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The death of a living being is known as 诲谤补惫测补苍颈谤惫腻峁嘺 whereas the liberation of a soul from body, where no more involvement in the worldly affairs remains, is called 产丑腻惫补苍颈谤惫腻峁嘺. While concluding the eighth 测辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱 namely 辫补谤腻, Haribhadras奴ri says that at this stage the great soul resorts to the 艣补颈濒别艣墨^[1] state by putting an end to the ailment called worldly existence (产丑补惫补惫测腻诲丑颈) and obtains liberation in true sense of the term^[2] (i.e. 产丑腻惫补苍颈谤惫腻峁嘺 ^[3] ). All philosophical school accepts liberation as the ultimate goal of a seeker in his spiritual journey. However, every philosophical school defines the state of a liberated soul differently.

Each philosophical school defines the state of liberation (苍颈谤惫腻峁嘺) with different words. It is presented as follows in 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补:

sa峁僺膩r膩t墨tatattva峁� tu, 辫补谤补峁� 苍颈谤惫腻峁嘺sa峁僯帽itam |
taddhyekameva niyam膩-cchabdabhede'pi tattvata岣� ||129||
蝉补诲腻艣颈惫补岣� 辫补谤补峁� brahama, siddh膩tm膩 tath膩teti ca |
艣abdaistaducyate'nvarth膩-dekamevaivam膩dibhi岣� ||130||

While narrating the state of a liberated soul from Jain philosophical view-point, Haribhadras奴ri says that a liberate soul is the one who has suffered a lot from the ailment called worldly existence since time immemorial and now is freed from this ailment totally. Haribhadras奴ri also says that the state of a liberated soul resembles with an ordinary man who is released from his ailment (惫测腻诲丑颈尘耻办迟补). That is to say formerly he suffered from the ailment and now whose ailment is no more with him^[4] .

In this way by giving this comparison Haribhadras奴ri implies three things:

1. a soul suffers from the ailment called worldly existence since time immemorial.
2. He seeks spirituality to absolve his soul from worldly existence and consequently is released from the ailment.
3. In the liberated state the existence of the soul remains intact. It is only his ailment, named worldly existence that disappears.

Buddhism thinks that just like the fire of a lamp leaves nothing once it is extinguished, a liberated soul does not exist once liberated. The Buddhists believe that a soul of every living being possesses the ailment called worldly existence. However they consider the co-existence of this ailment with the soul to be momentary and not beginning less/ time immemorial. The 厂腻峁卥丑测补 school of philosophy considers a soul to be eternally unchangeable (办奴峁璦蝉迟丑补 nitya). The 厂腻峁卥丑测补 believes that a soul is pure forever and does not accept its beginning less co-existence with the ailment called worldly existence. The 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophy says that the soul imagines itself to be impure and ignorant due to delusion. Therefore the worldly existence a soul lives in is not real but illusory or imaginary. As soon as the soul gets rid of such illusion, it is called liberated. Thus the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophy does not accept two facts: 1. since beginning less time a soul possesses the ailment called worldly existence. 2. it obtains liberation from this ailment by destroying its own capacity to accumulate karmans through spiritual practices.

To conclude we may that Buddhism does not accept existence of a liberated soul but believes in co-existence of a soul with the ailment called worldly existence. Moreover Buddhists accept this co-existence as momentary and not beginning less. The 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophy accepts the existence of a liberated soul but does not accept its beginning less co-existence with the ailment called worldly existence.

When a soul gets rid of the ailment called worldly existence, the soul is said to be liberated in real sense of terms. Since time immemorial this ailment causes innumerable births and deaths to a living being. While depicting the nature of such an ailment Haribhadras奴ri states that the worldly existence itself is the great ailment^[5] . He further says that this worldly existence is characterized by birth and death which includes the state of old age, diseased body and so on^[6] . Another form of worldly existence is the intense experience attachment and aversion caused by the rise of wrong faith (尘颈迟丑测腻迟惫补)^[7] . We may call birth, death, old age etc. as an external ailment (i.e. 产腻丑测补-bhavaroga) and the feelings of attachment aversion etc., raised due to wrong faith, as an internal ailment (abhyantara-bhavaroga). Moreover, Haribhadras奴ri says that the worldly existence can never be illusory or fake^[8] . It is so because the ailment called worldly existence is caused by the beginning less series of diverse types of karmans accumulated by a soul and it is directly experienced in the form of birth, death etc. by every living being^[9] . The matter particles of karmans (i.e. pudgala of 办腻谤尘补峁嘺 惫补谤驳补峁嚹�) is called dravya karman and the feelings of attachment, aversion, which are born out of the rise of the various types of karmans, is called 产丑腻惫补 karman^[10] . Thus the worldly existence is neither imagery nor illusory as believed by the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 school of philosophy.

If the worldly existence of a soul is real then the state of liberation, which is achieved by getting rid of the worldly existence, should also be real. A soul is afflicted by a disease called worldly existence. If the soul destroys the cause, i.e. beginning less series of accumulated karmans, of the worldly existence, then the soul becomes free from the disease called worldly existence. The implied meaning of word liberation (mukti) is to be liberated from something. Here the soul is liberated from the disease called worldly existence. Hence the liberation is real and not imaginary^[11] . The 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophy posits that the worldly state of a soul is illusory. To support this tenet the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophers say that every substance has its own nature and a substance has inseparable connection (avin膩产丑腻惫补 蝉补峁僢补苍诲丑补) with its nature (sva产丑腻惫补). That is to say that the substance is necessarily connected with its own nature and vice-versa. The substance does not exist in the absence of its nature and on the contrary the presence of the nature proves the existence of its substance. If the nature of the substance changes a little, the substance must change. If the nature of the substance disappears then its substance ceases to exist.

Till now we are well informed that since beginning less time a soul possesses the ailment called worldly existence and the soul is released from this ailment through spirituality. Now if we consider the worldly existence as the nature of a soul, then we have to accept its inseparable connection with the soul. It implies that as soon as the worldly existence disappears, the soul becomes non-extant. If the soul ceases to exist, then who will be liberated from the ailment called worldly existence. This question arises for the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophers. Therefore they accept a soul to be pure and immaculate since beginning. If they think so, then they would face a new problem of believing the worldly state of a soul to be illusory. If the worldly state of a soul is illusory, then the worldly existence would definitely become unreal. If such is the case, then the state of liberation, achieved by getting freedom from the worldly state, has to be imaginary too. If the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophers consider the state of liberation to be real, then they have to accept the worldly existence to be genuine.

It is only the theory of non-absolutism (补苍别办腻苍迟补惫腻诲补) of the Jainism, which has a solution for this problem. The Jainism proposes that transformation (辫补谤颈峁嘺尘补苍补) is a nature of a soul. The soul as a substance (dravya) remains constant but its modes (辫补谤测腻测补) changes constantly. The soul is constant from substantial stand-point (dravy膩rthika naya) and continuously undergoing transformation from modal stand-point (pary膩y膩rthika naya). A soul possesses two types of traits. They are: Original traits (sahaja sva产丑腻惫补) and Imposed traits (vaibh膩vika sva产丑腻惫补). The knowledge (箩帽腻苍补), perception (诲补谤艣补苍补) etc. are called original traits which the soul possesses forever. Anger, pride, deceit etc. are called imposed traits which the soul possesses until it is associated with karmans. Both the traits are changeable. For example the soul gets angry in one moment and becomes egoistic in the next moment. Thus we can say that the imposed traits of the soul are changing. Moreover, when the soul is one-sensed living being, the clarity of knowledge is less whereas the same soul takes birth of a human being, the clarity of knowledge is more than the previous one. This is how even the original traits of a soul are of the nature of transformation^[12] .

If we acknowledge the transformation as the nature of a soul, we neither have to face the problem that the soul ceases to exist as soon as it gets rid of its nature called worldly state nor accept that the state of liberation is unreal. Here we can say that since beginning less time a soul has been suffering from the ailment called worldly existence and now the same soul is changed into the liberated soul. When a worldly soul leaves off certain features viz. birth, death, old age etc., which had characterized a worldly soul till now, the same soul acquires certain new ones viz. cessation of re-birth in the state of liberation. During this process of transformation the soul certainly retains its inherent nature^[13] .

It is said in the 叠丑腻峁�y补 of 罢补迟迟惫腻谤迟丑腻诲丑颈驳补尘补蝉耻迟谤补 that,

鈥溾赌� |yadiha manu峁�yatv膩din膩 pary膩ye峁嘺vyayata 膩tmano devatv膩din膩 pary膩ye峁噊t辫腻诲补岣� ek膩ntadhrauvye 膩tmani tattathaikasva产丑腻惫补tay膩'vasth膩bhed膩nupatte岣� | eva峁� ca sa峁僺膩r膩pavargabhed膩产丑腻惫补岣�|...:- siddhatvenotp膩dovyayo'sya sa峁僺膩ra产丑腻惫补to 箩帽别测补岣�| j墨vatvena 诲丑谤补耻惫测补峁� tritayayuta峁� sarvameva峁� tu ||5||鈥�^[14] .

There are two forms of a substance. They are: 1.Existence (产丑腻惫补) and 2. Nonexistence (a产丑腻惫补). Since the etymology of a word sva产丑腻惫补 (i.e. nature) is one鈥檚 own state of being, only existence form of a substance can be called the nature of the substance. Therefore Haribhadras奴ri says that by the nature of a soul we mean its very being, its existence and this nature accompanies is so long as it lasts (i.e. always)^[15] . If we consider non-existence as the nature of the substance then there will arise the 补迟颈辫谤补蝉补峁単补 诲辞峁�a^[16] .

Haribhadras奴ri gives an illustration of the substance namely Time (碍腻濒补) to explain the 补迟颈辫谤补蝉补峁単补 诲辞峁�a. The time passes away continuously. The past time never returns and the future moments cannot be lived in present time. It is only the present moment that exists. In other words we may say that there is non-existence (a产丑腻惫补) of the past and future moments in the present moment. The nature of the present (惫补谤迟补尘腻苍补) is to exist. Now, if we consider the nonexistence of the past and future moments as the nature of the present moment, then the past and future moments will accept the existing nature of the present. This is how the past and future moments exist. Thus the past and future moments will become the present only. Therefore there does not remain anything called past moments or future moments. Now the present has no contradiction with past and future moments because they have turned into present. Hence the present appears to be the eternal. The Buddhists believe that everything is momentary. Therefore they will also consider the present as momentary^[17] . We have seen that the present has become eternal. Thus the Buddhists will have to face the problem of self-contradiction if they admit the non-existence as the nature of a substance. Now if one does not consider the non-existence of the past and future moments as the nature of the present, then the present will have contradiction with the past and future moments. It is so because every present moment was once a past moment and will become the future moment too. Therefore there remains no distinct existence of the present. This is how the Buddhists, who believe in monetarism, face a problem in both the propositions^[18] .

The 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophers believe in the Absolute Eternalism. According to them an effect actually exists in its cause before the production. It is called the 厂补迟办腻谤测补惫腻诲补. The 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophers state that 鈥�sa eva 补苍测补迟丑腻 bhavati鈥�. The effect (sa), which is dormant in its cause, that only (eva) becomes apparent as an effect (补苍测补迟丑腻 bhavati). For example one can extract oil from a sesame seed and not from a particle of dust. Since beginning the effect called oil is present in its cause the sesame seed. Therefore the oil can be acquired from the sesame seed and not from the dust-particle.

The Buddhists, who believe in the Absolute Momentarism, state that:

鈥�sa eva na bhavati鈥�.

They are called 础蝉补迟办腻谤测补惫腻诲颈苍蝉. According to them an effect is non-existent in its cause before production.

The Buddhists, who believe in the Absolute Momentarism, find fault with the aforementioned statement of the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophers^[19] . The Buddhists pick two words 鈥�sa鈥� and 鈥�补苍测补迟丑腻鈥� from the statement made by the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophers. The Buddhists say that if it is 鈥榯hat鈥� (i.e. 鈥�sa鈥�) then how can it be something else (i.e. 鈥�补苍测补迟丑腻鈥�) and vice-versa? A same thing can never be both, i.e. 鈥榯hat鈥� and 鈥榮omething else鈥�^[20] . This is how the Buddhists say that the statement, made by 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophers, is self-contradictory. Haribhadras奴ri points out the similar type of self-contradiction in the above mentioned statement of the Buddhists. The word 鈥�sa鈥� denotes existence whereas the words 鈥�na bhavati鈥� stand for non-existence. Here Haribhadras奴ri states that how can be an existing substance becomes non-existing one? Thus the statement of the Buddhists is also faulty^[21] .

Moreover Haribhadras奴ri further mentions the other fault namely 鈥榬ise of non-existence鈥� in the statement of the Buddhists^[22] . According to the Buddhists every substance is momentary. A substance exists only for a moment and in the next moment it ceases to exist. When one says that the substance has ceased to exist, it means that it has become non-existent. That is the substance which was existing in the previous moment has taken the form of non-existence. When we say that the substance has become non-existent, it implies that the non-existence is born. In the first moment the existence takes place. In the next moment with the end of existence the nonexistence takes birth. Whatever is born definitely comes to an end. Here, the non-existence, which is born in the second moment, comes to an end in the third moment. The extinction of the non-existence is nothing but the rise of existence again^[23] . Therefore the extinction of the nonexistence and rise of the existence takes place on the same moment i.e. on the third moment. Now on the fourth moment again the extinction of existence will take place. On the first moment a substance exists, it becomes non-existent on the second moment, again on the third moment, with the extinction of non-existence of that substance, it comes to the existence, on the fourth moment the same substance becomes non-existent and on the fifth moment the same substance becomes existent again. This is how on the basis of the principle 鈥榚verything is momentary鈥� the Buddhists form such a chain of existence and non-existence of a substance where it no more remains momentary.

Further Haribhadras奴ri asks the Buddhists that what do they think about the nature of non-existence? Do they think the non-existence to be eternal or momentary? If they accept that the non-existence is eternal then the non-existence remains present forever. The eternality of the non-existence leaves no space for existence. If the non-existence of a substance becomes eternal then the substance can never exists^[24] . It is thus because two contradictory forms namely nonexistence and existence of one and the same substance can never be together. If the Buddhists say that the nature of non-existence is momentary, then they will face a new problem. The nonexistence of a substance is as momentary as the substance itself. The non-existence stays for a moment and then the destruction of the non-existence takes place. The emergence and destruction of the non-existence continues in chain ^[25] . Since it leads to nowhere, it is inappropriate. To sum up we may say that the Absolute Momentarism propounded by the Buddhists is irrelevant.

The 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophers, who believe in the Absolute Eternalism, posit that a soul possesses unchangeable eternity. It remains pure forever. It does not change even a little. It neither assumes new features nor loses anything. If the soul were eternally unchangeable, it could not undergo transformation from the life of a human to that of a celestial being and vice versa. The acceptance of absolute permanence would, moreover, obliterate the distinction between worldly life and the state of liberation and, consequently, the spiritual discipline for the achievement of liberation would lose all meaning^[26] .

Thus the Absolute Eternalism and Absolute Momentarism could neither justify the reality of two states of a soul i.e. the state of a worldly existence and the liberated state nor establish the fact that a substance viz. a soul flows through its constantly changing 鈥榤odes鈥� (辫补谤测腻测补) and thereby persists. According to Jainism all substances are real as they have existence. Existence is the combination of impermanence and permanence, modes and substance. What appear and disappear are modes. What persists is substance. The modes are impermanent, but the substance is permanent. The eternal soul, worldly or liberated, has modes that appear and disappear, leaving the soul intact^[27] . It is possible because transformation (辫补谤颈峁嘺尘补苍补) is the nature of a soul. For instance a soul who is angry has become calm. That is to say that appearance of calmness causes the anger to disappear. This is how the soul becomes anger-free. In the same way when a soul is released from the bondage of attachment, aversion etc., it is called liberated in true sense of terms.

Finally it is established that a soul is neither absolutely eternal nor momentary, it is changeably constant (pari峁嚹乵墨 nitya). The theory of change-cum-constancy is propounded by Jainism.

Various philosophical schools use different words for the state of liberation (苍颈谤惫腻峁嘺). Similarly every philosophical school defines the cause of worldly existence with different word. Some one believes that 诲颈诲峁沰峁Ｄ� is the cause of existence. While according to some it is 补惫颈诲测腻 which causes the worldly existence. Some call it sahaja mala and for some it is 产丑补惫腻诲丑颈办腻谤补^[28] . The word 诲颈诲峁沰峁Ｄ� is referred by the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophers. According to them the desire to see (诲颈诲峁沰峁Ｄ�) is the transformation of the 笔谤补办峁泃颈. That is to say that 笔谤补诲丑腻苍补, 笔谤补办峁泃颈, Buddhi, Mahat etc. are born from the 诲颈诲峁沰峁Ｄ�. The 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophers posit that 笔谤补办峁泃颈, the basic principle of materiality, undergoes transformation in the form of things of our everyday experience so long as and only so long as 笔耻谤耻峁�a, the basic principle of consciousness, suffers from the desire to see (诲颈诲峁沰峁Ｄ�). Even though 诲颈诲峁沰峁Ｄ�, 补惫颈诲测腻, sahaja mala etc. is the nature of a soul since beginning less time, it can be destroyed^[29] . If we do not believe that 诲颈诲峁沰峁Ｄ� etc. can be removed, then they will become original nature (sahaja sva产丑腻惫补) of a soul instead of its imposed nature (vaibh膩vika nature). Consequently the worldly existence, which is born out of 诲颈诲峁沰峁Ｄ� etc., would become eternal. If the worldly state of a soul is eternal, then how can a soul attain liberation^[30] ? On the contrary if one considers 诲颈诲峁沰峁Ｄ� etc. as unreal, then he has to accept the worldly existence, which is arisen from 诲颈诲峁沰峁Ｄ� etc., to be fake or imaginary. If the worldly existence is so, then the experience of worldly existence, which every worldly being has, should also be unreal.

It is said that if the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophers say that a living being鈥檚 experience of worldly existence is illusory, then what support do they have to justify their statement^[31] ? The 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophers tell that the fakeness of the worldly existence is confirmed by the yogic knowledge. The great seers have acknowledged that a soul is pure since the beginning and will remain so forever. Under the influence of 诲颈诲峁沰峁Ｄ�, 补惫颈诲测腻 etc. a soul acknowledges itself to be impure and worldly. Such acknowledgement of a soul is illusory and not real. Haribhadras奴ri replies that yogic knowledge is not something which a soul possesses from beginning. The yogic knowledge is obtained by a soul through practicing spirituality. It implies the two states of a soul i.e. without the yogic knowledge and with the yogic knowledge. If the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophers admit only one state of a soul, then they have to accept that the yogic knowledge, which is another state of a soul, is illusory. If the yogic knowledge is illusory, then how can such yogic knowledge mention the worldly existence to be imaginary^[32] ? However the yogic knowledge is real only. A soul did not have yogic knowledge previously. When the state of a soul changes from worldly existence to spirituality, the soul obtains the yogic knowledge. Just as the state of a soul changes, similarly the soul is worldly and then becomes liberated.

In the ordinary world only that person is called released from ailment who suffered from it in earlier time and now has become free from it. The person, who is still suffering from an ailment, cannot be called one released from the ailment. Moreover the non-existence of the person is not the state of freedom from the ailment. It is so because if a person is not existing, then whom to identify as one released from ailment? The person, who is healthy and no more suffering from any ailment, can never be called one released from the ailment^[33] .

Similarly three types of soul is not a liberated soul.

1. The soul who is worldly.
2. The complete absence of a soul.
3. The soul who is never polluted by worldly existence and free from the beginning only^[34] .

To sum up we may say that Haribhadras奴ri establishes three things while describing changeably constant (pari峁嚹乵墨 nitya) nature of a soul.

He says that:

1. Since beginning less time a soul is worldly.
2. Through practicing spiritual discipline the soul destroys its worldly existence and achieves the liberated state.
3. In the state of liberation a soul exists.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

The 艣补颈濒别艣墨 state is a meditative trance which a person performs on the eve of attaining liberation, which is characterized by a cessation of all bodily, mental and vocal operations and which signifies the attainment of fourteenth stage of spiritual development (驳耻峁嘺蝉迟丑腻苍补).

[2]:

tatra dr膩geva bhagav膩-nayog膩d yogasattam膩t |
产丑补惫补惫测腻诲丑颈k峁�aya峁� k峁泃v膩, 苍颈谤惫腻峁嘺峁� labhate param ||186||
-驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010).

[3]:

, 苍颈谤惫腻峁嘺峁� labhate 辫补谤补峁�, 产丑腻惫补苍颈谤惫腻峁嘺mityartha岣� ||186||
   -The Auto-commentary of 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010).

[4]:

k峁Ｄ�峁嘺vy膩dhiryath膩 loke,惫测腻诲丑颈尘耻办迟补 iti 蝉迟丑颈迟补岣� |
bhavarogyeva nu tath膩, muktastantre峁�u tatk峁�ay膩t ||206||
   - 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010).

[5]:

bhava岣モ�搒a峁僺膩ra eva mah膩vy膩dhi岣� |... ||188||
   -The Auto-commentary of 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010).

[6]:

ki峁� vi艣i峁ａ弓a ity膩ha鈥搄anmam峁泃yuvik膩rav膩n, jar膩diupalak峁�a峁嘺metat,... ||188||
   -Ibid

[7]:

bhava eva mah膩vy膩dhi-rjanmamat啷� yuvik膩rav膩n |
vicitramohajanana-st墨vrar膩g膩divedana岣� ||188||
   - 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010).

[8]:

mukhyo-nirupacarito aya峁�-产丑补惫补惫测腻诲丑颈岣� 膩tmano-j墨vasya |... ||189||
   -The Auto-commentary of 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010).

[9]:

mukhyo'yam膩tmano'n膩di-citrakarmanid膩naja岣� |
tath膩nubhavasiddhatv膩t, savarpr膩峁嘺bh奴t膩miti ||189||
   - 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010).

[10]:

an膩dicitrakarmanid膩naja岣モ�揹ravya产丑腻惫补bhedabhinnakarmabalotpanna ityartha岣� |... ||189||
   -The Auto-commentary of 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010).

[11]:

etanmukat艣ca mukto'pi, mukhya evopapadyate |
janm膩di诲辞峁�avigam膩t, tada诲辞峁�atvasa峁単ate岣� ||190||

..., mukhya evopapadyate prav峁泃tinimittabh膩v膩t |
tath膩 c膩''ha-janm膩di诲辞峁�avigam膩t k膩ra峁嚹乼 tada诲辞峁�atvasa峁単atestasya 诲辞峁�avato'诲辞峁�atvapr膩pteriti ||190||

鈥�驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 and its auto-commentary (2010)

[12]:

See lines: 8-13 of p. 130 of the 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (Gujarati), written by Yugabhushanavijaya (2005)

[13]:

迟补迟蝉惫补产丑腻惫辞辫补尘补谤诲别'辫颈, tattatsvabh膩vyayogata岣� |
tasyaiva hi tath膩bh膩v膩t, tada诲辞峁�atvasa峁単ati岣� ||191||
   - 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010)

[14]:

See lines: 25-27 of p.277 and lines: 19-20 of p.278 of 厂补产丑腻峁�y补迟补迟迟惫腻谤迟丑腻诲丑颈驳补尘补蝉奴迟谤补, published by Shreeparamashrutaprabhavaka Jainmandal, Mumbai in 1932 A.D.

[15]:

svo bh膩vo'syasvabh膩vo ya-nnij膩 sattaiva tattvata岣� |
bh膩v膩vadhiraya峁� yukto, n膩'nyath膩'tiprasag峁単ata岣� || 192||
   - 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010).

[16]:

| bh膩v膩vadhiraya峁� 测耻办迟补岣�鈥搒惫补产丑腻惫辞'苍补苍迟补谤辞诲颈迟补岣�, n膩'nyath膩 测耻办迟补岣� |
ku ta ity膩ha鈥摬钩倬北璋�补蝉补峁単补ta iti ||192||
   -The auto-commentary of 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010).

[17]:

补苍补苍迟补谤补办峁�a峁嚹乥丑奴迟颈岣モ赌揵丑腻惫颈办峁�a峁嚹乥丑奴迟颈谤颈迟测补谤迟丑补岣�, 膩tmabh奴teha yasya tu-惫补谤迟补尘腻苍补sya v膩dino v膩 | tasya 诲辞峁�am膩ha-tay膩 - anantarak峁�a峁嚹乥h奴ty膩 avirodh膩t k膩ra峁嚹乨 vatarm膩nabh膩vena, 办颈尘颈迟测腻丑补-nityo'sau vatarm膩na岣�sy膩t, tadvat 蝉补诲腻 tad产丑腻惫补diti |... ||193||
   -Ibid.

[18]:

anantarak峁�a峁嚹乥h奴ti-r膩tmabh奴teha yasya tu |
迟补测腻'惫颈谤辞诲丑腻苍苍颈迟测辞'蝉补蝉补耻, sy膩dasan v膩 sadaiva hi ||193||
   - 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010)

[19]:

sa eva na bhavatyeta-d补苍测补迟丑腻 产丑补惫补迟墨tivat |
惫颈谤耻诲诲丑补峁� 迟补苍苍补测腻诲别惫补, tadutpatty膩ditastath膩 ||194||
   - 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010)

[20]:

| sa hi 鈥� sa ev膩'nyath膩 产丑补惫补迟墨 鈥�tyukte evam膩ha - 鈥�yadi sa eva, katham补苍测补迟丑腻 bhavati? 补苍测补迟丑腻 ced bhavati 办补迟丑补峁� sa?鈥� iti |.. ||194||
   -The Auto-commentary of 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010)

[21]:

| etacca 鈥� sa eva na 产丑补惫补迟墨 鈥�tyatr膩'pi sam膩nameva | tath膩hi - 鈥�yadi sa eva, 办补迟丑补峁� na bhavati? abhavan v膩 办补迟丑补峁� sa eva?鈥� iti viruddhametat |... ||194||
   -Ibid

[22]:

| abhyuccayam膩ha-tadutpatty膩dita ityabh膩votpatty膩de岣� tath膩-viruddhamiti ||194||
etad产丑腻惫补nayaiva''ha鈥�sato'sattve tadat啷� 辫腻诲补-stato n膩艣o'pi tasya yat |
tanna峁ａ弓asya punar产丑腻惫补岣�, 蝉补诲腻 n膩艣e na tatsthiti岣� ||195||
   - 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 and its auto-commentary (2010)

[23]:

sato-产丑腻惫补sya asattve'bhyupagamyam膩ne 鈥� sa eva na bhavati 鈥� iti vacan膩t, 办颈尘颈迟测腻丑补-tadat啷� 辫腻诲补 ityasattvot辫腻诲补岣� |
办腻诲腻肠颈迟办补迟惫别苍补 tata-utp膩d膩t n膩艣o'pi tasy膩'sattvasya, 鈥�yadat啷� pattimat tadanitya 鈥�尘颈迟颈办峁泃惫腻, yad-yasm膩deva峁� tat-tasm膩t, na峁ａ弓asya sattvasya punar产丑腻惫补stane啷坴a rupe峁嘺, tadasattvavin膩艣膩nyath膩nupapatta岣ム�� |... ||195||
   -The Auto-commentary of 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010)

[24]:

鈥� | atha n膩艣o n膩艣膩tman膩 bh膩v膩t 辫谤腻办 pa艣c膩cc膩'vasthita eva-etad膩艣a峁卥y膩''ha-蝉补诲腻 n膩艣e abhyupagamyam膩ne, 办颈尘颈迟测腻丑补 - na tatsthiti岣�-vivak峁�itak峁�a峁噀'pi tann膩艣膩diti ||195||
   -Ibid

[25]:

sa k峁�a峁嘺sthitidharm膩ced, dvit墨y膩dik峁�a峁噀'sthitau |
yujyate hayetadapyasya, tath膩 cokt膩natikrama岣� ||196||
k峁�a峁嘺sthitau tadaiv膩'sya, n膩'sthitiryuktyasa峁単ate岣� |
na pa艣c膩dapi s膩 neti, sato'sattva峁僾yavasthitam ||197||
   - 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010)

[26]:

tadabh膩ve ca 蝉补峁僺腻谤墨, mukta艣ceti niratharkam |
迟补迟蝉惫补产丑腻惫辞辫补尘补谤诲辞'蝉测补, n墨ty膩 t膩ttvika i峁�yat膩m ||199||
   -Ibid

[27]:

For detail see 5.29 to 5.32 verses of the 罢补迟迟惫腻谤迟丑腻诲丑颈驳补尘补蝉奴谤补.

[28]:

诲颈诲峁沰峁Ｄ�'vidy膩malabhav膩dhik膩r膩di,... |... ||200||
   -The auto-commentary of 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010)

[29]:

诲颈诲峁沰峁Ｄ乨y膩tmabh奴ta峁� ta-nmukhyasya nivartate |
pradh膩n膩dinaterhetu-stadabh膩v膩nna tannati岣� ||200||
   - 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010)

[30]:

补苍测补迟丑腻sy膩diya峁� nitya-me峁Ｄ� ca bhava ucyate |
eva峁� ca bhavanityatve, 办补迟丑补峁� muktasya 蝉补尘产丑补惫补岣�? ||201||
   -Ibid

[31]:

补惫补蝉迟丑腻 tattvato no ce-nnanu tatpratyaya岣� katham? |
bhr膩nto'ya峁� kimaneneti?, m膩namatra na vidyate ||202||
   -Ibid

[32]:

yogi箩帽腻苍补峁� tu m膩na峁� cet?, tad补惫补蝉迟丑腻ntara峁� nu tat |
迟补迟补岣� ki峁�? bhr膩ntametat sy膩-d补苍测补迟丑腻 siddhas膩dhyat膩 ||203||
   -Ibid

[33]:

vy膩dhitastadabh膩vo v膩, tadanyo v膩 yathaiva hi |
vy膩dhimukto na sann墨ty膩, kad膩cidupapadyate ||204||

惫测腻诲丑颈迟补岣�鈥搒补帽箩腻迟补惫测腻诲丑颈谤别惫补, tadabh膩vo v膩, tadanyo v膩鈥搗y膩dhit膩nyo v膩 tatputr膩di岣�, yathaiva hivy膩dhimukto na tray膩峁嚹乵eko'pi, sann墨ty膩鈥搒anny膩yena kad膩cidupapadayata iti 诲峁涐梗峁�膩n迟补岣� ||204||

鈥� 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 and its auto-commentary (2010)

[34]:

蝉补峁僺腻谤墨 tadabh膩vo v膩, tadanyo v膩 tathaiva hi |
mukto'pi hanta no mukto, mukhyav峁泃tyeti tadvida岣� ||205||
k峁Ｄ�峁嘺vy膩dhiryath膩 loke,惫测腻诲丑颈尘耻办迟补 iti 蝉迟丑颈迟补岣� |
bhavarogyeva nu tath膩, muktastantre峁�u tatk峁�ay膩 ||206||
- 驰辞驳补诲峁涐梗峁璱蝉补尘耻肠肠补测补 (2010)