Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories (Study)
by Diptimani Goswami | 2014 | 61,072 words
This page relates ‘Satkaryavada� of the study on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories with special reference to the Tarkasangraha by Annambhatta. Both Nyaya and Vaisesika are schools of ancient Indian Philosophy, and accepted in their system various padarthas or objects of valid knowledge. This study investigates how the Tarkasamgraha reflects these categories in the combined Nyayavaisesika school.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
ٰⲹ岹
ٰⲹ岹 is upheld by the ṃkⲹ-Yoga and Advaita Vedānta philosophers. According to ٰⲹ岹 the effect already exists in the cause in a potential condition. So, it is not basically new creation and different from the material cause. But effect is only an explicit manifestation of that which are contained in its material cause. For example, a pot is not different from the clay, a cloth is not different from the threads. There are two divisions of ٰⲹ岹-ʲṇām岹 and վٲ岹. They are called to be ʲṇām徱Բ, who believes that the effect is a real transformation of its cause, but who believes that the effect is unreal, they are վٲ徱Բ.[1] ṃkⲹ-Yoga’s view is known as ʰṛt-ʲṇām岹, 峾ԳᲹ’s view is known as Brahma-ʲṇām岹, Śṃk is վٲ徱.
It is the ṃkⲹs who have actually established the theory ٰⲹ岹 by different arguments. Īśvaṛakṛṣṇa has discussed the theory of ٰⲹ岹 in his ṃkⲹkārikā.[2] He gives five arguments to prove this theory. The five arguments are discussed here as follows:
a. 岹첹
The effect must pre-exist in the cause. If the effect is not existent in its cause then no effort can bring it into existence. The non-existent things like hare’s horn or the sky-flower cannot be produced. 峦貹پ Ѿś says in his commentary that a thousand artists also can never make the blue colour into yellow.[3] According to him, if the effect is produced from something where it is not present previously then anything can be produced from any cause. There is no example of such an effect.[4]
b. Բ-ṇāt
For the production of a thing, it is necessary to take the proper materials from which that thing can be produced. If one wants to produce curd, he must take milk, since curd cannot be produced from water. 峦貹پ Ѿś explains the term Բ as cause and ṇa as relation. There exists a relation between cause and effect. This relation is not possible with a non-existent thing.[5] Hence the effect must
pre-exist its cause.
c. 屹
Some effects can be made from some causes and some other can be produced from some different causes, e.g. curd can be produced from milk only, not from sand. A cloth can be produced from threads. This implies that the effect exists in its cause even before its production.. Any effect is not made from any cause, the potter takes only clay to produce a pot, instead of taking milk or threads or any other thing.[6]
d. Śaktasya Śakyakaraṇāt
A cause can produce that effect for which it has the essential potency. It means that the effect must be potentially contained in its cause before its production. If, it is not, such then curd can be produced from water, oil, from sand, cloth from reeds, etc. For this reason, the effect is sat in its cause before its production.[7]
e. ṇa屹
An effect cannot be made without cause. Everything has a cause. The effect remains in its material cause. Without cause the effect is impossible (ṇa屹). 峦貹پ Ѿś points out that there is no different between the cause and the effect. As the cause is existent, so the effect must also be existent. According the ṃkⲹs, the cause and effect are the implicit and the explicit stages of the same process. 峦貹پ Ѿś also says that the effect is a property of the cause and as such is not different from it.[8] Thus, from these arguments the ṃkⲹs try to establish that the effect is existent (sat) in its cause before its production.
The Advaita Vedāntins are also ٰⲹ徱Բ. Śṃk gives arguments to establish the pre-existence of effect in the cause. He says that if a thing does not exist in and in identity with something, it cannot be originated from that, as for example, oil from sand. In his view, the effect exists in the cause and is non-different from the cause production. It also may be believed that the effect must be identical with its cause after production.[9] Again Śṃk argues that the effect is not revealed before its before its production because the effect exists in an unmanifest condition in its cause. But it becomes manifest when it is produced.[10]
Śṃk also points out that it is seen that people takes particular cause for a particular effect. For example, people take up milk for curd as its cause. Similarly clay is taken up for making pot, gold for necklace etc. No one takes earth to make curd or milk to make a pot. This fact does not fit in with the theory of nonexistence of the effect before origination. If everything is not existed everywhere before its creation there is reason that curd is produced from milk and not from earth and pot is produced from earth not from milk.[11] Hence, it must be admitted that the effect pre-exists in the cause.
According to aٰⲹ徱Բ cause has some special power for which the effect is produced from that cause. The meaning of this is that milk alone has some special capacity for curds and not for pot. The clay alone has some special potency for pot and not for curd. Against this argument of the aٰⲹ徱Բ, Śṃk points out that if this capacity of the cause remains before the origination of the effect, the aٰⲹ岹 becomes meaningless and the theory of ٰⲹ岹 becomes confirmed.[12] Śṃk again points out that the potency is assumed in the cause which determine the effect cannot influence the effect being different from it or being non-existent. If there is difference between potentiality and both cause and effect or if the potentiality is non-existent, it cannot produce the effect because its features of being different and non-existent are equally present in relation to other things.[13] So, cause must have the potentiality as its essence and the effect is the essence of the potency.[14] “Cause and effect are not two different things which can be seen independent of each other like horse and cow. The difference between the effect before manifestation and after is a relative one. The cause and the effect represent two phases of one thing and are really of one nature.�[15]
Again Śṃk points out that the son of a barren woman is impossible, it can never be born. If it becomes possible is then only the effect which is not-existent before its production can be produced. As a matter of fact, the son of a barren woman and the non-existence of an effect both are equally non-existent. The effect which is non-existent cannot be produced even by the activity of the causal agents just like the barren women’s son cannot be brought about by any operation of cause.[16]
The aٰⲹ徱Բ say that the activity of the causal agent will become useless if he tries to bring into existence what already exists. Therefore, to make the activity of the causal agent purposefull, it must be accepted that the effect does not remain before its production.[17] Refusing this point Śṃk argues that this is not acceptable as the activity of the causal agent becomes meaningful by transforming the cause into the shape of the effect. He says that the effect is non-different from the cause and anything, not existent already in cause cannot be produced. A thing does not become different just because of the appearance of some peculiarity. Thus, things like milk etc. are themselves called products when they exist in the form of curd etc.[18] Although Śṅk峦ⲹ has established ٰⲹ岹 refuting the views
of the aٰⲹ徱Բ, actually he is a ٲ徱, according to which the effect has no real existence. In his view, the effect has no existence as distinct from that of the cause.[19] No modifications exists as apart from its cause. That is why the 貹Ծṣa says that the effect is nothing but respective names and forms; ultimately the cause is real.[20] This is the idea of ٲ岹, since in ٲ岹, the cause does not actually change into the effect, but falsely appears to be something different.[21] However, in empirical cases, 貹ṇām岹 is also accepted by ṅk. It is only in case of the origination of the world from Brahman, ṅk accepts ٲ岹.
Footnotes and references:
[2]:
asadakaraṇādupādānagrahaṇātsarvasambhavābhāvāt/ śaktasya śakyakaranātkāraṇabhāvācca satkāryam// ṃkⲹkārika, 9
[3]:
[6]:
asaṃbaddhasya janyatve asaṃbaddhatvāviśeṣeṇa � ⲹٲ�
sarvasmādbhavet, nacaitad …saṃvaddham saṃvaddhena janyata. Ibid.
[7]:
[8]:
iha yad yato’bhidyate tat tasya dharmo na bhavati yathā gauraśvasyadharmaśca paṭastantūnā� tasmānnārthāntaram. Ibid
[9]:
yacca yadātmana yatra na vartate na tat tatutpadyate, yathāsikatābhyastailam. tasmāt prāgutpatterananyatvād utpannampyananyadeva ⲹ� ityavagamyate ūٰ -śṅkṣy, 2.1.16
[10]:
cf. Ibid., 2.1.17
[11]:
aviśiṣṭe hi prāgutpatte� sarvasya sarvatrasattve kasmāt kṣīrādeva dadhyutpadyate na mṛttikāyā�, mṛttikāyā eva ca ṭa utpadyate na kṣīrāt. Ibid., 2.1.18
[12]:
tarhyatisayavattvātprāgavasthāyā aٰⲹ岹hāni� ٰⲹ岹siddhaśca. Ibid
[13]:
ٳٱ屹śṣādԲⲹٱ屹śṣāc. Ibid
[15]:
Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 529
[16]:
cf. vandhyāputrasya kāryābhāvasya cābhāvatvāviśeṣād � kāryābhāvo’pi kārakavyāpārādūrdhvam na bhaviṣyatīti. ūٰ-śaṅkarabhāṣya, 2.1.8
[17]:
cf. ata� kārakavyāpārārthavattvāya manyāmahe prāgutpatterabhāva� ⲹⲹ iti. Ibid
[19]:
kāraṇāt paramārthato’nanyatva� vyatirekeṇa abhāvā� kāryasyāvagamyate. ūٰ-śaṅkarabhāṣya, 2.1.14
[20]:
cf. Chāndogya 貹Ծṣa, 6.1.4