Essay name: Tarkabhasa of Kesava Misra (study)
Author:
Nimisha Sarma
Affiliation: Gauhati University / Department of Sanskrit
This is an English study of the Tarkabhasa of Kesava Misra: a significant work of the syncretic Nyaya-Vaisesika school of Indian philosophy widely used as a beginner's textbook in southern India and has many commentaries. This study includes an extensive overview of the Nyaya and Vaisesika philosophy, epistemology and sources of valid knowledge. It further deals with the contents and commentaries of the Tarkabhasa.
Chapter 4 - Purvabhaga of Tarkabhasa: Contents
72 (of 73)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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between the vi峁ya, jar, and the vi峁yin, its cognition. If it is contended that
the jar is due to its producing the cognition, then the sense-organs also would
become objects of cognition which is produced by them. Therefore it is
inferred that the jar acquires a characteristic through the cognition by which
that alone becomes the object of that cognition and not other things like the
sense-organs. It is in this manner that j帽膩tat膩 is proved to exist by arth膩patti
caused by the unaccountability of the object-ness, and not merely by sense-
perception.
Kesava Misra put Naiyayika's view in this regard. They say that it is
not correct. Because, the characters of becoming object and subject arise from
the very nature of a cognition. Between a thing and its cognition there is this
natural peculiarity that the former becomes the object and the latter the subject
in relation to each other. If this were not so no object-ness could occur in past
and future things, because j帽膩tat膩 does not exist in them in as much as no
characteristic can be produced in a thing that is not there. Moreover j帽膩tat膩
itself is the object of a cognition, which would require another j帽膩tat膩, and
that another and so on endlessly. Thus, it would lead to the defect of endless
regression - anavastha. To avoid this defect we have to grant the existence of
j帽膩tat膩, even then knowledge alone can be produced by that j帽膩tat膩. Validity
can come only through a particular j帽膩tata which does not stray away from a
valid cognition and by virtue of which that knowledge and its validity are
grasped simultaneously. The same argument can be applied to invalidity also.
In this manner invalidity also would be grasped intrinsically. If in spite of this,
invalidity is held to be grasped extrinsically, then validity should also be held
