365bet娱乐

NATURE AND FORMS OF UPAM膧NA 303 memory. A man who has seen a gavaya may, when perceiv-
ing a cow, know its similarity to the gavaya. It is possible
only for him to remember that a cow was found to be like a
gavaya at the time when he perceives the gavaya. But a man
who has never seen a gavaya cannot know that a cow is similar
to it. When the perception of a gavaya suggests to him that
the cow is like it because the gavaya is like the cow, we cannot
say that he only remembers the cow's likeness, since there was
no previous perception of it.
The Naiy膩yika is perhaps conscious of the weakness of
his first two arguments and so brings forward a third one to
supplement them. He thinks that even if upam膩na be different
from memory, we may very well explain it as a form of in-
ference. From the perception of the gavaya we know that
it has some points in common with the remembered cow. This
leads to the inference that the remembered cow is like the
gavaya, because it has some points in common with the gavaya.
The Vedantist's upam膩na is thus reduced to a mediate syllogistic
inference: "Whatever has certain points in common. with
another thing is like that thing; the remembered cow has some
points in common with the perceived gavaya; therefore it is
like the gavaya.
" I
The Naiy膩yika seems to be on strong ground when he
reduces the reasoning about likeness and unlikeness to infer-
ence. The Ved膩ntist's upam膩na, when analytically considered,
deals with our knowledge of the relations among correlative
terms. Ordinary syllogistic inference is concerned with the
relations of subject and predicate among different terms. But
there are other relations which furnish grounds of inference.
These are the relations among correlative terms. The doctrine
of correlation (pratiyogitva) and the relations of correlative
terms have been much elaborated in the modern Nyaya. There
are two kinds of correlation, namely, abh膩vapratiyogitva or the
correlation existing between a term and its contradictory, and
1 Vide NM., p. 148.