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Those, who opine that there being no soul other than Brahman, may say for argument's sake that just as Akasa is one and by limiting adjuncts like Ghata, Matha and the like it is referred to as Chatakasa, Mathakasa and so on. Similarly, Brahman also with the limiting adjuncts, assumes + the role of Jiva. Or else, it may be also be contended that the Jivas are the Ambas or parts of the all-pervasive Brahman like the water in pots fetched from a lake. In the Advaita, Brahman is partless (Akhanda). The Advaita does not accept the view of Amsa and Amsin in ultimate sense. What all reference about the Amsa and Amsin, seen in the Advaita works, relates with empirical level 712 B (Vyavaharika), Vadiraja, disregarding the view, opines that even this idea of Amsa and Amsin of the Advaita does not help to prove the identity between Brahman and soul. J If it is argued that the Brahmansa in a body is Jiva, then it is as good as saying that Brahmansa outside the body is not Jiva. Then the very proposition as Brahman is all-pervasive becomes unsould. Further, there cannot be I

movements in limiting adjuncts such as body since according to the Advaita, Brahman is Niskriya or passive. And Upadhi or limiting adjunct being insentient cannot have activity of its own. Thus the movements of living bodies become impossible. As there is no movements or shaking in Brahman, it cannot be said that the body gets activated by 'Brahman. Thus, the body should become stable or movementless. So the Brahmansa, abiding in a body, since having no movement cannot hope to go to heaven and the like. raise the question that movements are seen in grass and the like that are insentient when they are shaken by wind. But the reply is that it is not the mere wind that moves and One may causes movements in other things, but it is the presiding deity of the wind, being sentient, that moves and causes the movements in others. This is possible provided Kriyasakti is admitted in presiding deities unlike the Brahman of the 714 Advaitins, } As their Brahman is Niskriya, Brahmamsa must also be likewise Niskriya. Further it cannot be argued that it is because of the association of Upadhi, viz., body Brahman becomes active since Upadhi is Jada. It is by its nature always inactive. 715 And it is also not reasonable to hold that the body at every step, gets associated with the facing Brahmamsa, leaving the one behind. Because, in that case, at every step, there are to be deaths and births.

241 The above given exposition may seem to be unconnected to the topic of the content, But by close observation and deep reflection, relevancy of the exposition may be known. The main aim of the exposition is to tackle the concepts y Upadhi or limiting adjunct, Abheda or identity and also Niskriyatva or actionlessness of Brahman. On the basis of Upadhi, neither Abheda of Jiva from Brahman nor the Niskriyatva of them be established. By admitting Upadhi, Deha etc., if Kriyasakti is taken to be attributed to the Jivas or Brahmamsas then the above shown absurdity and irrelevancy are inevitable, In this way, the given exposition is connected with the context. Without If the souls are taken to mean Brahmamsas in the limiting bodies, then there cannot be movement in the souls. Because, when Brahman is motionless, how can there be motion in Brahmamsabhutajivas, souls being parts of Brahman. the movement of the mud or clay, the pot made of that cannot move, Further, the body being limiting adjunct, product of nescience cannot generate action since the very nescience 716 is insentient. So it is not proper to state that the souls are Brahmamsas and thereby there is identity between them. Because, if that would be the case then as in Brahman according to

k ' 242 the Advaita, there should not be any activity in the souls which are Brahma parts. And it is evident that activity is seen in souls. So even according to the Advaita, the fact that souls are parts of Brahman, cannot be proved. And if, with regard to the limiting adjuncts parts of Brahman are explained, then they differ from body to body. as it is to be bigger in an elephant and very small in ants and the like, This optional view seems to be similar to that of Jainism. 717 It is specified in the Brahmasutra- Utkrantigatyagtinam (II.iii.19) that the soul of atomic nature is having dependent powers. Hence, the soul cannot be identical with Brahman. Nor is it Brahmamsa. But it is In the Advaita, Brahman is motionless by nature. And this Brahman becomes active or will have the motion when 719 getting associated with adjunct by name Maya. impossible. Because, the nature does not change. He cannot be active even when there is the association of thousands of limiting adjuncts. i Because adjunct being insentient is itself inactive. How can then it cause action in others like the space in pot cannot cause movement since by nature it is actionless. In the same way, when Advaita holds that Brahman is actionless by nature, there cannot be action by

any means. Advaita cannot explain the soul of Brahmamba either Sthiramsa or immovable part or Caladamsa or movable part because the soul, by nature, is inactive. The soul can neither be immovable part of Brahman nor movable part of Brahman. If immovable part is taken then that would be against the experience. If it is taken as movable part, then It should have the movement. Brahman has no movement. .720 But according to them, i 243 Thus, in the Advaita neither immovable part nor movable part proves identity. According to the sutra and the Sruti, 721 soul is Anu. The souls attain different bodies as they 722 are associated with fruits of actions of each body. Being dependent they are distinct from each other. This is the state of soul. On the contrary, Brahmachaitanya or supreme soul is altogether distinct. It exists always and everywhere. It is pure by nature. It is also indestructible, partless, unchangeable, eternal and firm. When Brahman is indestructible, partless etc., there is no chance to have pieces of It as souls. So souls are not at all parts of Brahman. Since Brahman is alone and partless in the Advaita, the very contention that the souls are parts of Brahman is untenable. Nanatva in respect of parts cannot be proved also. 723

244 Brahman is endowed with Vicitrasakti or supreme power. He is Omniscience Lord of all and soledoer. He is of the minute as well as of the biggest form. Though, Brahman is capable of doing anything. He never thinks to misuse His 724 power and thereby to assume the form of a soul. As Now it cannot be argued that the Avidya or nescience responsible for Brahman assuming the form of the embodied soul, contributes power. Because it is insentient. nescience is insentient, it has no power of discrimination. So it cannot assist Brahman in assuming the state of soul. Thus, it is evident that neither Brahman can Itself assume the form nor can nescience make It to assume the soul form. Brahman of the Advaitins being. Nirvisesa or qualityless, cannot have the power which is also a quality. If It would have the power of that kind, It could have driven out the nescience making It to assume soul form. And nescience, being insentient cannot have this power. If that is admitted then the Advaita would be similar to that of Nirisvarasankhyas. Further, it cannot be said that power can be attributed to the qualified Brahman (Ainana-Avidya-visista Brahman). Because originally this power is neither in Brahman nor in nescience. Further, Brahman, knowing the nescience to be the cause of undesirable and unworthy things and of sorrowful transmigration does not want to get associated V

with that. Or Brahman will be inactive until It is moved 1 by nescience and It is inactive again when nescience disassociates from Brahman. Thus, really speaking, the idea of a qualified Brahman is baseless and unreasonable. In this way, Brahman assuming soul form is totally impossible. Therefore, souls are not parts of Brahman. They are distinct beings. In some Puranas they are described as parts 726 of Brahman, but it is to be understood in the sense of dependence. They are under the control of the Lord, The incarnations, Matsya, Kurma and the like are His Svarupamas or nature forms. Hence, there is no distinction among them. Whereas there is distinction from the souls as they are not Bhinnamsas. 727 Therefore, the contention that Brahman assumes the state of soul is not correct. As Brahman is all-pervasive, and soul is Anu, the distinction is evident. And this distinction is existing since beginningless time and it will continue to exist even in release. Hence, identity is by no means possible here and hereafter. Though the body as adjunct gets destroyed, it is not possible for soul to become identical with Brahman since as already proved, both of them possess opposing aspects like the water in the jar and in the lake. When jar is destroyed the water will not become identical with the water of the lake. 728 Now, if Brahman is regarded as actionless then Brahma-

formed soul must also be actionless. Because, the inexpressible Maya or Avidya of the Advaita, dividing Brahman in parts, cannot contribute power of action to the parts. r 1 In the Dvaita view, there is no difficulty, since it is So He the Saktivisesa or His unique form, the very nature of Brahman, which helps Him to assume Any as well as Mahat forms. is of infinite forms. The same Saktivisesa proves the movement in Him. But the souls possess only Anu form and dependent Kriyasakti. Hence, both of them are absolutely 729 distinct from each other. And Brahman, abiding in all the souls, is one and the same and is perfect and Supreme. He is one with Mahat and all-pervasive form and is infinite with indwelling forms. All these forms are perfect in respect of qualities and are identical with original form. 729 A The sruti- Antarbahisca tatsarvamvyapya narayanasthitah specifies that all-pervasive Brahman is the Narayana. If the Advaitins hasten to admit the possibility of two all-pervasive sentients, then the very concept of the Advaita 730 So they cannot accept two all-pervasive stands uprooted. sentients. Therefore, the illustration of Chatakasa, Mathakasa given at the beginning to prove their identity, is irrelevant. The souls do not conform with the size of the bodies in the form of adjuncts. They are Anus. The

247 above analogy may be taken with reference to the incarnations of the Lord as His all forms are all-pervasive. Souls are like dust particles flying in the space. So they were not, are not, and shall not be identical with Brahman. 731 When Brahman is beginningless and souls are beginningless, distinction among them must also be beginningless as explained above. So identity cannot be thought of between soul and Brahman. It cannot be stated that though difference is beginningless, it gets destroyed at the attainment of the release because difference is not the product of nescience. Though, nescience is destroyed by knowledge, difference remains as it is. The Ekajivavadins hold that it is due to Avidya, that Brahman attains the soul form. Soul is one only and it is 732 its nescience by which the entire world is fabricated. When its nescience is removed, there originates Aikya Jnana as 'I am Brahman' and by this, the fabricated world ceases 7380 to exist. The Bahujivavadins Chold that it is due to the manifold Upadhis, that Jivas or Brahmamsas are many. By knowledge of identity when once adjuncts get destroyed, they getting liberated, attain Brahmasvarupa. For them the world becomes unreal. Vadiraja attacks the view of the Ekajivavadins. He

248 argues that if the settlement in the world is unreal and sentiency abiding is so many bodies, is unreal, then how 734 can the movements etc., causing effects be possible? The unreality cannot move. If it is a real serpent, then only it can move. In the same way, sentiency as well as their living world must be real, then only movements and the like are possible. And it is not the delusion that causes movements. The whole world cannot be taken to mean to be ephemeral. If souls are superimposed on one Cetana, then they are unreal. Since being superimposed, they cannot be the parts of real Brahman and there is no question of identity. 735 i Further, the view of the Advaitins that all the souls are parts of Brahman is also not tenable. The distinction between soul and Brahman is evident since beginningless time. This is because of their inherent distinct nature and distinct constituent characteristics. Souls, living in different bodies, are of Anu size. Brahman is all-pervasive and of Mahatparimana. Brahman is Niskriya (not affected by by the effects of actions). He is perfect. Souls are active and are affected by actions. And as a result of that they move from one body to another and from one place to another. Brahman is defectless. Souls are defective, and So such souls cannot be as a result of that they suffer. parts of Brahman or forms of Brahman, f

The Advaitins hold that like the difference of ether in the pot, souls or parts of Brahman possess unreal difference caused by adjuncts. But it is wrong. Because, if difference is unreal, then the very attributes and effects of that also become unreal. If difference is real, then only all those will be real. Chatakasa does not move wherever pot moves. And ether in the pot does not get + stained with the water, or dirt in the pot. It is unaffected So if soul would be a part like the ether all-pervasive. 736 of all-pervasive Brahman he should be actionless and unaffected like the ether in the pot. But the soul is not like that. He is active and hence associated with the fruits of actions. So the distinction between him and Brahman is real. As dust particles, distinct from ether and each other, fly in the ether that is motionless and unchangeable, the souls too, distinct from each other and from Brahman and being active abide in all-pervasive Brahman. If they were to be parts of Niskriyabrahma, they must not be Sakriyas as said above. If dust particles are parts of ether, then they must be actionless, But they are active. Since, they are not the parts of ether. In the same way. souls, being active, are not the parts of Brahman. 737 If the difference is regarded as empirical, then the very concept difference would be meaningless since it will be no more after the knowledge of sublation. If the knowledge of

sublation is negated then the very idea of empirical difference is useless. So the five-fold distinction is evident to the experience of all. The state of distinction safeguards the very code or law of worldly behaviour. Let all entities be distinct, soul as a soul, matter as matter and the Lord as the Lord. There is no need to change their states. The soul need not become matter or Brahman and vice-versa. As the scriptural passage- Dhata yatha purvamakalpayat states, the creation and the like which are subject to the five-fold' distinction, have been continuing since beginningless time and they will continue till eternity. The release is not attaining the identity with Brahman but attaining the experience of inherent bliss always. I 737 A 739 The passage Sarvam khalvidam Brahma refers to the entire world of sentients and the insentient matter. So there is no scope to drop matter from the meaning of the term 'Sarvam. If at all Aikya or identity is to be understood, let it also be understood with matter and not only with sentient souls. Because, 'Sarvam' stands for all including souls and matter. So the passage is to be understood as everything is under the control of the Lord or everything gets or comes into existence from the Lord. Otherwise,

the contention of proving identity of souls and Brahman leads to undesirable identity of matter with Brahman. 740 So identity of souls is untenable. If identity between Brahman and soul is voluntarily forced, then all the above mentioned auspicious attributes stand untenable or they are to be abandoned. 251 the Vadiraja taunts at the Advaitins saying that it is good on their part to prefer identity with matter to identify with souls since that does not make their Brahman to assume soul form and to undergo the hardships of transmigration. Whereas, it cannot be applied in the Dvaita view, since matter is not capable of doing anything. It is inactive by its very nature. According to the Advaita, Brahman is Svaprakasa, that means Svavedyatva is there is Brahman (absence of self- 740 A knowledge or realization). It can also be found in matter. So identity with matter is preferable. Vadiraja taunts that the passage- Sarvam khalvidam Brahma becomes fruitful and relevant only when the Advaitins hasten to relate entire identity comprising the identity with souls and identity with matter that lead to unreality of the world and also unreality of souls (beings). Let Brahman be also unreal as being. When everything is unreal, then like bondage,

release will also be-come Mithya. This leads to the absence of Bandha and Moksa. Both Moksasadhana and Sukhaboktrtva also become Mithya. Then the state of Mukti would be nominal and for only name sake, Thus, if Jivaikya is related then it appears attributing Baddhatva and Muktatva to Brahman and entire Jagat becomes Mithya. But the Sruti conveys that the entire world of Jiva and Jada is under the control of Lord. 742 In this way the Advaita-interpretation of this Sruti 1 is irrelevant and contradictory to valid perception. It is · also against the Brahmasutras. Badarayana has shown the way of interpreting the scriptural statements wherein there appears contradiction as in Mrdabravit, Apo'bruvan and the like. 742 A Here neither the clay nor the water can speak but it is the presiding deities of clay and water that speak. Thus, relevant to the context and to the valid perception, the srutis are to be interpreted. conduct. to The The expression of Atmaikya is against the very code and It is neither pleasing nor a real one. Paundrak Vasudeva was severely punished since he declared that he was 743 the Lord. It was neither pleasing nor a real one, entities that are ever distinct like the cloth and the soap cannot be identical. So the expressive meaning of the Sruti since sublated, should not be accepted as the real meaning.

Even the liberated souls are not identical with each other nor with Brahman. Because, Brahman is ever-released and they are the gainers of release. So there cannot be And their distinct living is also evident. There identity. may be little bit similarity in some aspects like the 744 The gained they explicit form. (Sarupya). Further, although gain the required knowledge may not attain, release. knowledge has no impact on them. It is only those who are eligible in nature. Knowledge is the only instrumental. In release, similarity may be termed only in respect of the state of liberation. That means one is liberated like Identity cannot be referred to even in case of others. 745 Sayuiyamuktas. They are also distinct from Brahman, It is true that in the cavity of the heart of the soul, there abide both the soul and Paramatman. Paramatman is everreleased and Omniscience whereas Jiva is Nivamya, Alpajna and the like. Jiva experiences the Karmaphala, whereas Paramatman does not. So both of them are distinct like 746 milk and water. Thus on account of possessing contradictory qualities and distinct nature since beginningless time 2 cannot be stated and proved. 747 The Advaitin's Isvara cannot be identical with the world of Jiva and Jada. If Isvara is incapable of the creation of the world then the world cannot come into existence, since

without Karta there cannot be any Karya. If He is taken be capable, even then He cannot be identical. Because, creator and created must be distinct each other. 748 If the import of the sruti is taken as real, then the Advaitins admitting the identity of soul and Brahman, would become unreal and not a reality. And if the import of the passage is taken to be unreal, then also the Advalta becomes not a Tattva that means, it cannot be proved. Since Nirguna } passage declares Brahman as attributeless identity cannot be 749 talked of. In spite of knowledge, if nescience is attributed to Brahman there cannot be this Samsara since that nescience cannot influence and affect the inherent knowledge. If nescience is negated in Omniscient Lord, then also there is no Samsara (effect of nescience). 750 Nescience cannot be referred to in Brahman. If nescience is possible, then only soul form, and the like become possible. As it is said that knowledge of Brahman is real, He cannot have the nescience (ignorance) (knowledge of comprehending limited objects). If He has no knowledge, then also there can be no nescience since, absence of knowledge does not lead to or result into any apprehension 751 of nescience. Thus, there is not even a single argument, relevant in all respects, that can help the Advaltins to prove and to assert identity. The very ldea or concept identity is against the valid experience and contradictory to the import of the srutis.