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At the last portions of 碍腻谤颈办腻惫补濒墨 (办腻谤颈办腻蝉 from 146 to 152) and its commentary, the purport of injunctions has been thoroughly discussed by 痴颈艣惫补苍腻迟丑补 狈测腻测补pa帽c膩nana. According to him, everyone desires happiness. This happiness is produced in the soul due to righteous action (dharma). So, there is a causal relationship between the righteous action and happiness. Like this, sorrow or unhappiness is caused by unrighteous action. Unhappiness is just the opposite quality to happiness of soul. Because as soon as a man perceives unhappiness having the generality of unhappiness naturally it becomes the object of his hatred. No one desires unhappiness.

Now, if a person acquires the knowledge of the absence of unhappiness or misery and the knowledge of happiness, he desires for the eradication of unhappiness or the absence of that and for having happiness. Then he also desires for the means of having the absence of unhappiness and for having the means causing or producing happiness. So, all kinds of desires of a person can be divided into two groups鈥攖he desires related to the results and the desires related to the means. Here the results are happiness and the absence (诲丑惫补峁僺补-destruction) of misery. The desires for these two are caused by the knowledge of these two. Because if there is no knowledge about these two, then there would not be any desire for these two on behalf of that desiring person. So, here one can not deny the causal relationship. These desires are called 鈥�辫丑补濒补惫颈峁�a测颈峁嚹� 鈥� 颈肠肠丑腻 (the desires related to the result). These happiness and the absence of misery are considered as the ends of life or as the aim of a man (辫耻谤耻峁Ｄ乺迟丑补) by itself. So, it is called 鈥�蝉惫补迟补岣� 辫耻谤耻峁Ｄ乺迟丑补.鈥� It is perceived as having the characteristic of 蝉惫补惫峁泃迟颈迟惫补 in the soul. The form of the desire of this knowledge is鈥斺�楳ay this object (happiness etc.) be/reside in me.鈥� It is called 鈥�蝉惫补惫颈艣别蝉补峁嘺惫补迟迟腻-辫谤补迟颈蝉补苍诲丑腻苍补鈥� (the knowledge of having the qualility of desire in oneself). This kind of desire does not depend on the desire of attaining another object. The clearer expression is 鈥�itarecch膩nadh墨necch膩vi峁�ayatva峁� 蝉惫补迟补岣ケ璩馨�耻峁Ｄ乺迟丑补tvam鈥�. Happiness and the destruction of unhappiness are 蝉惫补迟补岣�hurus膩rthas becuase people want these to have in them. The desire for these two is not intervened by any other desire.

The desire for the means of the desired objects is also a kind of desire. But it is dependent on the desire of the desired objects. So, the means of the desired objects by itself are not considered as the aim of a man. It is called up膩yavi峁�ayi峁嚹� 颈肠肠丑腻. In this desire the cause is the knowledge of the state of being the means for the desired objects (颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻箩帽腻苍补).

The desires have different nomenclatures according to different activities. So, 鈥�肠颈办墨谤峁Ｄ�鈥�, 鈥�箩颈丑墨谤峁Ｄ�鈥� etc. are the varieties of desire. The commentator comments鈥斺��肠颈办墨谤峁Ｄ乯ih墨r峁�ety膩dibhed膩t 颈肠肠丑腻bhed膩岣� bhavanti.鈥� But the root of every activity is the desire to do or to perform the activity. Without that desire no action is performed. So, the desire to do an action is discussed by Visvan膩tha. The desire to do an action is that in which 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟惫补鈥� (the state of being accomplished by one鈥檚 volition or the feasibiliy to be done by one鈥檚 volition) becomes a qualifier of that desire and in which the object to be accomplished by volition is accepted as the object of that desire. For example, 鈥業 will perform the activity of cooking by my volition or by my mental and physical effort.鈥� Here my object is cooking and 鈥槹灬箾t颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟惫补鈥� has become the qualifier of my desire to cook. The 鈥槹灬箾t颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟惫补鈥� is an essential condition. Because I know that cooking is feasible by me and if it was not feasible for me I would not engage myself in cooking. So, the causes of desire to do an action are the knowledge of attainability by one鈥檚 own volition and the knowledge of the state of being the means for the desired end (颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补j帽膩na). One does not desire to touch the moon by his hand because it is not feasible for him. Similarly, one does not take poison for eating because it is not his desired end (补苍颈峁ａ弓补).

Not only that, sometimes even in the presence of the 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟惫补鈥� and 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥� desire is not produced in the soul鈥攊f there is not the knowledge of dissociation from the strong and harmful end (产补濒补惫补诲补苍颈峁ａ弓腻苍补苍耻产补苍诲丑颈迟惫补箩帽腻苍补). It is also called 鈥�dv颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻箩帽腻苍补鈥� (the cognition of the state of being the means for the undesired end). It is an obstructing factor to desire. It has been exemplified by Visvan膩tha in his 鈥�惭耻办迟腻惫补濒墨鈥� commentary with a good example. Eating of rice mixed with honey and poison is feasible for a person. It is desired object because of honey. But eating of that rice may cause death because of its connection with poison鈥攖his kind of cognition of 鈥�诲惫颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� obstructs the desire to take that rice. Here the negative result (death) is stronger than the positive one (i.e., eradication of hunger). So, one does not generally wish to take rice mixed with honey and poison together because of the fear of death.

There are some different opinions regarding the obstructing factors of desire. Some regard strong unwillingness or hatred as the obstructing factor (pratibandhaka). Visvan膩tha does not accept this. Because hatred or unwillingness is preceded by the knowledge of sorrow. So, the knowledge of sorrow having the quality (= generality) of sorrowness is the more accurate or precise obstructor of desire. According to the 狈测腻测补 and 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 philosophy, a quality does not have a quality. So, here the word 鈥榪uality鈥� should be taken as a word signifying 鈥榞enerality鈥� (= 箩腻迟颈).

According to Visvan膩tha, the knowledge of 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥� along with the knowledge of 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟腻鈥� is the cause of desire. But some other philosophers accept that the knowledge of the state of not being the cause of stronger undesired end (产补濒补惫补诲补苍颈峁ａ弓腻箩补苍补办补迟惫补箩帽腻苍补) is the propelling factor to desire. This view is also discarded by Visvan膩tha. Because sometimes it is perceived that in the absence of that knowledge desire is produced only from the knowledge of 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟腻鈥�. So, the knowledge of 鈥�产补濒补惫补诲补苍颈峁ａ弓腻箩补苍补办补迟惫补鈥� is not an essential cause for the initiation of an action.

It should be mentioned here that desire is produced where the knowledge of 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥� is more strong than the knowledge of 鈥�补苍颈峁ａ弓补s膩dhanatva鈥�. For this reason, one begins cooking for the eradication of his hunger and for the gratification of his taste organ though there is inevitable (苍腻苍迟补谤墨测补办补) physical and mental suffering in cooking. Here the positive result surpasses the negative consequences. So, there is no hate for cooking on behalf of a hungry person.

In short, the Ny膩y膩-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 philosophy admits that the causes of an activity are desire, the knowledge of 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟腻鈥�, the knowledge of 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� and the direct knowledge of the material cause.

So, 痴颈艣惫补苍腻迟丑补 says鈥�

鈥�肠颈办墨谤峁Ｄ乲峁泃is膩dhye峁ａ弓as膩dhanatvamatis tath膩 ||
up膩d膩nasya c膩dhyak峁�a峁� prav峁泃tau 箩补苍补办补峁� bhavet ||^[1]

A person who has satisfied his hunger does not take more food because he does not have any desire for food. Moreover, it will cause his physical problem like vomiting, feeling of uneasyness etc.

But the modern 狈补颈测腻测颈办补蝉 do not admit the knowledge of 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟腻鈥�, in the form of 鈥楾his is feasible by my volition鈥� as the only cause for volition. Because it is not possible for a person to have the knowledge of 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟腻鈥� for the activity which will occur in the future. So, one needs to have a direct and analogical knowledge from another person to be prompted to an activity like cooking.

But this argument does not stand. Because the analogical cognition can always not be had. Sometimes, a reader strives to acquire knowledge from a script which is new to him and invented by another. So, the 鈥榬elated time鈥� or 鈥榯he time concerned to鈥� would be taken as the qualifier of the knowledge of 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� etc.

A person inebriated by anger takes food mixed with poison because at that time he loses the knowledge of 鈥�产补濒补惫补诲补苍颈峁ａ弓腻苍耻产补苍诲丑颈迟惫补鈥�, that is to say鈥攈e has the knowledge of 鈥�产补濒补惫补诲补苍颈峁ａ弓腻苍补苍耻产补苍诲丑颈迟惫补鈥�.

Now, the opponent puts a question. Though a believer in sacred tradition (腻蝉迟颈办腻) knows illicit intercourse (补驳补尘测腻驳补尘补苍补), killing of enemy etc. to be the causes to hell, yet why does he have the knowledge of 鈥�产补濒补惫补诲补苍颈峁ａ弓腻苍补苍耻产补苍诲丑颈迟惫补鈥�, and why does he have effort to that immoral activities? The 狈补颈测腻测颈办补 says that, that person is so much inebriated by fierce anger or by the desire for killing that at that time he completely forgets the negative aspects of that activities.

Injunctions of Veda are the propelling factors to achieve some desired end. So, in cases of 鈥�痴颈艣惫补箩颈迟膩 yajeta鈥� (One should sacrifice through the 痴颈艣惫补箩颈迟 sacrifice.) etc. where the results are not mentioned, heaven etc. are to be imagined as results in compliance with the knowledge of 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥�.

Actions can be divided into three categories i.e. non-obligatory actions 鈥�办腻尘测补鈥� (for getting a particular result), perpetually obligatory actions (nitya) and occasionally obligatory actions (naimittika). According to the 狈补颈测腻测颈办补蝉 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补j帽膩na鈥� is to be regarded as the instigating factor in all the three kinds of actions. Because the capability of producing the desired objective or the fulfilment of the desired goal is in the 鈥�nitya鈥� and 鈥�naimittika鈥� actions also like the 鈥�办腻尘测补鈥� actions. If the 鈥�nitya鈥� and 鈥�naimittika鈥� actions are not performed, then there will be sin in the soul. So, these actions are also conceived as the means of desired end. Only the subtle difference is that in 鈥�办腻尘测补鈥� actions the desired end is perceived in the form of attendance (产丑腻惫腻迟尘补办补) and in 鈥�nitya鈥� and 鈥�naimittika鈥� actions the desired end i.e. the eradication of the undesired end is perceived in the form of absence (a产丑腻惫腻迟尘补办补).

So, the conclusion of the 狈补颈测腻测颈办补蝉 is that the 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥� qualified by the feasibility by volition is the purport of the 濒颈峁� suffix.

But the 笔谤腻产丑腻办补谤补 School of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 does not agree with this view regarding the meaning of the 濒颈峁� suffix. 笔谤腻产丑腻办补谤补s say that in the vedic sentence鈥斺��jyoti峁ａ弓omena svargak膩mo yajeta鈥� (One desirous of heaven should sacrifice by the 闯测辞迟颈峁ａ弓辞尘补 sacrifice.) by the 濒颈峁� suffix and invisible result namely 补辫奴谤惫补 produced from the 闯测辞迟颈峁ａ弓辞尘补 sacrifice is meant. It is the intermediate causal link between the sacrifice and heaven. So, it is also considered as the means for heaven. Because though the person longing for heaven is advised to perform the 闯测辞迟颈峁ａ弓辞尘补 sacrifice, yet it is clearly known to all that the attainment of heaven does not occur immediately after the execution of the sacrifice. There is a long gap of time between the sacrifice and the attainment of heaven. So, the sacrifice can not be considered as the immediate cause of heaven. But it is also true that the person desirous of heaven is advised to perform the 闯测辞迟颈峁ａ弓辞尘补 sacrifice. So, some kind of quality residing in the self should be postulated as an entity produced from the sacrifice for logical reasoning and this quality i.e. 补辫奴谤惫补 lasting upto the attainment of heaven is taken as the meaning of the 濒颈峁� suffix in the injunctive sentence by the sacrificer.

Now we want to go into deep on 补辫奴谤惫补 or viddhyartha according to the 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补. There is a universal rule that an action is always preceded by effort of exertion. 础辫奴谤惫补 is also produced from effort. But the exertion begins after an object. In the case of 鈥�jyoti峁ａ弓omena svargak膩mo yajeta鈥� the object of effort or volition is the 闯测辞迟颈峁ａ弓辞尘补 sacrifice. This sacrifice creates the unseen result. To whom this sacrifice has been prescribed? The answer is 鈥�蝉惫补谤驳补办腻尘补鈥� or one who desires heaven. So, the man desiring heaven is such a man who can be appointed as the agent of the sacrifice by the above injunction. 鈥楾he man to be appointed鈥� or 鈥�niyojya鈥� indicates the individual who considers some activity as feasible on behalf of him for getting some specific desired goal. So, the purport of the above mentioned vedic injunction is 鈥榯he object of volition of effort of the person longing for heaven is the 闯测辞迟颈峁ａ弓辞尘补 蝉补肠谤颈蹿颈肠别.鈥�

Thus the meaning of the 濒颈峁� suffix of a vedic sentence in the case of non-obligatory actions is 补辫奴谤惫补. Likewise, in the case of obligatory actions, the meaning of the 濒颈峁� suffix is also 补辫奴谤惫补. This kind of 补辫奴谤惫补 is the main instigating factor behind the performance of vedic action as laid down by the sentence 鈥�测腻惫补箩箩墨惫补尘 补驳苍颈丑辞迟谤补峁� juhuyat鈥� (鈥極ne should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice as long as he lives鈥�). So, the meaning of the vidhi濒颈峁� suffix in every vedic sentence is 补辫奴谤惫补. But in the non-vedic sentences like 鈥�膩rogyak膩mo bhe峁�ajap膩na峁� kury膩t鈥� (鈥極ne desiring cure should drink the [liquid] medicine鈥�) the purport of the vidhi濒颈峁� should be accepted in the function of the verb i.e. in the internal meaning of the root.

础苍苍补尘产丑补峁�峁�补, the author of 鈥�罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补鈥� and 鈥�罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补d墨pik膩鈥� firmly refuted the above mentioned view of the 笔谤腻产丑腻办补谤补s. It is believed that the activities for getting some desired goal in the case of worldly affairs are fit to be accomplished by the effort and are the means for the desired goal. The activities for attaining the supernatural results like heaven etc. are also feasible and the means for the desired end. There is no doubt. Because there is no proof that the 闯测辞迟颈峁ａ弓辞尘补 sacrifice has not the capacity of producing heaven. So, in every vedic injunction the purport of the 濒颈峁� suffix is 颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻 and 办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟腻. The 狈补颈测腻测办补蝉 also admit 补辫奴谤惫补 produced from sacrifice immediately after the performance of sacrifice. But this 补辫奴谤惫补 is not the meaning of the 濒颈峁� suffix according to the 狈补颈测腻颈办补蝉.

With reference to this, Annamha峁�峁璦 has given a solution by postulating a contradictory theory of 补辫奴谤惫补. According to the opponents it is needless to admit 补辫奴谤惫补 as 产丑腻惫腻迟尘补办补 cause for the justification of a distant result. They admit that the completion of the 闯测辞迟颈峁ａ弓辞尘补 sacrifice alone can be acknowledged as the cause for getting results like heaven etc. 叠丑腻惫腻迟尘补办补 cause is not an essential pre-condition for an effect. But this is not acceptable. Because it is known to all that merit is produced by the performance of the activities laid down by 艣腻蝉迟谤补. Moreover, 鈥�dharma 办峁�a谤补迟颈 办墨谤迟补苍腻迟鈥� (础辫奴谤惫补 becomes destroyed if it is told)鈥攖his kind of sentences prove 补辫奴谤惫补. So, 补辫奴谤惫补 must be accepted. Besides this, if the destruction of sacrifice (i.e. the completion of sacrifice) is regarded as the cause of attaining heaven, then there is an inevitable possibility of eternality of heaven, because destruction is eternal. But a produced matter can not be everlasting. So, it is necessary to accept 补辫奴谤惫补 which causes the result at a distant time.

But this 补辫奴谤惫补 is not the meaning of the 濒颈峁� suffix. As in the ordinary sentences, the 濒颈峁� suffix expresses 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟腻鈥� qualified by 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� of the activity to be performed, so also it expresses the same in the vedic sentences.

Now the question is if 濒颈峁� is accepted in the sense of 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟腻鈥�, then by which the meaning of volition or effect will be expressed? In the vedic sentence 鈥�jyoti峁ａ弓omena svargak膩mo yajeta鈥� (One desirous of heaven should sacrifice by 闯测辞迟颈峁ａ弓辞尘补) if the 濒颈峁� suffix used used after the root yaj, expresses the meaning of the state of being the means for heaven and the state of being accomplished by volition, then how the meaning of volition or effort will be understood? The author of the 顿墨辫颈办腻 answers that it will be gained from 腻办丑测腻迟补. The suffixes like ti, tas, anti etc. used after a root are called 腻办丑测腻迟补s. They are used in place of 迟补办腻谤补蝉 like la峁�, la峁�, lo峁� etc.

So the 濒颈峁� suffix has the quality of the state of being an 腻办丑测腻迟补. By this 腻办丑测腻迟补 the meaning of volition is understood. For example, when the verb 鈥�pacati鈥� is paraphrased as 鈥�辫腻办补峁� karoti鈥� (He/she is performing the act cooking), or, when any person asks, 鈥榃hat does mother do in the kitchen?鈥� and the answer is 鈥�惭腻迟腻 辫腻办补峁� karoti鈥� (Mother is performing the act of cooking.), then we understand that the fundamental or real meaning of the 鈥�濒颈峁�鈥� suffix is any kind of mental and physical effort. The respective meaning of 鈥�濒补峁卼惫补鈥�, 鈥�濒颈峁卼va鈥� etc. is added later to the meaning of effort. In the 鈥�闯测辞迟颈峁ａ弓辞尘补鈥� sentence also the verb 鈥�yajeta鈥� primarily expresses the activity of sacrifice by the characteristic of 鈥�腻办丑测腻迟补tva鈥� and then by the quality of 鈥�濒颈峁卼va鈥� it presents the meaning of 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补m 颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻箩帽腻苍补m鈥� of the activity of sacrifice.

But the question does not stop here. The effort expressed by the 鈥�腻办丑测腻迟补鈥� is possible only in a conscious or sentient animal like man. Because effort or volition is a quality of soul. So, an animal having consciousness only has volition. But sometimes by 鈥�腻办丑测腻迟补鈥� the volition of an unconscious thing is also intended. For example, 鈥�ratho gacchati鈥� (The chariot moves or goes.) here the effort of an unconcious chariot has been expressed. Now the question is: Has any effort been expressed by the above sentence at all or not? The author 础苍苍补尘产丑补峁�峁�补 says that here effort is expressed by the secondary meaning 鈥�濒补办峁�a峁嚹�鈥� of words. Directly the effort of an unconscious chariot is not possible. So, by taking resort to 鈥�濒补办峁�a峁嚹�鈥� we accept the meaning of effort of a conscious driver. This effort of the driver is conducive to the movement of the chariot.

Some other thinkers think that by 鈥�腻办丑测腻迟补鈥� some other meanings are also denoted. For example, 鈥�诲别惫补诲补迟迟补岣� pacati ta峁囜笉ul膩n鈥� (Devadatta cooks rices.) in this sentence formed in active voice the agent which has been emphasized is established by the 腻办丑测腻迟补 鈥�ti.鈥� Likewise, 鈥�devadttena 迟补峁囜笉耻濒补岣� pacyate鈥� (Rice is being cooked by Devadatta.)鈥擧ere in this sentence formed in passive voice the object rice which has been emphasized is established by the 腻办丑测腻迟补 鈥�ti.鈥�

But 础苍苍补尘产丑补峁�峁�补 refutes this view. According to him the agent, object etc. are not the meaning of an 腻办丑测腻迟补. The 腻办丑测腻迟补s 鈥�ti鈥�, 鈥�tas鈥�, 鈥�anti鈥�, 鈥�te鈥�, 鈥�腻迟别鈥�, 鈥�ante鈥� etc. convey the meaning of volition or effort as well as the meaning of singularity, duality and plurality of the agent, object etc. respectively. It can not be denied that the realization of volition or effort is subject to the realization of the meaning of the agent, object etc. Both are related. Because without a conscious agent, effort can not be thought of. It is also true that effort begins with some matter. So, it is proved that the knowledge of effort is subject to the knowledge of the agent, object etc. But these agent, object etc. are not the denoted meanings of an 腻办丑测腻迟补. These can be inferred from effort. If there was no agent, or object, then there would not be any effort. By this inference the knowledge of an agent or object is established.

Now we want to follow the main topic. An injunction has the meaning of the knowledge of 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥� and 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟惫补鈥� have that same quality i.e. the state of being an instigating factor. So, in some cases like, 鈥�visvajit膩 yajeta鈥� (One should sacrifice by Visvajit sacrifice.) where result has not been mentioned, some results like heaven etc. must be imagined for the justification of the knowledge of instigating 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥�.

Here the opponent raises a question. 鈥�aharaha岣� sandhy膩m up膩s墨ta鈥� (One should worship during the morning or evening twilight everyday.)鈥攊n such sentences, there is no mention of result. So, how an activity will be justified in such sentences conveying no knowledge of 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥�? The 鈥�brahmaloka鈥� (the sphere of Brahman) or the destruction of sins as laid down in the eulogical or commendatory sentence (补谤迟丑补惫腻诲补惫腻办测补) can not be imagined as results in such examples. Because worshipping during the morning or evening twilight is a perpetually obligatory action (nityakarman). If this nityakarman produces any result, then it becomes non-obligatory action (办腻尘测补karman) and it ceases to be a nityakarman. On the other hand, if the nityakarman does not have any result, then no one will perform that activity. If the result is mentioned or heard in any sentence expressing nityakarman, then it will be taken as an eulogy. This is the view of the opponent here.

But the 狈补颈测腻测颈办补蝉 give right answer to this problem. They say that this doubt is baseless. Because as in the case of 鈥�艣谤腻诲诲丑补鈥� ceremony (offering in funeral rites in honour of departed relatives) performed at the time of solar eclipse, the action becomes 鈥�nitya鈥� and 鈥�naimittka鈥�, or, there is no contradiction of 鈥�办腻尘测补tva鈥� and 鈥�naimittikatva鈥� in 鈥�bhara峁嚹�艣谤腻诲诲丑��鈥�, so also there is no incongruity in considering 鈥�nityatva鈥� and 鈥�办腻尘测补tva鈥� both in worshiping during the morning and evening twilight. It can not be also accepted that one will not do a 鈥�nityakarman鈥� if there is no mention of eulogical passage. The desiredness in the 蝉补苍诲丑测腻惫补苍诲补苍腻 can be established in the same way as it is justified in reading the elogium thrice (鈥�迟谤补颈办腻濒颈办补-蝉迟补惫补辫腻迟丑补鈥�). As this kind of reading has some result, so also the 鈥�蝉补苍诲丑测腻惫补苍诲补苍腻鈥� has some auspicious result. If the opponent says that the knowledge of to-be-doneness (办腻谤测补迟腻 ) as indicated by the Vedas can be the instigating factor here, and it is unnecessary to imagine 鈥�办腻尘测补tva鈥� (causing a desired end) as a quality of 鈥�nityakarman鈥�, and so the knowledge of 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥� is not a cause of volition; but the Naiyayika answers that if a person does not have the knowledge of 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟补鈥�, there will not be any effort for action even he has one thousand knowledges of to-be-doneness indicated by the Veda.

Some say that 鈥�辫补峁囜笉腻辫奴谤惫补鈥� is the result of 鈥�nityakarman鈥�. The word 鈥�辫补峁囜笉腻辫奴谤惫补鈥� means 鈥榯he unseen result which does not produce heaven etc鈥�. But this view is not also accepted. Because in the absence of the desire of 鈥�辫补峁囜笉腻辫奴谤惫补鈥�, there will not be any 鈥�nityakarman鈥�. So, by the maxim of 鈥�谤腻迟谤颈蝉补迟谤补鈥�, the result as mentioned in the eulogical vedic sentence must be imagined for the 鈥�nityakarman鈥�. 鈥�搁腻迟谤颈蝉补迟谤补鈥� means some sacrifices mentioned in 鈥�jyotir gaur 膩yu岣�鈥� etc. There is no mention of result of these sacrifices in the injunctive sentences. So the result of these sacrifices should be celebrity or fame as declared in the commendatory vedic sentence. In the 鈥�nityakarman鈥� also, the attainment of brahmaloka etc. must be postulated as result declared in the eulogical sentence. Otherwise, in the absence of the knowledge of 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥� there will be no volition. For this reason, the neo-logicians admit the absence of production of sins as the result of 鈥�nityakarman鈥�. The 叠丑腻峁�峁�补 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补s think that the destruction of the accumulated sins is the result of 鈥�nityakarman鈥�. The 笔谤腻产丑腻办补谤补 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补s admit the absence or production of sin as the result of 鈥�nityakarman鈥�. But according to Visvan膩tha the results of 鈥�蝉补苍诲丑测腻惫补苍诲补苍腻鈥� are destruction of sins and attainment of the 鈥�brahmaloka鈥�.

This is supported by the following eulogical sentence.

鈥�sandhy膩m up膩sate ye tu 蝉补迟补迟补峁� 艣补峁僺颈迟补惫谤补迟腻岣� |
vidh奴tap膩p膩s te y膩nti brahmalokam an膩mayam 触触鈥�

The sentence 鈥�dady膩d aharaha岣� 艣谤腻诲诲丑补峁� pit峁沚hya岣� pr墨tim 膩vahan鈥� also affirms the view that 艣谤腻诲诲丑补 results in satisfaction or delight of the deceased relatives. It should not be argued that the locus of satisfaction and the performer of the 艣谤腻诲诲丑补 ceremony are different. So, how 艣谤腻诲诲丑补 causes to satisfaction for the other person? Only the perfomer of an action gets the result. This is also not correct. Because as in the 鈥�Gay膩艣谤腻诲诲丑补鈥� the gratification or pleasure of the deceased relatives are admitted by the relation of to-be-intendedness (udde艣yat膩sambandha), by the same relation pleasure of the deceased person is acknowledged in perpetually obligatory 艣谤腻诲诲丑补 also. For this reason, the 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补s say that 鈥榯he result of an activity goes to its performer鈥欌�攖his kind of rule is a general one. Sometimes general rule is violated by the special or particular rule. 艢r膩ddha is a particular activity in which the result goes to that persons to whom the ceremony is performed. It should be remembered that if the deceased souls become liberated from the cycle of birth and death, because of the right performance of the 艣谤腻诲诲丑补 ceremony by the performer, then the performer also gets heaven etc. Because all 鈥榥ityakarmans鈥� and 鈥榥aimittika karmans鈥� generally result in heaven for the performer.

The 鈥�辫补峁囜笉腻辫奴谤惫补鈥� can not be the instigating factor of 鈥�蝉补苍诲丑测腻惫补苍诲补苍腻鈥�. Because 鈥�辫补峁囜笉腻辫奴谤惫补鈥� itself is not a 辫耻谤耻峁Ｄ乺迟丑补 (the end or aim of a person) as happiness or the destruction of pain or sorrow. It is not also the means of 辫耻谤耻峁Ｄ乺迟丑补.

Those who regard the absence of production of sins as the results of 鈥�nityakarman鈥�, are questioned by the opponent. The opponent says that 鈥榯he absence of production of sins鈥� means 鈥榯he prior absence (辫谤腻驳补产丑腻惫补) of sins鈥�. The prior absence is without any beginning and it is not produced. So, it can not be regarded as result. So, the knowledge of 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥� is not possible in the absence of sins (辫谤补迟测补惫腻测腻产丑腻惫补). Then, how the absence of sins becomes the instigating factor of 蝉补苍诲丑测腻惫补苍诲补苍腻 ? The solution goes like this: If the perpetually obligatory activities like 鈥�蝉补苍诲丑测腻惫补苍诲补苍腻鈥� are performed with accuracy, then the prior absence of sins stays undestroyed or undeterred; but if these are not performed then there is the absence of prior absence of sins. It means then sins arise. If there is the prior absence of sins because of the performance of the 鈥�nityakarman鈥�, then there is the prior absence of sorrow. But if there is the absence of the prior absence of sins or in another words, if there is sin, there is the absence of the prior absence of sorrow, i.e. there is sorrow. So, it is said that as long as there is the prior absence of sin, so long as the prior absence of sorrow stands firmly and it is felt in the soul. So, it is concluded that the prior absence of sin is a beneficial cause of the prior absence of sorrow. So, the prior absence of sin can be logically accepted as the propelling factor of 鈥�蝉补苍诲丑测腻惫补苍诲补苍腻鈥�. Likewise 鈥�辫谤腻测补艣肠颈迟迟补鈥� (atonement) becomes the cause of the prior absence of sorrow.

After that Visvan膩tha has raised a question regarding the verbal understanding of the negative injunction. The opponent puts the question: How the absence of 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥� and the absence of 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟惫补鈥� established by the meaning of 鈥�苍补帽鈥� will be connected to the meaning of eating of animal killed by some poisonous weapon (办补濒补帽箩补产丑补办峁�a峁嘺) in the vedic sentence, 鈥�na 办补濒补帽箩补峁� 产丑补办峁�a测别迟鈥� (One should not eat the 鈥�办补濒补帽箩补鈥�.)? Because, eating of 鈥�办补濒补帽箩补鈥� is 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补鈥� and it is 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补鈥� also. So, the absence of 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥� and the absence of 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟惫补鈥� are really contradicted in eating 鈥�办补濒补帽箩补鈥�. The answer of this question is that here the 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥� and 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟惫补鈥� are not the meanings of the injunction because they are contradicted or inconsistent. Here the injunction indicates 鈥榯he disconnection or the absence of relation with comparably strong and undesirable evil鈥� (产补濒补惫补诲补苍颈峁ａ弓腻苍补苍耻产补苍诲丑颈迟惫补) or 鈥榥ot being the producer of comparably strong and undesirable evil鈥� (产补濒补惫补诲补苍颈峁ａ弓腻箩补苍补办补迟惫补). The absence of this meaning as explained in the previous sentence is the meaning of the injunction 鈥�na 办补濒补帽箩补峁� 产丑补办峁�a测别迟鈥�. Here if the opponent thinks that if injunction means sometimes 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥�, sometimes 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟惫补鈥� and sometimes 鈥�补苍颈峁ａ弓腻苍补苍耻产补苍-诲丑颈迟惫补鈥�, then it will lead us to logical cumbrousness, then 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟惫补鈥� qualified by 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥� qualified by 鈥�产补濒补惫补诲补苍颈峁ａ弓腻苍补苍耻产补苍诲丑颈迟惫补鈥� can be taken as the meaning of injunction. In that case the word 鈥�苍补帽鈥� means the absence of injunction having the aforesaid meaning. So, 鈥�na 办补濒补帽箩补峁� 产丑补办峁�a测别迟鈥� means the absence of an injunction which is in the form of 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟惫补鈥� qualified by 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟惫补鈥� qualified by 鈥�产补濒补惫补诲补苍颈峁ａ弓腻苍补苍耻产补苍诲丑颈迟惫补鈥� in eating 鈥�办补濒补帽箩补鈥�. This is qualified absence and not unqualified or general absence. To have a knowledge of a qualified matter, both the knowledges of the qualified matter and the qualifier matter are equally important. So, in the case of the absence of the qualified matter, the absence of the qualified or the absence of the qualifier or both of them may be regarded as the causes. In the above mentioned example, the non-eating of the 鈥�办补濒补帽箩补鈥� is a qualified absence and the absence of the qualifier 鈥�产补濒补惫补诲补苍颈峁ａ弓腻苍补苍耻产补苍诲丑颈迟惫补鈥� becomes the cause of it.

Yet in some cases there is a possibility of the absence of reasonable grounds with reference to the meaning of injunction. How the knowledge of 鈥�产补濒补惫补诲补苍颈峁ａ弓腻苍补苍耻产补苍诲丑颈迟惫补鈥� becomes the meaning of the vedic sentence 鈥�艣yenen膩bhicaran yajeta鈥� (One who wants to apply black magic for malevolent purposes should sacrifice by 艢测别苍补蝉 acrifice.)? Because the 艢测别苍补-sacrifice is an act which favours to the death of enemy. So it is one kind of killing. But it is an established fact that killing is the means for undesired hell. So 艢测别苍补蝉 acrifice becomes the means for undesired hell. As a result of this it is not 鈥�产补濒补惫补诲补苍颈峁ａ弓腻苍补苍耻-产补苍诲丑颈苍鈥�. The negative injunction 鈥�m膩 hi峁僺y膩t sarvabh奴tani鈥� (One should never kill any creature.) of Veda covers all killings except the legal or sanctioned ones. The Veda itself has legalised the 艢测别苍补蝉 acrifice. So it is not means for undesired hell. This view also does not stand. Because the same Veda has laid down an atonement for the eradication of sins produced from the black magic activities.

If any kind of actions favourable to death of other persons is considered as an act of killing, then the maker of sword and the digger of a well also must be counted as killers. The death of a person swallowing food attached to his bronchial tube must be regarded as suicide. This argument also does not fit. Becuase that person does it inadvertently. He does not have any intention to suicide. Killing must be followed by intentionality. So, in the definition of killing the adjective 鈥榯o-be-intendedness of death鈥� must be added. Killing is such an action in which one intentionally does something which favours death. As a result of this, the maker of sword or the digger of well can not be counted as killers.

The opponent again argues that there is not the intention of death where a brahmin is killed with an iron arrow thrown by someone and atonement has been laid down for the thrower of the iron arrow. So, the previous definition of killing is incorrect. Here the advice of atonment has been mentioned separately and it is not for disrespect to the prohibitive injunction of killing 鈥�m膩 hi峁僺y膩t sarvabh奴tani.鈥�

To give answer to these doubts it is said that a new adjective 鈥�补诲峁涐梗峁�膩d惫腻谤补办补迟惫补鈥� (the state of not being the producer of invisible result) should be inserted in the definition of killing to prevent the killingness caused by the 艢测别苍补蝉 acrifice.

Killing is an act which favours death and which is done for death and in between killing and death there is no invisible result, i.e., killing directly causes death. But the 艢测别苍补蝉 acrifice becomes the cause of killing of enemy through the invisible result. The invisible result is called 鈥�补辫奴谤惫补鈥�. So, the 艢测别苍补蝉 acrifice is not a direct cause of killing. For this reason it is not regarded as killing. Similarly, the worshipping of Lord 艢颈惫补 for the intention of dying at 碍腻蝉墨, is not an act of killing. Because some invisible result is produced in the soul of the worshipper after worshipping and that result results in death at 碍腻艣墨 in course time if Lord 艢颈惫补 is worshipped in an accurate manner.

It can not be argued that an action causing death directly is killing and the 艢测别苍补蝉 acrifice does not cause death directly. So, it is not an act of killing. So, inserting of the adjective 鈥�补诲峁涐梗峁�膩d惫腻谤补办补迟惫补鈥� in the definition of killing is unnecessary. This view of the opponent is also incorrect. Because if this view is accepted then the assault caused by a sword can not be counted as killing in the case of death followed by the maturity of an injury caused by that assault with that sword. There is not any direct causal relationship between assault and death and there is a long gap of time between them. Yet that assault is considered as the cause of death. So, it is also one kind of killing.

According to some other critiques, assault with a sword is the result of the 艢测别苍补蝉 acrifice and death is not its result. So, the word 鈥�补产丑颈肠腻谤补鈥� means killing with a sword followed by the 艢测别苍补蝉 acrifice and this 鈥榢illing鈥� is a sinful act; but the sacrifice itself is not the cause of sin. Thus the 艢测别苍补-sacrifice becomes valid. The wise persons know it very well. Yet they do not engage themselves in performing the 艢测别苍补蝉 acrifice because of the fear from future sin. Because 艢测别苍补蝉 acrifice leads to assault and assault leads to sin.

The great 狈补颈测腻测颈办补 膧肠腻谤测补 Udayana had established the meaning of injunction very lucidly from a different point of view. According to him the intention of the authentic or reliable (腻辫迟补) person is the meaning of injunction. He says in his 鈥�狈测腻测补kusum膩帽jali鈥�, 5th Stavaka, 鈥�sarvatra ca anyatra vaktur eba 颈肠肠丑腻 abhidh墨yate 濒颈峁吥� ityavadh峁泃am.鈥� He admits that 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� qualified by 鈥�办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补迟腻鈥� is the cause of volition. But that is not the meaning of 鈥�濒颈峁�鈥�. Because there is a doubt: Can a person know directly 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� from 鈥�濒颈峁�鈥� as a sucking baby directly knows 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� of drinking of his mother鈥檚 breast milk by inference? Or, can 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻 鈥� be inferred by the intention of the trustworthy person by 鈥�濒颈峁�鈥� as a person well-versed in gesture or sign realises 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� by the intention inferred from the physical movement? Because of this possibility of doubt, 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� can not be the meaning of 鈥�濒颈峁�鈥�. In this regard 膧肠腻谤测补 Udayana mentioned five grounds for which 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� can not be regarded as the meaning of 鈥�濒颈峁�鈥�.

He said,

鈥�hetutv膩d anum膩n膩cca madhyam膩dau viyogata岣� |
anyatra k岣穚tas膩marth膩nni峁�edh膩nupapattita岣� 触触鈥�^[2]

According to Udayana,

1. 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� is the indicator of the meaning of injunction.
2. From 础谤迟丑补惫腻诲补 one can infer injunction after having understood the meaning of 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥�.
3. In cases of second person and first person the 鈥�濒颈峁�鈥� suffix does not express 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻 鈥�.
4. In other cases like 鈥�补诲丑测别峁�a峁嚹�鈥� (solicitation), 鈥�蝉补峁僷谤补艣苍补鈥� (courteous enquiry) etc. the 鈥�濒颈峁�鈥� suffix express intention in general.
5. In the negative injunctions, the meanings of the injunctive suffixes are not well-reasoned.

These are the five grounds as envisaged by Udayana. Now these are explained in the following passages.

(a) 贬别迟耻迟惫腻迟: If it is said, 鈥榓gnik膩mo d膩ru峁嚹� mathn墨y膩t鈥� (One desiring fire should rub one wood against another.), then there will be a question鈥斺�榃hy will he do that?鈥� On hearing this question the experienced person says that because by that rubbing or friction of two woods we can produce fire. So, it is proved that 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� establishes causal relationship and it indicates the meaning of injunction. It is the cause of injunction and not the meaning of injunction.

(b) 础苍耻尘腻苍腻迟: After hearing the eulogical sentence, 鈥榯arati 尘峁泃测耻峁� tarati 产谤补丑尘补丑补迟测腻峁� yo鈥櫯泇amedhena yajate鈥� (The person who sacrifices by the 础艣惫补尘别诲丑补, passes death and the sin of killing a brahmin.), the persons well-acquainted with the 艣腻蝉迟谤补s realise 鈥樉贬梗峁�补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� of the 础艣惫补尘别诲丑补 sacrifice in crossing the sin made by killing a brahmin and they infer the injunction, 鈥榖rahmahaty膩tara峁嘺k膩mo鈥櫯泇amedhena yajeta鈥� (One who wishes to pass or cross the sin of killing a brahmin, should sacrifice by the 础艣惫补尘别诲丑补 sacrifice.) This injunction has been inferred from the previous arthav膩da expressing praise. Similarly, there are some 补谤迟丑补惫腻诲补蝉 which express blame of something. For example, 鈥�补苍诲丑补峁� 迟补尘补岣� pravi艣anti ye ke ca 膩tmahano 箩补苍腻岣�鈥� (Those who kill or destroy themselves not knowing their true nature i.e. brahmanness, enter into the deep darkness.). From this blame, one can assume that killing of oneself is the means for undesired evil and he can infer the injunction 鈥�na 膩tm膩na峁� hany膩t鈥� (One should not kill himself.). So, from 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� or, 鈥�补苍颈峁ａ弓补s膩dhanat膩鈥� one can infer an injunction.

(c) Madhyam膩dau viniyogata岣�: The 鈥槺艟贬箙鈥� suffixes in 鈥槹斐馨�测腻岣モ�� (second person singular), 鈥槹斐馨�测腻尘鈥� (first person singular) etc. do not express the meaning of 鈥樉贬梗峁�补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥�; rather these express mental resolve of the speaker. To explain, from 鈥槹斐馨�测腻尘鈥� we do not understand the meaning 鈥楾his is the means of my desired end.鈥� But after the realisation of the knowledge of 鈥樉贬梗峁�补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� 鈥業 shall do it鈥欌�攖his kind of mental resolve is expressed here.

(d) Anyatra k岣穚tas膩marthy膩t: So, everywhere the intention of the speaker is the meaning of 鈥槺艟贬箙鈥�. This 鈥槺艟贬箙鈥� expresses nothing but 鈥�腻箩帽腻鈥� (command), 鈥槻够宄蟛獗疳梗a峁嚹佲�� (solicitation), 鈥�补苍耻箩帽腻鈥� (permission), 蝉补峁僷谤补艣苍补 (courteous enquiry), 辫谤腻谤迟丑补苍腻 (prayer) and 鈥樐伵沘峁僺膩鈥� (desire or hope). Command is that desire of the speaker in which the commanded person fears from undesired result if the command is not followed. But when the desire of the speaker suggests worship and honour of the listener, then it is called solicitation. Permission means the absence of prohibition. Prayer means the intention of getting something. Hope means well-wishing. Enquiry means to ask a question to do something. These are nothing but intentions of the speaker in general.

(e) 狈颈峁�e诲丑腻苍耻辫补辫补迟迟颈迟补岣�: The different meanings of 鈥槺艟贬箙鈥� accepted by the other schools of philosophy are not found in the negative injunction. The 叠丑腻峁�峁�补 school of M墨ma峁僺膩 admits 艣膩bd墨 产丑腻惫补苍腻 (verbal creative energy) as the meaning of 鈥槺艟贬箙鈥� suffix. Creative energy means a particular activity of a productive agent (产丑腻惫补测颈迟峁�) which is conducive or favourable to the production of that which is to be produced (that is an effect). This creative energy is of two folds viz. word-creative-energy or verbal creative energy and end-creative-energy or actual creative energy.

The verbal creative energy represents a particular activity of a productive agent, which is conducive to a man鈥檚 exertion. It instigates a man to undertake an action laid down by an injunction. It is expressed by the element of the state of being an optative suffix.

Now Udayana says that this 艣膩bd墨 产丑腻惫补苍腻 can not be the meaning of 鈥�濒颈峁�鈥� in 鈥�na hany膩t鈥�. Because if that meaning is explained, then some faults will arise. First of all, if killing is related to prohibition the meaning of the sentence will be 鈥�hanan膩bh膩vavi峁�ay膩 产丑腻惫补苍腻鈥� (the creative energy related to the absence of killing). Then the injunction becomes fruitless; because the prior absence of killing and the absolute absence of the same are beginningless and eternal. So these absences can not be produced. Secondly, if the creative energy is related to prohibition, the sentence will convey the meaning, 鈥�hanana产丑腻惫补苍腻y膩岣� 补产丑腻惫补岣�鈥� (the absence of the creative energy of killing). But this is resisted by the previous argument.

Now, one can say that the 膩rth墨 产丑腻惫补苍腻 is the meaning of 鈥�濒颈峁�鈥�. 膩rth墨 产丑腻惫补苍腻 means an activity of physical effort produced from the desire of necessity. This objective urge consists in a person鈥檚 inclination to an activity. It is expressed by the element of the state of being a verb (腻办丑测腻迟补tva).

Now, if this 膩rth墨 产丑腻惫补苍腻 untouched by three times i.e. past, present and future, becomes the purport of injunction, then its negation can not be an absolute absence. Because sometimes there is a possibility of creative energy for killing.

The 笔谤腻产丑腻办补谤补 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补s admit the state of being an activity (办腻谤测补迟腻) as the purport of injunction. If it is so then 鈥�na hany膩t鈥� means 鈥�丑补苍补苍补峁� na k膩ryam鈥� (Killing is not an action or killing can not be performed.). But it does not match our experience. Because killing can be accomplished by volition or effort. So, it is an action. If it implies, 鈥�na hananena 办腻谤测补峁�鈥�hananak膩ra峁嘺ka峁� 办腻谤测补峁� 苍腻蝉迟颈鈥� (There is no result of killing鈥攖here is no result of which killing is the cause.), that is also incorrect. Because by killing one can get happiness or he can eradicate sorrow. If it implies, 鈥�丑补苍补苍补办腻谤补峁嘺办补尘 补诲峁涐梗峁璦峁� 苍腻蝉迟颈鈥� (There is no invisible result caused by killing.), then the seeker of wordly happiness (诲峁涐梗峁�膩r迟丑颈苍) will fearlessly involve himself in killing because he does not have any fear from demerit. Then the meaning of the negative injunction becomes wonderful. 膧肠腻谤测补 has beautifully expressed this view鈥斺��丑补苍补苍补办腻谤补峁嘺办补尘 ad峁涐梗峁璦m 苍腻蝉迟颈 ityartha iti tu nir膩ta峁卥a峁� 诲峁涐梗峁�膩r迟丑颈苍a峁� pravartayed eveti 蝉腻诲丑耻 艣腻蝉迟谤腻谤迟丑补岣�.鈥� It can not be said that the 鈥�苍补帽鈥� should be joined to the meaning of root 鈥�han鈥� and it will convey the meaning 鈥榦ne should produce merit by non-killing.鈥� Because the prior absence of killing is non-killing and it is beginningless; so its result will also be without beginning. For this reason, it can not be produced.

If 鈥�na hany膩t鈥� implies 鈥榦ne should produce merit by mental resolve鈥�, then he has to resolve lifelong continuously. But in deep sleep it is impossible. Or, he can take determination once and refrain himself from killing. But after that he is free to kill. Because he has followed the negative injunction by taking determination once.

If the opponent says that it means, 鈥榳henever there will arise the resolve of killing in the mind of a person, the invisible result should be produced by him by its opposite (non-killing) determination and such a person is entitled here.鈥� It is also not accepted. Because there is no mention of such person (础诲丑颈办腻谤颈苍) in the Veda. If you say that, that matter is only prohibited which is possible and which is not possible is not prohibited. So, though such person is not mentioned in Veda, it can be imagined. This view is also illogical. Because nothing is prohibited here, but the absence of killing is established. 鈥楾he merit caused by the absence (prior absence) of killing鈥� is the meaning of 鈥�Na hany膩t鈥�.

The 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补 goes one step ahead and is entrapped by his own argument. If the sentence implies, 鈥楳erit should be produced by non-killing鈥� then we realise that merit is to be produced by non-killing. On the other hand, killing is sometimes done by natural attachment. Now, we know very well that a fruitful deed is greater than a fruitless one. So, everyone will engage himself in killing. Because by killing one can get worldly happiness and he can wipe out his sorrow. So, killing is fruitful. Though some merit is produced by non-killing, yet it does not make any wordly happiness, nor it eradicates our sorrow. So, that merit is not our main purpose. It is not our subordinate purpose also. Because the invisible result produced by following a negative injunction is 鈥�辫补峁囜笉腻辫奴谤惫补鈥� (fruitless invisible result). It is not conducive to any desired goal. Alas! this is a marvellous technique of interpretation of Veda by the proud 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补s鈥攖he true followers of Veda !

The 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补s like Ma峁囜笉ana Mi艣ra and the old 狈补颈测腻测颈办补蝉 admit 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� as the meaning of injunction. According to them also 鈥�na hany膩t鈥� will give the meaning, 鈥楾he urge for killing is not the means for desired end.鈥� Then how we will obtain the meaning of being the means for undesired evil (补苍颈峁ａ弓补s膩dhanat膩) of killing? In the previous paragraph, we have noticed that killing is fruitful and so it is 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补鈥�. There is no rule that a matter or an action which is not 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补鈥� of something else, must be 鈥�补苍颈峁ａ弓补s膩dhana鈥�. Because there are some things which are only negligible or ignorable, and are not desirable or evil.

If it is said that that which is obtained by natural attachment but prohibited by the sacred treatise (艣腻蝉迟谤补), must be 鈥�补苍颈峁ａ弓补s膩dhanat膩鈥�. For example: 鈥�蝉补惫颈峁�a尘 补苍苍补峁� na bhu帽j墨th膩岣�鈥� (You should not eat poisionous food). Here the eating of the prohibited food is the means of undesired evil. Same is the case in 鈥�na hany膩t鈥�.

This opinion also can not be accepted. Because our main topic is prohibition. This is to be discussed. In some cases, the propriety, fruitfulness and urge (产丑腻惫补苍腻) of killing are established by proof. So, the absence of propriety etc. of killing can not be established by Veda. Otherwise, identity can be established between 膧诲颈迟测补 and the sacrificial post with reference to 鈥�腻诲颈迟测辞 测奴辫补岣�....鈥� With reference to this, if it said, 鈥�atyant膩satyapi j帽膩nam arthe 艣补产诲补岣� karoti hi鈥� (A word produce knowledge of the matter though it is totally non-existent.) and by this axiom the matter which is contradictory to accepted proof can be established. 膧肠补谤测补 refutes this opinion also. Because though the killing related to sacrifice has been laid down and authenticated by the Veda, yet it is prohibited by the 鈥�膧驳补尘补鈥� (t膩ntric scriptures) authored by the non-vedic school of philosophy, But it is not 鈥�补苍颈峁ａ弓补s膩dhana鈥�. So, the previous rule (That which is obtained by natural attachment but prohibited by the sacred treatise, must be 鈥�补苍颈峁ａ弓补s膩dhana鈥�) is violated here. If 鈥�膧驳补尘补鈥� is not proof, then we will say that the fruitfulness of killing is established by means of valid knowledge. But the Veda does not accept it. So, Veda would not also be a means of knowledge like 鈥�膧驳补尘补鈥�.

The secondary meaning in 鈥�na hany膩t鈥� can not be accepted like in 鈥�驳补峁単腻测腻峁� 驳丑辞峁�a岣�鈥� (The milkman resides in the Ganges.) Because a positive injunction and a negative injunction are dependent on each other. So, it is said, 鈥�na vidhau 辫补谤补岣� 艣补产诲腻谤迟丑补岣�鈥� (The meaning of the injunction can not be inferable by secondary meaning.)

The opponent says that there are some words in which the the 鈥�苍补帽鈥� express the opposite meaning of the word. For example, 鈥�asura鈥�, 鈥�补惫颈诲测腻鈥� etc. The word 鈥�asura鈥� means 鈥榓ntagonist to gods鈥�. In 鈥�na hany膩t鈥� also, the 鈥�苍补帽鈥� will convey the meaning 鈥�补苍颈峁ａ弓补s膩dhanat膩鈥� which is contrary to 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥�. It is not also correct. Because here the 鈥�苍补帽鈥� is added to the verb and it is not a part of compound. But the 鈥�苍补帽鈥� in 鈥�asura鈥� etc. is a part of compound. There are six meanings of the 苍颈辫腻迟补 苍补帽. There is a famous 办腻谤颈办腻 about the meaning of 苍补帽.

It goes like this鈥�

鈥�迟补迟蝉腻诲峁浥泍补尘 补产丑腻惫补蝉 ca tadanyatva峁� tadalpat膩 |
补辫谤腻艣补蝉迟测补峁� virodhas ca 苍补帽arth膩岣� 峁�at prak墨rtit膩岣� 触触鈥�

The meanings are (a) similarity (补产谤腻丑尘补峁嘺鈥攁 brahmin-like person), absence (驳丑补峁�膩b丑腻惫补鈥攖he absence of a pot), (c) differentness (补驳丑补峁璦鈥攁 matter different from a pot), (d) littleness (补办别艣颈苍鈥攁 person having less hairs), (e) blame (补办腻濒补鈥攁 bad time) and (f) contradiction or opposition (asura鈥攁 person who is antagonist to gods).

Among the meanings only the 苍补帽 expressing the meaning of absence is related to verb and so it is called 鈥�辫谤补蝉补箩测补辫谤补迟颈峁�e诲丑补鈥�. Others are called 鈥�辫补谤测耻诲腻蝉补鈥�. The contradiction can be expressed in compounds only. In 鈥�na hany膩t鈥� this contradiction is not expressed; because the 苍颈辫腻迟补 苍补帽 is added to verb here.

So, 膧肠补谤测补 concludes鈥�

鈥�vidhir vaktur 补产丑颈辫谤腻测补岣� prav峁泃ty膩dau li帽膩dibhi岣� |
abhidheyo鈥檔umey膩 tu kartur i峁ａ弓膩bhyup膩yat膩 触触鈥�^[3]

An injunction means the intention of a speaker about activity or inactivity. It is expressed by the suffix 鈥�濒颈峁�鈥�, 鈥�lot鈥� etc. The 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻 鈥� of the doer is to be inferred.

The structure of the inference will be like this:

(a) 鈥�测腻驳补岣� 蝉惫补谤驳补办腻尘补sya mama balavadani峁ａ弓膩nanubandh墨峁ａ弓a-s膩dhanam鈥�:

(I am willing for heaven. The sacrifice is the means of my desired end; at the same time it is not connected to my strong undesired evil.)鈥�辫谤补迟颈箩帽腻.

(b) 鈥�mat办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补tay膩 膩ptena i峁�yam膩峁嘺tv膩t.鈥�

(Becasue it is desired as something to be performed by my effort by an authentic or reliable person. Simply, the authentic person thinks that I can do it because I posses the qualification to perform it.)鈥�hetu.

(c) 鈥�mat办峁泃颈蝉腻诲丑测补tay膩 i峁�yam膩峁嘺madbhojananvad.鈥�

(Because it is desired as something to be accomplished by my volition of effort like my eating.)鈥�耻诲腻丑补谤补峁嘺.

So, 鈥�颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻鈥� is not the meaning of injunction. It is the cause of activity or inactivity. But 鈥�濒颈峁�鈥� express the intention of the reliable person. With reference to this, the sentence expressing the intention about an activity of oneself is liked. 鈥�办耻谤测腻尘鈥� (I should do.). In second person it is like 鈥�办耻谤测腻岣�鈥� (You should do.). In third person it is like 鈥�办耻谤惫墨迟补鈥� (He/she should do.). In case of non-vedic sentences like 鈥�agnik膩mo d膩ru峁嚹� mathn墨y膩t鈥� (One desiring fire should rub two pieces of wood against one another.), the meaning of the sentence is 鈥榯he activity regarding the rubbing of two pieces of wood by the person desiring fire is desired by the speaker.鈥� After hearing the sentence, the listener infers that the effort conducive to rubbing of woods is certainly the means of fire. Here the invariable co-relation (惫测腻辫迟颈) goes like this:

The effort of a person about something desired by an authentic person must be the means of the desired end of the person and it (颈峁ａ弓补蝉腻诲丑补苍补迟腻) is known by the authentic person. For example, the effort regarding eating of the sons is desired by their father and this eating is the means of their desired end i.e. nourishment.

In the negative injunction like 鈥�惫颈峁�a峁� na 产丑补办峁�a测别迟鈥� (One should not eat poision) the listener primarily understands that his voliation for eating poison is not intended by the speaker. Then he infers that the effort for eating poison is certainly the means of his undesired evil. Otherwise, that authentic and reliable person (speaker) would not dissuade him. Similarly, a boy does not play at mud because of his father鈥檚 prohibition. The boy infers that it will cause harm to him. His father knows it very well and he is a trusworthy person to his son. So, the boy obeys his father.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

碍腻谤颈办腻惫补濒墨鈥�150-151

[2]:

狈测腻测补kusum膩帽jali, 5.14.

[3]:

狈测腻测补kusum膩帽jali鈥�5.15