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Consciousness is central to human existence because all objective phenomena are believed to exist as manifestations of Consciousness. The very idea of being familiar with Consciousness provides a testimony to its existence. What Augustine said about time is well applicable to Consciousness. According to him when one was not talking about it, one knew what it was, but when asked about it one no longer knows it.^[1] One misses out on understanding Consciousness when one tries to hold it, cognize it and objectify it. It appears ethereal and almost deceptive because it is intangible, the more we try to apprehend it the more it slips from the grip.

The Sanskrit term for Consciousness is 鈥�Cit鈥�. Quite often we find the terms 鈥�箩帽腻苍补鈥� and 鈥�vi箩帽腻苍补鈥� being used interchangeably for Consciousness in 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲蝉. The discussion of 鈥楥onsciousness鈥� is found in the 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲蝉 while explaining the real nature of the Self/ 腻迟尘补苍. The 腻迟尘补苍, though usually translated as 鈥楽elf鈥�, does not refer to the empirical self, the 鈥業鈥�. In the 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲蝉, both 腻迟尘补苍 and Cit refers to pure Consciousness, a kind of trans-empirical Consciousness, which not only is different from the empirical Consciousness, but also is the source/ substratum of the later. In the present study, I have used the terms 鈥楽elf鈥�, 鈥�腻迟尘补苍鈥�, 鈥�Brahman鈥�, 鈥楥onsciousness鈥�, 鈥榩ure-Consciousness鈥�, 鈥�Cit鈥� as synonyms.

As mentioned above, the study of Consciousness is 鈥渆vasive鈥�. Nevertheless, it has generated much curiosity and interest in the minds of academicians, neuro scientists, researchers etc. In the contemporary West Consciousness is quite often viewed as an epi-phenomenon of matter and also sometimes equated with the mind. For the most part, Consciousness and mind are treated as synonymous and used interchangeably; and intentionality is regarded as a defining characteristic of Consciousness. Consciousness is always seen 鈥榦f鈥� or 鈥榓bout鈥� something; and the goal of the pursuit is one of seeking rational understanding of what consciousness/mind is.

In India philosophers have undertaken a complex study of Consciousness but most of the studies have tried to incorporate the views based on the 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲蝉 in general. According to Advaita 痴别诲腻苍迟补, 补苍迟补岣�k补谤补峁嘺 or the mind, is like everything, a product of ignorance. The Self alone is Consciousness, and it cannot arise as a contingent factor of subject-object relation. The Advaita agrees with the modern psychologists and says that mind is just a totality of conscious states and process. The Self which is neither mind nor matter is the ground of both mental and physical states of experiences. Consciousness reveals everything and is the substratum of all experience, viz., the wakeful, dream and deep-sleep. It is not a mere knowing but involves transcendence of the objects known and the knowing process. According to Advaita tradition mind is that which has a locus in time and space, whereas Consciousness is that which is not limited either by time or space, but gives a meaning to these. In this tradition mind, like matter, is only an appearance in Consciousness. Just as in dreams, the material substantive experience of waking life also becomes an illusion or a mere appearance.

Indian philosophy in general does not accord any concrete status and an abode to the mind (manas). Manas is a name given to a series of conscious activities such as desires, aversion, pleasure, pain, thought, etc. and also to memory through which it is capable of referring to the past, present and future. That there is a Self for whom these mental modes exist cannot be denied. Apart from the qualities of the mind it is very difficult to know the pure Self at the empirical state, for the former are the only means through which knowledge can arise. Hence, the mind is an instrument, an 补苍迟补岣�k补谤补峁嘺 whose activity is as an indicator of the existence of the pure Self.

According to 狈测腻测补 School, manas is not only material but also the internal senseorgan, responsible for the experiences of pleasure, pain and other such internal states. The materiality of manas is clearly emphasized in the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 philosophy because the mind is generated from the primordial matter called the 辫谤补办峁泃颈. The Advaitins believes that mind along with all other things is but a creation of ignorance. Structurally mind is subtle matter and is limited. The fact that it is material and functions as an instrument of knowledge does not necessarily make it rank as a senseorgan. There is little difference of opinion amongst all the orthodox systems about the proof for the existence of mind. Almost all of them make use of inference to prove that mind exists, and to all of them it is material and unconscious. It is also considered as an invariable accompaniment of the Self at the empirical level of gnosis. Wherever knowledge arises in the Self, it is always either because of the activity of the mind and the sense-organs or at least of the mind alone acting by itself.

All the orthodox (腻蝉迟颈办补) schools of Indian philosophy, irrespective of the metaphysical theories, conclude that mind cannot be identified with the Self who is the 鈥榢nower鈥�. In Western philosophy the word 鈥榤ind鈥� is usually taken to mean both the subjects of Consciousness and the psychical states and also the process of Consciousness which manifest the Self. The word 鈥榤ind鈥� as used in Indian philosophy does not mean this. At best we may say that it is that it refers to the empirical view of mind given by Western philosophers. It is considered positively as a substance and primarily as an instrument of knowledge.

The significant point here is that the individual self (箩墨惫补) and the external world (jagat) form a single block like the dreamt subject and dreamt object in the dream state. The dreamer observes the dreamt world through the dream instruments of knowledge (补苍迟补岣�k补谤补峁嘺). In the waking state also the individual 箩墨惫补 and the world experienced form a single block. The individual sees the world through the external sense organs, mind etc. and comprehends it, but it was actually through one鈥檚 Consciousness that one experienced the dreamt individual along with the dreamt world and the dreamt instrument. After awaking from the dream and knowing well that it was illusory one does not feel the compulsion to understand the nature of dreamt objects instruments of knowing processes.

It is important for us to understand at the outset that for Advaitins like 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 a study of 补苍迟补岣�k补谤补峁嘺 is not really essential. The 补苍迟补岣�k补谤补峁嘺 that is used in wakeful state is not different from the instruments utilized for cognizing the dream objects. There is no difference whatsoever between the dream and the wakeful state. It is often noticed in the 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 that the author uses the term mind as synonymous with Consciousness. He interprets mind to mean the 腻迟尘补苍 which is neither born nor dies^[2] . Mind is sometimes seen by 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 as consciousness that is conditioned by ignorance and in this sense it is seen as the ground of the empirical world. Such a conditioned mind is known as 箩墨惫补. What is pointed out here is significant. As long as the individuality (箩墨惫补tva) is superimposed on the eternal Consciousness there is a perception of the world. So long as there are perceptions of the world, it is mandatory to talk about instruments of knowledge. But when one reaches the state of 补尘补苍颈产丑腻惫补, (a state of no-mind) the error about oneself as being embodied is corrected and the notion of 补苍迟补岣�k补谤补峁嘺 becomes redundant. What remains as non abandonable presence is Consciousness. This is just like waking up from sleep when one realizes that Consciousness alone assumed an apparent tri-partite division as the cogniser, the object and the instruments of knowledge in dream. Similarly after Selfrealisation one knows that it is the same Consciousness which appeared as the tripartite division of Jagat-箩墨惫补-补苍迟补岣�k补谤补峁嘺. The study of 补苍迟补岣�k补谤补峁嘺 is valid only as long as one is ignorant of the Self. The notion of 补苍迟补岣�k补谤补峁嘺 itself is a superimposition (补诲丑测腻蝉补) to be corrected with the true knowledge of the Self.

The text 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 is a short treatise with only 12 mantras. This has been commented and elaborated by 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in the form of verses called the 办腻谤颈办腻蝉. The text is called 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 or 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补k膩rik膩. In his 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 has built a systematic philosophy of Consciousness using scriptures (艢谤耻迟颈) and reasoning (tarka). This is a seminal work of great historical and philosophical significance. The 9th century philosopher and commentator 艢补峁卥补谤补 has offered a further commentary on 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 giving a clear and lucid exposition of 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 work. However, there are many controversies regarding the 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 which I have attempted to unfold in the forthcoming chapters. I have dealt in detail the textual study of both 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 and 艢补峁卥补谤补 in this thesis. The 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 is also known by the names 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 or 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲颈测补办腻谤颈办腻 and 膧驳补尘补艣腻蝉迟谤补. Bhattacharya, (op.cit.,p.Ixi) points out different readings in different manuscripts such as, 膧驳补尘补驳谤补苍迟丑补, 鲍辫补诲别艣补驳谤补苍迟丑补, 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补-痴腻谤迟迟颈办腻, 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测辞辫补苍颈峁�a诲-骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补-痴测腻办丑测腻苍补, 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补s膩kh膩, or simply 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲墨测补 after its author.

There are English translations of the 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 and its commentary. There are two accepted scholarly publications of the Manuscripts of the 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测辞辫补苍颈峁�a诲 and 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补k膩rik膩 along with the commentaries. They are as follows: (1) The Memorial Edition, vol.5 of The 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测辞辫补苍颈峁�a诲 with 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 k膩rik膩and 艢补峁卥补谤补 叠丑腻峁�y补 and (2) the standard 膧nadasrama Sanskrit series, No.10 which includes 膧苍补苍诲补驳颈谤颈鈥檚 T墨k膩 as well. It should be noted that there are other interpretations accorded to 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 by Kuranarayana, Madhva and Purusottama for the Visistadvaita, Dvaita and Suddhadvaita traditions respectively.

There are several translations of the text available. The first English translation was done in 1894 by Manilal N. Dvivedi entitled The 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测辞辫补苍颈峁�a诲 with 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 碍腻谤颈办腻s and the 叠丑腻峁�y补 of 艢补峁卥补谤补 (The Bombay Theosophical Publication Fund). This was soon followed by a German translation by Paul Deussen in 1897 (Sechzig 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲鈥檚 des Veda, Leipzig). Dr. M. Srinivasa Rao鈥檚 translation of The 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测辞辫补苍颈峁�a诲 with 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补k膩rik膩and 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 commentary appeared in the 痴别诲腻苍迟补 Kesari, vols, xviii-xxi, of Sri Ramkrishna Math, Madras, 1931-5. In 1936 Swami Nikhilananda鈥檚 translation with annotation of the same was published by Sri Ramkrishna Ashrama, Mysore. The great scholar Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya has meticulously edited with exhaustive notes the text 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 entitled The 膧驳补尘补艣腻蝉迟谤补 of 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 which he also translated into English in the year 1943. This was published by the University of Calcutta Press. In response to Bhattacharya, R. D. Karmarkar, brought out a new edition of the 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补k膩rik膩 with an English translation and notes in 1953 (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute). In the same year Swami Chinmayananda published his Discourses on the 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测辞辫补苍颈峁�a诲 with 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 碍腻谤颈办腻, Madras: Cinmayananda publication Trust. In 1957 another translation of the 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 and 碍腻谤颈办腻 with 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 commentary was included in Swami Gambhirananda鈥檚 Eight 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲蝉, Vol.II, Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1957, PP 173-404. An English introduction of Swami Satchidanandendrasaraswati鈥檚 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补 Rahasya 痴颈惫峁沬迟颈 (A commentary on Sri 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补 碍腻谤颈办腻s with 艢补峁卥补谤补bh膩峁�ya): published by Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, Holenarasipur, Karnataka, 2011, firmly established that 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 was truly a follower of 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲ic sampradaya and not Buddhist tradition as claimed by Bhattacharya. A major Hindi translation of 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测辞辫补苍颈峁�a诲, 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补karika with 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 commentary, published by Gita Press, Gorakhpur, Samvat 2062, is a crucial and renowned work which becomes indispensible for proper understanding of the text 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补k膩rik膩.

Of the above mentioned primary texts, I have profusely used the translation of Swami Nikhilananda, 鈥�The 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 with 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 碍腻谤颈办腻and 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 commentary鈥�. Swami Nikhilananda鈥檚 extensive notes on the 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 are beneficial in understanding the central philosophy of 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补. He seems to convincingly argue for a more radical position than the commentator 艢补峁卥补谤补 himself.

Many secondary scholarly works has been published on the text 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补k膩rik膩. T.M.P.Mahadevan鈥檚 book titled 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补: A Study in Early Advaita, University of Madras, 1975, is one such study which has an in depth understanding of the text. His book contains an elaborate response to the arguments put forward by Bhattacharya claiming Buddhist influence on the 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补k膩rik膩. Many western Indologists have also made a fair study of 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻. Some significant publications need special mention which are as follows:

Michael Comans, The Method of Early Advaita Vedanta: A Study of 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补, 艢补峁卥补谤补 Surve艣vara and Padmap膩da. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000. The teaching of 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 is discussed in this work uniquely within the tradition of Advaita.

Colin A. Cole, 础蝉辫补谤艣补 Yoga: A Study of 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补 碍腻谤颈办腻. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982. This work has tried to investigate the nature of the soteriology the quest for liberation, of Advaita 痴别诲腻苍迟补 from religious point of view.

Caterina Conio, The Philosophy of the 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补 碍腻谤颈办腻. Varanasi: Bhartiya Vidya Prakashan, 1971. A critical evaluation of the significance of 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补-k膩rik膩 to contemporary Philosophy both in and out of India has been done in this work.

Thomas E. Wood, The 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 and the 膧gama 艢膩stra. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982. This work challenges many of the interpretations of 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 which have been favored by the 艢补峁卥补谤补 School and by most modern scholarships.

The present research work entitled: 鈥�A Study of Consciousness in 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻鈥�, aims to look at the nature and function of Consciousness from the classical Indian philosophy in general and Advaita tradition in particular. The methodology that I have adopted is a textual one. A detailed study of the primary text of 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 and 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 commentary on it has been done with the aim of expounding the text for a comprehensive analysis of the nature of consciousness.

Being soteriological in its approach, Advaita 痴别诲腻苍迟补 proposes liberation/freedom as the ultimate goal and believes that it is attained only by being aware of the true nature of Consciousness. According to Advaita, understanding Consciousness is crucial to eradicate the misery of bondage. Bondage is effected by (1) non understanding of the given i.e. Consciousness (迟补迟迟惫腻补驳谤补丑补峁嘺尘) and (2) instead misapprehending or distorting the reality, i.e. (补苍测补迟丑腻驳谤补丑补峁嘺尘). This bondage, based on ignorance, can be removed only by knowledge of the 鈥�tattva鈥� i.e. Consciousness. Hence the study of Consciousness is central to Advaita Philosophy. In the contemporary world, torn apart by caste, creed, gender and religious differences, an understanding of the nature of Consciousness stands as a statement of hope, as an injunction to live a just and virtuous life, to pursue higher knowledge and to transcend the delusion of both the 鈥渙ther鈥� and suffering.

This research is an indepth study of Consciousness based on the models and mechanisms undertaken by 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in his seminal text 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 which brings out the nature of Consciousness through a comprehensive and rigorous investigation of the three states, namely, wakeful, dream and deep sleep demonstrating that Consciousness is non-dual, continuous and pervasive in and through the three states of experience. It stands as an irrefutable principle. One can speak of one鈥檚 experience only if one is conscious of it; and to be conscious means to be Consciousness itself. One does not possess Consciousness as an adjective but one is that principle itself.

Attempt has been made in this textual study to resolve crucial issues around which the study of the nature of Consciousness revolves. They are as follows: What is Consciousness? How is it different from the internal organs namely the mind, intellect, ego and memory? How does Consciousness manifest itself? In 鈥榙isputational terms鈥�, is it self-illumined (蝉惫补辫谤补办腻艣补) or has a dependent illumination (辫补谤补辫谤补办腻艣补)? Does Consciousness possess intentionality or not? In other words: is it 蝉补惫颈峁�a测补办补 or 苍颈谤惫颈峁�a测补办补? Questions regarding the form, structure and content of Consciousness raised by scholars in India are as follows: Is Consciousness with form (蝉腻办腻谤补) or without form (苍颈谤腻办腻谤补)? Does Consciousness have a locus, (腻艣谤补测补) or being all pervasive it is free from space and time cognates (nir腻艣谤补测补)? Taking into consideration the above mentioned issues, I strongly feel that no other system of philosophy has thought so deeply on the nature of Consciousness as 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻.

According to Advaita 痴别诲腻苍迟补, Consciousness is not a characteristic of mind but selfmanifesting, non-intentional principle of awareness. They hold that self-luminosity is the defining principle of Consciousness; i.e. Consciousness is immediately experienced, even though it is not an object of knowledge. It is called the subject, not in the sense of 鈥榢nower鈥� or 鈥榗ognizer鈥� (闯帽腻迟腻 or 辫谤补尘腻迟腻), but in the sense that it is the ultimate revealing principle, the transcendental a-priori, which itself is not revealed by anything else. It is often described in the Advaita literature as prak膩sa eka ra艣a, meaning that which has only one rasa or essence that is manifestation. Therefore, Consciousness is described as the 鈥榣ight of lights鈥� (闯测辞迟颈蝉腻尘 箩测辞迟颈岣�) as the ultimate presupposition of all knowledge.

Advaita 痴别诲腻苍迟补 maintains that Consciousness is one and is 鈥榰nnegatable鈥�, 鈥榥on abandonable鈥� and 鈥榥on sublatable鈥� principle. Between the seer, the Consciousness and the seen, the world, the former stands as an immutable witness that has no annihilation. The negation of objects can well be construed but the negation of the thinker is not possible, for the one who negates has to be present in every act of negation. The negation of the Consciousness cannot be even hypothetically posited, because every act of negation presupposes Consciousness. It is important to note that Consciousness cannot be made available through any known epistemic mechanisms such as perception, inference etc. Since Consciousness is necessary pre-condition for 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺蝉 to function; no known epistemic mechanisms such as perception, inference etc. can be made available to grasp it. However, the system ingeniously conceives a model which is universally available using which the immutable Consciousness can be known. This model gets clearly established by 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 through his 补惫补蝉迟丑腻迟谤补测补辫补谤颈办峁Ｄ�, the study of three states. In order to prove the undisrupted continuity of Consciousness, the followers of Advaita 痴别诲腻苍迟补, like 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 and 艢补峁卥补谤补 undertake an intensive analysis of Consciousness from the perspective of three states, namely, wakeful, dream and deep sleep. While the objects of waking and dream may get sublated by the successive state, the witnessing Consciousness remains the same forever.

The main feature of the wakeful state of Consciousness, as stated by the 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲, is the commonness of experience about the world around us. All human perception, ideation, reasoning, knowledge about the external world are considered to be the output of wakeful state. It is referred to as 痴颈艣惫补. The mind and the senses which functions in this state aided by physical light are the instruments through which Consciousness experiences every kind of external object. The 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 describes 痴颈艣惫补 as 产补丑颈峁�p谤补箩帽补岣� meaning that 痴颈艣惫补 is the knowledge of the external objects.

The state of dream is a condition wherein the external sense organs cease to function. There is no cognition of 鈥淚鈥� or 鈥渕ine鈥� with reference to the gross physical body. Based upon the impressions from the experience of objects of the waking state, the mind projects dream objects. This state is called Taijasa, since it experiences internal objects through internal light. It is also referred to as 补苍迟补岣�p谤补箩帽补岣�.

In the waking state when the sense organs are active, one can review the dream experiences and understand the dream as mere external projection of the mind. From the standpoint of dream, dream objects are as gross and external as those experienced in the waking states. However, one who has awakened knows that the dream objects were subtle, internal and composed of mere impressions gathered from the waking states.

In the deep sleep state, senses and the entire 补苍迟补岣�k补谤补峁嘺 comprising of intellect, mind, ego and memory remains non-operative. This state is shorn of all desires, dreams and erroneous cognition. The 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 refers to this state as pra箩帽腻苍补ghana岣�, a mass of undivided, uniform Consciousness. This state is free from both knowledge as well as ignorance owing to the absence of above 补苍迟补岣�k补谤补峁嘺岣�. Consciousness therefore remains blissful and peaceful (腻苍补苍诲补尘补测补). However, the continuity of Consciousness is established when one wakes from deep sleep. It is only then, we are able to explain recollection of the experience as 鈥淚 slept happily and I did not know anything鈥�. This experience is felt when one emerges from deep sleep to the wakeful state. The recollection is possible because of the presence of Consciousness in that state.

The 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 refers to the fourth or 罢耻谤墨测补 which represents the nature of Consciousness. 罢耻谤墨测补 is described as essentially a non-dualistic state. It can only be expressed through negation. It is a state free from sense perception, the world of thought and ideas cognized through the instruments of mind and intellect, and other limited forms of understanding. The text indicates that 罢耻谤墨测补 is not an object, nor an entity, nor an idea of concept, nor even a state but rather the ever present 鈥渟ubstratum鈥� which allows for 鈥渟entience鈥�, 鈥渋ntelligence鈥�, 鈥渧itality鈥�, and 鈥渆xperience鈥�. 罢耻谤墨测补 ever remains unaffected and unattached by the three states. I have discussed more of 罢耻谤墨测补 in the following chapters.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

Whitney J. Oaks (ed.), 鈥�The confession鈥�, chapter xiv. Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, (New York: Random House, 1948), 191.

[2]:

惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 III, 46, 54, 61-62, etc.