365bet娱乐

' NATURE AND FORMS OF UPAM脗NA 305 the cow is like the gavaya' is not a case of upamana, but of
pratyabhij帽膩, since it can very well be explained by the per-
ception of likeness in the gavaya and memory of the cow. So
also the Naiyayika's upam膩na as a source of the knowledge of
denotation of words is, according to Jainas, a case of pratya-
bhij帽膩 or recognition. The knowledge of the likeness or un-
likeness through which we recognise an object is given by
perception. The knowledge of the object as a cow or a gavaya
is due to the recollection of their description as supplied to us
by some competent person.
1 It is to be observed here that the Jaina view of upamana
as a form of pratyabhij帽膩 or recognition rests on a wrong
assumption. They seem to think that a knowledge is explained
when we explain the constituent parts of it. But to explain
the component parts of knowledge is not to explain knowledge
itself. To say that it is so is the fundamental error of all asso-
ciationist theory of knowledge. If it were really so, the Jaina
view of pratyabhij帽膩 itself as a distinct type of knowledge will
have to be discarded, since it is constituted by perception and
memory. On this assumption we may reduce all kinds of
knowledge to perception, since the constituents of all knowledge
ultimately come from perception. That we recognise other
kinds of knowledge than perception is due to the fact that the
combination of elements derived from perception involves new
principles which take us beyond perception. We shall consider
hereafter if the Naiy膩yika's upam膩na involves any new prin-
ciple of combination so as to justify us in treating it as a new
kind of knowledge.
3. The classification of upam膩na
Upam膩na was at first regarded as only of one kind,
namely, as the knowledge of a thing as denoted by a word
through its similarity to a well-known object of experience.
路 Prameyakamalam盲rta峁囜笉a, pp. 97-100.
39-(O.P. 103)