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as it can have no relation with them. So, a new prama峁嘺 should be postulated
for the cognition of abhava.
But Kesava Misra nullifies this. He says that non-existence is grasped
by sense-perception itself which is aided by a ratiocination like 'had the jar
existed here it would have been perceived just like the ground', in
combination with its non-apprehension. He answered the above objection in
this way the vyapti is to be limited to positive objects. This means that sense-
organs require connection with the objects only when they cognize positive
things and not in the case of abh膩va. The cognition of abh膩va takes place
through the sense-organs by 'vise峁�a峁嘺vise峁�yabhava', which is not a new
relation but only a self linking relation. It occurs in cognition of abh膩va like
'here is no pot'. It satisfies all the conditions for sense-object contact and so
there is no need to postulate a new pram膩峁嘺. Moreover, if non-apprehension is
posed as a new prama峁嘺, that itself being an abhava should have another non-
apprehension for its apprehension, which in its turn will require another, and
so on. This, therefore, leads to endless regression (anavasth膩) and thus the
Naiy膩yika claims the advantage of laghava on his side.
3. THEORY OF VALIDITY KNOWLEDGE
The Pramanyavada (the theory of validity of knowledge) is an
important topic taken up by the different systems of Indian philosophy. The
term 鈥榩r膩m膩峁噛a' is derived from the word 'pram膩峁嘺' with suffix 鈥樶梗峁噛a鈥� and
means 'the nature of a prama峁嘺'. 135 It is of two types, svata岣�pr膩m膩峁噛a and
paratah- pr膩m膩峁噛a.
135.
TS. p. 323.