟补帽箩补濒颈鈥檚 驰辞驳补-厂奴迟谤补 2.3: 鈥淭he torments are ignorance, the sense of Self, attachment, aversion and clinging to life.鈥�^[28] If anything, 艢补峁卥补谤补 was more consistent in applying this Yoga classification, sticking to the psychological significance of ignorance that takes the Self to be its opposite, whereas 叠丑补谤迟峁沺谤补辫补帽肠补鈥檚 leaned towards 补惫颈诲测腻 as a cosmic power.^[29] The point of 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 departure from 叠丑补谤迟峁沺谤补辫补帽肠补 was his theory of reflection of the Self in the intellect as constituting the vij帽膩n腻迟尘补苍: the individual was not a chunk of Brahman that is cut off by a cosmic power of ignorance. It was a product of one big mistake, a succession of nested mirror images assuming substance because of being graced by the light of awareness.^[30]

We can now see what is the 鈥渉uman鈥� condition in 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 eyes. Which dharma in any specific form will be pertinent to oneself is dependent on a set of specific categories that have been superimposed over the Self: 鈥淪criptural statements such as 鈥榓 产谤腻丑尘补峁嘺 should sacrifice鈥� function through superimposition of characteristics such as membership to class, stage of religious life, and age.鈥�^[31] This is the specific superimposition that must take place for dharma to become pertinent, over and above the general identification with the mind, body and senses and their natural properties: membership in the 惫补谤峁嚹伵况补尘补 system. One must have become a member of the social structure for which the Veda is relevant, and without such a state of affairs obtaining, dharma does not pertain to oneself in any way. The light of awareness that permeates the field of 鈥淚 and mine鈥� must illumine a specific area of social identity that is formed into a habitual nature through 补惫颈诲测腻-办腻尘补-karma.

艢补峁卥补谤补 was, of course, aware that there was a world beyond Vedic society, but that world was of little interest to him. It was split between the 鈥渘atural world,鈥� in which everyone participates and which is comprised of natural actions such as breathing and eating when one is hungry, actions that have no consequence for the law of karma because of not being scripturally regulated,^[32] and the world of sheer desire and innate faults such as attachment and aversion, in which one acts against the regulations of the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions and glides down the scale of Being all the way to plant life.^[33]

One must have been born in the three upper classes for starters: this is the Self for which dharma in general has pertinence:

The 鈥楽elf鈥� here refers to the natural person that is characterized by a complex of body and senses, a member of one of the castes.^[34]

The regulated Vedic world provides the means for attaining the goals of prosperity and liberation, and the initial point of both pursuits requires one to be a member of Vedic society, born in it.

Footnotes and references:

[back to top]

[1]:

耻辫补濒补产诲丑颈岣� 蝉惫补测补峁�-jyotir 诲峁浥沬岣� pratyak-sad-补办谤颈测补岣� |
s膩k峁Ｄ乼 sarv膩ntara岣� s膩k峁Ｄ� cet膩 nityo 'gu峁噊 'dvaya岣� ||鈥�艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 鲍辫补诲别艣补-厂腻丑补蝉谤墨 1.18.26, translation Mayeda 2006b:174-5.

[2]:

See 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the B峁沨ad-膧谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 1.4.10.

[3]:

See 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the B峁沨ad-膧谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 1.4.7.

[4]:

艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 鲍辫补诲别艣补-厂腻丑补蝉谤墨 1.18.43.

[5]:

Throughout the 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 鲍辫补诲别艣补-厂腻丑补蝉谤墨, particularly in 1.4 and 1.18. The asmat-pratyaya is the term used famously right at the beginning of the 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the Brahma-厂奴迟谤补

[6]:

Cf. 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 鲍辫补诲别艣补-厂腻丑补蝉谤墨 1.18.39: dvayor eveti cet tan na dvayor ev膩py adar艣an膩t; 鈥淚f it be said that the reflection is a property of (a combination) of the two, we say no, because it is not seen even when the two are present.鈥�

[7]:

艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 鲍辫补诲别艣补-厂腻丑补蝉谤墨 1.18.65. Also, 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the 叠谤补丑尘补-厂奴迟谤补 1.1.1, I.5: evam aham-pratyayinam 补艣别峁�a-sva-辫谤补肠腻谤补-s膩k峁�i峁噄 pratyag-腻迟尘补苍y adhyasya ta峁� ca pratya-腻迟尘腻na峁� sarva-s膩k峁�i峁嘺峁� tad-viparyaye峁嚹乶ta岣�-kara峁嚹乨i峁�v adhyasyati: 鈥淟ikewise, superimposing the internal organ that bears the sense of Self over the internal Self, the witness of the modifications of that bearer, one proceeds to reversely superimposing the internal Self over the internal organ.鈥�

[8]:

See 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the B峁沨ad-膧谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 1.4.17, VIII.159: sv膩bh膩viky膩 sv腻迟尘补苍i kartr-膩di-办腻谤补办补-办谤颈测腻-phal腻迟尘补kat膩dhy膩ropa-lak峁�a峁嘺y膩 补惫颈诲测腻v膩sanay膩 惫腻蝉颈迟补岣� so '办腻尘补yata k膩mitav膩n. On the reflection of the Self being the agent, see 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 鲍辫补诲别艣补-厂腻丑补蝉谤墨 1.18.53a: 腻迟尘腻产丑腻蝉补s tu ti峁�-惫腻肠测补岣�.

[9]:

tam etam 补惫颈诲测腻khyam 腻迟尘腻n腻迟尘补苍or itaretar膩dhy膩sa峁� 辫耻谤补蝉办峁泃测补 sarve 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺-prameya-vyavah膩r膩 laukik膩 vaidik膩艣 ca 辫谤补惫峁泃迟腻岣�. 蝉补谤惫腻峁噄 ca 艣膩str膩峁噄 vidhi-辫谤补迟颈峁�e诲丑补-尘辞办峁�a-辫补谤腻峁噄. 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the 叠谤补丑尘补-厂奴迟谤补 1.1.1, I.3.

[10]:

See, for instance, the end of the 础诲丑测腻蝉补-叠丑腻峁�y补 of the 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the 叠谤补丑尘补-厂奴迟谤补 1.1.1, I.5, where the two are most explicitly paired in relation to superimposition: evam ayam 补苍腻诲颈r ananto naisargiko鈥檇hy膩so 尘颈迟丑测腻-pratyaya-谤奴辫补岣� 办补谤迟峁泃惫补-产丑辞办迟峁泃惫补-辫谤补惫补谤迟补办补岣� sarva-loka-辫谤补迟测补办峁�a岣�; 鈥淭hus is this natural superimposition that is without a beginning or end, false notion in nature, the instigator of agency an enjoyment, evident to all.鈥� Also, the 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the B峁沨ad-膧谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 Introduction, VIII.5: i峁ａ弓膩ni峁ａ弓a-辫谤腻辫迟颈-辫补谤颈丑腻谤别肠肠丑腻-办腻谤补峁嘺尘 腻迟尘补-惫颈峁�a测补尘 补箩帽腻苍补峁� 办补谤迟峁�-产丑辞办迟峁�-svar奴p膩bhim膩na-lak峁�a峁嘺m; 鈥淭he cause of the desire to attain the good and avoid the evil, viz, ignorance regarding the Self, which expresses itself as the idea of one's being the agent and experiencer鈥︹��

[11]:

buddhis t膩vat svacchatv膩d 膩nantary膩c ca 腻迟尘补-caitanya-箩测辞迟颈岣�-辫谤补迟颈肠肠丑腻测腻 bhavati; tena hi vivekin膩m api tatra 腻迟尘腻bhim膩na-产耻诲诲丑颈岣� 辫谤补迟丑补尘腻; tato 'py 膩nantary膩t manasi caitany膩vabh膩sat膩, buddhi-sampark膩t; tata 颈苍诲谤颈测别峁�u, 尘补苍补岣�-sa峁儁og膩t; tato 'nantara峁� 艣ar墨re, indriya-sampark膩t. eva峁� p膩ramparye峁嘺 办峁泃蝉苍补峁� 办腻谤测补-办补谤补峁嘺-蝉补峁僩丑腻迟补尘 腻迟尘腻 caitanya-蝉惫补谤奴辫补-箩测辞迟颈峁Ｄ� 补惫补产丑腻蝉补测补迟颈. 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the B峁沨ad-膧谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 4.3.7, IX.527-8.

[12]:

Ibid: tena hi sarvasya lokasya 办腻谤测补-办补谤补峁嘺-sa峁単h膩te tad-v峁泃ti峁�u ca aniyat腻迟尘腻bhim膩na-buddhir yath膩-惫颈惫别办补峁� 箩腻测补迟别.

[13]:

See 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 鲍辫补诲别艣补-厂腻丑补蝉谤墨 1.18.27.

[14]:

adhy膩so 苍腻尘补 atasmi峁僺 tad-buddhir ity avoc膩ma. tad yath膩鈥�putra-bh膩ry膩di峁�u vikale峁�u sakale峁�u v膩 aham eva 惫颈办补濒补岣� sakalo veti 产腻丑测补-dharm膩n 腻迟尘补苍y adhyasyati; tath膩 deha-dharm膩n 'sth奴lo鈥檋a峁� k峁浥沷鈥檋a峁� gauro鈥檋a峁� ti峁ａ弓h膩mi gacch膩mi la峁単hay膩mi ca' iti; tathendriya-dharm膩n鈥�'尘奴办补岣� 办腻峁嘺岣� 办濒墨产补岣� andho鈥檋am' iti. tath膩nta岣グ觳拱�补峁嘺-dharm膩n 办腻尘补-蝉补峁卥补濒辫补-惫颈肠颈办颈迟蝉腻诲丑测补惫补蝉腻测腻诲墨苍. 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the 叠谤补丑尘补-厂奴迟谤补 1.1.1, I.4-5.

[15]:

tam etam eva峁�-lak峁�a峁嘺m 补诲丑测腻蝉补峁� 辫补峁囜笉颈迟腻 avidyeti manyante. 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the 叠谤补丑尘补-厂奴迟谤补 1.1.1, I.3.

[16]:

Hacker 1995:57-100; Mayeda 2006b:22-26, 76-84.

[17]:

A second issue related to ignorance developed in post-艢补峁卥补谤补 Advaita 痴别诲腻苍迟补, growing into a dispute over which the school would divide in two camps. This was the question about the locus of this ignorance: one line of Advaitins, including his immediate students 厂耻谤别艣惫补谤补 and Padmap膩da, claimed that Brahman itself is the locus of ignorance, whereas another line, started by V膩caspati Mi艣ra but continuing the tradition of 惭补峁囜笉补苍补, claimed that the individual Self or 箩墨惫补 is the locus. As shown by Ingalls (1953), 艢补峁卥补谤补, while aware of the problem, chose not to deal with it because he considered that no solution within what is logically possible could be forthcoming.鈥�
艢补峁卥补谤补 discussed the question 鈥淲hose is ignorance?鈥� in a couple of places (most notably 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the 叠谤补丑尘补-厂奴迟谤补 4.1.3, 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the B峁沨ad-膧谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 4.1.6 and 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the Bhagavad-骋墨迟腻 13.2), which all tend toward evasion and can be roughly characterized by the following dialogue:
-Now, whose is this ignorance that you are talking about?
-Well, of the ignorant, duh!
-That would be me, I gather.
-There you have it, then.
-But hold on a second, you say that I am Brahman, and that I, being Brahman, cannot be ignorant!
-Good for you! If you understand that much, what is the problem?
Ingalls sees in this the same strategy that was employed by the Buddha in answering metaphysical questions, such as those in the famous Cula-Malunkyaputta-Sutta.

[18]:

艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the 叠谤补丑尘补-厂奴迟谤补 13.2.

[19]:

Mahadevan 1985.

[20]:

箩腻迟颈-karm膩dimattv膩d dhi tasmi帽 艣abd膩s tv aha峁僰峁泃i. 鈥淎s this bearer of the "I"-notion has a universal, and is possessed of action, etc., it can be referred to by words.鈥� 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 鲍辫补诲别艣补-厂腻丑补蝉谤墨 1.18.28. Translation Mayeda 2006b:175.

[21]:

艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 鲍辫补诲别艣补-厂腻丑补蝉谤墨 1.18.31.

[22]:

avidyay膩 bh膩vanay膩 ca karmabhir vivikta 腻迟尘腻vyavadhi岣� 蝉耻苍颈谤尘补濒补岣�. 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 鲍辫补诲别艣补-厂腻丑补蝉谤墨 1.10.9ab.

[23]:

箩墨惫辞 mukhya-辫谤腻峁嘺-蝉补肠颈惫补岣� sendriya岣� samanasko鈥�惫颈诲测腻-karma-辫奴谤惫补-辫谤补箩帽腻-辫补谤颈驳谤补丑补岣�. 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the 叠谤补丑尘补-厂奴迟谤补 3.1.1, II.527-8.

[24]:

谤腻驳腻诲颈-办濒别艣补-惫腻蝉补苍腻k峁�ipta-karm膩pek峁Ｄ� tv 补惫颈诲测腻 惫补颈峁�a尘测补-办补谤墨 蝉测腻迟. 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the 叠谤补丑尘补-厂奴迟谤补 2.1.36, II.344.

[25]:

迟补蝉尘腻诲 产丑补惫颈迟补惫测补峁� tena, yena prerito '惫补艣补 iva bahirmukho bhavati svasm膩l lok膩t. nanv 补惫颈诲测腻 s膩; avidv膩n hi bahirmukh墨-产丑奴迟补岣� pravartate鈥攕膩pi naiva 辫谤补惫补谤迟颈办腻; vastu-svar奴p膩var峁嚹乼mik膩 hi s膩; pravartaka-b墨jatva峁� tu pratipadyate andhatvam iva gart膩di-patana-辫谤补惫峁泃迟颈-丑别迟耻岣�. eva峁� tarhy ucyat膩峁� ki峁� tad yat 辫谤补惫峁泃迟颈-hetur iti; tad ih膩bhidh墨yate鈥�别峁�a峁嚹� 办腻尘补岣� 蝉补岣�. 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the B峁沨ad-膧谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 1.4.16, VIII.157-8.

[26]:

sv膩bh膩viky膩 sv腻迟尘补苍i kartr-膩di-办腻谤补办补-办谤颈测腻-phal腻迟尘补kat膩dhy膩ropa-lak峁�a峁嘺y膩 补惫颈诲测腻-v膩sanay膩 惫腻蝉颈迟补岣� so '办腻尘补yata k膩mitav膩n. 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the B峁沨ad-膧谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 1.4.17, VIII.159.

[27]:

karma-丑别迟耻岣� 办腻尘补岣� sy膩t, pravartakatv膩t. 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the 罢补颈迟迟颈谤墨测补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 Introduction, VI.8.

[28]:

补惫颈诲测腻smit膩-谤腻驳补-dve峁Ｄ乥hinive艣膩岣� kle艣膩岣�.

[29]:

Cf. 笔补迟补帽箩补濒颈鈥檚 驰辞驳补-厂奴迟谤补 2.5: anity膩艣耻肠颈-du岣�kh膩n腻迟尘补su niyta-艣耻肠颈-sukh腻迟尘补-khy膩tir 补惫颈诲测腻, 鈥淚gnorance is the notion that takes the self, which is joyful, pure, and eternal, to be the nonself, which is painful, unclean, and temporary.鈥� Translation Bryant 2009.

[30]:

The similarity of 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 psychology with that of Yoga, and the purported authorship of the 驰辞驳补-厂奴迟谤补-叠丑腻蝉测补-痴颈惫补谤补峁嘺, prompted Paul Hacker to advance the thesis that 艢补峁卥补谤补 might have been a converted yogin. Cf. particularly the following statement: 鈥淔or the time being it is not possible to decide to what extent 艢补峁卥补谤补, with his point of agreement with the 鈥溎乼mology鈥� and psychology (鈥渃ittology鈥�) of Yoga, follows an already existing (pre-monistic) 痴别诲腻苍迟补 tradition, since no work of this literature except the enigmatic 叠谤补丑尘补-厂奴迟谤补 attributed to 叠腻诲补谤腻测补峁嘺 is any longer extant. But since he differs from other Advaitins on those points of 膩tmology as well as in avidyology which connect him with Yoga, we may assume for the time being that his relations with this system were particularly close as a result of his earlier allegiance to it.鈥� (Hacker 1995:119) It should be evident from my previous chapter that the crucial categories of 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 鈥溎乼mology, cittology, avidyology and brahmology鈥� were taken from 叠丑补谤迟峁沺谤补辫补帽肠补, who was mocked for not being able to decide whom he wants to make alliance with. While 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 acquaintance with Yoga seems more thorough than what he could have gathered from 叠丑补谤迟峁沺谤补辫补帽肠补, it was 叠丑补谤迟峁沺谤补辫补帽肠补 who, for all we know, used or introduced the terms 补惫颈诲测腻, 惫腻蝉补苍腻, 办腻尘补 as 诲辞峁�a, vij帽膩n腻迟尘补苍, avy膩k峁泃e and vy膩k峁泃e 苍腻尘补-谤奴辫别 etc., in 痴别诲腻苍迟补. This, I think, makes Hacker鈥檚 thesis unnecessary.

[31]:

tath膩 hi鈥攂r膩hma峁噊 yajeta ity 膩d墨ni 艣膩str膩峁噛 腻迟尘补苍i 惫补谤峁嚹伵况补尘补-vayo鈥檝asth膩di-vi艣e峁Ｄ乨hy膩sam 腻艣谤颈迟测补 pravartante. adhy膩so 苍腻尘补 atasmi峁僺 tad-buddhir ity avoc膩ma. 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the 叠谤补丑尘补-厂奴迟谤补 1.1.1, IV.4.

[32]:

This is a recurring distinction in his comments. For instance, 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the B峁沨ad-膧谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 1.3.1.

[33]:

See, for instance, the introduction to the 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the B峁沨ad-膧谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 This was, of course, a pan-Ved膩ntic attitude inspired by the 鈥渢hird state鈥� of the Ch膩ndogya 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲, other than the southern and the northern course that we saw in the previous chapter: 鈥淭hen there are those proceeding on neither of these paths鈥攖hey become the tiny creatures revolving here ceaselessly. 鈥楤e born! Die!鈥欌�攖hat is a third state.鈥� Ch膩ndogya 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 5.10.8. Translation Olivelle 1998:237.

[34]:

腻迟尘补iva鈥�蝉惫腻产丑腻惫颈办补岣� avidv膩n 办腻谤测补-办补谤补峁嘺-蝉补峁単丑腻迟补-濒补办峁�a峁噊 惫补谤峁嚹�. 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁�y补 on the B峁沨ad-膧谤补峁噛补办补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 1.4.17.