Principle of Shakti in Kashmir Shaivism (Study)
by Nirmala V. | 2016 | 65,229 words
This page relates ‘Representation of Anti-Shaktism as Anti-grammarian Perspective� of the thesis dealing with the evolution and role of Shakti—the feminine principle—within the religious and philosophical framework of Kashmir Shaivism. Tantrism represents an ancient Indian spiritual system with Shakti traditionally holding a prominent role. This study examines four major sub-streams: Kula, Krama, Spanda, and Pratyabhijnā.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
Part 2 - Representation of Anti-Śāktism as Anti-grammarian Perspective
After outlining the key aspects of the Ś-centred philosophy in the first chapter, through the second chapter dzԲԻ岹 moves on to the comprehensive criticism of the philosophy of Sanskrit grammarians (especially of ṛh) for their conceptualization of the word supreme called ʲśⲹԳī[1]. In fact, as noted by John Nemec, dzԲԻ岹’s refutations of ṛh’s theory is based on his conceptualization of the ultimate as word-having the nature of Śپ£ Parā vāc and the divergence is actually of an anti-Śٲ character.
Nemec views it as,
dzԲԻ岹’s argument against ṛh’s ⲹ貹īⲹ and the commentary ⲹ貹īⲹvṛtti are linked to his repudiation of a Śٲ Tantric school that invoked the grammarians to justify the view that the goddess, and not Ś is the supreme.[2]
The third chapter, whereas, unambiguously presents the diverging thoughts related with the supremacy of the concept of Śپ. This portion may be viewed as the foremost reference to the subordinated form of Śپ.
Although he authored Śٲvijñānīya the pantheistic approach of dzԲԻ岹 is extremely centred the masculine principle, the Ś.
The real nature of Śdṛṣṭi according to Raffaele Torella is,
In this difficult, discordant but fascinating work, he alternates expositions of a non-dualist doctrine that is felt to be still very near to its scriptural sources-though these cannot be clearly distinguished-logical justifications, visionary tirades and summary dismissals of opposing doctrines; he presenting an exceedingly long and malevolent demolition of the theories of the grammarians.[3]
But still he does not explain why these anti-grammarian theories are said to be malicious.
Indeed it is the approach against the prominence of feminine principle, which in many other contexts is commonly identified with Śپ. See Īśٲⲹñ I. 5.11:
चिति� प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा पर� वाक् स्वरसोदिता �
स्वातन्त्र्यमेतन्मुख्य� तदैश्वर्यं परमेष्ठिनः �پ� ٲⲹśٳ 貹 vāk svarasoditā |
svātantryametanmukhya� tadaiśvarya� 貹ṣṭԲ� ||
The argument suggests that the ʲśⲹԳī situates in the third (of the 36) category from fundamental principle known as ś which neither can be considered as the level of mere śپ, nor as that of the initial moment called aunmukhya. Actually here the ʲśⲹԳī’s position is in the midst of the first and succeeding categories ie., Ś and Śپ. Thus there arises a tendency to suspect duality in the concept of Brahman in ṛh’s view.
dzԲԻ岹’s argument starts with an emphasis that the grammarian’s ʲśⲹԳī is insufficient to be considered as the Supreme as it is equivalent to the power of cognition to be found in the level of third principle, ś and ends with the identification of ʲśⲹԳī (as an action having two parts) with that of the desire of a potter.[4]
Further there is a direct refutation of his contemporary Śٲ opponent Pradyumnabhaṭṭa which clearly states that the agent or Ś has to be considered as the Supreme rather than the Śپ who always comes under or within Ś.
Śdṛṣṭivṛtti discusses the same as follows;
साङ्ख्यादिसिद्धान्तेषु रचना वाक्कर्मेन्द्रियमिति प्रणेतृसंबन्धिकल्पनामात्रमेतत्, � तु परमार्थसंवित्पर्यालोचनस्पर्शौऽस्ति� � � प्रक्रिय� परमार्थविचारेष� संबन्धता� याति � तथ� हि सर्वेऽर्था� संविदि प्रतिष्ठामुपयान्ति असंविदित� असन्� एव � संविच्� विमर्शशून्या संविदे� � भवति� ततश्� समस्ततत्त्वसाररूपोऽय� विमर्शौऽनुभूयमानोऽभिलापम� एवेत� वाचा सह का स्पर्ध� पाण्यादीनामि... पश्यन्ती तावत� स्वरूपाभिधानाभ्यां विचार्यतां यथ� पश्यन्ती पश्यन्तीत्वे� युक्तैवेत्यर्थ� �
sāṅkhyādisiddhānteṣu racanā vākkarmendriyamiti praṇetṛsaṃbandhikalpanāmātrametat, na tu paramārthasaṃvitparyālocanasparśau'stii na ca prakriyā paramārthavicāreṣu saṃbandhatā� yāti | tathā hi sarve'rthā� saṃvidi pratiṣṭhāmupayānti asaṃviditā asanta eva | saṃvicca vimarśaśūnyā saṃvideva na bhavatii tataśca samastatattvasārarūpo'ya� vimarśau'nubhūyamāno'bhilāpamaya eveti 峦 saha 貹 pāṇyādīnāmi... paśyantī tāvat svarūpābhidhānābhyā� ⲹ� ⲹٳ paśyantī paśyantītvena yuktaivetyartha� ||
(That speech is an organ of action, is the characterisation found in the settled opinions of the ṅkⲹ, etc. Hence it is merely an idea associated with those who promulgate it, but it has no bearing on the design of consciousness, the supreme reality; nor is this characterisation associated with the considerations of supreme reality. For instance all objects become established in consciousness, non-appearing entities simply do not exists� therefore how hands etc. compete with speech? Indeed, objects first become real in the form of consciousness, and consciousness, the nature of which is reflective awareness, is first of all penetrated by speech alone, and not by hands, feet etc.)[5]
The utmost aim of the formulation of Śdṛṣṭi—as in the case of all other newly developed sources—is the presentation and establishment of the dynamic supreme reality—Ś�. Ś is the all-pervasive consciousness and the entity as same as of the universe. Ś, is both the supreme individual and all the entities found in the world. The universe known through the sensory experience is also real since it is nothing else the Supreme’s consciousness itself.
It should be noted that the kingship might have possessed a key role in the institution of the philosophical homogeneity that naturally fits in the main stream monistic philosophy proposed by Brāhmaṇism—which has assumed to satisfy the political interests. Thus tantric systems have undergone a vast range of domestication or internalisation processes as a matter of sustenance, for which they adopted major elements of orthodox systems. In Tantrism, the compound and unique ritualistic speculations had got homogenized and they were assimilated into the dominant model of Brahmanism, which according to Alexis Sanderson is having a duality in its religious life i.e., ‘doing without knowing and knowing without doing�[6]. The necessity of such a characterisation of the pure gnostic philosophy by differentiating it from the ritualism may be viewed as a cause of propagation of the monistic philosophy—indeed having a masculine supreme.
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
[2]:
John Nemec, The Ubiquitous Ś, p.9.
[3]:
Raffaele Torella (Ed. and Tr.), The Īśvaratyabhijñāri, pp.xiv-xv.
[4]:
Raffaele Torella summarises the entire content of this argument as,
“The grammarians who think of themselves as so clever-says dzԲԻ岹, quoting passages from ⲹ貹īⲹ and ⲹ貹īⲹvṛtti-claim that the supreme Brahman is to be identified with ʲśⲹԳī Vāc, but the latter at the most is identifiable with the power of knowledge that corresponds to the plane of ś-definitely not to the highest plane. In fact, as the word itself says, ʲśⲹԳī “sees� something. But what is the nature of its object? If we say that they are externalised images that it has produced, we must ask ourselves whether they are real or unreal. In the first case the distinctive feature of this philosophy is lacking, namely seeing the manifestation as illusory (vivarta). On the other hand the unreality of what it sees would have repercussions for it, rendering it asatya, which is inadmissible. If the cause of this perceiving of unreal things is nescience, it is the latter that must be established as being real or not. If it is real, then ʲśⲹԳī is contaminated by it. If it is not real, it is not understood how there can be a relation between a real thing and an unreal one. The same is also true of its creation. Moreover this nescience cannot be seen as an attribute either of ʲśⲹԳī (for the above mentioned reasons); or of something else, since nothing real exists apart from it. Nor is it to be considered as independent, because then it would be impossible to supress it. Nor can can imputed only to the middle level, because in any case it is ʲśⲹԳī that is the cause of it. If ʲśⲹԳī is to be identified with ṭa, we must ask ourselves how words, unreal as they are, can manifest it. Even the belief that pronouncing a correct word leads to heaven results in attributing, to the only reality that can be its subjects, characteristics which are contrary to its nature, such as the desire for particular fruitions, etc. it is not possible to posit as the highest reality that which because its very nature, always remains-however you put it-an instrument of action (vāc). Not even identifying the Ś岹ٲٳٱ without beginning and end with Parā vāc makes sense, since this means identifying the object (sound) with the instrument (voice). If then ʲśⲹԳī is said to be only a proper noun and hence, to escape all the criticism concerning the fact of seeing etc., and that it is only the feminine ending that counts-which is intended to express its being the power of knowledge-the reply is that, if it has nothing to do with seeing, it is insentient and therefore cannot be the power of knowledge either.�
In Mrinal Kaul, Ashok Aklujkar (Eds.), “From an Adversary to the Main Ally: The Place of ṛh in the Kashmirian Ś Advaita�, The Linguistic Traditions of Kashmir, D. K. Printworld, New Delhi, 2008, pp. 509- 510.
[5]:
Śdṛṣṭivṛtti, p.49; John Nemec, The Ubiquitous Ś, p.161.
[6]:
Alexis Sanderson, “Ś� Exegesis of Kashmir,� p.434.