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According to the Mimamsa and the Vedanta, upamana is the source of our knowledge of the likeness of things. In some cases we may get the knowledge of likeness from perception, as when we perceive a gavaya and know it to be like the cow. From the perceived likeness of the gavaya to the cow we next know that the cow is like the gavaya, although the cow is not now perceived by us. This latter knowledge of the likeness of the unperceived cow to the perceived gavaya is due to upamana or comparison. It cannot be due to perception, since its locus, namely, the cow is not now perceived, but only remembered. It is no doubt conditioned by the perception of likeness in the gavaya. But when from this perceptual knowledge of likeness we pass to the knowledge that the cow, not now perceived, is like the gavaya, it is no longer perception. Nor is this second knowledge of likeness due to inference. In inference the paksa or the minor term is an object of perception and the linga or the middle term is present in the paksa. In the alleged inference of the cow's likeness to the gavaya, the paksa, i.e. the cow cannot be an object of perception, and the linga, i.e. the likeness of the gavaya would be present not in the paksa ' cow,' but in the gavaya. Further, when from the one likeness we know the other, we are not conscious of any inferring, but of comparing. Introspection tells us that the actual process of reasoning involved in the second knowledge of likeness is not inferential.2 Similarly, when we perceive a horse and know it to be unlike the cow, our knowledge of the unlikeness is perceptual. But when from this we conclude that the cow. 1 Vide Nyayamanjari, PP. 141-42. 2 Vide Sastradipika, pp. 74-76; Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. III.

not now perceived, is unlike the horse, we depend, not on perception and inference, but on upamana or comparison. Thus the Mimamsaka and the Vedantist admit that there is a perceptual element in upamana. But they go further and prove that the reasoning about likeness and unlikeness, based on some perception, cannot be fully explained by perception or inference. It constitutes an independent source of valid knowledge (pramana), to which they give the name of upamana. The Naiyayikas criticise and reject the above view on the following grounds. First, they point out that it violates the ordinary rule of upamana or comparison. In all cases of upamana we compare the unfamiliar object with something well-known in order to understand it better. In the above view the well-known cow is compared with the strange gavaya. But this cannot give us any new knowledge about the cow which is already too well-known to us. Secondly, the knowledge of the cow's likeness may be explained by memory and so does not require a separate source of knowledge like upamana. When we perceive the gavaya we are reminded of the cow and not of other things. The reason is that there are certain points of resemblance between the two and that these were previously perceived with the perception of the cow. Hence we have a memory of the cow as that which was previously perceived to have some resemblance with the gavaya which is now perceived. Hence there is no need for an independent pramana called upamana to explain the knowledge of likeness and unlikeness. * It is to be observed here that Nyaya criticism has so far very little force. It is true that we ordinarily understand an unfamiliar object by comparing it with what is familiar. But this does not prevent us from comparing the familiar with what is new and unfamiliar. Nor does it invalidate our subsequent knowledge of the former as like or unlike the latter. Further, we cannot say that all knowledge of likeness is 1 Vide Nyayamanjari, pp. 146-47.

memory. A man who has seen a gavaya may, when perceiving a cow, know its similarity to the gavaya. It is possible only for him to remember that a cow was found to be like a gavaya at the time when he perceives the gavaya. But a man who has never seen a gavaya cannot know that a cow is similar to it. When the perception of a gavaya suggests to him that the cow is like it because the gavaya is like the cow, we cannot say that he only remembers the cow's likeness, since there was no previous perception of it. The Naiyayika is perhaps conscious of the weakness of his first two arguments and so brings forward a third one to supplement them. He thinks that even if upamana be different from memory, we may very well explain it as a form of inference. From the perception of the gavaya we know that it has some points in common with the remembered cow. This leads to the inference that the remembered cow is like the gavaya, because it has some points in common with the gavaya. The Vedantist's upamana is thus reduced to a mediate syllogistic inference: "Whatever has certain points in common. with another thing is like that thing; the remembered cow has some points in common with the perceived gavaya; therefore it is like the gavaya. " I The Naiyayika seems to be on strong ground when he reduces the reasoning about likeness and unlikeness to inference. The Vedantist's upamana, when analytically considered, deals with our knowledge of the relations among correlative terms. Ordinary syllogistic inference is concerned with the relations of subject and predicate among different terms. But there are other relations which furnish grounds of inference. These are the relations among correlative terms. The doctrine of correlation (pratiyogitva) and the relations of correlative terms have been much elaborated in the modern Nyaya. There are two kinds of correlation, namely, abhavapratiyogitva or the correlation existing between a term and its contradictory, and 1 Vide Nyayamanjari, p. 148.

satpratiyogitva or the correlation existing between relative terms. The relations among contradictory terms like A and not-A, red and not-red, are the grounds of immediate inferences by conversion, obversion, contraposition, etc. The correlations among relative terms are the grounds of both mediate and immediate inferences. There are different types of such correlation. Bradley' enumerates four types of these relations. These are: (1) The synthesis of identity, e.g. A is the father of B, B is the son of A; or, A is the brother of B, and B of C, then A is the brother of C. (2) The synthesis of degree, e.g. A is greater than B, B is less than A; or, A is hotter than B, and B than C, therefore A than C. (3) The synthesis of time, e.g. A is earlier than B, B is later than A; or, A is a day before B, B contemporary with C, therefore C a day after A. (4) The synthesis of space, c.g. A is north of B, B is south of A; or, A is north of B and B west of C, therefore C southcast of A. The Vedantist's upamana deals with the correlations of likeness and unlikeness which, following Bradley, we may call the synthesis of comparison. It consists in reasoning from the proposition A is like B' to the proposition 'B is like A'; or from 'A is unlike B' to 'B is unlike A.' It is really a kind of immediate inference. But there being no such thing as immediate inference in Indian Logic, the Naiyayika puts it in the form of a syllogism which has the additional advantage of testing the validity of such reasoning. The Jainas do not recognise upamana as an independent source of knowledge, but include it under pratyabhijna or recognition. They understand pratyabhijna in a very wide sense so as to cover all such cases of knowledge as 'this is that object,' 'this is like that,' 'this is unlike that,' 'this is at a distance from us,' 'this is a trec,' etc. It is clear from this that pratyabhijna here stands for any knowledge which is conditioned by perception and memory. The reasoning from the proposition 'the gavaya is like the cow,' to the proposition 鈫� Bradley, Logic, Vol. I, pp. 264-66,

the cow is like the gavaya' is not a case of upamana, but of pratyabhijna, since it can very well be explained by the perception of likeness in the gavaya and memory of the cow. So also the Naiyayika's upamana as a source of the knowledge of denotation of words is, according to Jainas, a case of pratyabhijna or recognition. The knowledge of the likeness or unlikeness through which we recognise an object is given by perception. The knowledge of the object as a cow or a gavaya is due to the recollection of their description as supplied to us by some competent person. 1 It is to be observed here that the Jaina view of upamana as a form of pratyabhijna or recognition rests on a wrong assumption. They seem to think that a knowledge is explained when we explain the constituent parts of it. But to explain the component parts of knowledge is not to explain knowledge itself. To say that it is so is the fundamental error of all associationist theory of knowledge. If it were really so, the Jaina view of pratyabhijna itself as a distinct type of knowledge will have to be discarded, since it is constituted by perception and memory. On this assumption we may reduce all kinds of knowledge to perception, since the constituents of all knowledge ultimately come from perception. That we recognise other kinds of knowledge than perception is due to the fact that the combination of elements derived from perception involves new principles which take us beyond perception. We shall consider hereafter if the Naiyayika's upamana involves any new principle of combination so as to justify us in treating it as a new kind of knowledge.