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The Pramanyavada (the theory of validity of knowledge) is an important topic taken up by the different systems of Indian philosophy. The term 'pramanya' is derived from the word 'pramana' with suffix 'snya" and means 'the nature of a pramana'. 135 It is of two types, svatahpramanya and paratah- pramanya. 135. Tarkasamgraha p. 323.

151 The Mimamsaka accepts the theory of Svatahpramanyavada. It may be translated as the theory of the self-validity of knowledge or intrinsic 136 validity of knowledge. All apprehension is intrinsically valid. All knowledge is valid by itself. It is not validated by any other knowledge. Its validity arises from those vary causes from which knowledge itself arises. Validity of knowledge is arises from the essential nature of the causes of knowledge. It is not due to any extraneous conditions.Prabhakara and Kumarila both uphold the intrinsic validity of knowledge. Prabhakara says: 'all cognitions as cognitions are valid; there invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their objects.' Kumarila also says: 'the validity of knowledge consists in its apprehending an object; it is set aside by such inconsistencies as its disagreement with the real nature the object.' All knowledge, therefore is presumably valid and our normal life runs smooth on account of this belief. It can be explained by taking the following examples when a rope is mistaken for a snake, the knowledge of the rope-snake is invalidated by the subsequent knowledge of the rope. Similarly, if a person suffering from jaundice sees a conch yellow, the knowledge of the yellow conch is invalidated on account of the defect in the organ of vision, - 136. tatra gurunam mate jnanasya svaprakasarupatvat tajjnanapramanyam tenaiva grhyate. Bhattanam mate jnanam atindriyam, jnanajanya jnatata pratyaksa, taya ca jnanam anumiyate. Murarimisranam mate anuvyavasayena jnanam grhyate. Sarvesam api mate tajjnanavisayakajnanena tajjnanapramanyam grhyate. Bhasapariccheda pp. 523- 524.

152 that is on account of the presence of the bile pigments in the eye. Though the invalidity of knowledge is inferred, yet knowledge itself is intrinsically presumed to be valid. Its validity is not subject to inference. The Mimamsaka advocates the self validity of knowledge both in respect of its origin (utpatti) and ascertainment (jnapti). The validity of knowledge arises together with that knowledge and it is also known as soon as that knowledge is known. The very conditions which give rise to knowledge also give rise to its validity as well as to the belief in that validity. Validity of knowledge and knowledge of that validity arise together with that knowledge and from those very conditions which give rise to that knowledge. Neither validity nor belief in that validity is due to any external condition and neither requires any verification by anything else. From these facts two conclusions are drawn by the Mimamsakas, (i) the validity of knowledge arises from the very conditions that give rise to that knowledge and not from any extra conditions. (ii) The validity of knowledge is also known as soon as the knowledge arises; belief does not await the verification of the knowledge by some other knowledge, say, an inference. This Mimamsa view, in its double aspect, is known as the theory of intrinsic 137 validity. Kumarila says, "intrinsic validity belongs to all sources of right knowledge, for a power by itself non-existence cannot be brought into being by another. 138 Knowledge may be mediated by the senses, inferential marks 137. Slokavartika 2.1.1. as quoted in An Introduction to Indian Philosophy 138. svatah svarva-pramananam pramanyam iti gamyatam / na hi svato'sati saktih kartum anyena sakyate. Slokavartika 2. 47.

153 and the like, but it reveals objects by itself and gives rise to a sense of its own validity. If we are to wait till we ascertain the purity of the causes, we have to wait for the origination of another cognition due to other causes, and so on ad infinitum. 139 The other schools of Indian philosophy also have put forward divergent opinions regarding validity of knowledge. According to Samkhya, validity and invalidity are intrinsic and need no reference to external grounds for their verification. The Samkhyas believe in the theory of causation which is known as satkaryavada, which means, that the effect exists in the material cause even before it is produced So, they say that validity and invalidity, which are present in all knowledge, are intrinsic and manifested by merits and demerits of the cause, since what is absolutely non-existent cannot consistently be produced If it is said to be consistent, the result would be that even sky flower could be produced But a specific effect can be produced only from its specific cause. A cloth can be produced only from threads. From this the conclusion is drawn that the effect exists in the material cause even before its production or appearance. The function of the causal conditions on this account is not without any utility, because that is for the sake of manifestation. Therefore, just like the manifestation of the cloth by the function of the causal conditions, there is only the manifestation of the validity and invalidity by merits and demerits. Hence both the validity and invalidity are intrinsic. 140 139. Slokavartika 2. 49-51. 140. tasmat karaka-vyaparad ghatadyabhivyaktivad gunadosabhyam pramanyapramanyayor abhivyaktir eva ityubhyam api svatah. Manomeyodaya p.180.

154 The Buddhists believe that validity is extrinsic but argue that the 141 invalidity is intrinsic. According to them any verbal knowledge is ipso facto false, being infected by concepts (vikalpas). Here it may be mentioned that, according to the Buddhists, knowledge of an object which arises for the first time alone is valid and all other knowledge regarding the object which arises later on are invalid. The latter is not valid because it apprehends what has already been apprehended According to the Naiyayikas, the validity of empirical knowledge is extrinsic. It has to be verified by inference from conditions, that is to say, from other knowledge. They say that validity is extrinsic in the case of production and apprehension. If validity requires the causes of the knowledge for its production, there would be validity even in the case of invalid knowledge, since there are causes of the knowledge. If they are not present, the production of the knowledge would be inconsistent. Invalidity does not require the causes of the knowledge, because on the strength of the same reason already stated, the result would be invalid even in the case of valid knowledge. So, the 141. kincapramanyam apyevam svata, eva prasajyate, na hi svato satas tasya kutascid api sambhavah. Tarkasamgraha p. (II) 911.

155 Production of validity is due to merits of the sense-organs and the production of invalidity is due to their demerits or defects. 142 These are summarized by Madhavacarya as follows: According to the Samkhya both validity (pramanatva) and invalidity (apramanatva) of cognition are self-evident or intrinsic (svatah). The naiyayikas hold that both are extrinsic (paratah). The Bauddhas say that invalidity is intrinsic and validity is extrinsic. The Mimamsakas consider that validity is intrinsic, but invalidity is extrinsic. 143 The Nyaya theory of Paratahpramanya and the Mimamsa theory of Svatahpramanya are respectively compared to the theory of Correspondence and the theory of Coherence in Western logic. 144 According to Western realism, the nature and criterion of truth is correspondence with external reality, while according to Western idealism, it is coherence or selfconsistency. The theory of correspondence advocates that truth is a 142. jnanam hi pramanyapramanyayoh sa dharanyan na svatah kincid avadharayitum ksamate, ato gunatva dosatva ca karanenotpannau yau jnanasya guna-dosau tadvasena yatharthatva-rupam pramanyam ayatharthatva rupam capramanyam nirnetavyam, ato dvayam api parata iti. Nyayaratnakara p.41. cf. Studies in Pramanaratna 143. 144. pramanatvapramanatve svatah samkhyhah samasritah, naiyayikaste paratah saugatascaranam svatah/ prathamam paratah prahuh pramanyam vedavadinah, pramanyam svatah prahuh paratascapramanatam// Sarvadarsana-samgraha p.279. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy p. 216.

156 determinate and external relation between two distinct and independent things. It is one-one relation between ultimately simple elements. Our knowledge in order to be true must correspond to the external reality as it is. The theory is criticized on the ground that a purely external relation is meaningless as well as impossible. If the terms related are conceived as ultimately simple and independent entities, there can be no relation between them. The entities, being independent, the relation can not inhere in either or in both, and if the relation falls outside them both, then the relation itself becomes a third entity and needs another relation to relate it to the first two and so on ad infinitum. Again correspondence itself must exist for a mind which actively discovers truth and does not invent it. Thus the so-called correspondence becomes a subsequent experience and when we say that our knowledge corresponds with reality what we contradict. Hence, correspondence glides away in coherence. The coherence theory is advocated by the idealists who believe that Reality is a concrete Identity-in-difference, a real Whole which is immanent in all its diverse parts which are organically related to it. Reality is the ultimate subject of all our judgments and a judgment is defined as an ideal content referred to reality. Thought is neither an abstract identity nor a mere difference, but a living process, a significant Whole which is an identity-in-difference. It is selfconsistent and coherent. Reality is free from contradictions not because it has annihilated them but because it has overcome their antagonism in its harmonious bosom. And truth is the systematic coherence which is a characteristic of a significant whole. This theory is criticized on the ground that according to it, no truth is completely true, because coherence, being in

157 discursive judgments, fails of concrete coherence which is the absolute truth. Coherence may be the test of truth, but if it is regarded as the nature of truth, then no 'truth' can be completely true. Coherence is mediacy and if validity is mediate, then no cognition can be absolutely valid. In our proposed text Tarkabhasa, Kesava Misra discusses Pramanyavada elaborately. Before going to his own view, he mentions Mimamsakas regarding validity of knowledge. According to Mimamsaka, the validity of 145 knowledge is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic. For example, when a man knows that there is water he proceeds to get it only after ascertaining the validity of his cognition. In some cases he may act even on the basis of doubtful validity and if he finds water after his effort he determines that his knowledge is valid. This means, when a man gains a certain knowledge through whatever means, he gathers its validity also through the same means. No cause other than those that created that knowledge is required for ascertaining validity which is a characteristic of knowledge. Thus, validity is ascertained intrinsically. Knowledge precedes effort. No doubt can arise about a thing before it is known. Therefore it has to be accepted that before he proceeds to act man gains knowledge through 'arthapatti' (presumption) based on the unaccountability of the knownness (jnatata). Cinnambhatta says that, the Mimamsaka theory can be given in two ** 146 forms, about origin and awareness. About origin it is said that the 145. pramananam pramanyam svato 'pramanyam tu parata iti mimamsakah samgirante. Tarkabhasa-prakasika p.185. 146. pramanyasya svatastvam dvividhamutpattau jnaptau ceti. Ibid.

158 same conditions which produce the cognition also produce its truth. About awareness it is said that by whatever means one knows the cognition, knows also its truth. 147 According to Kesava Misra there is no validity of knowledge which is grasped through arthapatti and which is based on the unaccountability of jnatata. When one cognizes a jar (etc.), he also apprehends the jnatata about the jar in the form 'I have gained knowledge of the jar'. Through this it is inferred that a characteristic called jnatata is also produced when the knowledge (of the jar) occurs. Jnatata does not arise before this knowledge, but arises after the knowledge; and because of these positive and negative concomitances it is determined that jnatata is produced by the knowledge (of the jar). As no effect is produced without cause, this jnatata produced out of the knowledge, cannot be accounted for without its cause, the knowledge. This is how through arthapatti knowledge (the cause) is brought about by jnatata (the effect). This view is not correct for there is nothing like jnatata apart from the fact of being the object of the knowledge. Cinnambhatta also comments in this regard. 148 Again Mimamsaka objects that the fact that the jar becomes the object of a cognition is nothing other than that of its being the substratum of jnatata that is produced by the cognition of the jar. The object-ness of the jar is not brought about by the relation of 'tadatmya', because no identity is admitted 147. tatrotpattau svatastvam nama jnanakaranamatrajanyatvam. Ibid. jnaptau svatastvam tu jnanagrahakamatragrahyatvam. Ibid. p.185. 148. DNPS p.369.

159 between the visaya, jar, and the visayin, its cognition. If it is contended that the jar is due to its producing the cognition, then the sense-organs also would become objects of cognition which is produced by them. Therefore it is inferred that the jar acquires a characteristic through the cognition by which that alone becomes the object of that cognition and not other things like the sense-organs. It is in this manner that jnatata is proved to exist by arthapatti caused by the unaccountability of the object-ness, and not merely by senseperception. Kesava Misra put Naiyayika's view in this regard. They say that it is not correct. Because, the characters of becoming object and subject arise from the very nature of a cognition. Between a thing and its cognition there is this natural peculiarity that the former becomes the object and the latter the subject in relation to each other. If this were not so no object-ness could occur in past and future things, because jnatata does not exist in them in as much as no characteristic can be produced in a thing that is not there. Moreover jnatata itself is the object of a cognition, which would require another jnatata, and that another and so on endlessly. Thus, it would lead to the defect of endless regression - anavastha. To avoid this defect we have to grant the existence of jnatata, even then knowledge alone can be produced by that jnatata. Validity can come only through a particular jnatata which does not stray away from a valid cognition and by virtue of which that knowledge and its validity are grasped simultaneously. The same argument can be applied to invalidity also. In this manner invalidity also would be grasped intrinsically. If in spite of this, invalidity is held to be grasped extrinsically, then validity should also be held

160 to be grasped extrinsically, i.e. both are grasped by means other than those that produce cognition. Pramanya here means 'the fact of being true to its nature' and not the 'fact of being instrument of a valid cognition'. Thus, the validity of knowledge is grasped extrinsically and not by the same means that produces the knowledge.