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Liberation in early Advaita Vedanta

by Aleksandar Uskokov | 2018 | 195,782 words

This page relates ‘Winning the World of the Gods� of the study named “Scripture and the Hermeneutics of Liberation in Early Advaita Vedanta� which highlights how liberation (in Sanskrit: Moksha) is posited as the “highest good”—i.e., it represents freedom from the cyclical process of birth and rebirth. It further shows that Shankara’s doctrine emphasizes that liberation is solely derived from knowledge of Brahman.

Go directly to: Footnotes.

The third attainment is the worlds of the gods, deva-loka, culminating in the world of ᾱṇy or brahma-loka, achieved through the northern course known to us from the 󳾲-ūٰ attributed to 岹ⲹṇa account. The means of attaining this world is meditation on the so-called lower Brahman, to which ritual may be optionally added to form a variety of ñԲ-karma-samuccaya, a combination of �knowledge� and “action,� that is, meditation and ritual. This attainment is, really, the equivalent of the state of liberation in the Brahma-ūٰ.

As I have already reminded us, the normative ձԳٲ account of liberation presented by Bādārāyaṇa in the 󳾲-ūٰ attributed to 岹ⲹṇa envisioned a standard 󳾲- arranged around an injunctive text.

The doctrine of was explicitly modeled on the ritual, insofar as the individual 󳾲-s were formed by combining details from different texts, had the same standardized object—Brahman—ad involved the same attainment�brahma-loka—achieved by ascending through the same northern course. The attainment was a specific place, achieved by motion. The process was meditative absorption on Brahman through any of the thus standardized s. The result involved enjoying the Vedic delectable objects: ancestors that manifest at will, garlands and perfumes, women, and carriages. Liberation itself consisted in winning sovereignty, , and pleasure, bhoga, which were directly derived from the seventh and eighth ṻ첹 of the ԻDzⲹ, respectively.

I also said that for Śṅk this doctrine involved action of the mental kind because at the very least one had the choice to sit down and intentionally identify oneself with Brahman—or not. It was not a matter of knowing, but of doing, and doing was posterior to ṇa and involved a host of personal and other factors. A sure sign that a text was not about liberation was if the text was injunctive. “Knowledge arises from reliable warrants and concerns the real nature of the thing. It can be neither produced nor blocked by a hundred ܲԳپDzԲ.�[1] Well, sure sign most of the time, as we shall see in Chapter Nine. Liberation, as we shall also see later, was just about knowing, a form of anamnesis, and had nothing to do with action of any kind.

See, for instance, his comment on the one of the ūٰ on meditation that I identified as crucial because of being pellucid, 4.1.7:

The consideration about sitting and the like does not arise, to begin with, regarding meditations that are related to ritual subsidiaries, because in that case they are dependent on the ritual [and regulated by its provisions]. It does not arise regarding perfect seeing either, because knowledge is dependent on the thing. It is, however, with regard to other kinds of meditation that it should be deliberated whether one should meditate without a specific rule—standing, lying down or sitting—or strictly sitting.[2]

Knowledge qua knowledge cannot be scripturally regulated, because it follows the constitution of things, not some human, divine, or non-personal whim. Śṅk, thus, cancelled out what 岹ⲹṇa affirmed, and his distinction of knowledge and meditation in effect divided 岹ⲹṇa’s 󳾲- into one leading to Brahman the effect, -brahma or ᾱṇy, as already suggested by , involving absorptive meditation and in which everything that we know from the 󳾲-ūٰ attributed to 岹ⲹṇa account was fine and dandy, and another one concerning the pure Brahman, involving theological and philosophical reflection and a thoroughly reevaluated role of ritual. Śṅk continued using most of the same standard terms for both meditation and reflection: , ñԲ, viñԲ, 岹śԲ, ṛṣṭi, even the one which was most clearly associated with meditation, ܱԲ,[3] but he explicitly drew the distinction when it had to be drawn and used terms such as samyag-岹śԲ, “perfect seeing,� and pairs such as para- and apara-, ṇa- and Ծṇa-, brahma- and ܱ-ⲹ.[4]

There were a few other, equally important reasons why Śṅk denied that achieving brahma-loka was real liberation, most of which are commonly known and just what we would expect from him. Liberation is just being the Self, ٳԲ ٳԲ� ǰṣa�, and is, thus, equivalent to the Self.[5] Ergo, liberation is omnipresent and non-different from the itinerant. The individual Selves are ultimately Brahman, so liberation cannot be something one could reach by going to another place, for it only makes sense to reach that which is separate from oneself.[6] Further, the reaching of brahma-loka presupposes duality—a agent, action, object of attainment—ad with that it presupposes and reinforces ignorance. It also jeopardizes texts that affirm non-duality: they could only make sense if they were related to liberation, whereas the meditational texts would still be meaningful with brahma-loka as their independent attainment.[7]

But for our purposes here the important thing was that going to brahma-loka involved attaining the same Vedic desirable objects, —women and the like—that one wished to attain prompted by desire. The essential difference was just that one did not have to return to the human realm as in the case of ritual and the southern course. In the old ձԳٲ this was good enough a difference, since, as I argued, its disagreement with īṃs was less on the attainment and more on the means. With Śṅk, however, we reach here the point where a wedge is inserted in the Veda as a canon: on the one hand are things 峾ⲹ, geared towards attaining the common pleasurable objects in one of the three worlds through some form of action, and on the other hand there is the world which is the Self, attained solely through knowledge. Brahma-loka, the northern course, meditation and sovereignty and enjoyment were part of the first group. One was prompted by the same desires as defilements to attain desirable objects of the same kind.[8]

This was the top of what could be achieved pursuing ṛtپ-dharma and promotion or abhyudaya as the human good toward which such dharma aimed.

Ritual, with or without the accompaniment of meditation, which this ignorant man, for whom the divisions of caste, order of life and so forth exist, and who is bound to those rites, performs, leads to promotion beginning with human birth and ending with identity with ᾱṇy.[9]

Introducing the path of the gods which is for obtaining the results in the lower meditations�[10]

The course of the gods must be common to all meditations “with qualities� that result in the attainment of promotion.[11]

Let us note this well: brahma-loka is at the top of the process of abhyudaya. What this meant was that the text which was front and center in the 󳾲-ūٰ attributed to 岹ⲹṇa account of liberation, the dahara- of the eighth chapter of the ԻDzⲹ, was not about liberation at all: it was about meditation that results in promotion. This was a profoundly troubling text for Śṅk, not only because the 󳾲-ūٰ attributed to 岹ⲹṇa took its account of liberation as the normative in all 󳾲-s, but because it infelicitously combined all kinds of things that Śṅk could not see hand in hand: the Self that is free from faults, old age, death, lamentation, hunger and thirst—in short, his own favorite description of the Self—with “true� desires and resolves, that meant the ability to have ancestors manifest themselves at one’s will, to have fun with women, carriages, garlands and perfumes, all predicated on the ability to move throughout the worlds without restriction.

For our ultimate mahā-ⲹ purposes, we should note that this separation of meditation that ultimately leads to brahma-loka meant that the central sentences in 岹ⲹṇa’s 󳾲-s, such as ya ٳ apahata-pāpmā vijaro vimṛtyur viśoko vijighatso '辱� satya-峾� ٲⲹ-ṅk貹� so 'nveṣṭavya� sa vijijñāsitavya� of the dahara-, could not possibly be the most important 貹Ծṣaic statements, for the simple reason that their final attainment was not liberation. One gets the sense that Śṅk thinks such passages could be rectified for knowledge and liberation purposes, if read in the light of ñⲹ’s teaching of the Self, in which case the possession of unfailing desires and the like would not stand for what the meditator hopes to achieve, but for some form of praise of Brahman, and the injunctive force of the core statement would also fail to obtain.[12] We could say that Śṅk turned the table on 岹ⲹṇa: we can rectify passages for coherence, but not the way 岹ⲹṇa wanted.

This rejection of attaining brahma-loka as the equivalent to liberation meant going directly against the 󳾲-ūٰ, so a saving grace was found in the idea of krama-mukti or gradual liberation, which was already there in the 󳾲-ūٰ attributed to 岹ⲹṇa itself but was rejected by 岹ⲹṇa. One could still achieve real liberation in brahma-loka if one became disillusioned with the idea of sovereignty and developed perfect knowledge of the Self, in which case one would still need to complete one’s term in brahma-loka—just as the liberated aspirant on earth would have to wait till death for full liberation—but would be then liberated along with ᾱṇy.

Śṅk was explicit that the sovereignty won through meditation had to end with the expiry of the kalpa, and that the rise of perfect knowledge had to happen before one could be really liberated in brahma-loka.

Great sages may have been attached to other meditations [lit., knowledges] that result in sovereignty and the like. It makes sense that after [attaining brahma-loka] they became disillusioned on seeing that such sovereignty depletes and, becoming fully absorbed in knowledge of the Supreme Self, attained liberation.[13]

Those who have attained the world of Brahman that is the effect reach the supreme and pure state of վṣṇ along with ᾱṇy, the ruler of the world, after the destruction of the world, their perfect vision having arisen there [in brahma-loka]. In this way, the notion of gradual liberation should be accepted from the text that speaks about non-return.[14]

One gets a sense from this last comment as well as from his interpretation of the last ūٰ in the 󳾲-ūٰ attributed to 岹ⲹṇa that he trusted this sequence, from becoming disillusioned with sovereignty to developing perfect knowledge and getting liberated, was likely to happen in brahma-loka, but he was explicit that winning brahma-loka meant just avoiding rebirth till the next creation of the world: “It is understood that they return after this kalpa.�[15]

ñٳ put the two eloquently together:

If a man, his mind full of desiring, attains who sits on a lotus [i.e., ᾱṇy] by a combination of ritual and meditation, he, being ignorant, attains again the human condition without transmigrating [that is, in the next cycle of creation]. If, on the other hand, he comes to know the Supreme Self there [in brahma-loka], he is freed from all bondage. This is the gradual liberation presented in the texts of all Vedic branches, and one which is quite reasonable.[16]

Thus, attaining brahma-loka became a large gray area in Śṅk’s system, representing simultaneously the top attainment of the abhyudaya course and liberation, albeit gradual, getting one’s feet wet in Ծḥſⲹ. We will address the question of brahma-loka as being simultaneously abhyudaya and Ծḥſⲹ once again at the end of the chapter, relative to the different types of meditation.

We should, finally, also note that the statement “liberation is attained solely through knowledge� should be taken with a grain of salt, for some of the 峾ⲹ things were irredeemable—those explicitly tied to specific objects of desire—whereas other were dependent on the agent and, although constituting a form of action and not knowledge, played a crucial soteriological role as well. The wedge, thus, was not a line of demarcation, but an intersection. The crucial text here was one already known to us, ṛh-Āṇy첹 貹Ծṣa 4.4.22.

This will occupy us in the next chapter, but here is a foretaste:

At this point it should be explained here how the whole Veda can be employed to the subject of the Self � By repeating what has been said in this chapter, along with the result, it is attempted to show that the whole of the Veda, sine the corpus dealing with optional rituals (峾ⲹ) is to be employed just for this purpose. Thus, a repetition is made starting with the words “That very.� � The whole of the ritual portion of the Veda, with the sole exception of the parts dealing with optional rituals (峾ⲹ), is employed through absorption in this knowledge of Brahman laid down in the present chapter starting with “What light� and having the delineated results.[17]

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

ñԲ� tu ṇa-ᲹԲⲹ� ⲹٳ-ūٲ-ṣaⲹ� ca. na tat niyoga-śatenāpi kārayitu� śakyate, na ca پṣe-śatenāpi vārayitu� śakyate. Śṅk’s ṣy on the 󳾲-ūٰ 3.2.21, III.595.

[2]:

첹ṅg-samvarddheṣu tāvat upāsaneṣu karma-tantratvāt na āsanādi-Գ; nāpi samyag-darśane, vastu-tantratvād viñԲsya; itareṣu tu upāsaneṣu kim aniyamena tiṣṭhan īԲ� śayāno vā pravarteta uta niyamena īԲ eveti cintayati. Śṅk’s ṣy on the 󳾲-ūٰ 4.1.7, III.782.

[3]:

See, for instance, Śṅk’s ṣy on the ղٳپīⲹ 貹Ծṣa 1.11.4, where ܱԲ is not meditation proper, but reflection.

[4]:

The first two pairs are omnipresent in his works. On the last, see Śṅk’s ṣy on the 󳾲-ūٰ 3.2.21.

[5]:

Śṅk’s ṣy on the ղٳپīⲹ 貹Ծṣa Introduction.

[6]:

gati-śܳٱ iti cet�ūⲹ-屹ṇa, tayordhvam ity evam-ādi-gati-śrutibhya� prāpyo ǰṣa iti cet; na; sarva-gatatvāt gantṛbhyaś cānanyatvāt. ākāśādi-kāraṇatvāt -ٲ� brahma, brahmāvyatiriktāś ca sarve vijñānٳna�; ato nāpyo ǰṣa�. gantur anyad vibhinna-ś� ca bhavati gantavyam. na hi, yenaivāvyatirikta� yat, tat tenaiva gamyate. Śṅk’s ṣy on the ղٳپīⲹ 貹Ծṣa 1.11.4, VI.48-9. Also, the Introduction to the eighth ṻ첹 of the ԻDzⲹ.

[7]:

Śṅk’s ṣy on the ղٳپīⲹ 貹Ծṣa 1.11.4 on both. On the second, Śṅk’s ṣy on the 󳾲-ūٰ 3.2.14-5 is a good delineation of the principle.

[8]:

See Śṅk’s ṣy on the ṛh-Āṇy첹 貹Ծṣa 1.4.17.

[9]:

etasya hy aviduṣo varṇāśramādi-pravibhāgavato 'dhikṛtasya karmaṇo -sahitasya kevalasya ca śāstroktasya ⲹ� manuṣyatvādiko brahmānta ٰܳ첹ṣa�. Śṅk’s ṣy on the ṛh-Āṇy첹 貹Ծṣa 1.4.10, VIII.141.

[10]:

aparāsu su phala𱹲-Բ� panthānam avatārayiṣyan... Śṅk’s ṣy on the 󳾲-ūٰ 4.2.1, III.699.

[11]:

sarvāsām eva abhyudaya-پ-phalānā� saguṇānā� nām aviśeṣeṇa eṣ� deva-yānākhyā gatir bhavitum arhati. Śṅk’s ṣy on the 󳾲-ūٰ 3.3.31, III.666.

[12]:

See Śṅk’s ṣy on the 󳾲-ūٰ on 3.3.39, III.681, where 岹ⲹṇa affirms the unity of the “meditations on the heart� in the ԻDzⲹ 貹Ծṣa and ṛh-Āṇy첹 貹Ծṣa, and in effect makes the ṛh-Āṇy첹 貹Ծṣa conform the ԻDzⲹ 貹Ծṣa: “But, there is this difference between the two: in the ԻDzⲹ account, the meditation on Brahman is of the qualified kind, because it is said that desires are to be known just as the Self is: ‘Those who depart from here without discovering the Self and these true desires.� In the ᲹԱⲹ첹, however, we see just that Brahman without qualities being taught.� ⲹ� tu atra vidyate śṣa�—saguṇ� hi 󳾲- chāndogye upadiśyate�atha ya ihٳnam anuvidya vrajanty etāṃ� ca satyān kāmān ity ٳ- kāmānām api vedyatva-śravaṇāt, vājasaneyake tu Ծṇam eva brahma upadiśyamāna� dṛśyate.

[13]:

jñānāntareṣu ca aiśvaryādi-phaleṣv āsaktā� syur maharṣaya�. te paścād śⲹ-ṣaⲹ-岹śԱԲ Ծṇṇ� 貹ٳ-jñāne pariniṣṭhāya 첹ⲹ� prāpur ity upapadyate. Śṅk’s ṣy on the 󳾲-ūٰ 3.3.32, III.671.

[14]:

ⲹ-brahma-loka-pralaya-ٲܱ貹ٳԱ sati tatraiva utpanna-samyag-岹ś� Գٲ�, tad-adhyakṣeṇa hiraṇyagarbheṇa saha, ata� 貹� pariśuddha� viṣṇo� 貹� 貹岹� پ貹ⲹԳٱ—iīٳٳ� -ܰپ� anāvṛtty-ādi-śruty-abhidhānebhyo� bhyupagantavyā. Śṅk’s ṣy on the 󳾲-ūٰ 4.3.10, III.831.

[15]:

tasmād asmāt kalpād ūrdhvam āvṛttir gamyate. Śṅk’s ṣy on the ṛh-Āṇy첹 貹Ծṣa 6.2.15, X.780.

[16]:

yadi vā samuccaya-ś ܰṣa� 첹Բ� vrajati 峾ܰ첹-dhī� |
punar eva mānavam ima� tu vinā parivartam āvrajati mūḍha-mati� ||
athavā sa tatra 貹ٳ-mati� parimucyate sakala-bandhanata� |
krama-yoga-muktir uditā śrutiṣu pratiśākham evam upapannatarā ||�ñٳ’s ṅkṣe貹-Śī첹 3.50-51.

[17]:

etasminn ٳ-viṣaye sarvo vedo yathopayukto bhavati tat tathā vaktavyam. � tac ca yathā asmin prapāṭhake 󾱳󾱳ٲ� saprayojanam anūdya atraivopayoga� kṛtsnasya vedasya 峾ⲹ-ś-varjitasya–ity evam-ٳ� ܰٳԳܱ岹� sa vā eṣa ity-ādi� � 쾱� jyotir iya� ܰṣa� ity evam-ādi-ṣaṣṭ-ṻ첹-vihitāyām etasyā� 󳾲-yām evaṃphalāyā� 峾ⲹika-ś-ᾱٲ� ṛtԲ� 첹-ṇḍ� tādarthyena viniyujyate. Śṅk’s ṣy on the ṛh-Āṇy첹 貹Ծṣa 4.4.22, IX.641-4.

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