Vakyapadiya (study of the concept of Sentence)
by Sarath P. Nath | 2018 | 36,088 words
This page relates ‘The Concept of Sentence Indivisibility and Sphota� of the study on Vakyapadiya by Bhartrhari and his treatment of the Concept of Sentence in Language. Bhartrhari was a great grammarian and philosopher who explored the depth and breadth of Sanskrit grammar. These pages analyse the concepts and discussions on sentence and sentence-meaning presented in the Vakyapadiya, against the different systems of knowledge prevalent in ancient India (such as Mimamsa, Nyaya and Vyakarana).
Go directly to: Footnotes.
4. The Concept of Sentence Indivisibility and ṭa
The concept of ṭa is one of the most important contributions of Indian thinkers to the crucial problem of general linguistics. It was ṛh, who brought to light the breadth and depth of this concept beyond its linguistic features in his ⲹ貹īⲹ. But, some of the ideas underlying this theory can be found in earlier grammatical and philosophical literature in Sanskrit. It can be stated emphatically that, the whole superstructure of ṛh's language theory is erected on the concept of akhaṇḍavākyaṭa, which is already described. He used this fundamental concept in the study of language, which was successfully developed by later grammarians. This concept paved new pathways in the language studies in India. As discussed, the concept of ṭa was no new idea for the predecessors of ṛh. But the Idea of sentence-indivisibility, introduced by ṛh, has some unique features when compared to the concept of ṭa in general. Before proceeding into the characteristics of the concept of sentenceindivisibility, ṛh's perspectives on ṭa doctrine has to be discussed.
In the School of Grammar, the word or sentence, when taken as an indivisible meaning-unit, is the ṭa. ʲٲñᲹ distinguishes ṭa and dhvani in Ѳṣy as " ṭa� ś岹�, Ծ� ś岹ṇa�" (Vol.1, 1991, p.181). Thus ṭa is the real ś岹 (speech or language), while dhvani, the audible part is a quality of speech. Indologists like A B Keith mistakenly treated this as a mysterious entity and overlooked its linguistic significance, probably due to its association with ṛh's ś岹brahman (Matilal, 1992, p.84). Later scholars like J Brough, K A S Iyer, Kunjunni Raja etc. mention ṭa as a linguistic entity. They described it as the languagesymbol or an 'auditory image' of the uttered speech as well as the meaning bearing unit[1]. Matilal, examining all these views, describes ṭa as an auditory impression of the meaning (1992, p.85).
ṛh begins his discussion about ṭa referring to two aspects of language.
dvāvupādānaśabdeṣu ś岹u ś岹vido vidu�
eko Ծٳٲ� śabdānām aparo'rthe prayujyate.
�(ⲹ貹īⲹ, 1.44)
Here, ṛh analyses the speech act from the speaker's point of view, which has two dimensions. In the language act, one is the causal root of articulated sounds (Ծٳٲ� śabdānām) while the other is the manifested or applied, to convey the meaning (arthe prayujyate). From the speaker's point of view, the articulated sounds are produced from the 'wordprinciple' which is present in the intellect (ܻٳś�). Thus the causal root of audible sound 岹 is the 'Buddhisthaś岹�' or the wordprinciple in the intellect (ⲹ貹īⲹ, 1.46). ṛh calls this Buddhisthaś岹 as ṭa. This gets transformed into utterance, when a person intends to speak (ⲹ貹īⲹ, 1.108). Though the uttered language is sequential, its source, the language faculty in the intellect (ܻٳś�), is devoid of any sequence or parts. But, the listener grasps the ś岹 produced by the speaker in a sequential manner, but not as whole. Thus, he may experience the ṭa as having sequence while hearing. ṛh solves this problem by differentiating dhvani or the audible sound into ʰṛtԾ and ղṛtԾ[2]. The ղṛtԾ is the actual sound spoken by the speaker and heard by the listener. Hence it includes all the peculiarities and differences in the utterance of the speaker like intonation, tempo etc. (Brough, 1951, p.40) The ʰṛtԾ, which is indicated by the ղṛtԾ, is a stage just before the articulated sounds come into existence. It represents the phonological structure or the sound pattern of the form. All the non-linguistic personal variations are absent in this stage. But, the time sequence is still present in this. This actually manifests the internal ṭa, the integral linguistic symbol. The ʰṛtԾ is so close to the integral linguistic symbol ṭa that the characteristics of ʰṛtԾ is superimposed on ṭa. Thus we may experience the ṭa as sequential or having parts. Brough discusses these three stages in his "Theories of General Linguistics in Sanskrit Grammar" vividly.
The later grammarians like Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita and 岵śṭṭ enumerated eight different types of ṭa. This differentiation is based on two fundamental principles, viz. indivisibility and meaningfulness. Thus we get Varṇaṭa, Padaṭa and Vākyaṭa respectively, when we consider either the letter or the word or the sentence as 峦첹 or meaning-bearing unit (Śabdakaustubham, 1933, p.10). These three are again classified into پ and Vyakti. If word and sentence are considered as indivisible symbols denoting the meaning of the whole without any reference to the parts, they are known as ṇḍpadaṭa and ṇḍvākyaṭa. These are the eight types of ṭa described by later grammarians. Though ṛh does not enumerate these eight classes of ṭa, he seems to have held the ṇḍvākyaṭa as the real ṭa (Brough, 1951, p.45). This is evident when he emphasizes on the definitions of sentence that come under the ṇḍ School of sentence, which is already discussed. Thus, according to ṛh, the concept of ṭa in general, forms the philosophical outlook of his language theory. To ṛh, the theory of ṭa is part of his monistic and idealistic metaphysical theory according to which, the ś岹tattva is the eternal principle of the universe. His magnum opus ⲹ貹īⲹ is also begun with the statement that the whole phenomenon of material existence is only the Vivarta[3] of this speech principle (1.1).
The concept of indivisible sentence, expounded in the second canto of ⲹ貹īⲹ, forms the basis of his psycho-linguistic analysis of language. The idea of 'sentence-indivisibility' deals with how language is used and grasped. This explains sentence as the real linguistic unit, which is devoid of any sequence or parts. ʳṇyᲹ points out that ṛh is not the first to introduce the idea of indivisibility in the School of Grammar. ṇiԾ and ʲٲñᲹ have recognized the indivisibility of sentence:
"sūtrakārasya tu atiṅgrahaṇāt ekameva ṇḍ� vākyam arthaikatvāt ākhyātabhede' pi abhipretamiti gamyate",
—ⲹ貹ī�, 2.1-2).
But it must be admitted that ṛh is the first to establish logically the concept of indivisibility of a sentence. He emphatically states that the sentence is 'a single undivided utterance' (eko' navayava� ś岹�). Sibabjiban Bhattacharya explains this view as the phonetic completeness of the sentence and is not merely the aggregation of the words occurring in it. What is worthy of note here is that the whole sentence is an individual, and is not the aggregate of its parts (1984, p.28).
The grammarians consider the sentence to be indivisible because the opposite theory of division would result in infinite regress or in the acceptance of atomism (Punitha Sarma, 1998, p.77). If it is held that the words in a sentence are those very ones which are found independently somewhere else and if the phonemes are those which are found independently, there would be no essence of the sentence or the words other than phonemes. If the ṇḍ view of sentence is accepted, the phonemes also can be divided even into smaller parts like an atom and this division would be carried out infinitely. Thus ultimately, there would be no unit, which would be looked upon as the expressive element.
Therefore the grammarians put forth the sentence as an entity over and above the phonemes and words.
padāni vākye tānyeva varṇāste ca pade yadi varṇeṣu varṇabhāgānā� 岹� syāt paramāṇuvat.
bhāgānām anupaśḷeṣeṇa na varṇo na 貹岹� bhavet teṣāmavyapadeśyatvāt kimanyadapadiśyatām.
�(ⲹ貹īⲹ, 28-29)
Modern scholars like Kunjunni Raja, J Brough, KAS Iyer and Gaurinath Sastri etc. hold that, the ṭa is the auditory impression of the uttered speech as well as the meaning-bearing agent. But, this concept is not enough to solve the problem of the cognition of the sentence-meaning. Hence, they hold that the ṭa in general and Vākyaṭa in particular has been assumed as a solution to the problem of the meaning of the sentence[4]
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
The word ' ṭa' is derived from the root ' ṭa vikasane', which signifies 'to burst' or 'to shine forth'. Thus it can be described in two ways; if it is explained as ' ṭati, vikasati, ٳ� asmāt iti ṭa�', then ṭa is that from which the meaning shines forth and hence it can be taken as the meaning-bearing agent. If it is described as ' ṭyٱ anena iti ṭa�', then it can be defined as an entity which is manifested by the uttered speech. According to this view, ṭa is the auditory impression manifested by dhvanis.
[2]:
ṛh's analysis of language encompasses three aspects viz. ղṛtԾ, ʰṛtԾ and ṭa.
[3]:
Vivarta is a concept, developed by the Advaita Vedānta system, which is described as the process of manifestation by which the one becomes many.
[4]:
This view is explained in 4.7.2 of this thesis.