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After clearing out the doubts regarding the Nirdosatva of the Lord, Vadiraja takes up for criticism the Advaita 449 concept of Ainana. nescience to Brahman. The Advaitins attribute Ajnana or They say that Brahman is the Asraya

134 (locus) and Visaya (object) of Ajnana. 450 And it is said that He, because of this, undergoes Samsara (transmigration). If all this is admitted, then Nirdosatva or defectlessness of the Lord would become baseless. Vadiraja states that Brahman can be neither the Asraya nor the Visaya of nescience. By superimposition of Alnana, only erroneous experience will result and that will lead to attaining states like Jivabhava. But the superimposition of nescience on Brahman is impossible. Because, according to the Advaita, superimposition is of two types: (1) Tadatmyamistaking one entity for another and (2) Dharmaropa mistaking the attributes of one entity as the attributes of another entity, mistaking the attributes of body such as 451 Sthulatva, etc., as the attributes of the self. ropa But Brahman has no such erroneous experience of two kinds. It > cannot be said "Ainanam Brahma" which means Ainana cannot be attributed to or transferred to Brahman saying "Brahma 452 Ajnanam. # Thus Ainanaropa is not possible in Brahman. And the experience as Ajnoham "I am ignorant" involves no superimposition. It is only the experience of Siddhajnana. It may be superimposition only when association of nescience in that, is regarded as superimposed, For this, presence of nescience must be there somewhere before and same is to be wrongly associated with Brahman by superimposing t

135 the attributes of that. But in the Advaita, there is no 454 another entity" other than Brahman, which can be the locus and object. Presence of nescience cannot be regarded as superimposed. And in the Advaita, nescience is not a different and independent entity. According to them, it 455 is Brahmasrita or associated with Brahman and not Anyasrita. To have erroneous experience in Brahman, there should be nescience before, then it is to be superimposed. The expression "I am ignorant" may be erroneous in him, who has no nescience. And it is not erroneous in him, who has nescience. f So, in the Advaita, Ajnanasamsargaropa is not possible since, nescience is already associated with Brahman. So, there is no question of superimposition as such. And this association cannot be treated as superimposition. So, the expression- "I am ignorant" is not erroneous one. The superimposition of nescience might be possible, if Brahman is considered an Adhara or substratum of nescience and the attributes of Adharatva (state of being substratum) of Ajnana are seen. But, the Advaita Brahman feels Itself as 'It is ignorant.' So the experience of ignorance is not all erroneous. Moreover, unless the superimposition of nescience is proved, the superimposition of its association cannot be proved and vice versa. The superimposition of nescience in Brahman is not possible since, nescience is not an independent and different entity. So, in the form of cognition "I am ignorant," there is no

} 136 Aropa of Tadatmya, and Samsarga as shown above. 456 In the statement "I am ignorant," if Ajnanaropa is accepted, then there would be Apasiddhanta i.e., the very concept of their Siddhanta will collapse. For, according to the Advaita, nescience is associated with the very nature of Brahman and it is the root cause of the experienced such as "I am ignorant" etc., So how can either the nescience or its association be superimposed? The association of pot and earth is not at all superimposed (not imagined). It is real. So nescience being present with Brahman, is not erroneous, but it is to be accepted as real and non-erroneous. And Brahman is declared as Nirdosa or defectless in the 458 Advaita. If association of nescience is referred to Brahman then the very Nirdosatva will be no more. And nescience cannot become erroneous to itself. It may cause erroneous experience such as pride etc., which are seen in the embodied soul. So it is evident that Ajnana is Jivasrita and not Brahmasrita. Thus, superimposition of nescience 457 in Brahman is not tenable. The nescience is eternal and hence there is no first and second nescience as such. Even if it is taken for granted, the latter does not become the cause of the defect of erroneous experience to the former. But, it may become the cause of the ascertainment of nescience as in darkness.459 Bhrama is possible, only when something is understood in its absence. In the same way, erroneous

137 experience (Bhrama) may get originated, only when superimposition of nescience or its association is possible. As shown above, the superimposition of Ajnana is impossible. All this has been said and thus proved that the Advaita concept of Ajnana remains unproved. Really speaking, in the eternity of Ainana, it cannot become the cause of superimposition of latter Ajnana. Moreover, at the time of the ascertainment or apprehension (in the case of experience as "I am ignorant), nescience cannot become the cause of 460 1 Bhrama (its superimposition). Because, cause should precede 461 the effect. Ajnana being Ajnana being a Dosa or defect, should give rise to Bhrama (erroneous experience). But here, both nescience 462 and erroneous experience become mutually cause and effect. It means whenever there is nescience, there is apprehension of erroneous experience and whenever there is erroneous experience, there is nescience, (defect). Thus, the view is affected by Anyonyasraya-dosa or the fallacy of mutual 463 dependence. Now the erroneousness cannot be said as born 464 of nescience because according to the Advaita, even this erroneous experience of nescience is cognized by Saksin. And this Saksin is eternal and unborn. So in "I am ignorant," the knowledge of it, is cognized by eternal Saksin, And this experience is unborn and not erroneous. Whatever is not born of defect (nescience) is not erroneous experience. 465 SO, the expression "I am ignorant" does not accept Ainana as

I 138 Brahmasrita, since there is no any valid proof. But it is clear that it is Jivabrita or associated with soul, where its effects such as pride, arrogance etc., are clearly perceptible. So, the association of nescience in Brahman is just imagined and baseless. Thus, in Brahman, as there is no nescience, there is no erroneous experience. In the Advaita, the self is Nirvisesa (devoid of all characteristics). So, how can there be defect of nescience and the erroneous experience from that in It? The Nirvisesatva view of the self (Brahman) does not permit nescience to be the cause of erroneous experience. So nescience concept of the Advaita is not tenable. 466 Now, if nescience is not superimposed, then it must be real. When it is real there is the loss of the Advaita. Not only this, the world created by this should also be declared as real. Because, when the cause is regarded as real then the effect must also be real. The real cause By this, the Bheda does not give rise to an unreal effect. or difference is also established and because of real nescience it remains unsublated so far as cognition is concerned. And according to the Advaita, whatever is real, 467 like Brahman, never disappears. So, the real nescience remains as it is and because of this there is no Moksa or liberation. Moksa is cessation of nescience. When nescience

} ' is real like Brahman there is no cessation and hence there is no liberation. 468 Thus, the doctrines in the form of branches of the tree of the Advaita, such as identity, liberation fall one by one, since the very root Ainana of the Advaita-tree is not firm. 139 } According to the Advaita, Pratikarmavyavasthiti means when the nescience which is Bandhaka or binder and the veil of an object, is removed by the preception of direct cognition (Aparoksajnana), then that entity becomes an object $ of knowledge Cetana. This is Pratikarmavyavasthitih. As shown above, when the cessation of real nescience is impossible, then Pratikarmavyavasthitih is baseless. Thus, nescience as contended by the Advaitins, is nowhere found as proved so far. So, Brahman does not get associated or affected by this nescience and for It there is no necessity to attain state of soul and see the world. to Thus, there is no nescience as such; even if it is real (in the Jiva) its products such as world etc., are also real. So, acceptance of the concept of nescience by the Advaita leads to baseless and impossible conclusions. Thus, the whole tree of the Advaita with nescience as its root, when uprooted, collapses And there remains nothing as a topic for the allh completely. 469 Advaita Sastra. 470 Now "I am ignorant" and other statements " give the sense that nescience is present in soul since he $ 1

has such experience. How can it be then Brahmasrita? For 140 $ Pramana (valid means) is somewhere and Prameya or an object i of knowledge is elsewhere. Pramana is the experience of soul and how can Brahman be an object of knowledge of this? 1 1 And even by the fact of Aikya (identity) in Brahman and Jiva, nescience cannot be attributed to Brahman. If attributed, then there will be the defect of Anyonyasraya (mutual dependence). When identity is proved, nescience as Brahma- srita is proved and when nescience as Brahmasrita is proved then the identity is proved. Thus, there is Anyonyasrayadosa. So nescience is impossible in Brahman, The -472 Bhagavadgita clearly shows that the Lord is Sarvajna or And by this Omniscient and Arjuna is Alpaina or knowing little. And these two qualities are mutually contradictory. statement, it is evident that the Lord has the perception of His Sarvainatva omniscience for ever. So, nescience seen in the soul cannot be associated with Brahman, is also not approved of by Sruti, Smrti etc. Thus, nescience Now, even the Jiva does not become the locus of nescience. If it is to be the locus of nescience, then it would be earlier to nescience. And if nescience is proved, then the Jiva is proved, and if Jiva is proved then only it can be a locus of nescience. If it is contended that Brahman, owing to Ajnana, attains Jivabhava, then the Jiva has to be admitted as distinct

141 since beginningless' evident. 472 A and by this Bheda-difference becomes So to avoid this, the Advaitins have to declare that Jiva is Ajnanakalpita. So, when it is Ajnanakalpita, 473 then also there is the defect of mutual dependence. And, this defect of mutual dependence is more severe, than the defect of endless regression (Anavastha).. Because, in Anavastha (as in seed and sprout), the relation of mutual i cause cannot be decided and it is not deformed and moreover, it does not create any Ayatharthajnana (the tree is not born of the seed of the same tree). Whereas in mutual dependence, the state of cause and effect is defective, So nescience is not a Visava or object at all. Brahman is not Asraya or locus of this nescience (of superimposed nature). If it is admitted that nescience present in soul is also there in Brahman, then Brahman Itself owing to Ajnana should attain JIvabhava. By this knowledge of identity, experience of a Jiva should also be seen in all, i.e., nescience of one soul should be in all and experience of one soul must be there in all. To avoid this crisis, if Wavaharikabheda (empirical difference) is allowed to flourish, then the experience as 1 "I am ignorant" does not prove nescience in Brahman, So Jiva is ignorant, he is not the Lord and creator of the world. He, who is the Lord and creator, has no ignorance, i The association of Bhrama (illusion) of nescience is impossible

142 in Brahman. 474 475 In Srutis also, it is clearly stated that, soul is associated with Ainana since eternity and this Ajnana (positive) is of Abhavarupa (negative) and Bhavarupa /as it veils the understanding of the nature of knowledge, bliss etc. There is no Ajnana in the sense of 'self,' but only in respect of the content of knowledge, bliss etc., of 'self. So in "I am ignorant" Ajnana is of Abhavarupa. Otherwise, the Samsara (with Bhavarupajnana) would have to be declared as Moksa. If there is realisation of the pleasure of self, then 476 that state is called Mukti And there is no rule as such, that without the knowledge of the Svarupasukha (Bhava), there cannot be knowledge of its Abhava as there is no knowledge of the objects without the light, Because as, for the cognition (perception) of darkness, light is not required. So also for knowledge of Abhava, knowledge of Svarupasukha (Bhava) is not necessarily required, So just giving up of the rigidity of the rule as knowledge is ever dependent on an object, it is to be accepted that Svarupa knowledge is common and general and knowledge of its qualities such as bliss etc., are particular and peculiar. So "I am ignorant" means, the sense of I (self) is general and common and ignorant means 477 Abhavarupajnana of the qualities of self (Avacchedaka). Thus, in this context, the problem is whether an object of which Ajnana is talked of, is known or not, For this the Advaitins have no solution. But in the Dvaita, the solution

143 is shown as above (with the help of the Samanya and Visesa). Without the distinction of Samanya and Visesa if I Jhanabhava (absence of knowledge) is meant as Atyantabhava (total non-existence) then the Atyantabhava is Sunya and its knowledge would become absolutely real as Brahman. 1 (It is as good as saying the Sunya is also real). Because knowledge of Pratiyogin of Atyantabhava is real as Brahman. So, the Sunya (a Pratiyogin of Atyantabhava) should also be real. 478 Then, if Jnana of Jnanabhava is not accepted, it is as good as negating the Jnana itself, which is impossible as a blind by birth cannot negate the presence of variegated and colourful earth. There is nothing which is absolutely unknown since there is no evidence. (It means, everything including Jnanabhava, is cognized in the form of knowledge). 479 So, Jnana of Jhanabhava is to be accepted. As nescience is accepted, likewise let absence of knowledge also be accepted in the form of knowledge. Thus, there are two aspects (Ajnana and Jhanabhava) to be put on. May be Bhavarupajnana or Abhavarupajnana, there is no so much distinction since Ajonatatva is common to both. If Bhavarupajnana is accepted, as it is a partial view that causes the loss of the Advaita. According to the Dvaita view, there is no

144 480 Abhava of Jnanasamanya since Saksijnana is eternal one. And so far as Abhava is concerned, it is there in the Visesajnana of the Jivas. But it is not there in Brahman, since So in the experience of Jiva as "I am ignorant" He is Sarvajna. the Ainana is of Abhavarupa of Visesajnana. So as to say it does not mean that Jiva has no samanyainana of Brahman, but he lacks Visesajnana which is Abhavarupa. I 480 A If some one says that he does not understand Brahman, it means he has no direct cognition of Brahman through eye: (He lacks Visesainana of Brahman or lacks Sastrajnana pertaining to Brahman) but he may be having Samanyajnana. 'to' The Ajnana does not mean total negation of Jnana but only absence of Visesajnana. So the statement "I am ignorant" does not negate Paroksajnana gained by the study of Sastras, but it negates only the Aparoksajnana (direct cognition) of Brahman. Here the same is applied to the Advaitins, because the Bhavarupajnana although conceals the nature of Brahman (Brahmaparoksa) it does not negate the Jnana gained by the Sastras. The Advaitins contend that they do not understand It (Brahman) even after gaining Its knowledge by the Sastras. 480 B $ In the Dvaita, there is no impossibility of cognition (Jnana) of Ajnana (Jnanabhava). 481 According to the Advaita, Brahmajnana is not competent to remove Ajnana but it is the

145 Manovrttijnana, that removes the Ajnana. But this view is not tenable since it is as good as saying that a king, impossible to be killed by the sharp weapons of his enemies, is slain by the sword of his own at home. The Vrttijnana is originated from Avidya (Ajnana). How can this Vrttijnana remove the Ajnana which cannot be removed by Brahmajnana? (knowledge of Brahman or absolute knowledge)? So the view of the Advaitins is contradictory to the sruti and reason as well. And Brahmajnana is Ajada (sentient) and Vottijnana is Jada (insentient). So how can this Vattijnana which is insentient, remove the nescience? One Jada cannot kill another Jada as it is originated from that. It is impossible. Really speaking, the very contention as Vrttijnana originates from insentient Ajnana (nescience) is unsound. The mind (Vrttijnana) only when having association of the Svarupajnana, becomes capable to cognize the objects. So how then does the mind (Vittijnana) become competent to remove nescience without Svaruoajnana? For the removal of nescience, connection of Svarupajnana is necessary. Otherwise, neither can it (Manovrttijnana)cognize the objects nor can it remove the nescience since it is insentient. 482 Only with the help of Cetanasakti of Svarupainana, the two above mentioned capacities are seen in Vrttijnana. 483 So the nescience stands undestroyed., Thus, having disregarded the nescience, Vadiraja takes up

$ 146 the Bhrama (illusion) of the Advaitins for refutation. This illusion is also a product of nescience, If it is said that Brahman cognizes the Siddhajagat, then it is not the Bhrama. And if at all it (Jagat) becomes the product (Kalpita) of illusion to which nescience is the cause, then it (Jagat) would be eternal (Sarvakalikanitya) being Brahmakalpita. As long as the world is there, nescience is also there and eternal Brahman is also there. And as Brahman and nescience are eternal, Brahman would have the cognition of the world for ever, Because as long as nescience is there, illusion is also there, and Jagat a product (Kalpita) of that nescience is cognized without destruction (Pralaya) since the power of cognition of Brahman is eternal and indestructible. Thus, 15" illusion, also Nitya. The Adrsta, Kala etc., cannot be of Bhrama. treated as the cause of Pralaya, since they are also products 484 The Advaitins quoting the sruti passage- "Mayinantu mahesvaram" contend that Maya is in Brahman. But here the term Maya means Prakrti (primal matter). So Mayin does not give the sense of Brahman having Maya. The term Mayin does not attribute Maya to Brahman. Brahman does not get bound by Maya like the term Cakrin, referring to a potter, does not make him get bound by the wheel. As a potter makes use of the wheel in manufacturing the pots and the like, Brahman also makes use of Maya in creating this world. 1 As the wheel is under the control of the potter, the

147 Maya is also under the control of Brahman. So Mayin means 485 He, with Maya under His control. Brahman, although Mayin is Mayadura like a king, although in forest is called Dhanin. How can Brahman get affected by Maya (Ajnana) when He is declared as Sarvajna? He, who is Omniscient has no Aimana. Brahman is Sarvaina in the sense, He is an embodiment of eternal power of cognition and cognizes Himself and the whole world. So attributing nescience to Omniscient is as good as saying that a mother is a barren woman, which 486 is self-contradictory. The sruti proclaims that Brahman 486 A means. my is Asanga (having no association of Ainana as such). And it cannot be argued that, it is only by means of Ainana, that Brahman gains the knowledge of the world (contact of the world) and without Ainana His Sarvajnatva is no more. Because, Ajnana need not play the role of conductor since Brahmagetana is all pervasive and need not be helped by any And very naturally Brahman has the contact with all the objects. The Advaitins explain the term Asanga as Brahman, 486 B in Its nature, is devoid of any contact. In the Dvaita view, Asanga means Brahman, not affected by the association of the world. Really speaking, the Advaitins cannot explain the term since, in their view, Brahman is associated with nescience always. But in the Dvaita, Brahman is Asanga in the sense that He is all pervasive which means although having associated with the world, He is disassociated in the sense 487 So the very He does not get affected by that association. i

148 * } } } Sruti passage Asanga wards off even the association of Ajnana in, Brahman. But it does not rule out the association or the contact of other things other than the Ajnana. Because, Asanga-sruti not merely discard the defect of Ajnana but discards other defects (demerits) also. Otherwise, this Sruti would oppose other Sruti passages such as Niranisto 487 A So the Asanga-sruti negates the association of defective things such as Ajnana and the like, and it does not negate the association of meritorious and auspicious qualities. The Asanga-sruti, admitting meritorious and niravadhyah. auspicious qualities in Brahman such as Sarvesvaratva, SarvaO' yapitva, Sarvakartrtva etc., does not admit creation of defective world. It means, because, Lord Brahman is Sarvakarta. He does not create any illusory world, but creates a real world. And by this very creation, He is not affected by any Dosa. i } Thus, the term Asanga gives the sense of the absence of the contact of demerits or defects. The creation of the world does not make Him to be defective, whereas it proves His Sarvainatva, Sarvakartrtva, Sarvavyapitva etc. So, this sruti describes that Brahman has the association of the Prakrti (primal-matter) and at the same time it negates the association of the defects such as Karman, Ajnana, Duhkha etc. And the sruti-Niranisto niravadhyah does not negate the f association of meritorious qualities, but negates the association of demerits. The Asangasruti also suggests that Brahman

150 nescience are two different, separate, distinct, opposite and contradictory aspects. Therefore, Madhva has stated in his Upadhikhandana, that Ajnana can never be attributed to Brahman 491 who is Omniscient (Akhilasamvetr). Now it cannot be said that let there be Ajnana in the presence of Jnana. Because, then the prefix a (giving the sense of negation) becomes hum i futile, or else, Ajnana should mean the knowledge of Brahman 491 A since 嘟� denotes Lord Visnu. So His knowledge is Afnana. And Brahman has no Vrttijnana (since He has no mind which is Prakrta). So there is no question of getting affected His Svarupajnana as shown above and also Manasikajnana since there is no material mind, Thus there is no nescience in 492 Brahman. lu 1 nescience. j The world, including mind is the product of Before creation there was no nescience since there was no world as such. How can then the forming or fashioning of these be possible? So there is neither nescience nor illusion in Brahman. When it is proved that Brahman has no Manasikajnana (Vittijnana) how then its nescience (if taken for granted) be removed? Because, in the Advaita, Ajnana is to be removed by Vrttijnana, And it is foolish to say that nescience of Brahman would be removed by Vrttijnana of the Jivas forming in future. Because, nescience of one cannot be removed by the Vrttijnana of another. And if the Advaitins say that this is possible because of the identity of Brahman and embodied soul, then as shown earlier, there would be

151 Anyonyasraya (if there is nescience in Brahman there is identity and if there is identity there can be nescience in Brahman). It also cannot be said that it is possible as Brahman attains the Jivabhava through Its nescience because it amounts to saying that nescience is there along with Jnana (true knowledge) which is a self-contradiction. it is proved that Vrttijnana of soul cannot remove the nescience of Brahman. As Brahman is veiled (or concealed) Now by nescience, there is no chance for soul to gain true knowledge since he is identical with Brahman in the Advaita, Let the Vrttijnana, a product of nescience, destroy not only the nescience (even if taken for granted) but also true knowledge since it is understood that it is present always with Ajnana in Brahman and both of them are not contradictory, as Ainana is not going to be destroyed by Jnana. This view becomes opposed to the sruti passage- Prstvaiva tam mucyate (Realising It one gets liberated), because, according to this view neither Samsara nor Ainana can be destroyed. Further, it is to be accepted that nescience has only resisting power towards the origin of true knowledge. Otherwise, the Srutipassages relating to the destruction of Ajnana by Jnana become futile. 493 A Now this nescience cannot be destroyed by Manasajnana. Because, Manasainana related to Brahman, is insentient according

152 to the Advaita. The Acit element of this Jnana is not capable to destroy the Ajnana. And if the Cit element is regarded as competent as it is the very nature of Brahman, then there is no scope for Ainana to be there in Brahman. So the Bhavarupajnana which is Nitya as contended by the Advaitins, is not at all there in the Lord.