The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
by Satischandra Chatterjee | 1939 | 127,980 words
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge. The thesis explores the Nyaya's classification of valid knowledge sources: perception, infe...
Part 1 - The Nyaya definition of Sabda (testimony) and its different kinds
Sabda literally means verbal knowledge. It is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences. All verbal knowledge, however, is not valid. Hence sabda, as a pramana, is defined in the Nyaya as valid verbal testimony. It consists in the assertion of a trustworthy person.' A verbal statement is valid when it comes from a person who knows the truth and speaks the truth about anything for the guidance of other persons. But it is a matter of common observation that a sentence or statement is not by itself sufficient to give us any knowledge of things. Nor again does the mere perception of the words of a sentence lead to any knowledge about objects. It is only when one perceives the words and understands their meanings that he acquires any knowledge from a verbal statement. Hence while the validity of verbal knowledge depends on its being based on the statement of a trustworthy person, its possibility is conditional on the understanding of the meaning of that statement. Hence sabda or testimony as a source of valid knowledge consists in understanding the meaning of the statement of a trustworthy person.3 It will appear from the above definition that the first step in sabda or testimony is the perception of the words of a sentence or proposition set forth by some trustworthy person. In the case of a spoken sentence we have an auditory perception, and in that of a written sentence we have a visual perception of the 1 Aptopadesah sabdah, Nyaya-sutra, 1. 1. 7. 2 Vide Tarkikaraksa, pp. 94-95. * Vide Bhasapariccheda & Siddhanta-muktavali, 8 r. Cf. Vakyarthajnanam sabdajnanam, Tarkasamgraha, p. 73.
an understanding It is through this constituent words. Secondly, there must be of the meaning of the words perceived by us. understanding of the meaning of words that we come to the final step, namely, the verbal knowledge of objects or the truth about certain objects. Thus the karana or the special cause of sabda or valid verbal knowledge is the knowledge of words (padajnana) which leads to the knowledge of objects through its function (vyapara) of recalling to our minds the meanings connected with words or sentences.' Thus sabda is distinguished from the preceding pramanas by the fact that it is due to the knowledge of words or sentences, while perception is due to sense-object contact, inference to the knowledge of vyapti or universal relation, and upamana or comparison to the percep tion of similarity or dissimilarity. There are two ways in which all verbal knowledge has been classified in the Nyaya system. According to Vatsyayana, verbal knowledge is of two kinds, namely, drstartha or that relating to perceptible objects and adrstartha or that relating to imperceptible objects." The first is limited to the ordinary sensible objects of this world, while the second relates to supersensible objects which cannot be known by means of perception. Under the first head we are to include the trustworthy assertions of ordinary persons, the saints and the scriptures in so far as they bear on the perceptible objects of the world. Thus the evidence given by witnesses in law courts, the knowledge about plants that we get from a reliable farmer, the scriptural injunctions about certain rites and ceremonies for rainfall, birthcontrol and the like are illustrations of drstartha sabda. The second will include all the trustworthy assertions of ordinary persons, saints, prophets and the scriptures in so far as they bear on supersensible realities. Thus the scientist's assertions about atoms, ether, electrons, vitamins, etc., the prophet's instructions about virtue and vice, the scriptural texts on God, Padajnanam tu karanam dvaram tatra padarthadhih, etc., Bhasapariccheda & Siddhanta-muktavali, 81. 2 Sa dvividho drstadrstarthatvat, Nyaya-sutra & Nyaya-Bhasya, 1. 1. 8.
heaven, future life and the like are illustrations of adrstartha sabda. According to the later Naiyayikas, there are two kinds of sabda or verbal testimony, namely, vaidika or the scriptural and laukika or the secular. In the first we have the words of God. The Vedas are created by God and are therefore valid on all points. Vaidika or scriptural testimony is thus perfect and infallible by its very nature. As distinguished from this, laukika or secular testimony is not all valid. It is the testimony of human beings and may therefore be true or false. Of laukika testimony, only that which proceeds from trustworthy persons is valid, but not the rest.' It will be observed here that while the first classification of sabda depends on the nature of the objects of knowledge, this second classification has reference to the nature of the source of knowledge in testimony. All Naiyayikas, however, agree in holding that testimony must always be personal, i.c. based on the words of some trustworthy person, human or divine. In respect of truth or validity there is no difference between the trustworthy assertions of an ordinary person, a saint, a prophet and the scriptures as revealed by God.