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Shankaracharya and Ramana Maharshi (study)

by Maithili Vitthal Joshi | 2018 | 63,961 words

This page relates ‘Shankaracarya on Jagat� of the comparative study of the philosophies of Shankaracharya (representing the Vedic tradition and Vedanta philosophy) and Ramana Maharshi (representing modern era). For Shankara (Achreya) his commentaries on the ten major Upanishads are studied, while for Ramana Maharshi his Ulladu Narpadu (the forty verses on Reality) is taken into consideration.

Go directly to: Footnotes.

Chapter 2.2 - Śṅk峦ⲹ on Jagat

In the Kevala-屹ٲ-Գٲ-philosophy, the Brahman is stated as the sole cause of the jagat (world). Śṅk峦ⲹ says that the omniscient Īś, which is not different from one’s Self, is the cause of the creation of the world, just like the clay and the gold are the causes of the pots and the ornaments respectively. The very Īś is the cause of the continuance of the world through controlling it, like the magician controls the continuance of the . And, the Īś himself is the cause of the dissolution of the expanded world into himself, like the earth wherein the four kinds of creatures get dissolved.[1] Apart from the Īś, any other entities, like insentient Բ (primary matter or nature), (atoms), (non-existence), ṃs (transmigratory soul) etc. cannot be the cause of creation, sustainment and dissolution of the world.[2] Furthermore, the Brahman is itself the ܱԲ-ṇa (material cause) as well as the nimitta-ṇa (efficient cause) of the world. In the worldly experience, the clay, the gold etc. are treated as the material causes. They proceed expecting the ṣṭ (supervisor), like potter, goldsmith etc. However, in the case of the Brahman, which is the material cause, no other supervisor or instrumental cause is expected, since the Śܳپ declare that there was only one entity before creation.[3] In the opinion of Śṅk峦ⲹ, the whole world appearance is illusory. It is not a real transformation of its cause, namely the Brahman. It is imposed on the Brahman due to the , just as a snake on a rope. Thus, the world is an illusion appearing on the Brahman. [4] In this connection, Śṅk峦ⲹ puts forth the illustrations of the dream etc. The creation of the chariots etc. in the dream does not harm the nature of the individual soul. Moreover, it is seen in the world that the illusory creation of the elephant etc. does not change the nature of its creators, namely the magicians or the gods etc. Similarly, the creation of the world takes place without changing the unified nature of the Brahman. [5]

Owing to the acceptance of the ٰⲹ岹, i.e. the doctrine regarding the existence of the effect in its cause, Śṅk峦ⲹ denies the abrupt rise of the world. He admits the latent existence of the world even before its creation. He says that the primal state of the world is not an independent state, but it is dependent on the Īś. This state must be assumed, since the creatorship of the Īś cannot be established in its absence. The activity of the Īś becomes untenable in the absence of this śپ (power). Additionally, the latent power must be admitted to prove the absence of the birth of the liberated ones. The power is burnt away by the in the case of the liberated souls. This potential power is of the nature of the and it is indicated by the word avyakta (unmanifested). It is the profound sleep, full of , in which the ī sleep without knowing their real nature. The nature of is inexplicable. It cannot be said as real or as unreal.[6] Thus, the causal state of the world is denoted by various words, such as śپ, avyakta, , etc. In the context of the īṣaṇa (visualization) of the Īś, Śṅk峦ⲹ says that this very primal state of the world i.e. the state of unmanifested names and forms, which cannot be said to be similar with the Brahman or different from the Brahman, becomes the object of the knowledge or the vision of the Īś before the creation of the world.[7]

In the commentaries, Śṅk峦ⲹ has established the Brahmaṇa-, i.e. the doctrine of the Brahman as the sole source of the world. He has proved this doctrine with the help of Śܳپ, ṛt and yukti (logic). Especially, in the ǻⲹ viz. in the second chapter of the 󳾲-ūٰ, he has refuted the doctrines of other systems of philosophy, which are against the Brahma-ṇa-岹. In that very chapter, he has removed the contradiction found in the Śܳپ entences regarding the creation of the world. In the various 貹Ծṣa, the creation is described in different ways. Similarly, the sequence of the creation is also mentioned differently. Śṅk峦ⲹ puts forth this problem and reconciles these Śܳپ entences in his commentary on the 󳾲ūٰ. [8]

According to Śṅk峦ⲹ, the world cannot stay apart from the Brahman in three states, namely creation, sustainment and dissolution. The world is created from the five elements, which are of the nature of names and forms.[9] In the commentary on the ղٳپīⲹ 貹Ծṣa, he explains the sequence of the creation of the five elements as follows: the ś (space) is produced from the Brahman, which is of the nature of one’s Self. The space possesses the ś岹-ṇa (quality of sound) and it gives the vacuum for all the manifested things. The (air) is produced from that space. It possesses two qualities, namely the 貹ś-ṇa (quality of touch), which is the own quality of the air, and the sound, which is continued in it from the space. In a similar way, the agni (fire) is produced from the air, the ap (water) from the fire and the ṛt󾱱ī (earth) from the water. The fire possesses three qualities viz. sound, touch and colour. The former two qualities are continued in the fire from the previous elements and the ū貹-ṇa (quality of colour) is its own. Similarly, the water possesses four qualities. The rasa-ṇa (quality of taste) is its own quality and the remaining three qualities are continued from the previous three elements. The earth possesses five qualities. The gandha-ṇa (quality of smell) is its own quality and the remaining four qualities are continued in it from the previous four elements.[10]

However, in the Chāndogya 貹Ծṣa, the creation of the space and the air is not stated from the Brahman. But, this Śܳپ directly asserts the creation of the tejas (fire) from the Sat viz. the Existence and then the creation of the water from the fire and the creation of the the anna (earth) from the water. After this, it states the manifestation of names and forms by the supreme Deity viz. the Existence through the process of ٰṛt첹ṇa (making three-fold).[11] About this exclusion of the space and the air from the fire etc., Śṅk峦ⲹ asserts that this is not a fault, since these two are found in a thing possessing of colour. In the fire, which possesses the quality of colour, the sound and the touch are also perceived. And, thereby, the existence of the space and the air can be inferred, since they possess the qualities of sound and touch subsequently.[12] The ٰṛt첹ṇa-śruti, in which the process of making each element three-fold is explained, is accepted in the Kevala-屹ٲԳٲ-philosophy as a basis of the 貹ñī첹ṇa-process (making each element fivefold).[13] The process of the ٰṛt첹ṇa, which is related to the threefoldness of fire, water and earth, is explained by Śṅk峦ⲹ as follows: While making each element threefold, the very element in turn becomes predominant and remaining two in turn become subordinate. If this is not accepted, the process of threefoldness would become one only, just as making a rope threefold by collecting its three threads together. And, so there would not be the different process of threefoldness in the case of each of three deities, namely the elements. Thus, by the process of threefoldness, the fire, the water and the earth have obtained the separate name and the distinct identity, such as ‘This is fire�, ‘This is water� etc.[14] Further, in the Brahma-ūٰ, the Īś alone is stated as the creator of the names and the forms. Hereupon, Śṅk峦ⲹ comments that the Īś, who is the creator of the threefoldness, manifests the names and the forms, and not the ī. The agency of the Īś in this creation is unquestionable. The ī, which is not the Īś, is not capable of manifesting various names and forms, such as mountains, rivers, oceans etc. And even the things, which can be manifested by the ī, are manifested only by depending on the Īś. [15] Furthermore, in the 󳾲-ūٰ, it is asserted that the elements such as space etc. do not create their effects by themselves, but it is the Īś who creates the effects by residing in the form of that specific element and meditating upon that effect.[16]

In the state of continuation too, the world-appearance cannot remain different from its cause, namely the Brahman. Here, Śṅk峦ⲹ quotes some Śܳپ entences stating the non-difference of the world from the Brahman and says that the effect is non-different from its cause in a same way during creation, continuation and dissolution.[17] The sequence of the dissolution of the elements takes place exactly in a reverse order of their creation, i.e. the earth merges into the water, the water merges into the fire and so on. Āⲹ says that the effect dissolves in its immediate cause and not in the cause of its own cause. Thus, all the effects enter into the nearest, subtle and the subtlest cause successively and in this manner, finally they all merge into the supreme and extremely subtle cause viz. the Brahman. [18] Thus, the whole world successively dissolves into the Brahman. But, it dissolves leaving its latent power behind. The world emerges again having the latent power as its source. If this is not accepted, the emergence of the world will be accidental, i.e. it will emerge without the cause.[19]

While speaking of the variations in the Śܳپ-passages about the creation of the world, Śṅk峦ⲹ says that each ձԳٲ-text differs regarding the sequence of the space etc. in the case of the sequence of creation, but these texts do not contradict with each other regarding the creator. Each ձԳٲ describes the Brahman as being the cause of the creation in a similar way. In every ձԳٲ, the cause of the world is described as omniscient, controller of all, Self of all and non-dual.[20] Therefore, the intended purpose of all the ձԳٲs is the Brahman. In the opinion of Āⲹ, all the (narratives) related to the theory of creation are eulogistic and their intended purpose is the Self-realization alone. Or, just as seen in the ordinary world, these narratives are meant for the easy comprehension of the truth that the Īś, who is the great magician, omniscient and omnipotent, has created all the things just as a magician. Otherwise, any result cannot be obtained by mere understanding of the narratives of the creation. On the other hand, the immortality, which is the highest goal, can be achieved by the knowledge of the unitary nature of the Self.[21] So, the objective of all the ձԳٲpassages, explaining the creation, is none but the Brahman.

The effects are seen to be manifested in the form of (name) and ū貹 (form) on the basis of the Brahman. In the viewpoint of Śṅk峦ⲹ, these differences are not real. The division is accepted to be imagined on the Brahman due to the , so the Brahman has no parts in itself. The moon does not become many, even when it is perceived as if many by a person, who has a timira-ṣa (blurred vision). The Brahman is supposed to have all the empirical usages, such as transformation etc. because of this multiform-nature, which is as same as names and forms imagined by the . These names and forms are of the nature of both manifested and non-manifested. These cannot be explained as real or unreal, so these are inexplicable. The names and the forms do not have real existence, but these are generated from the speech only. The Brahman remains beyond all such empirical dealings in its real state.[22] Further, the names and the forms cannot be separated from the Brahman, since the Brahman is their intrinsic nature. In all the conditions, these are essentially the Brahman alone, because they have no existence apart from the Brahman. On the contrary, the Brahman is not essentially the names and the forms. It only appears to be connected with the empirical dealings such as knower, things to be known and knowledge owing to the limiting adjuncts of the names and the forms.[23]

Śṅk峦ⲹ declares the falsity of all the effects on the ground of the non-difference of the effect from its cause. The effect cannot be absolutely real, since it always changes. The form of earthen pot etc. perceived through the eyes is unreal, because it cannot be perceived apart from its material cause viz. the clay. Similarly, all the effects are unreal owing to their non-perception apart from their cause. Additionally, the effects do not get manifested before their production and after their destruction. So, they are unreal.[24] In short, this whole universe is nothing else but the highest Brahman alone. All the ideas, related to the nonBrahman, are mere , just like the perception of a snake on a rope. The Vedas declare the absolute reality of the Brahman alone.[25] The nondifference of the effect from its cause is thought over in the 󳾲ūٰ (II.1.6.14-20). In the commentary on these ūٰ (aphorisms), Śṅk峦ⲹ proves this non-difference using various Śܳپ entences as well as the logic. For instance, he quotes the illustration of the clay and its effects such as pot etc. ([Chāndogya 貹Ծṣa] VI.1.4) and says that the modifications of the clay are originated from the speech alone. In truth, the modifications do not have independent existence. The clay alone is true. In a similar way, any effect does not have separate existence from the Brahman. Accepting this non-difference, the declaration of the Śܳپ that all things are known by the knowledge of one thing, can be proved. Therefore, as the space contained in the pot is not different from the cosmic space or the mirage is not different from the desert, so there cannot exist the world comprised of experiencer and things to be experienced, if it is seen other than the Brahman. [26] Thus, in the opinion of Āⲹ, all the effects in the form of names and forms are real only in their essential nature as Existence viz. the Brahman, but they are unreal by themselves.[27]

Śṅk峦ⲹ further says that the association of the soul with actions, their instruments and results is produced owing to its contact with the adjuncts of the names and the forms. This association is superimposed on the soul by the . Owing to this association with the limiting adjuncts, the ī experiences the ṃs.[28] The ṃs is of the nature of agentship and enjoyership. It is related only with the ñⲹ (things to be known) but it is wrongly imposed on the ñ (knower) due to the . Therefore, the perceiver does not get contaminated by the ṃs, just as the space is not affected by the qualities such as the concave or the dirtiness etc. imposed on it by ingnorants. In a similar way, the Īś exists in all the ṣeٰ viz. the fields or the adjuncts, not getting affected by the ṃs. In the common experience too, it cannot be seen that anyone is benefited or ruined by a certain quality imposed by the . [29] In this manner, the Brahman, on which the names and the forms are superimposed by the , can never get contaminated by them.

At some places, Śṅk峦ⲹ has mentioned the as the cause of multiplied appearance on the Brahman. But, he does not discuss any conceptual difference between the and the . [30] Moreover, he has not developed the concept of in the commentaries. In the commentary on the 󲹲岵ī, he mentions that the , which is the cause of all the effects, is possessed by the Īś and it is of the nature of triṇas (three qualities) viz. sattva, rajas and tamas. [31] Furthermore, he explains the illusory nature of the in the 貹Ծṣa. The ܰṣa viz. the Self is hidden in all the creatures. He is concealed on account of the viz. the , hence he does not appear in the form of one’s own Self, even though he is the Self of everyone. The is deep-rooted, difficult to understand and diversified in nature. Owing to this , all the creatures do not grasp their basic identity with the supreme Self. They identify with the aggregate of the body and the senses, even though these entities are not the Self and also these are the objects of perception, just as pot etc. All the creatures transmigrate because of the delusion of the of the supreme Self.[32] In the Ҳḍa岹-, the is said to be non-existent. Hereupon, Śṅk峦ⲹ comments that the is not a real entity, namely the Brahman. A thing, which does not exist in real sense, is called . [33] The unreality of the world is established in the Ҳḍa岹- by asserting the dependence of the world-phenomena on the mind. In the commentary on these , Śṅk峦ⲹ says that any movement does not occur in the Self. All the entities in the world can be experienced, only when the mind becomes active. So, these entities are not real in the absolute sense.[34] The duality is not different from the mind. It is not seen in the absence of the mind. The mind stops functioning in its perfectly controlled state and also in the state of deep sleep. Anybody cannot experience the duality in these states. Therefore the duality is none other than the imagination of the mind.[35] Further, Āⲹ says that the mind is also sat (existent), when it is seen not to be different from the Self. A snake imagined on a rope is regarded as existent, when its substratum viz. the rope is considered. Similarly, the mind is existent, when its substratum viz. the Self is thought over.[36]

Although Śṅk峦ⲹ has always declared the falsity of the world, he has accepted the temporal existence of the world in the sphere of for the sake of explaining the (empirical or worldly usages). He strictly opposes the existence of any entity apart from the Brahman in the state of abidance in the Self-knowledge. For this, he quotes the Śܳپ entences declaring the oneness of the Brahman and further asserts that the worldly usage regarding actions, instruments of actions and their results is not rejected for the avivekin (one who is unable to discriminate) in the empirical state of names and forms. So, the scriptural and the empirical viewpoints are respectively based on the knowledge and the ignorance.[37] Further, using the dream analogy, he asserts that all the empirical dealings can be regarded as true before attaining the knowledge of the unity of the ī and the Brahman, just like the dealings in the dreams are not suspected as false before one wakes up. As long as one does not experience the unity of the Self, he cannot consider the empirical dealings such as means of knowledge, objects of knowledge and results etc. to be false.[38] In this way, Śṅk峦ⲹ accepts the continuation of all the empirical dealings before realizing the unitary experience of the Self i.e. the Brahman.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

Ibid II.1.1.1 Preface

[2]:

Ibid I.1.1.2

[3]:

Ibid I.4.7.23; See also [Śṅk ṣy on Chāndogya 貹Ծṣa] VI.2.1

[4]:

[Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] II.1.11.33 [Śṅk ṣy on Ҳḍa岹-] II.32

[5]:

[Śṅk ṣy on Brahma-ūٰ] II.1.9.28

[6]:

Ibid I.4.1.3; See also [Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] I.2.6.22

[7]:

[Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] I.1.5.5

[8]:

Ibid II.3.1.1

[9]:

[Śṅk ṣy on Bṛhadāraṇyaka 貹Ծṣa] II.2.1 Preface

[10]:

[Śṅk ṣy on ղٳپīⲹ 貹Ծṣa] II.1.1; See also [Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] II.3.1.1 to II.3.6.12

[11]:

[Chāndogya 貹Ծṣa] VI.2.2-4 Ibid VI.3.3

[12]:

[Śṅk ṣy on Chāndogya 貹Ծṣa] VI.4.2-4

[13]:

[-Ծṇaⲹ Ṭīk] on [Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] II.4.9.20

[14]:

[Śṅk ṣy on Chāndogya 貹Ծṣa] VI.3.3; See also [Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] II.4.9.22

[15]:

[󳾲-ūٰ] II.4.9.20 [Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] II.4.9.20

[16]:

[󳾲-ūٰ] II.3.7.13 [Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] II.3.7.13

[17]:

Ibid II.1.3.9

[18]:

[󳾲-ūٰ] II.3.8.14 [Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] II.3.8.14

[19]:

Ibid I.3.8.30; See also [Śṅk ṣy on 󲹲-ī] IX.18

[20]:

[Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] I.4.4.14

[21]:

[Śṅk ṣy on Aitareya 貹Ծṣa] II.4.1 Preface; See also [Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] I.4.4.14, II.1.11.33, IV.3.5.14;[Śṅk ṣy on Bṛhadāraṇyaka 貹Ծṣa] I.4.7; [Śṅk ṣy on Ҳḍa岹-] I.7; [Śṅk ṣy on Ҳḍa岹-] III.15

[22]:

[Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] II.1.9.27; See also [Śṅk ṣy on Praśna 貹Ծṣa] VI.3

[23]:

[Śṅk ṣy on ղٳپīⲹ 貹Ծṣa] II.6.1

[24]:

[Śṅk ṣy on Bhagavad-ī] II.16

[25]:

[Śṅk ṣy on Muṇḍaka 貹Ծṣa] II.2.11

[26]:

[Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] II.1.6.14

[27]:

[Śṅk ṣy on Chāndogya 貹Ծṣa] VI.3.2

[28]:

[Śṅk ṣy on Bṛhadāraṇyaka 貹Ծṣa] II.1.15

[29]:

[Śṅk ṣy on 󲹲-ī] XIII.2

[30]:

[Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] I.3.5.19; See also [Śṅk ṣy on Ҳḍa岹-] 3.10

[31]:

[Śṅk ṣy on 󲹲-ī] XIV.3; See also [Śṅk ṣy on 󲹲-ī] VII.25, XIII.19, XV.1

[32]:

[Śṅk ṣy on ṻ 貹Ծṣa] III.12

[33]:

[Ҳḍa岹-] IV.58 [Śṅk ṣy on Ҳḍa岹-] IV.58

[34]:

Ibid II.33

[35]:

Ibid II.32; cf. [Śṅk ṣy on Ҳḍa岹-] III.31

[36]:

[Śṅk ṣy on Ҳḍa岹-] III.29

[37]:

[Śṅk ṣy on Bṛhadāraṇyaka 貹Ծṣa] III.5.1

[38]:

[Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] II.1.6.14; See also [Śṅk ṣy on 󳾲-ūٰ] I.2.5.20, III.2.1.4, III.2.5.15

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