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[Full title: 鈥淭ransgressing the Boundaries鈥� of Disciplinarity: The Sectarianization of Classical Knowledge Systems]

By the sixteenth century in south India, as with the majority of the subcontinent, the idea of newness had thoroughly captivated intellectual discourse鈥攚hether novelty of form, substance, or indeed of scholarly methodology. It is no accident, in fact, that schools of thought whose very names proclaimed the virtue of newness had come into sudden vogue across sectarian lines. Such is the case, most notably, with Navya 狈测腻测补, or 鈥淣ew Dialectics,鈥� an emergent discipline whose influence reached nearly every corner of Sanskrit intellectual discourse, sectarian theology being no exception.

Take, for instance, the following aphorism, cited by the 惭腻诲丑惫补 theologian N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya in his 础诲惫补颈迟补办腻濒腻苍补濒补 (The armageddon of Advaita), a systematic diatribe countering the Madhvatantramukhamardana (Crushing the face of Madhva鈥檚 doctrine) of the 厂尘腻谤迟补-艢补颈惫补 polymath Appayya 顿墨办峁�i迟补:

Statements endowed with logical reasoning are admissible even from a child.
Anything else should be abandoned like grass, even if spoken by 叠谤补丑尘腻.^[1]

According to N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya, what Appayya lacked, succinctly, was logical reasoning. As an outspoken proponent of Madhva鈥檚 Dvaita (dualist) theology, N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya embarked on his polemical project, the 础诲惫补颈迟补办腻濒腻苍补濒补, not merely to defend a dualist model of ontology but also to champion the revolutionary dialectical models of Navya 狈测腻测补 philosophy. Navya 狈测腻测补, although perhaps better known for its origin and efflorescence in Bengal following the influential thirteenth-century 罢补迟迟惫补肠颈苍迟腻尘补峁噄 (Crest jewel of principles) of 骋补峁単别艣补, had made a second home for itself among the prominent logicians of the 惭腻诲丑惫补 lineage, who were justly renowned by contemporaries for their unsurpassed mastery of the discipline. This trend perhaps reached its zenith under the pioneering dialectical endeavors of 痴测腻蝉补 罢墨谤迟丑补, whose metaphysical tracts, with such names as the 狈测腻测腻尘峁泃补 (The nectar of logic) and the 罢补谤办补迟腻峁囜笉补惫补 (The dance of reasoning), began to evoke an invariable concomitance between Navya 狈测腻测补 and the 惭腻诲丑惫补 tradition itself. In subsequent generations, 痴测腻蝉补 罢墨谤迟丑补 was succeeded by prolific scholars such as Vijay墨ndra 罢墨谤迟丑补, who continued the Navya 狈测腻测补 legacy with his 狈测腻测补- 尘补耻办迟颈办补尘腻濒腻, 狈测腻测补- 蝉补峁単谤补丑补, Ny膩y 腻诲丑惫补诲颈辫颈办腻,^[2] among many others鈥攚hich, even when not directly concerned with formal logic, relentlessly evoke the semiotic authority of the 鈥淣ew Dialectics.鈥�

Even outside of the 痴补颈峁ａ箛补惫补 fold, critics of Madhva鈥檚 doctrine gravitated toward the 惭腻诲丑惫补 predilection for formal logic, seizing every opportunity to impugn the rationality of the school鈥檚 founder. Among the most memorable critiques of Madhva鈥檚 dualism, Appayya 顿墨办峁�i迟补鈥檚 Madhvatantramukhamardana caricatures Madhva as no less than an intellectual fraud, delusional enough to believe himself an incarnation of the wind god, 痴腻测耻. Appayya further contends that among the scriptural passages Madhva cites, many were simply fabricated out of thin air (svakapolakalpita, or literally, 鈥渇ashioned from his own cheek鈥�),^[3] and the remainder interpreted so tortuously as to defy even the limits of plausibility.

He elaborates:

鈥淪uch 峁歡vedic mantras are demonstrated to refer to the triad of incarnations of 痴腻测耻 that he himself has made up, and so forth鈥攖hus we witness the wholesale transgression of the boundaries of reasonable authority [辫谤腻尘腻峁噄办补尘补谤测腻诲辞濒濒补峁単丑补苍补尘闭.鈥�^[4]

Appayya then continues to adduce a version of the very aphorism 惭腻诲丑惫补s themselves cite with pride, censuring not merely the theological doctrine of his 惭腻诲丑惫补 opponents but equally their attachment to logical reasoning as the cornerstone of academic inquiry.

Now, on the principle 鈥淪peech endowed with reason is to be accepted, not [mere] venerability,鈥� we would give credit to his doctrine if we could discern in it anything reasonable. But such is not the case. For, generally, in his doctrine, statements that are ascertained from his own heart alone are supported, rather than commonly held principles. And those principles that are exhibited are extremely carelessly observed, applied here and there at will. Even the boundaries of 笔奴谤惫补 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 are led astray through interpretations of disharmony [补蝉腻尘补帽箩补蝉测补]. Generally speaking, words are used completely inappropriately. His versification cannot possibly be construed syntactically, and more often than not the meters do not exist.^[5]

While railing against the methodological preoccupations of his opponents, Appayya reveals his own disciplinary leanings as well. Although considered by all a polymath鈥攁 master of all disciplines (sarvatantrasvatantra)鈥擜ppayya, to the best of our knowledge, never once composed a treatise on formal logic. Rather, he cultivated a particular expertise in the field of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻, or Vedic exegesis, a discipline that had centuries before attained the status of a general hermeneutics, its principles adopted widely across the Sanskrit knowledge systems. Beyond developing a simple mastery of the field, Appayya also pioneered a sustained inquiry into the status of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 as a discipline, negotiating the complexity of its relationship with 痴别诲腻苍迟补 philosophy, or Uttara 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻.^[6] Despite the discursive prestige accorded to Navya 狈测腻测补 terminology by the sixteenth century, his prose shows few traces of its unmistakable philosophical idiom.^[7] And perhaps most tellingly, with his provocatively titled treatise on 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻, the 痴颈诲丑颈谤补蝉腻测补苍补 (The elixir of injunction), Appayya proclaimed to his contemporaries that the entire discipline of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 was in need of resuscitation鈥攁nd that he, specifically, would provide the remedy.^[8]

In short, Appayya鈥檚 primary concern, beyond Madhva鈥檚 alleged carelessness with source criticism, is that the integrity of the boundaries鈥攐r the operative rules鈥攐f 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 hermeneutics not be compromised through haphazard textual interpretations. By describing Madhva鈥檚 reading strategies as 鈥渄isharmonious鈥� (补蝉腻尘补帽箩补蝉测别苍补颈惫补), Appayya further demarcates himself as an avowed insider in 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 hermeneutics: the principle of 蝉腻尘补苍箩测补蝉测补, or 鈥渉armony,鈥� is a 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补 axiom that requires interpreters, wherever possible, to understand texts as harmonious intentional communications, free from internal contradiction. Such subtle gestures were by no means lost on his 惭腻诲丑惫补 contemporaries. Given that their 厂尘腻谤迟补-艢补颈惫补 opponent had so thoroughly identified himself with the inner workings of the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 system, they began to look for strategies to dismantle not merely Appayya鈥檚 own arguments but also the very universality of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻鈥檚 hermeneutical apparatus.

What precisely was the relationship, then, between 惭腻诲丑惫补 faith and formal logic, 艢补颈惫补 scripture and 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 exegesis? Disciplinarity, it seems, was no longer coterminous with the object of inquiry for the Sanskrit knowledge systems in early modern south India. One did not become a 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补, in this climate, merely to understand the meaning of the Vedas, nor a 狈补颈测腻测颈办补 to master syllogistic reasoning. Rather, by the sixteenth century, during the floruit of Appayya 顿墨办峁�i迟补, the first stages of a sectarianization of the means of knowledge took place, as discipline-specific approaches to textuality came to be claimed as the property of competing religious traditions. To be a 惭腻诲丑惫补 theologian in this period, one had little choice but to apply oneself to the study of Navya 狈测腻测补; and over the course of time, 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 acquired an intimate association with the social circles of the 厂尘腻谤迟补-艢补颈惫补s, such that by the following centuries prominent 惭腻诲丑惫补s expressed a wholehearted disdain for the interpretive maxims of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 philosophy.

By the time of Vijay墨ndra 罢墨谤迟丑补, a genuine skepticism had begun to arise in 惭腻诲丑惫补 circles concerning the general applicability of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 hermeneutics. Although Vijay墨ndra himself had authored works of the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 school, he evidently felt no compunction, as did Appayya, regarding the 鈥渢ransgressing鈥� of its 鈥渂oundaries鈥� in the service of Dvaita theology.

In his 罢耻谤墨测补艣颈惫补办丑补峁囜笉补苍补 (Crushing the transcendent-fourth 艢颈惫补), for instance, Vijay墨ndra even celebrates the virtue of transgressing 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补 boundaries, which, he contends, was in fact a deliberate and strategic decision on the part of the 惭腻诲丑惫补 school:

It is unreasonable to say that the boundary of 笔奴谤惫补 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 is led astray by such improper application. By saying that the statements of our Teacher [Madhva] were arrived at merely by his own fancy, one acts like a frog in a well. Only the principles shown by our Teacher possess the fortitude of intellect, and not those shown by others. The disharmonious application of the boundaries of 笔奴谤惫补 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 is in fact precisely our doctrine.^[9]

It is N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya, however, who finally threw down the gauntlet, in his 础诲惫补颈迟补办腻濒腻苍补濒补, calling for the wholesale rejection of 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补 reading strategies outside of the narrow confines of Vedic ritual exegesis. Structured as a systematic counterattack on Appayya鈥檚 Madhvatantramukhamardana, the 础诲惫补颈迟补办腻濒腻苍补濒补 rejects each one of Appayya鈥檚 allegations in turn, including the notorious issue of Madhva鈥檚 recovery鈥攐r fabrication鈥攐f little-known scriptures. As one may predict, N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya was prepared with an equally incisive counterattack for each of Appayya鈥檚 allegations, attempting to renegotiate the limits of what constitutes acceptable scriptural authority and how we can reliably trust the authenticity of an attested source. In making his case, N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya exhibits much of the heightened philological sensitivity marshaled by his near contemporary, 狈墨濒补办补峁囜弓丑补 顿墨办峁�i迟补, in his 艢颈惫补tattvarahasya, never hesitating to bring critical scrutiny to fundamental questions of source criticism.

Take, for instance, the question of metrical flaw, still employed today as a key text-critical principle for determining whether a verse or text has been modified or poorly transmitted over the centuries. Madhva鈥檚 sources, Appayya tells us, are consistently riddled with metrical errors; thus, we are forced to doubt the faithfulness of their transmission and, as a result, their reliability as authoritative scripture. N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya takes a firm and principled stand on the matter based on the legacy of classical Sanskrit metrics, claiming that an innumerable array of variant verse forms are in fact metrically permitted, and, hence, a deviant metrical form cannot be reliably accepted as a criterion for the corruption of a verse. In fact, he reminds us quite correctly that the 惭补丑腻产丑腻谤补迟补 is full of metrically deviant verses, all of which are accepted equally as authoritative by his contemporaries.

He elaborates:

For instance, the meter known as 箩补驳补迟墨 consists of twelve syllables, and there are 4,096 mutually distinct subtypes because of their derivations based on their sequential formation of heavy and light syllables. Names, such as 惫补峁兣沘蝉迟丑补, drutavila mbita, and so forth, have been designated for a few among them. Such is the case for a single meter; as there may be a greater number of syllables in a given meter, an individual meter may exceed a lakh [of subtypes]. And as for those [well-known] meters such as 艣腻谤诲奴濒补惫颈办谤墨岣峣迟补 and 蝉谤补驳诲丑补谤腻, these are applied specifically per verse or per foot. It is not that a single specific meter is demanded by all four lines of a verse.^[10]

On the question of metrical flaw, N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya is by no means timid in attempting to disarm not only Appayya鈥檚 arguments but even his principal tools of textual interpretation. What engages his attention throughout the majority of the 础诲惫补颈迟补办腻濒腻苍补濒补, however, is not metrics but 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻. Preoccupying himself with the analytical power of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 maxims, and the limits of their applicability, N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya calls into question the essential nature of disciplinarity in Sanskrit 艣腻蝉迟谤补 and the extratextual sectarian significance of disciplinary divisions. Appayya, for his part, being an accomplished 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补 with an ingenious sense of the hermeneutic potential of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 strategies of interpretation, launches his attacks on Madhva by way of highly specific 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补 principles. Take, for instance, the first verse of the Madhvatantramukhamardana鈥攓uite likely intended both as an intellectual witticism and as a genuine attack on the scriptural foundations of dualist theology.

He writes,

To those who define the subject of the 叠谤补丑尘补蝉奴迟谤补蝉 as 鈥溑毦北共� or 痴颈峁ａ箛耻,鈥�
It is agreed鈥攚e who worship 苍颈谤驳耻峁嘺 brahman accept the 蝉补驳耻峁嘺 as well.
Little contradiction arises for us, who know the na hi 苍颈苍诲腻 maxim.
Nor should any other interpretation of the 厂奴迟谤补蝉 be suppressed by you.^[11]

The na hi 苍颈苍诲腻 maxim is an interpretive principle paraphrased directly from the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻s奴trabh膩峁�ya (2.4.20) of 艢补产补谤补, who aims to resolve the potential contradictions in ritual procedure resulting from Vedic passages that appear to censure (苍颈苍诲腻) a particular sequence of actions. Such blame, 艢补产补谤补 contends, does not prohibit what seems to be prohibited, but rather simply allows room for some other possibility.

As he writes,

鈥淏lame, after all, is not employed to blame the blameworthy, but rather to praise something other than what is blamed (na hi 苍颈苍诲腻 nindya峁� ninditu峁� prayujyate, ki峁� tarhi nindit膩d itarat pra艣a峁僺itum). As such, what is understood is not a prohibition of what is blamed but rather an injunction of something else.鈥�^[12]

Appayya, for his part, extracts the na hi 苍颈苍诲腻 maxim from its Vedic ritual context and adapts it for the resolution of apparent logical contradictions in other scriptures, such as the sectarian 笔耻谤腻峁嘺蝉 and the 叠谤补丑尘补蝉奴迟谤补蝉. Any scriptural statement that appears to castigate either 艢颈惫补 or 痴颈峁ａ箛耻鈥攐r even to deny the nondualistic nature of the world鈥攎ay simply be interpreted as an optional, contingent description of the true state of affairs. Individual deities, for example, may be equated with the nondual brahman as 蝉补驳耻峁嘺 manifestations on the force of this same maxim. Apparently exasperated by this approach, N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya not only maintains that Appayya鈥檚 particular uses of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 hermeneutics are inapplicable as a critique of Madhva鈥檚 doctrine of dualism, or as a means to determine the identity of or difference between 艢颈惫补 and 痴颈峁ａ箛耻, but he also goes much further and throws into question the more general validity of 笔奴谤惫补 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 itself as an approach to textual interpretation outside of the narrow confines of Vedic ritual procedure.

As he remarks aphoristically in one of his verses:

鈥湶涯�尘腻峁僺腻, set forth to resolve the contradiction among statements occupying the peak of scripture, is in this case entirely fruitless.鈥�^[13]

By reducing the consequences of the na hi 苍颈苍诲腻 maxim to absurdity, what N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya aims to elucidate is the danger involved in haphazardly applying hermeneutical principles without careful attention to what those principles logically entail. When any critical statement can be explained away as optionality, scripture is rendered unable to negate heretical doctrines in simple, declarative statements. Even genuine philosophical refutation becomes logically impossible. By thus attempting to outlaw 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 reading practices in the arena of sectarian debate, N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya reveals the growing division between the very tools of textual interpretation employed by rival sectarian traditions. In fact, rather than agreeing on a single shared medium for debate, the two rival traditions began to demarcate certain textual approaches as essentially their own property, distancing themselves from attack and counterattack by attempting to invalidate their opponents鈥� reading practices. In fact, N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya enthusiastically accepts Appayya鈥檚 allegations that Madhva 鈥渢ransgresses the boundaries鈥� of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻, construing this transgressive maneuver as the culmination of the 惭腻诲丑惫补 school鈥檚 mastery of syllogistic logic. No school of philosophy, even 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻, he argues, ought to be accepted as the arbiter of all intellectual activity.

Were this the case, one who failed to accept the primacy of 鈥減rimordial matter鈥� (辫谤补办峁泃颈) would 鈥渢ransgress鈥� the precepts of the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 school of philosophy, and one who failed to accept the ontological inherence of properties in objects would 鈥渢ransgress鈥� the principles of 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补.

And as for the claim that even the boundaries of 笔奴谤惫补 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 are being led astray by improper argumentation, then our response is that we are not the servants of the 笔奴谤惫补 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补s. We鈥檒l proceed with whatever boundaries we like. But rather鈥�

Statements endowed with logical reasoning are admissible even from a child. Anything else should be abandoned like grass, even if spoken by 叠谤补丑尘腻.

Based on this principle, we accept what is reasonable, and we abandon what is unreasonable. This is an ornament, not a fault, for those who propound independent systems of thought. Otherwise, by failing to accept the ontological category of inherence, one would transgress the boundaries of 碍补峁嚹乨补鈥檚 [痴补颈艣别峁�i办补] system, and by failing to accept the primacy of 辫谤补办峁泃颈, one would transgress the boundaries of 厂腻峁僰丑测补; thus, we by no means consider this a fault. But rather, how could we not perceive you yourself鈥攚ho have accepted the singularity of the self, the universal brahman, the falsehood of the world, and the fact that the Veda teaches falsehood鈥攁s having transgressed the boundaries of all systems apart from the Buddhists.^[14]

In short, N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya turns Appayya鈥檚 allegation on its head鈥攖ransgressing the hermeneutics of 笔奴谤惫补 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 is no fault at all but rather a dearly held principle of argumentation and interpretation. Despite鈥攐r perhaps even because of鈥攖he vehemence of his argumentation, N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya manages both to solidify the boundaries between their respective sectarian communities and, in the process, to draw widespread scrutiny across sectarian boundaries to the very reading practices that had been taken for granted for centuries as the foundations of textual interpretation. As a result, the source material of sectarian debate became the source of a widespread reconsideration of textual interpretation itself, as intellectuals from all camps contributed to an incisive reconsideration of just how the texts they had long taken for granted really do mean what we think they mean.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

yuktiyuktam 耻辫腻诲别测补峁� 惫补肠补苍补峁� b膩lak膩d api | anyat t峁涐箛am iva ty膩jyam apy 耻办迟补峁� padmajanman膩 || Quoted by N膩r膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya, 础诲惫补颈迟补办腻濒腻苍补濒补, pg. 42. This aphoristic verse is best known from the 驰辞驳补惫腻蝉颈峁ａ弓丑补 / 惭辞办峁�o辫腻测补 textual corpus. See for instance 惭辞办峁�o辫腻测补 2.18.3.

[2]:

The 狈测腻测腻诲丑惫补诲墨辫颈办腻, for instance, is, remarkably, a treatise of the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 school of Vedic hermeneutics, about which more will be said below. The fascination with the homonymy of the term 苍测腻测补 as 鈥渓ogic鈥� and 苍测腻测补 as a 鈥渕axim鈥� of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 hermeneutics is perhaps no accident.

[3]:

See Mesquita (2000, 2008) for the controversy on the authenticity of Madhva鈥檚 scriptural citations.

[4]:

ity膩di峁沢vedamantrasya svakalpitav膩yvavat膩ratrayaparatay膩 pradar艣anam ity 膩dipr膩m膩峁噄kamary膩dolla峁単hana峁� bh奴ya岣� sa峁僤峁浥泍ate. Appayya 顿墨办峁�i迟补, Madhvatantramukhamardana, pg. 11.

[5]:

ath膩pi yuktiy耻办迟补峁� vaco 驳谤腻丑测补峁� na tu puru峁�agauravam iti ny膩yena tanmata峁� 艣raddadh墨mahi yadi tatropapanna峁� 办颈峁僣颈诲 膩kalayema. na tv eva峁僷r膩ye峁嘺 hi tanmate svam膩trah峁沝ay膩r奴岣峢膩ni vacan膩ny evopaj墨vy膩ni na tu ny膩y膩岣�. ye tu ny膩y膩岣� pradar艣it膩s te 鈥榩y atyanta艣ithil膩 eva kvacit kvacid 腻艣谤颈迟腻岣�. p奴rvam墨m膩峁僺膩mary膩d膩 鈥榩y 补蝉腻尘补帽箩补蝉测别苍补颈惫补 n墨t膩. pr膩ye峁嚹乻膩dhubhir eva 艣abdair 惫测补惫补丑腻谤补岣�. 艣lokaracan膩y膩m anvay膩sa峁僢havo v峁泃t膩ny ath膩bh膩va艣 c膩dhika岣�. Appayya 顿墨办峁�i迟补, Madhvatantramukhamardana, pg. 11.

[6]:

See Pollock (2004) for a discussion and partial translation of the work in question, the 笔奴谤惫辞迟迟补谤补尘墨尘腻峁僺腻惫腻诲补苍补办峁�a迟谤补尘腻濒腻, or 鈥淭he Milky Way of Discourses on 笔奴谤惫补 and Uttara 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻,鈥� in Pollock鈥檚 translation.

[7]:

Diaconescu (2012), for instance, has observed that Appayya鈥檚 language shows remarkably little Navya 狈测腻测补 inflection, without, however, inquiring into why this might be the case.

[8]:

See also McCrea (2008) on the extensive discourse, both critical and approbative, generated in response to Appayya鈥檚 provocative theses.

[9]:

p奴rvam墨m膩峁僺akamary膩d膩s膩ma帽jasyenaiva n墨yateti tad ayuktam. asmad膩c膩ryod膩h峁泃avacan膩ni svam膩trah峁沝ay膩r奴岣峢膩n墨ti vadan k奴pama峁囜笉奴k膩yate. asmad膩c膩ryapradar艣itany膩y膩n膩m eva matid膩r岣峢ya峁� na parasparadar艣it膩n膩m. p奴rvam墨m膩峁僺akamary膩d膩s膩ma帽jasya峁� c膩smanmata eva. Vijay墨ndra 罢墨谤迟丑补, 惭补诲丑惫补迟补苍迟谤补尘耻办丑补产丑奴峁�a峁嘺, GOML, Madras, Ms. No. 15446, fol. 6.

[10]:

yath膩 dv膩da艣膩k峁�ar膩 箩补驳补迟墨 苍腻尘补 惫峁泃迟补峁� tasy膩艣 ca gurulaghuprakriy膩vyutp膩danena paraspar膩sa峁僺p峁涐梗峁�膩�� catv膩ri sahasr膩峁噄 峁�a峁囜箛avati艣 ca bhed膩 bhavanti. tadanta岣�pravi峁ａ弓膩n膩峁� katipay膩n膩峁� 惫补峁兣沘蝉迟丑补drutavilambit膩daya岣� 蝉补峁僯帽腻岣� 办峁泃腻岣�. evam ekasya chandasa ete, yath膩 yath膩 chandok峁�ar膩峁嚹乵 adhikatva峁� bhavati tath膩 tath膩 lak峁Ｄ乨hikaprast膩ram ekaika峁� 惫峁泃迟补峁� bhavati. y膩ny api 艣腻谤诲奴濒补惫颈办谤墨岣峣迟补蝉谤补驳诲丑补谤腻d墨ni v峁泃t膩ni t膩ni ca 艣lokap膩dapary膩pt膩ny eveti 苍颈测补尘补岣�. na tu tad eva 惫峁泃迟补峁� 艣lokasya p膩dacatu峁ａ弓aye 鈥榩y apek峁�a峁嚹珁am ity asti. tena鈥攕arvair devai艣 ca bhaktyai岣� svanimi峁�anayanai岣� kautuk膩dv墨k峁�yam膩峁嘺岣� p膩y膩c che峁�agarutmad膩didivijai岣� sa峁僺evita岣� sva峁� padam. ity atra 膩dyap膩de 蝉谤补驳诲丑补谤腻 dvit墨yap膩de ca 艣腻谤诲奴濒补惫颈办谤墨岣峣迟补m. 础诲惫补颈迟补办腻濒腻苍补濒补, pg. 51.

[11]:

艣颈惫补峁� 惫颈峁ａ箛耻峁� v膩 yady abhidadhati 艣腻蝉迟谤补sya 惫颈峁�a测补峁� tad 颈峁ａ弓补峁� 驳谤腻丑测补峁� na岣� 蝉补驳耻峁嘺m api tad brahmabhajat膩m. virodho n膩t墨va sphurati na hi 苍颈苍诲腻 nayavid膩峁� na s奴tr膩峁嚹乵 arth膩ntaram api bhavadv膩ryam ucitam. Madhvatantramukhamardana, pg. 2, v. 1.

[12]:

na hi 苍颈苍诲腻 nindya峁� ninditu峁� prayujyate. ki峁� tarhi nindit膩ditarat pra艣a峁僺itum. tatra na ninditasya prati峁�edho gamyate, ki峁僼v itarasya 惫颈诲丑颈岣�.

[13]:

惫颈谤辞诲丑补峁� v膩ky膩n膩峁� 艣ruti艣ikharabh膩j膩峁� 艣amayitu峁� 辫谤补惫峁泃迟腻 m墨m膩峁僺膩 bhavati sakal膩p墨ha viphal膩. 础诲惫补颈迟补办腻濒腻苍补濒补 2.13.

[14]:

yad api p奴rvam墨m膩峁僺膩mary膩d膩py as膩ma帽jasyena n墨tety 耻办迟补峁�, tad apy 耻办迟补峁� na hi 惫补测补峁� 辫奴谤惫补尘墨尘腻峁僺补办腻苍腻峁� 办颈峁僰补谤腻岣�. yattanmary膩dayaiva vartemahi. ki峁� tu鈥攜uktiyuktam 耻辫腻诲别测补峁� 惫补肠补苍补峁� b膩lak膩d api | anyat t峁涐箛am iva ty膩jyam apy 耻办迟补峁� padmajanman膩 || iti ny膩y膩d yad upapanna峁� tat sv墨kurma岣�, yad anupapannam... tatparityaj膩mas, tad etad bh奴峁�a峁嘺m eva na tu 诲奴峁�a峁嘺峁� 蝉惫补迟补苍迟谤补迟补苍迟谤补辫谤补惫补谤迟补办腻苍腻尘. 补苍测补迟丑腻 samav膩y膩na峁単墨k膩r膩t k膩峁嚹乨膩dimary膩dolla峁単hana峁� 辫谤补办峁泃颈pr膩dh膩ny膩na峁単墨k膩r膩t s膩峁僰hyamary膩dol-la峁単hanam ity 膩dy api 诲奴峁�a峁嘺峁� kimiti nodbh膩vaye岣�. pratyuta sakalav膩dyanabhimatam 膩tmaikatvam 补办丑补峁囜笉补峁� brahma vi艣vamithy膩tva峁� vedasy膩tattv膩vedakatvam abhyupagatavatas tavaiva 艣奴nyav膩dyatiriktasarvat膩ntrikamary膩dolla峁単hana峁� 艣奴nyav膩dimataprave艣asyeti 办补迟丑补峁� na nibh膩layase. 础诲惫补颈迟补办腻濒腻苍补濒补, pg. 42.