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Such in very brief is the line of argumentation suggested by Mr. Melamed. The grounds on which it is based may not be new. The presentation of his case is elaborate, though not always adequate; in some parts, it suffers from a lack of firsthand knowledge of Hindu sources of philosophical learning. Though this be so, it must be acknowledged that Mr. Melamed has done well in drawing pointed attention to the fact that the foundations of Christian philosophy, if not belief, are not far removed from the doctrines so definitely conceived of in the Upanishads and so scientifically synthetised in the Sutras of Badarayana. This, however, is not to say that agreement is possible in every view propounded by Mr. Melamed or in every suggestion thrown out by him in his highly recondite and vastly learned volume. His idea of "dead" or "static" Brahman, for instance, stresses an aspect which can at all be true only from one view-point of the teachings of the Upanishads. Even in that case, it is only theoretically so. His suggestion that a "static" Brahman of the Upanishads led to the conception of a "static" God in the hands of Spinoza, seems equally unsustainable. This latter statement does, in fact, serious injustice to Spinoza. Nature or God as conceived by Spinoza is all-comprehensive,

infinite or perfect, so that there is nothing outside of the cosmic system, nothing supernatural. Nature, moreover, according to him, is not static but dynamic, exercising all existing forms of energy. Each ultimate kind of energy is described an attribute of God. 1171 Then, again, his criticism that a "passive " metaphysical idea which incul cates "passivity and eternal peace" lends to the de-individualizing of man and ends in "brutality and despotism", cannot prove acceptable. Expanding his view-point, Mr. Melamed says that "Spinoza's theory of the State and Buddha's indifference to the brutality of the caste system support the implication that causation as the only reality extends the realms of brute nature to the realm of human history. the worlds of Spinoza and Buddha, man, overawed by the eternal immutable law, vanishes from the picture. And with him disappear all that revolves about man-history, ethics, politics, jurisprudence, social service, and true philanthropy. All that remains is the ceaselessly revolving wheel of fate which stares at the puppet show called human life."117 If this were really so, it would be truly appalling. In 1171 Mr. Melamed's statement that "philosophical thought in India is either non-dualistic or purely monistic (pp. 21, 40)," is too sweeping in character and betrays a lack of first-hand knowledge of Indian systems of philosophic thought which, it is but right to add, colours his whole study. He later qualifies his statement (see p. 253) by saying that "Monism was not the only religious expression of ancient India" and instances the Sankhya school of thought, which he describes as one of the most important philosophical groups in India," which propounded the absolute dualism of mind and matter. But his complaint is that even the adherents of this system regarded knowledge as only a means to salvation". 66 16 1172 Elsewhere Mr. Melamed remarks that "like all true Eastern mystics, Spinoza was interested not in man, but in the forces of eternity," p. 232. As to Buddha, he writes in the Introduction : "Buddha, too, was not concerned with the lot of the lower castes" p. 13-14. These criticisms form the central parts of Mr. Melamed's work. His description of the State as conceived of by Spinoza reminds one of Vico's characterization of it as "a city of hucksters", because of its alleged lack of the sense of duty. But this seems a piece of superficial criticism. 53

But fortunately for us, it does not appear to be a correct reading of either Spinoza's political theory or of the Hindu caste system or of caste in the Buddhistic or the Upanishadic view. As Professor Watson points out, Spinoza holds that the State is the great means by which man is freed from "the wretched and almost brutish existence" which is spent by those "who live in a state of barbarism without a political order of life". It is true that the State cannot determine the whole life of man; there are spheres and interests which lie beyond it; nevertheless there is much which only a State can do, and it is one of the most important means of human happiness. From what source then does society derive its powers or rights? "The answer of Spinoza," remarks Prof. Watson, "is that man has a natural right which is coextensive with his power over things. The power is by no means unlimited, because each individual being is only a part of a whole order or system which is constituted by the essential nature of God. The good of man is that which will contribute to his greatest welfare or happiness... The only way to make a man better is to give him reasons for changing his opinion. The society which by its laws encourages industry, enterprise, honesty and thrift, supplies to its citizens adequate reasons for regarding these qualities as for their good.... The end of the State is to make men free, that is, to induce them to live according to reason, and it can only do so by presenting and enforcing certain courses of conduct. The individual must obey the law or submit to the penalties imposed by the State. If every man followed reason, he would cease to speak of being under obligation to obey the law, and would speak only of liberty and happiness and the love of his fellows, which is identical with the love of God. A law is not properly a command, but a rule of conduct which a man prescribes to himself or to any other with a view to a certain end. But as the true end of life is recognized only by a very few, legislators have promised rewards to those who obey the law and threatened punishment to those who violate it. It is for

" 835 this reason that a law has come to be regarded as a command. Man is not naturally moral or social, but must fight his way towards sociability, and the State is the chief moral agency in this contest. In the state of nature men are one another's enemies. But this is only the first state of man. Every one desires to live in security and without fear; and this end cannot possibly be attained as long as enmity, hatred, anger and guile rule in place of reason. >>1173 Spinoza naturally rejects the view of Hobbes that in a state of nature there is "war of all against all". He holds to the view even in a state of nature, man is a social animal and but for his being social, life would have been impossible. In his view, the government is not an alien force; but the best friend that man has in the world. There is no antagonism between the individual's interest and interests of the community: "The status civilis has its natural source in the desire to be free from some common fear and to remove the common causes of unhappiness. The end of the State, then, is not to restrain men by fear, and subject them to a foreign yoke, but to ' deliver each man from fear, so that he may be able to live with the utmost possible security; that is to say, that he may maintain in the best way his own natural right to exist and to act, without doing harm either to himself or to his neighbours."1174 The State is indeed a necessity, but it is a necessity of thought. Spinoza's Spinoza's theory of the State marks a distinct advance upon that of Hobbes, especially in its conception of the source of duties. The notion that men have rights apart from society is the foundation on which Hobbes' theory of the Social Contract is built. Rights are thus divorced from duties and it is supposed that the only rights that they possess are those granted to them by positive enactment, except certain primitive rights, which survive under the new conditions. According to Spinoza, there can be no right which does not flow from the 1178 1174 " J. Watson, The State in Peace and War, 92-101. Tractatus Politicus, III. 6.

consciousness of a common interest on the part of members of a society. Such a right implies recognition by the common will. Spinoza's theory of the State may not, it may be suggested, seem to be consistent with itself as is, indeed, pointed out with great force by Professor Watson.1175 But to say that it "extends the realms of brute nature to the realm of human history" seems an imperfect generalization of uncertain validity. There is, however, reason for this misunderstanding on the part of Mr. Melamed. Spinoza carries out unflinchingly the fundamental principle of his ethical philosophy, that man's highest good is the result of that conatus sese conservandi which is found in all forms of being. Anything like selfsacrifice or even self-blame he rejects. self-blame he rejects. Asceticism is for him nothing but a torva et tristis superstitio. The true end of all action is to secure the greatest self-satisfaction or individual happiness and in this attitude of pure affirmation, Spinoza finds the secret not only of the State but of the highest form of blessedness. From passion, the motive operative in man in his first mind, liberation is to be obtained by an enlightened self-interest that leads to identification with the common weal. It is entirely a question of the greater enlightenment which comes from the wider view of reason. When we bring our own life into connection with the life of society as a whole, we see the irrationality of the narrow view of passion and we seek our own good in the common good. 1176 The fundamental mistake in Spinoza's political philosophy as in his general philosophy, according to Professor Watson, is "to conceive the bare individual as having a nature apart from society, whereas there can be no distinctively moral action except in so far as the individual discharges a function in society which enables him to minister to the well-being of the whole community.117 Spinoza was debarred from taking 1175 J. Watson, loc. cit., 99-101. 1176 Ibid., 100-101. 1177 Ibid., 1101-02.

this view by his denial of all final causes. Holding that man like other beings is determined solely by material and efficient causes, "he can properly speak neither of rights nor of duties, both of which imply relation to an end, namely, the good of society as a whole." This does not prevent him from tacitly assuming that "human affairs are directed to an end as when he says that men seek to secure a higher form of civil society. He thinks that a clear understanding of the world will lead to an advance from a lower to a higher form of society; and in so doing he tacitly assumes that man is determined by the idea of social perfection and, not simply by the impulse to secure his own well-being. "1178 So far as to Mr. Melamed's misconception of the true theory of State as evolved by Spinoza. Next, as to his criticism of the Hindu caste system, it is only necessary to say a few words here to indicate his radical misunderstanding of it. The Upanishads do not, for instance, support the position put forward by him. According to the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 1179 which describes the creation of the four castes and the law (Dharma) in keeping with the speculations of the period, insists on the essential equality, if not oneness, of all castes, each being created as required for the good of society, the law being above all. The special glorification of the Law which the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad indulges in, shows that at the time it was composed, it was felt that in the eye of the Law all were equal and none could pretend to a higher status over another. In the Bhagavad-gita, the exaltation of the Dharma is carried still further. The position taken in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad is emphasised, if not enlarged. The castes have not only their particular qualities but also their particular duties. And then we are told 1180 that the performance of one's own duty-and duty is throughout 1178 Ibid., 102. 1179 Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , I. 4. 10-14. 1180 Bhagvad-gita, III. 35.

stressed in the Gita as nothing else is-though destitute of merit is better than the performance of another's duty well discharged. Death in performing one's own duty is preferable, the performance of the duties of others is dangerous. The theory of creation is referred to in two places in the Gita¹181 and these indicate the position of the Bhagavad-gita in regard to caste. In the first, Sri Krishna says:-"The four-fold division of castes was created by me according to the apportionment of qualities and duties." In the second, he enumerates the respective duties of the four castes, and then says:-"(Every) man intent on his own respective duties obtains perfection. Listen, now, how one intent on one's duty obtains perfection. Worshipping, by (the performance of) his own duty, him from whom all things proceed, a man obtains perfection. One's own duty, though defective, is better than another's duty well performed. Performing the duty prescribed by nature one does not incur sin." As Mr. K. T. Telang points out, in the Bhagavad-gita, the duties of the different castes do not overlap. In Chapter X, in which the best of everything is mentioned, the Brahmana is not declared to be the best of castes. On the other hand, the King is mentioned as the highest among men. 118 The Bhagavad-gita and Buddha agree first in their protests against the authority of the Vedas, and second in their conception of the true view of the differences of caste. The Gita shelves caste, while Buddha rejects it. The Gita does not totally root out caste; but it places it on a less untenable basis. In Telang's view, the Gita is really the predecessor of the Buddhist attempt to do away with caste. Buddha's attitude towards caste is well brought out by his definition of an outcaste, which is illustrated by the story of the Chandala who was re-born in the Brahman world. In the Sutta Nipata, in which the story is told, we read: "Not by birth does one become an out-caste; 1181 1182 Bhagavad-gita, IV. 13; XVIII. 41. Ibid., X. 27.

not by birth does one become a Brahman; by deeds one becomes an outcaste, and by deeds one becomes a Brahmana. Buddha himself is neither a Brahman, nor a king's son, wandering mendicant." "Do not ask about descent, The nor a Vessa (Vaisya), but a Sutta Nipata again asserts: but ask about conduct; from wood, it is true, fire is born; (likewise) a firm muni, although belonging to a low family, may become noble, when restrained (from sinning) by humility. One who has seen Buddha is appeased, even if he be of black colour. The Buddhist Sutras maintain that the truth proclaimed by Buddha is open to all. According to the Vinaya texts, members of the four castes renounce their names and their lineage when they become Buddhist monks. " The Jaina attitude is equally clear. In the Jaina Sutras, the story is told of the monk Harikesa Bala, born in the family of Svapakesa, the lowest of lowly castes, converting a Brahmana. The self-same Sutras state that a Brahmana, Kshatriya, an Ugra or a Chchavi when entering the Order is not stuck up on account of its Gotra. Their reasoning is direct and simple. If there were only one Soul, these could not be of Brahmanas, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas and Sudras. This indifference to caste was adopted by the Saivas, according to whom, men of different castes may become Brahmanas. According to the Vedanta Sutras of Badarayana, difference of castes results from the soul's connection with a body, though all souls are part of Brahman and equal.1183 " " ; The alleged "indifference" of the "brutality of caste seems thus not justified; nor is it the alleged "brutality due to his so-called "passive" philosophy. Caste has bound a whole sub-continent to orderliness and to law caste has helped the spread of culture; and caste has meant social peace and domestic happiness. Politically it has been a great factor in building up a conglomeration of races into a single whole. Its so-called rigidity has been both its 1183 See The Indian Caste System, 55-61.

840 " INTRODUCTION merit and demerit. it cannot be said that this bred "brutality" or cruelty--at any rate of the type that has made cruelty to the Negro in America a common thing and cruelty towards the Jew in modern Germany a great virtue. Racial differences have been stressed unduly in these two cases with the result that the so-called inequalities bred by the caste system-caste signifies difference rather than inequality-in India pale into insignificance. Whatever its defects, caste in India has helped to ensure an amazing continuity, in tradition and in the arts and crafts ".1184 If it is, as has been suggested, a typical example of "introvert" disposition, then the credit for tolerance in religion, tolerance in social custom and habit, and tolerance in regarding differences as natural and even inevitable in some cases should go to the philosophy of the Upanishads and to the Buddhistic philosophy based on it, which made "looking inward" a not negligible factor in their make-up. It is because that this "looking inward" has been lacking in Europe that, despite the spread of culture and the propagation of philosophical views, tolerance is still unrecognized in practice even in the domains of religion and politics. It is not Spinoza's philosophy that is responsible for this defect in European character any more than caste can be held responsible for the inequalities we see in India, but despite Spinoza's philosophy and despite the doctrine of equality preached in the Upanishadic philosophy that intolerance and inequalities exist. In India at least, caste saved the aborigines from destruction, while its absence in other parts of the world has only meant their disappearance with the approach of immigrant foreign races, as in America, Australia, New Zealand and Africa. The accident of birth is stressed, but