Liberation in early Advaita Vedanta
by Aleksandar Uskokov | 2018 | 195,782 words
This page relates 鈥楾he Impersonal Nature of the Veda鈥� of the study named 鈥淪cripture and the Hermeneutics of Liberation in Early Advaita Vedanta鈥� which highlights how liberation (in Sanskrit: Moksha) is posited as the 鈥渉ighest good鈥濃�攊.e., it represents freedom from the cyclical process of birth and rebirth. It further shows that Shankara鈥檚 doctrine emphasizes that liberation is solely derived from knowledge of Brahman.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
6. The Impersonal Nature of the Veda
But these differing accounts aside鈥攁nd there were many other related differences, some of which will appear in the next chapter鈥攂oth camps agreed that knowledge from verbal cognition as such is inerrant; and, both the presupposition and the refined product of this was that words鈥攁s informative and corresponding to referents鈥攄o not denote individual things, but real universals, the shape or blueprint of things. Verbal knowledge as such is never about this specific pot in front of me or about historical events. It, rather, provides the natural categories through which particular experience is structured. Of course, in an actual testimony corresponding to actual experience, words composed in a sentence would, if so required by the sentence, refer to individuals, but again as instantiations of such universals. As 碍耻尘腻谤颈濒补 claimed, individual entities have that dual nature to be an indivisible unity of a particular and a universal.[1]
That words have universals as referents was in itself not controversial, and it was accepted even by Buddhist philosophers. However, whereas Buddhists thought that universals are constructs, 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉, as we saw above, took them to be real on one hand and revealing rather than concealing the true nature of object. This 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 doctrine was formulated already in one of the crucial 蝉奴迟谤补蝉 of the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻-S奴tra attributed to Jaimini (1.1.5), commonly known as the autpattika-蝉奴迟谤补: 鈥淭he relation of the word to its meaning is innate. Knowledge of such meaning is [had through] instruction, which is infallible in regard to imperceptible things. It is a reliable warrant, according to 叠腻诲补谤腻测补峁嘺, because it is independent.鈥�[2] The consideration of the 蝉奴迟谤补 leads us, finally, to the consideration of the nature of Vedic knowledge, 艣腻蝉迟谤补 as a specific form of 艣补产诲补.
Though knowledge from verbal cognition as such was theorized as inerrant, yet it was not accorded the status of 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 because of the strict requirement that a 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 should tell us something new. Once we鈥檝e learned what words mean, when used in non-sentential context they could at best remind us of a previously known reference.[3] And, as we have seen above, when sentences are formed from words, in testimonial accounts, there were two scenarios under which 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉 allowed an error to infect what is actually said: in intentional deception鈥斺�淚n all cases the thing is not cognized directly through personal speech, because it is contingent on personal desire, and persons use words even when the thing is not there鈥�[4] 鈥攁nd in reports of erroneous cognitions even when intentions are aboveboard. Both of these scenarios, notably, are contingent on personal agency: they require a speaker who is absolutely trustworthy and omniscient. Therefore, both can be removed, thought 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉, in a single stroke: remove the speaker and you remove both intention and prior cognition.
Intention (惫颈惫补办峁Ｄ�, literally desire to say) as 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉 understood it is the key word here, for it covers not only cases of speech intending to convey a state of affairs, true of false, but also the case where an individual or a group intends that a word should denote one thing rather than another. The second was arguably more dangerous for 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉, since it could happen that the most cherished word of words, dharma, gets to mean what the Buddha intended it to mean. So, the first step to secure the inerrancy of Vedic knowledge was to propose that the relation between the word and its reference is innate, natural, never instituted into being by a personal (or contractual) whim, human or divine. The word-reference relation is non-personal, 补辫补耻谤耻峁测补, said the 痴峁泃迟颈办腻谤补, and this is likely the first appearance of the idea that we have evidence of.[5] There never happened in history an event when someone said, 鈥渓et this thing be called 鈥榓 ball,鈥� that thing 鈥榓 cow鈥� and that yonder thing 鈥�dharma.鈥欌�� The basic, non-technical meanings of words (in the Sanskrit language), which impose upon our understanding on hearing, are meanings which words have always had, since the (non)-beginning of time. (Plato should have consulted Jaimini to learn the names of his ideas in the topos hyperuranius.)
But even such non-intentional words could be intentionally inflected by personal agency, as we have seen above. Therefore, at the last step it was claimed that there never happened in history an event where a person used the word-meaning relationship to compose the Vedas. The Vedas have always been there, transmitted in the same way as they are now.[6] This is the last feat which should secure the inerrancy of the Vedas: they are, properly speaking, not accounts of anything and they do not presuppose a prior cognition of which they would be reporting. The absence of a prior cognition that is a matter of reporting should, thus, eliminate the second point at which error could creep in. There is no possibility for a mix-up or for the virtues or defects of the speaker to modulate testimony.[7]
惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉 have used many arguments to bolster the claim that the word-meaning relationship and the composition of the Veda are non-personal. There is no perceptual evidence of an author, and all the other reliable warrants operate with perceptual data.[8] Were there one, we would have remembered him no matter how long ago it was, as that would have been a major event. Surely, we would have remembered if someone built the 贬颈尘腻濒补测补; it is not our home garden after all, the memory of which could have faded in the family. Men, furthermore, do not have the power to compose on such supersensible matters as are treated in the Veda.[9] One is tempted to interpret such understanding of the Veda as one of a naturally structured phenomenon: in the Vedas words are meaningfully ordered just as planets are in the solar system, as rivers flow down to the ocean, as water melts sugar and salt. Whereas for deists such ordered phenomena would betray personal intelligence behind it, 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉 would have agreed with Hume that this information is just not given in experience.
Two arguments specifically seem to support such an interpretation. The first argues from the awareness of an author that we have in the use of technical language, such as of 笔腻峁噄苍颈 when we talk Sanskrit grammar, and the absence of a similar impression in everyday language. While the claim that we are aware of a specific author is not particularly strong, we do have the sense of artificiality of technical lingo and notations, for instance in formal logic, which is strikingly different from the sense about the natural language acquired through observing how elders talk, as 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉 would say, where we never stop to think, 鈥渟omeone made this up.鈥� The second argument proposes that the claim that a personal author must have established the word-meaning relationship would involve a vicious circle, because such action of naming presupposes the use of language. 鈥淟et鈥檚 call this a 鈥榖all鈥欌�� as a performative utterance depends on a preexisting verbal practice. Both arguments, however, refer just to the word-meaning relationship, not the composition of the Veda, and 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉, one gets the impression, hope to prove both by proving the first.
Be that as it may, such was in 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 understanding the intention and prior cognition that were lacking behind language in general and the Vedas in particular. Not only are the Vedas not like Marco Polo telling us about his travels: they do not even admit an original act of assigning names to things. Knowledge from the Veda is knowledge just from words and from sentences which do not depend on or convey a prior experience. It is knowledge, but not about what has already been seen or heard.[10]
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
See McCrea 2013:134-6.
[2]:
autpattikas tu 艣补产诲补sy膩rthena sambandhas; tasya j帽膩nam upade艣o 'vyatireka艣 c膩rthe 'nupalabdhe, tat 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺峁� b膩dar膩ya峁嘺sya, anapek峁tv膩t. My translation follows the 痴峁泃迟颈办腻谤补. It is, perhaps, significant that this centralmost doctrine is attributed to 叠腻诲补谤腻测补峁嘺, the purported author of the 叠谤补丑尘补-厂奴迟谤补.
[3]:
See 碍耻尘腻谤颈濒补鈥檚 艢loka-V膩rttika 艢补产诲补 99-111.
[4]:
[5]:
补辫补耻谤耻峁测补岣� 艣补产诲补sy膩rthena sambandhas. 艢补产补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁补 on the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻-S奴tra 1.1.5, I.41. 艢补产补谤补 has aviyukta岣� as a gloss of 补耻迟辫补迟迟颈办补岣�, inseparable for innate, and he does not use the term 补辫补耻谤耻峁测补 except when quoting the 痴峁泃迟颈办腻谤补, but does talk about 辫补耻谤耻峁测补峁� vacanam, human speech.
[6]:
痴峁泃迟颈办腻谤补, 鈥溾�橳herefore, we think someone, a person, created a word-reference relation and composed the Veda in order to employ this relation.鈥欌�揙n this, it is now said, it is proven, because the relationship is non-personal.鈥� tasm膩n many膩mahe ken膩pi 辫耻谤耻峁峁嘺 艣abd膩n膩m arthai岣� saha 蝉补尘产补苍诲丑补峁� 办峁泃惫腻 蝉补尘惫测补惫补丑补谤迟耻峁� 惫别诲腻岣� 辫谤补峁嚹玹腻 iti. tad id膩n墨m ucyate鈥摬贡璨钩馨茚梗e测补tv膩t sambandhasya siddham. 艢补产补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁补 on the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻-S奴tra 1.1.5, I.52-53.
[7]:
[8]:
痴峁泃迟颈办腻谤补: puru峁sya sambandhur abh膩v膩t. 办补迟丑补峁� sambandh膩 苍腻蝉迟颈? pratyak峁sya 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺sya abh膩v膩t tat-p奴rvakatv膩c cetare峁Ｄ乵. 艢补产补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁补 on the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻-S奴tra 1.1.5, I.53.
[9]:
[10]:
鈥淏ut when the word itself talks, how can it be false? In that case there is no understanding from another person. When it is said 鈥榠t talks鈥�, it means that it makes known. It becomes the means of something being understood. Since the word is the means, it makes known by itself.鈥� atha 艣abde bruvati 办补迟丑补峁� mithyeti. na hi tad膩n墨m 补苍测补迟补岣� 辫耻谤耻峁Ｄ乨 avagama岣�. brav墨t墨ty ucyate bodhayati budhyam膩nasya nimittam bhavat墨ti. 痴峁泃迟颈办腻谤补 in 艢补产补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁补 on the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻-S奴tra 1.1.5, I.42. 鈥淭hat is, when a cognition has been brought about by means of words, there is no need for any other cognition (to corroborate it), or of any other person as having the same cognition.鈥� na hy eva峁� sati pratyay膩ntaram apek峁tavya峁�, 辫耻谤耻峁Ｄ乶tara峁� 惫腻辫颈. 补测补峁� pratyayo hy asau. 艢补产补谤补鈥檚 叠丑腻峁补 on the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻-S奴tra 1.1.5, I.25.