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The category of generality (samanya) was accepted by the Vaisesikas to explain the notion of commonness in the objects of a classe Individual jars, though different entities, but as they all produced a similar cognition, they were designated by a common name 'jar'. There must, therefore, be something common in all the individual jars, and that common element wes ghatava, the universal. Kanada seems to regard the generality as a conceptual product. Ha defines generality and particularity as mental concepts, i.s., they depend upon the intellecte He lays stress on the activity of thought in relation to generality and particularity. By generality, he means quality by which the intellect assimilates a number of objects and forms a group or classe By particularity he means a quality by which the intellect differentiates one object from others. Thus generality and particularity 1. sridhara, Nyaya Kandli, Page 195; Parthasarthi. Misro, Sastradlpika, Page 71. 2. Kanada, Vaisesikm Sutra, 123

are mental concepts. But Kanada admits that the common quality (samanya) exists in external things. So Kanada may be regarded as an advocate of conceptualism, which regards generality (samanya) as a mental concepte Bodas goes to the extent of suggesting that the sutra of the Vaisesika which enumerates six categories (the last three, samanya, etc., at par with the first three, substance, etc.) is an interpolatione But if even that suggestion were incorrect, there would be ample evidence to show that Kanada did not assign objective reality to the last three categories, samanya, etc. In the first instance, only three categories, substance, quality and movement, are included in the term 'artha' which obviously means an 248 objective reality. Secondly, the highest universal (satta) which means 'existence' is held to be residing only 4 in the first three categories. Moreover, although samanya, etc., are included in the list of padarthas, Kanada seems to differentiate between artha and padartha. While arthe seems to mean an objective existence, padartha seems to have been used in its literal sense, viz., 'the meaning of a word'. Padartha, therefore, can include even an intellectual entity because it can be expressed by a 1. J.N.Sinha, Indian Psychology Perception, Page 181. 2. Kanada, Vaisesike Sutra, l.1.4. 3. M.R.Bodas, Tarkasangraha, Introduction, Page 33. 4. Kanada, Vaisesika Sutra, 1.2.7. Sutro,"1.2.7.

249 word. Further, it has been already pointed out that samanya and visesa are explicitly declared to be dependent អaminya_end vasមន on the intellect, 1 which is a direct evidence to show that Kanada never conceived samanya, etc., as objective realities. Again, the terms 'samanya' and 'videsa', are used in the sense of genus and species which are always relative, throughout the Valdesika sutra. The same property may be samanya in relation to one class and Visesa in relation to another. For instance, in the case of a jar, the universal dravatva residing in it is genus (samanya) in relation to prthi vita, but it is at the same time species (visega) in relation to the universal satte. These two terms indicate that there are two aspects (general and particular) of every objecte Uddyotakar expressly says: "Every object has got two aspects, the general and the particular." Sridhara saysi "When we have the notion of commonness (anugatakara buddhi), we cognize the universal dravatva, etc., but when we have the notion of differentia (watti-buddhi), we cognize the individual substances, earth, etc." These l. Thide, 1.2.3. 2. Uddyotakara, Nyaya- Vartika, Page 131. 3. Sridhara, Nyaya-Kandl, Page 315.

250 statements of Uddyotakara and Sridhara indicate that samanya and visesa are not conceived as objective realities which reside by inherent relation in their individual objects, and but as two aspects of the object itself. Prasastapada (who first assigned objective reality to categories, samanya, etc.) regards the generality as eternal and residing in many things belonging to the 1 group of substance, quality or action. But it is an interesting point that Prasastapada himself says that one of their common properties is that they are indicated by 2 intellect (buddhilaksantva), Explaining this sridhara says, "If somebody doubts the existence of samanya, etc., there is no other proof of their existence except through the intellect. In the case of the first three categories, substance, etc., the proof of their existence may be provided by their effects also; but this is not possible in the case of the last three categories.' Prasastapada held that samanya performed both the functions, vise, that of causing the notion of commonness (anuvrtti) and also that of differentiation (vyavrtti). Prasastapada, Padarthadharmasamgraha, Page 11â—� 2. Ibid., Page 19. 3. Sridhara, Nyaya Kandli, Page 19. 4. Prasastapada, Padarthadharmasangraha, Page 11.

251 He supposed that they were semenyas primarily, and viaoga in a secondary sense. The function of differentiation having thus been assigned to samanya, the term 'visesa' was restricted to the ultimate particulars (antya-vises...). Thus Prasastapada paved the way for the generality being assigned an objective reality. Being regarded as objectively real, the generality was also conceived as eternal. Hence, Prasastapada was the first to hold samanya to be objectively real and eternal, but it is probable that the idea might have existed some time earlier, because, as Randle has pointed out, the Nyaya. Wyaya. Sutra of Gautama already speaks of samanya as eternal and perceptible by a sense-organe This clearly implies acceptance of the theory of objective reality of semanya. However, it is clear that while Kanada insisted more on the activity of thought and therefore the inseparable relation between the universal and the individual, Prasastapada shifts the stress to the eternal nature of the universals. 1 The Buddhists are not in favour of the above mentioned nature of sumanya. According to them, individual (svalaksana) alone is real and there is no 1. Randle, Indian Logic in Early Schools, Page 7; Gentama, Nyaya-Sutra, 5.1.15â—�

252 class or universal other than the particular objects of experience. The idea of sameness that we may have with regard to a number of individuals of a certain character is due to their being called by the same name. It is only the name that is general, and the name does not stand for any positive essence that is present in all the individuals. It means only that the individuals called by one name are different from those to which a different name is given. Thus certain animals are called cow, not because they possess any common essence but because they are different from all animals which are not cows. So there is no universal but the name with a negative connotatione 1 Thus, in Buddhist philosophy, we have the nominalistic view of the universal. 2 The Jainas and the Advaita-Vedantins conceptualistic view of the universal. them, the universal does not stand for entity over and above the individuals. 3 adopt the According to any independent On the other hand, it is constituted by the essential common attributes of all the individuals. So the universal is not separate from the individuals, but is identical with them in relation to existence. The universal and the individual 1. Kesaya Misra, Tarka Bhasa, Page 28. 2. Prabhasandra, Prameya-Kaml-martanda, Ch. IV. 3. Dharmarajadhvarindra, Vedanta-parithasa, Che I.

253 are related by way of identity. The universal has existence, not in our mind only, but also in the particular objects of experience. It does not, however, come to them from outside and is not anything like a separate 'essence', but is only their common nature. 1 But the Nyaya-Vaisesikas enunciate the realistic theory of the universal. According to them, universal is a real entity which corresponds to a general idea or olass-sssence in our minde Annaabhatta defines universal as one, eternal and inhering in many individuals. There is the class-essence of man in all individual men. It is one, though the individuals in which it inheres are meny. It is eternal, though the individuals in which it inheres are born and die. It is common to many individuals. We know individual men as belonging to the same class because there is the same universal or class-essence of man (naratva) in all men. Thus the Nyaya-Visesikas are realists. They recognize the reality of the universal corresponding to a concept in our mind. Some of the modern realists like Russell also hold that a 'universal 3 is an eternal timeless entity which may be shared by many particulars'. 1. Annam Bhatta, Tarka Sangraha, Page 94. 2. Thid. 3. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Ch. IX.

254 The samanya subsists in substances, qualities and 1 actions. Jarness of jer subsists in individual jars which are substances. Colourness of colour subsists in individual colours which are qualities. The class-essenge of movement subsists in all individual movements which are actions. The universal does not subsist in another universal. If there were such a universal, it would have another universal and so on. So, in order to avoid infinite regress, the universal subsisting in another universal is not recognized. There is only a single universal subsisting in all individuels of the same class. All individual cows have the same essential qualities because the some class essence (gotva) subsists in them all. If there were two or more universals in them, they would possess contrary qualities of different classes. The universal does not subsist in particularity, inherence and negation. Absolute non-existence is eternal, and is also a quality of many things, but is not intimately related to, i.e., is not a constituent element of, many things. Similarly, particularity is not samanya, since then it would lose its nature and become confused with 1. Kesava Miara, Tarka Bhasa, Page 28.

latter. Inherence cannot be confused with samanya, since then it will require intimate relation with intimate relation, and so on ad infinitume independent category. Samanya is thus an The universal exists in each individual wholly. It can never exist partly in each individual, because it has no parts. When a particular individual comes into existence it comes to be related to the universal. "Though the universal is eternal, its relation to a perticular individual comes into existence only at the moment when the individual comes into being." only The universals have been distinguished in three classes according to their scope, viz., para or the highest, apara or the lowest, and the parapera or the intermediate. "Being hood' is the highest universal. It covers the largest mmber of things. It includes all, and is not included in anything. The genus of jar is the lowest universal present in all jars, since it has the most limited or the narrowest extent. The genus of substance (drawatva) as another universal is parapara or intermediate between the highest and the lowest. It is 255 1. J.N.Sinha, Indian Psychology, Perception, Page 185. 2. Prasastapada, Padarthadharmasangrahe, Page 11; Sivaditya, Sapta Padarthi, Page 5. 3. Kanada, Vaisesika-Sutra, 1.2.4, 7-10, 17.

256 para or wider in relation to substances like earth, water, etc., and apara or narrower in relation to the universal 'being-hood' which belong to substance, quality and action. A distinction is also made into jati and upadhi. The jati of a thing is inborn, natural and eternal, while the upadhi is adventitious and transitory. Every common characteristic is not a jati. Jeti. Since some persons are blind, we cannot have a jati of blindness. If it were so, blind men, blind cows and blind horses would be grouped under the same class. Hmanity distinguishes human beings from other animals, but blindness does not differentiate blind men from blind cows. Again, if mon are grouped according to their language, race or religion, the same persons may belong to several classes. So, the classification of men as human beings is a jati, while their grouping according to their language or religion is en upadhi. Jati is eternal while the upadhi is transitory. Jati is a natural classification while upadhi is an sn artificial class. Udayana says that there is no jati, or generality (samanya), where only one individual exists (abheda), where there is no differene of individuality (tulyatvam), where there is confusion of objects belonging to different classes (samkara), where there is infinite regress (anavastha),

where there is a violation of essence (rupaheni), where 1 there is no relation (asambandha). These six conditions have been described by Sankar Misra as under: (1) Abhada: Generality inheres in many individuals. If there is only one individual, it can have no generality (samanya) inhering in it. Other is one individual substance. So there is no genus of etherness. (11) Tulyatvans Potness and pitchermass are not two different classes, because they are co-extensive. They are two different names of the same class. (111) Sankara: If there is a cross-division between two classes, they cannot be recognized as true universals. Four kinds of atoms (i.e., earth, vater, fire and air) and other are physical substances (bhutadrawa) while the four atomic substances and the mind are corporeal substances (murtadravya). Ether is physical but not corporeal. 1. Visvanatha, Siddhanta-muktavali, Page 8. 2. Sanker Misra, Vaisesika Upasakara, 1.2.3. 257

258 Mind is corporeal but not physical. So physicality (bhutatva) and corporeality (murtatva) are not generalities, because they involve cross-division. (iv) Anavastha: There cannot be a class of class. No generality can subsist in another generality since it would lead to infinite regresse (v) Rupahani: Generality cannot subsist in particularities since it would contradict their nature. Generality is inclusive; particularity is exclusive. So particularity absolutely refuses to allow of inherence of generality in ite (vi) Asambandha: Generality cannot subsist in inherence, since there is no relation of inherence between that generality and inherence so there is no generality of inherence.