Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 317 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
317 (of 404)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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NATURE AND FORMS OF UPAM膧NA 301 the authoritative statement and thereby lead to the knowledge
in question. A man recognises a gavaya as such just when he
perceives its similarity to the cow and remembers the statement
'the gavaya is an animal resembling the cow.'
2.
The Jaina, M墨m膩峁僺膩 and Ved膩nta views of upam膩na
According to the M墨m膩峁僺膩 and the Vedanta, upam膩na is
the source of our knowledge of the likeness of things. In some
cases we may get the knowledge of likeness from perception,
as when we perceive a gavaya and know it to be like the cow.
From the perceived likeness of the gavaya to the cow we next
know that the cow is like the gavaya, although the cow is not
now perceived by us. This latter knowledge of the likeness of
the unperceived cow to the perceived gavaya is due to upam膩na
or comparison. It cannot be due to perception, since its locus,
namely, the cow is not now perceived, but only remembered.
It is no doubt conditioned by the perception of likeness in the
gavaya. But when from this perceptual knowledge of likeness
we pass to the knowledge that the cow, not now perceived, is
like the gavaya, it is no longer perception. Nor is this second
knowledge of likeness due to inference. In inference the pak峁
or the minor term is an object of perception and the linga or
the middle term is present in the pak峁. In the alleged infer-
ence of the cow's likeness to the gavaya, the pak峁, i.e. the
cow cannot be an object of perception, and the linga, i.e. the
likeness of the gavaya would be present not in the pak峁
' cow,' but in the gavaya. Further, when from the one like-
ness we know the other, we are not conscious of any inferring,
but of comparing. Introspection tells us that the actual pro-
cess of reasoning involved in the second knowledge of likeness
is not inferential.2 Similarly, when we perceive a horse and
know it to be unlike the cow, our knowledge of the unlikeness
is perceptual. But when from this we conclude that the cow.
1 Vide NM., PP. 141-42.
2 Vide SD., pp. 74-76; VP., Ch. III.
