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In 补苍耻尘腻苍补, our knowledge of the 蝉腻诲丑测补 or major term as related to the 辫补办峁�a or minor term depends on the knowledge of 惫测腻辫迟颈 between the middle and major terms. It is on the ground of 惫测腻辫迟颈 or a universal relation that the middle term leads to the knowledge of the inferred object (惫测腻辫迟颈balen膩rthagamakam 濒颈峁単补m).^[1] Thus, every 补苍耻尘腻苍补 is logically dependent on the knowledge of 惫测腻辫迟颈.

痴测腻辫迟颈 and 辫补办峁�adharmat膩 (or 辫补办峁�at膩) are considered as the two main grounds for the operation of 补苍耻尘腻苍补. If fire is inferred on the hill, when smoke is perceived in it, then it is called 辫补办峁�adharmat膩 and when universal relation between fire and smoke is known, it is called 惫测腻辫迟颈. Though the conclusion in 补苍耻尘腻苍补 is not drawn exclusively from 惫测腻辫迟颈, but from 惫测腻辫迟颈 and 辫补办峁�adharmat膩 jointly, 惫测腻辫迟颈 is more important.

(1) 痴测腻辫迟颈:

Now, we shall discuss the nature of 惫测腻辫迟颈 in the following:

础苍耻尘腻苍补 is based upon 惫测腻辫迟颈 which is the invariable concomitance of the reason (hetu) with the predicate (蝉腻诲丑测补). Etymologically 惫测腻辫迟颈 (vi+apti) is a special relation between two facts which is universal in its nature. Literally 惫测腻辫迟颈 means the state of pervasion, i.e., one of the facts pervades (vyapaka) and the other is pervaded (vyapya). It implies a definite correlation between two facts of which the pervader is present. For example- parvato vahnim膩n dh奴mavattv膩t. Here, smoke is the pervaded (惫测腻辫测补) and fire is the pervader (惫测腻辫补办补).

In the 狈测腻测补 system, Gautama does not use the term 惫测腻辫迟颈. He speaks of niyama and aniyama in the sense of invariable concomitance and variable concomitance of the reason with the predicate. Gautama defines a discrepant reason (补苍补颈办腻苍迟颈办补) as one which has variable concomitance with the predicate. He defines 箩腻迟颈 as a sophistical refutation on the ground of mere similarity and dissimilarity of the subject with an example. This implies that it is based on mere similarity and dissimilarity unaccompanied by invariable concomitance of the reason with the predicate^[2] .

痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 speaks of 补惫颈苍腻产丑腻惫补 or inseparable relation of the reason with the predicate as the ground of inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补). He does not use the term 惫测腻辫迟颈. He speaks it as the relation of the reason (濒颈峁単补) with the predicate (濒颈峁単颈苍). It is the uniform relation between them which are found to co-exist in an example^[3] . In the view of V膩tsy膩y膩na, the inference of a predicate from a reason on the ground of mere similarity or dissimilarity with an example is invalid, because it is not based on invariable concomitance between the reason (hetu) and the predicate^[4] . Yet, 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 regards 惫测腻辫迟颈 as the logical ground of inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补). Jayanta, Udayana, 痴腻肠补蝉辫补迟颈 and 痴补谤补诲补谤腻箩补 define 惫测腻辫迟颈 as a uniform, (niyata) unconditional (补苍补耻辫腻诲丑颈办补) or natural (蝉惫腻产丑腻惫颈办补) relation between the reason and the predicate.

Jayanta, like Gautama, used the term niyama, but he also refers to other terms, viz., 惫测腻辫迟颈, 补惫颈苍腻产丑腻惫补 etc. According to Jayanta, first there is the perception of a mark; then there is the recollection of 惫测腻辫迟颈; then there is the knowledge of the presence of the reason pervaded by the predicate in the subject (辫补谤腻尘补谤艣腻); then there is the inference of the predicate in the subject. The knowledge of 辫补谤腻尘补谤艣补 is the direct cause of inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补), while the perception of 惫测腻辫迟颈 is its cause through its recollection. The knowledge of 惫测腻辫迟颈 is the logical ground of inference, (补苍耻尘腻苍补) while the 辫补谤腻尘补谤艣补 is the psychological ground^[5] . According to 骋补峁単别艣补, the Navya-Nay膩yika, invariable concomitance (惫测腻辫迟颈) is non deviation (补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤墨迟补迟惫补) or the absence of variable concomitance. 痴测腻辫迟颈 is the uniform absence of the reason (hetu) from the locus of the absence of the predicate (蝉腻诲丑测补)^[6] . 痴颈艣惫补苍腻迟丑补 defines 惫测腻辫迟颈 as the co-presence, in the same locus of the reason with the predicate which is not the counter positive of the absence residing in the locus of the reason.^[7] 痴测腻辫迟颈 has been negatively defined as the non-existence of the middle term in all places in which the major term does not exist.^[8]

In the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 system, 碍补峁嚹乨补 seems to be aware of invariable concomitance (惫测腻辫迟颈) of the probans with the probandum and its necessity for inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补). He however calls it prasiddhi. ^[9] According to him, it is a relation between cause and its effect or effect and cause or between two things related by conjunction, inherence etc. Pra艣astap膩da regards 惫测腻辫迟颈 as the ground of inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补). Wherever there is probans, there is probandum. Wherever there is the absence of probandum, there is the absence of probans. He calls 惫测腻辫迟颈 a general principle; (vidhi) of invariable concomitance between the probans and probandum known by the repeated observation of their agreement in presence and agreement in absence.^[10] 础苍苍补尘产丑补峁�峁�补 defines 惫测腻辫迟颈 thus-鈥淭he rule of concomitance as following case, taken as an example, wherever there is smoke there is fire called 惫测腻辫迟颈.鈥� ^[11]

In the 罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�, Ke艣avami艣ra begins with an apparently simple definition: 蝉腻丑补肠补谤测补niyamo惫测腻辫迟颈岣�. Here, 蝉腻丑补肠补谤测补 means co-existence which is the same thing as 蝉补尘腻苍腻诲丑颈办补谤补峁噛补. This co-existence should be invariable (niyata) and not adventitious. For example, wherever the hetu is, the 蝉腻诲丑测补 should exist in the same place. The illustration of 惫测腻辫迟颈, 鈥榳herever there is smoke there is fire鈥� undoubtedly gives some idea of this invariable concomitance but it does not furnish us with a sure test as to how 惫测腻辫迟颈 is to be found out and under what conditions it is valid. Two notions are involved in a 惫测腻辫迟颈, viz., that of 蝉腻丑补肠补谤测补 鈥榗o-existence鈥� or 鈥榗oncomitance鈥� and that 鈥榰niversality鈥� or rather the invariability of this 蝉腻丑补肠补谤测补. 厂腻丑补肠补谤测补 is the 蝉补尘腻苍腻诲丑颈办补谤补峁噛补, co-existence in one and the same place, of hetu and 蝉腻诲丑测补. When this co-exisrence of one thing with another is observed wherever the other thing exists, then the 蝉腻丑补肠补谤测补 is called niyata. ^[12]

Having discussed the definitions of 惫测腻辫迟颈 offered by different logicians, we may proceed to the discussion of the importance of 惫测腻辫迟颈 in 补苍耻尘腻苍补. It must be noted that if there is no 惫测腻辫迟颈, there is no inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补). If the 惫测腻辫迟颈 is wrong, the inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补) will be wrong. While discussing the importance of the 惫测腻辫迟颈 relation we are to note that the extension of the 濒颈峁単补 and 蝉腻诲丑测补 is not always the same. It very often happens that the 蝉腻诲丑测补 is more extensive (惫测腻辫补办补) or pervasive than the 濒颈峁単补, although it has been observed to be present, wherever the 濒颈峁単补 is present. Therefore, 蝉腻诲丑测补 is also called less extensive (惫测腻辫补办补) and 濒颈峁単补 is called the 惫测腻辫测补. For example, 鈥渨herever there is smoke, there is fire鈥�. But fire may be found to be present where there is no smoke. For this reason 蝉腻诲丑测补 is called 惫测腻辫补办补 and 濒颈峁単补 is called 惫测腻辫测补.

痴测腻辫迟颈 as the logical ground of inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补) may be defined either positively or negatively. Therefore, 惫测腻辫迟颈 is said to be of two kinds, viz., anvaya 惫测腻辫迟颈 and vyatireka 惫测腻辫迟颈. The former is invariable concomitance of the presence of the predicate. The later is the invariable concomitance of the absence of the predicate with the absence of the reason. In Indian philosophy, 补苍耻尘腻苍补 is considered to be a process of reasoning and depends on 惫测腻辫迟颈. So, the most valuable question regarding inference relates to the way of getting the universal proposition. This is called 惫测腻辫迟颈grahop膩ya. It is the method by which one arrives at it.

The 狈测腻测补 method of ascertaining 惫测腻辫迟颈 consists of four steps, viz., anvaya, vyatireka, 惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤腻驳谤补丑补 and tarka. Firstly, we observe that there is a uniform experience of two things, i.e., their co-presence that is called anvaya. Secondly, we observe that there is a uniform experience of their co-absence that is called vyatireka. Thirdly, we do not observe any contrary instance in which one of them is present without the other that is called 惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤腻驳谤补丑补. It is observed that wherever there is smoke, there is fire also. In the same way, wherever there is no smoke, there is no fire. We never observe a case in which there may be smoke without fire. From the observed double agreement of smoke and fire in their presence and absence together with the non-observation of any exception the 惫测腻辫迟颈 between smoke and fire is known, i.e., there is a universal relation between smoke and fire. Fourthly, if even after this there remains any doubt regarding the un-conditionality of the 惫测腻辫迟颈, it is removed by tarka or a hypothetical reasoning which indirectly proves its validity.^[13] In the 狈测腻测补 system, Gautama states that a 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a is the cause of inference. 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 elaborates the process and says that, firstly there is perception of a mark (濒颈峁単补), e.g., 鈥榮moke鈥�. Secondly, there is the recollection of invariable concomitance of the probans (hetu), e.g., 鈥榮moke鈥�, with the probandum, (蝉腻诲丑测补), e.g., 鈥榝ire鈥�. Thirdly, there is the inference of the existence of the unperceived predicate (fire) in the subject (hill). If the 濒颈峁単补-濒颈峁単墨 sambandha is taken to mean concomitance, it may be said that 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 accepts perception as the basis of ascertaining 惫测腻辫迟颈. Uddyotakara maintains the view of 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补, but he adds that the three conditions mentioned by 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 are three successive types of 辫谤补迟测补办峁�a and all of them are the instruments of inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补).^[14]

In the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 system, Pra艣astap膩da holds that the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum is known by the repeated observation of their agreement in presence and agreement in absence. Udayana also holds that 惫测腻辫迟颈 is known through the method of double agreement and not by a single observation. The importance of 惫测腻辫迟颈 in inferential process is admitted by all the systems of Indian philosophy. Though they are not unanimous regarding its function, yet it may be said that in every inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补) there are atleast three steps. The first step involves knowledge of the middle term as related to the minor term (濒颈峁単补j帽膩na). Secondly, there is knowledge of a universal relation between the middle term and the major term (惫测腻辫迟颈j帽膩na).In the last step, the conclusion is reached in which the major term is predicated of the minor term.

From the above discussion it is evident that the knowledge of 惫测腻辫迟颈 is the special cause (办腻谤补峁嘺) of inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补) in the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 system.

(2) 笔补办峁�a诲丑补谤尘补迟腻 or 笔补办峁�a迟腻:

Every inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补) depends on the knowledge of 惫测腻辫迟颈 or a universal relation between the middle and the major terms. So, it depends on the relation of the middle term with the minor term.^[15] It may be noted that, while 惫测腻辫迟颈 is the logical ground of inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补). 笔补办峁�a诲丑补谤尘补迟腻 or 辫补办峁�at膩 is the psychological ground of inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补).^[16] In Indian logic, the minor term is called 辫补办峁�a. 笔补办峁�a迟腻 is sometimes also known as 辫补办峁�adharmat膩 and it is the quality of something being a 辫补办峁�a. If there is to be any inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补) there must be a 辫补办峁�a. While the validity of 补苍耻尘腻苍补 depends on 惫测腻辫迟颈, its possibility depends on 辫补办峁�at膩. According to the 狈补颈测腻测颈办补蝉, 辫补办峁�at膩 consists in the absence of that condition in which there are the presence of certainty and absence of the will to infer.^[17] From the fact that the minor term is a subject about which we want to infer something, it will appear that the two obvious conditions of a minor term are absence of certainty about something (蝉颈诲诲丑测补产丑腻惫补) and the will to infer it (蝉颈峁Ｄ乨丑补测颈峁�a). The old 狈补颈测腻测颈办补蝉 accept both of these conditions and they opine that 辫补办峁�at膩 consists in the presence of doubt about the 蝉腻诲丑测补 or the major term.^[18] According to 础苍苍补尘产丑补峁�峁�补, 辫补办峁�at膩 as the absence (补产丑腻惫补) of certainty (siddhi) that is accompanied by (蝉补丑补办峁泃补) the absence (viraha) of the desire to infer (蝉颈峁Ｄ乨丑补测颈峁Ｄ�).^[19] According to the Indian logicians, a valid inference (补苍耻尘补苍腻) must satisfy at least two conditions. First, there must be a true proposition and secondly, it must imply another proposition. There is 辫补办峁�at膩 where there is a desire to infer, whether certain knowledge of the presence of the predicate in the subject is present or whether it is absent. There is no 辫补办峁�at膩, where there is certain knowledge of the presence of the predicate in the subject, and where there is no desire to infer, because such certain knowledge (siddhi) qualified by the absence of a desire to infer is present.^[20]

While 辫补办峁�adharmat膩 or 辫补办峁�at膩 is the psychological ground of inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补), 濒颈峁単补辫补谤腻尘补谤艣补 is considered to be the immediate cause of inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补).

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�,35, p. 58

[2]:

惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤腻诲 补丑别迟耻岣�, 狈测腻测补s奴tra, iv. 1. 5

[3]:

so鈥檡am ekasmin dvayor dharmayo岣� 蝉腻诲丑测补 s膩dhan补产丑腻惫补岣� s膩dharmy膩d vyavasthita upalabhyate. 狈测腻测补bh膩峁�ya, i. 1. 36

[4]:

s膩dharmyam膩trena vaidharmyam膩trena ca 蝉腻诲丑测补s膩dhane pratij帽膩yam膩ne 蝉测腻诲 补惫测补惫补蝉迟丑腻, Ibid., v. 1. 3.; iii 2. 12

[5]:

狈测腻测补ma帽jar墨, pp. 122-23

[6]:

蝉腻诲丑测腻产丑腻惫补惫补诲惫峁泃迟颈迟惫补尘, 罢补迟迟惫补肠颈苍迟腻尘补峁噄, p. 27

[7]:

athav膩 hetumannisth膩virah膩 pratiyog墨n膩 s膩dhyena hetoraik膩dhikara峁噛am 惫测腻辫迟颈rucyate. 叠丑腻峁Ｄ乸补谤颈肠肠丑别诲补, 办腻谤颈办腻 69

[8]:

惫测腻辫迟颈岣� 蝉腻诲丑测补vadanyasminnasambandha ud膩h峁泃a岣�. Ibid., 办腻谤颈办腻 68

[9]:

辫谤补蝉颈诲诲丑补辫奴谤惫补办补迟惫腻诲补辫补诲别艣补蝉测补. 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补s奴tra, 3. 1. 14

[10]:

鈥�.eva峁� prasiddhasamayasy膩sandigdhadh奴madar艣an膩t s膩hacary膩nusmara峁嚹乼tadanantaramagnyadhyavas膩yo bhavat墨ti. Pra艣astap膩da Bh膩峁�ya, p 491

[11]:

yatra dh奴mastatr膩gniriti s膩hacharyaniyamo 惫测腻辫迟颈岣�. 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p. 58

[12]:

罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�, p. 61

[13]:

惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补蝉测补驳谤补丑辞 atha sahac膩ragrahastath膩 / hetur惫测腻辫迟颈grahe,迟补谤办补岣� kvacicchank膩nivartaka岣� // 厂颈诲诲丑腻苍迟补尘耻办迟腻惫补濒墨, 办腻谤颈办腻 137

[14]:

濒颈峁単补濒颈峁単墨sambandh膩ddar艣anam gr膩hyam 辫谤补迟测补办峁�am 濒颈峁単补dar艣anam dvit墨yam鈥�.濒颈峁単补 辫补谤腻尘补谤艣补r奴pam 补苍耻尘腻苍补m bhavati. 狈测腻测补v膩rttika, 1. 1. 5

[15]:

补苍耻尘腻苍补sya dve a峁単e 惫测腻辫迟颈岣� 辫补办峁�adharmat膩 ca, 罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�, p. 89

[16]:

狈测腻测补ma帽jar墨, pp. 122-23

[17]:

蝉颈峁Ｄ乨丑补测颈峁Ｄ乿iraha vi艣i峁ａ弓asiddh补产丑腻惫补岣� 辫补办峁�at膩. 厂颈诲诲丑腻苍迟补尘耻办迟腻惫补濒墨, pp. 309-10 on 办腻谤颈办腻 70

[18]:

na nir峁噄te鈥檙the 苍测腻测补岣� pravartate kintu sa峁兣沘yite. 狈测腻测补bh膩峁�ya, i. 1. 1 Cf: sa峁僤igdha蝉腻诲丑测补dharm膩dharm墨 辫补办峁�a岣�. 罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�, p. 91

[19]:

蝉颈峁Ｄ乨丑补测颈峁Ｄ� viraha 蝉补丑补办峁泃补 蝉颈诲诲丑测补产丑腻惫补岣� 辫补办峁�at膩. 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补d墨pik膩, p. 26

[20]:

yatra tu siddhirasti, 蝉颈峁Ｄ乨丑补测颈峁Ｄ� ca 苍腻蝉迟颈, tatra na 辫补办峁�a. 厂颈诲诲丑腻苍迟补尘耻办迟腻惫补濒墨 on 办腻谤颈办腻 70, p. 367