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abh膩va or anupalabdhi. The Pr膩bh膩karas do not accept abh膩va as a separate
category but hold that it is identical with its substratum. According to them a
cognition like 'there is no jar at this spot, actually refers only to the empty
spot. This is only a round about way of accepting abh膩va. The Bh膩峁�峁璦
Mim膩峁僺akas, who are the main opponents, not only accept abh膩va as a
distinct category but stipulate a separate pram膩峁嘺 for its cognition. Their
arguments are briefly stated by Kesava Mi艣ra as objection. The Bh膩峁�峁璦
Mimamsakas says that there is no relation between the sense-organ and
abh膩va. Conjunction and inherence are the only two relations. Neither of these
is possible between sense-organ and abhava, as conjunction can take place
only between two substances and abh膩va is not a substance. Also inherence is
out of question as these two are not inseperables.
The relation existing between the qualification and the qualified is no
relation at all, as it is not a single entity subsisting in two things distinct from
itself. Abhava has both these characters i.e. it becomes both qualification and
qualified. If it were different from these it should come under any of the six
positive categories. But none of these categories subsists in abh膩va. Therefore
the qualification subsisting in abh盲va is nothing other than its own form which
consists in its capacity to cause the knowledge of thing related to it. The same
argument should be applied to relationships such as vyapakatva, k膩ra峁嘺tva,
etc. The character of pervading subsisting in fire etc. (vyapakatva) is identical
with that form of fire etc. which enables the cognition of something
concomitant with it (i.e. its vyapya). But such a generality does not subsist in
abhava. As a result abh膩va is not capable of being perceived by sense-organs