Essay name: Tarkabhasa of Kesava Misra (study)
Author:
Nimisha Sarma
Affiliation: Gauhati University / Department of Sanskrit
This is an English study of the Tarkabhasa of Kesava Misra: a significant work of the syncretic Nyaya-Vaisesika school of Indian philosophy widely used as a beginner's textbook in southern India and has many commentaries. This study includes an extensive overview of the Nyaya and Vaisesika philosophy, epistemology and sources of valid knowledge. It further deals with the contents and commentaries of the Tarkabhasa.
Chapter 4 - Purvabhaga of Tarkabhasa: Contents
71 (of 73)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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158
same conditions which produce the cognition also produce its truth. About
awareness it is said that by whatever means one knows the cognition, knows
also its truth.
147 According to Kesava Mi艣ra there is no validity of knowledge which is
grasped through arth膩patti and which is based on the unaccountability of
j帽膩tat膩. When one cognizes a jar (etc.), he also apprehends the j帽膩tat膩 about
the jar in the form 'I have gained knowledge of the jar'. Through this it is
inferred that a characteristic called j帽膩tat膩 is also produced when the
knowledge (of the jar) occurs. J帽膩tat膩 does not arise before this knowledge,
but arises after the knowledge; and because of these positive and negative
concomitances it is determined that j帽膩tat膩 is produced by the knowledge (of
the jar). As no effect is produced without cause, this j帽膩tata produced out of
the knowledge, cannot be accounted for without its cause, the knowledge. This
is how through arth膩patti knowledge (the cause) is brought about by j帽膩tat膩
(the effect). This view is not correct for there is nothing like j帽膩tat膩 apart
from the fact of being the object of the knowledge. Cinna峁僢ha峁弓a also
comments in this regard.
148 Again Mim膩峁僺aka objects that the fact that the jar becomes the object
of a cognition is nothing other than that of its being the substratum of j帽膩tat膩
that is produced by the cognition of the jar. The object-ness of the jar is not
brought about by the relation of 鈥榯膩d膩tmya', because no identity is admitted
147. tatrotpattau svatastva峁� n膩ma j帽膩nak膩ra峁嘺m膩trajanyatva峁�. Ibid.
j帽膩ptau svatastva峁� tu j帽膩nagr膩hakam膩tragr膩hyatva峁�. Ibid. p.185.
148. DNPS. p.369.
