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According to the Mimarinsa and the Vedanta, the validity of knowledge is due to conditions that are intrinsic to knowledge, and the knowledge of validity is due to the condition of knowledge itself. This means that knowledge is both made valid and known to be valid by its own intrinsic conditions. It is the very nature of knowledge to reveal its object. There is no knowledge which does not manifest the nature of some object. Hence it follows that knowledge requires no other conditions than itself in order to reveal its object. It cannot fail to give us truth if it is to be knowledge at all. For how can it reveal its object without being true? So we see that knowledge must be valid by its very nature, i.e. the very conditions which condition knowledge must also condition its validity. It cannot be said that knowledge is a

neutral cognition and that validity and invalidity are its adventitious characters. There is no such thing as a neutral or characterless cognition. Every cognition must be either valid or invalid. There is no third alternative here. A cognition which is neither valid nor invalid is not a fact but a fiction. As for doubt (samsaya), we are to say that it is not a neutral cognition, but a form of invalid knowledge. Further, if knowledge is not valid on its own account, it can never be made valid on account of any external condition. For the validating condition must itself be validated by other conditions, and these again by still other conditions and so on ad infinitum. This means that the validity of knowledge cannot be finally established. Hence we must either say that knowledge is valid by its very nature or deny that there is any valid knowledge at all. The validity of knowledge must thus be conditioned by the conditions of knowledge itself, i.e. it must be intrinsic to knowledge. The only external condition for validity is the negative one of the absence of vitiating factors (dosabhava). But this does not mean that validity is externally conditioned, since the absence of a thing is not a positive factor that contributes anything towards the validity of knowledge. The absence of vitiating conditions accounts for the absence of invalidity and not for the positive fact of validity. There is no evidence for any positive external condition like special efficacy of the conditions of knowledge (karakatiriktatadgutaguna). So we are to say that the validity of knowledge is due to the conditions of knowledge itself (svarupasthitaheluja), i.e. it is intrinsic to knowledge.' Similarly, the validity of knowledge must be known from the conditions of knowledge itself. A true knowledge is by itself known to be true. It does not require anything else to show its truth. In fact, the truth of knowledge cannot be known from any external condition. We cannot know it from any 1 Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. VI ; Sastradipika, pp. 20, 21, 48.

special efficacy in the conditions of knowledge (karanaguna). There is no such thing as a special potency of the causes of knowledge. Even if there were such a thing, it cannot be known, since it must pertain to the sense-organs and, as such, must be supersensible. Nor can we know validity from the experience of non-contradiction (badhakabhavajnana). Noncontradiction cannot be a test of the truth of knowledge. When we speak of non-contradiction we must mean either of two things, namely, that there is no contradiction for the present or that there cannot be a contradiction at any time. But to know that there is non-contradiction for the present is not to know that the knowledge must be valid. For what is not now contradicted may be and often is contradicted in the future. That there cannot be a contradiction at any time is what we can never know unless we become omniscient. Absolute non-contradiction is, therefore, an impracticable test of truth. Nor again can the validity of knowledge be known from its coherence with some other knowledge (savada). For this will lead to infinite regress. How can we know that there is real coherence between two cases of knowledge? How again do we know that the second knowledge, with which the first coheres and by which it is tested, is itself valid? To prove the validity of the second we must show its coherence with a third and so on ad infinitum. Or, if we stop anywhere and say that the last knowledge or the system of knowledge as a whole has self-evident validity, there is no reason why the first knowledge cannot be said to have the same self-evident truth. It cannot also be said that the coherence of knowledge consists in the volitional experience of expected results. The mere experience of desired objects is no evidence of the validity of knowledge. In dream we have vivid experiences of many desired things. This however does not make dream a valid knowledge at all. Thus we see that there cannot be any extraneous test of the validity of knowledge, like correspondence, coherence, non-contradiction or pragmatic utility. Hence knowledge must test or certify

its own truth, i.e. the validity of knowledge is self-evident." 95 Mimamsakas and the As to invalidity or falsity, the Vedantists hold that it is extrinsic to knowledge. While truth is organic to knowledge, falsity is accidental and externally conditioned. Thus the invalidity of knowledge is due to some defects in the conditions of knowledge (karanadosa). It is only when certain defects vitiate its natural conditions that knowledge fails in its purpose, namely, the attainment of truth. So invalidity is conditioned by conditions other than those of the knowledge itself. Similarly, the knowledge of invalidity depends on such external conditions as the experience of contradiction and the knowledge of vitiating conditions. This means that knowledge per se is valid. If in any case it is rejected as false, that is only because it fails to lead up to certain expected results (viparitavyavaharaja), and not because it fails to reveal its object. Every knowledge is intrinsically valid. When any knowledge is, as a matter of practical usage (vyavahara), called false, that is either because it is contradicted by some other knowledge or because it is perceived to arise from certain defects in its natural conditions. The invalidity of knowledge is thus both constituted and known by external conditions other than the conditions of knowledge itself." In some cases it may so happen that when one knowledge is contradicted by another, we may have some doubt with regard to the second invalidating knowledge and require a third knowledge to resolve the doubt. But even here we are not involved in an infinite regress and bound to give up the idea of the intrinsic validity of knowledge. If the third knowledge is consistent with the first, then the intrinsic validity of the latter remains established as before. What the third knowledge does is not to validate the first by reason of its coherence with it, but to dispel the false doubt raised by the second contradicting knowledge. If, on the other hand, the third is conVP. & Sastradipika, ibid., Nyayamanjari, pp. 162-65. 2 Ibid.

sistent with the second, it confirms the sense of contradiction and the first is known to be invalid. Here the invalidity of the first is known through something other than itself. That the third is consistent with the second does not mean that it validates the second. It means only that the doubt attaching to the second is dispelled by its coherence with the third. Hence it follows that every knowledge validates itself through itself and is invalidated by some other knowledge. That is, validity is intrinsic to all knowledge, while invalidity is extrinsic and accidental.' The Naiyayikas reject the first part of the Mimamsa theory, namely, that knowledge is both made valid and known to be valid by its own intrinsic conditions. The validity of knowledge cannot be due to the conditions of knowledge as such. If that were so, there could not be any invalid knowledge, since even invalid knowledge arises from the conditions of knowledge. In fact a valid cognition is more than a cognition as such. Hence it must be due to some special character of the general conditions of knowledge just as an invalid cognition is due to some positive factors that vitiate the general conditions of knowledge. The mere absence of vitiating factors cannot account for the positive character of validity. Thus the validity of perception is due not merely to the absence of vitiating factors like the discased condition of the sense organ, but to such positive factors as the healthy condition of the sense organ, etc. Similarly, in all other cases the validity of knowledge is due to some special auxiliary conditions in the specific causes of knowledge (karanaguna). Such special conditions may not be always perceived, but they may be known from other sources, like inference and testimony. The special efficacy of the sense organs may be known from the medical sciences. Further, if the validity of knowledge be due simply to the absence of vitiating conditions, its invalidity may also be said to be due to the absence of efficacious conditions. As such, we need not say that invalidity is due to external condiNM., pp. 166-67.

tions. Again, on the Mimamsa view, all knowledge being intrinsically valid, the distinction between truth and falsehood becomes insignificant. We should not speak of any knowledge as invalid. It cannot be said that when any knowledge turns out to be false, it altogether ceases to be knowledge or cognition. A wrong knowledge is as good a cognition as a true one. So, if cognition per se be true, there cannot be any wrong cognition. But that there are wrong cognitions, illusions, and hallucinations is an undeniable fact. So it must be admitted that both validity and invalidity are externally conditioned." Similarly, no knowledge is by itself known to be valid, i.e. the validity of knowledge is not self-evident. Thus the cognition of blue does not cognise its truth or validity at the same time that it cognises the blue colour. It does not even cognise itself immediately as a cognition of blue, far less as a valid cognition of blue. On the Bhatta view, a cognition is not immediately cognised, but is known mediately by inference. If so, the validity of knowledge cannot be immediately known by itself. Nor can we say that with every cognition there follows immediately another cognition which cognises the validity of the first. With the perception of blue, for example, we do not find another cognition immediately following it and cognising its validity or invalidity. There is no introspective evidence for a secondary cognition of validity appearing immediately after the primary cognition of an object. Even if there were such, the validity of knowledge will not be self-evident but evidenced by another knowledge. Further, if the invalidity of knowledge be known from its contradiction, we are to say that its validity is known from the absence of contradiction. On the other hand, if we accept the Prabhakara view that knowledge is self-manifest and guarantees its own truth without reference to anything else, we do not see how there can be doubt and suspicion, or how there can be any failure of practical activity. Since validity is inherent and self-evident in knowledge, every knowledge must carry in it an assurance of ¹ Nyayamanjari, pp. 170-71 ; Siddhanta-muktavali, 131-36. 13-(O.P. 103)

its truth and we should have no doubt. Similarly, every knowledge being true and known to be true by itself, there cannot be any disappointment in practical life. But doubts and disappointments are very common experiences of life. If it be said that doubt arises out of contradiction between two cognitions and is resolved by a third cognition, we are forced to give up the idea of self-evident validity. The third cognition may not constitute the validity of the first by reason of its coherence with it, but it at least conditions our knowledge of its validity. So the validity of one knowledge is known by another knowledge. In fact knowledge only reveals its object. To know that it is valid, i.e. it truly reveals the object, we must have some extraneous test like coherence with volitional experience or some accredited past knowledge. Hence the validity of knowledge must be known from external conditions." It will appear from the above discussion that the Naiyayikas are not prepared to accept the theory of intrinsic validity That truth is intrinsic to and self-evident in all knowledge is not admitted by them. But that the truth of some cases of knowledge is self-evident is admitted by some Naiyayikas. There is on this point a difference of opinion between the ancient and the modern exponents of the Nyaya. The older Naiyayikas insist that a proof of the validity of any knowledge requires the exclusion of other suggested possibilities contrary to it. Hence we find that they try to establish the validity of every knowledge by external grounds, even at the risk of an infinite regress. To prove the validity of knowledge we need not go beyond perception, inference, comparison and testimony. But one perception or inference must be proved by another individual perception or inference. Hence the same knowledge may sometimes be proved by another and sometimes taken to prove another (pradipaprakasavat). This seems to be a more empirical and common-sense view of the validity of human knowledge.² 1 Ibid. 2 Nyaya-Bhasya, 2. I. 17-19.

ater Naiyayikas, however, do not insist that every knowledge must be tested and proved before we can accept its validity. According to them, the validity of knowledge need not be proved if there is not the slightest doubt about it (samsayabhava). Its validity is practically self-evident so long as it is not contradicted. A motiveless doubt of a possible contradiction is of no account. To say that a knowledge is evidently valid it is not necessary to prove its infallibility or to exclude all other possibilities contrary to it. So, if there be such knowledge as cannot reasonably be doubted we are to say that it has self-evident truth. Of course, when any doubt or dispute arises as to its truth, we must prove it by some extraneous test. Among such cases of knowledge the Naiyayikas include logical inference and comparison, and cognition of the resemblance between two cognitions (jnanagalasadrsyajnana), cognition of cognition or self-consciousness (anuvyavasaya), and cognition of anything as something or as a mere subject (dharmijnana). Inference and comparison (upamana) as logical methods are based on some necessary relation between two terms, namely, a mark and the marked (hetu and saahya), a name and its denotation (samjna and samjni) respectively. Hence knowledge by inference and comparsion is known as necessary knowledge. These become the contents of self-conscious knowledge and, as such, their validity is self-evident. Similarly, the cognition of a cognition or awareness of awareness, the cognition of the similarity between cognitions and the cognition of anything as a mere subject are all cases of self-conscious knowledge. In these we not only know something but also know that we know it. That is, we know that something is known. Hence these cases of knowledge also are necessary knowledge having self-evident validity.' In the case of sense-perception and testimony, however, 1 Anumanasya nirastasamastavyabhicarasankasya svata eva pramanyamanumeyavyabhicarilingasamutthatvat, etc., Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika, pp. 12-13; anumanopamananuvyavasayadharmijnananamapi . . svata eva pramanyagraha, etc., Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-parisuddhi, pp. 119-20; vide also Tattvachintamani, I, pp. 277-79, 282-84.

there cannot be any self-evident validity. These are not based on any necessary relation between two terms. There is no necessary relation between sense-perception and its object or between words and their meanings. Hence we cannot say that to know anything by external perception or testimony is also to know that we know it. These cannot be the contents of self-conscious knowledge and their validity is not self-evident.¹ It should, however, be noted here that with the Naiyayikas the self-evident validity of some cases of knowledge does not exclude their liability to error. For the Mimamsaka and the Vedantist, the self-evident character of a truth means its infallibility which excludes the possibility of any falsification, so that error pertains not to truth but to its applications (vyavahara). For the Naiyayikas, however, even necessary truths are empirical and so require confirmation by fresh applications (i.e. pravrttisamarthya), whenever necessary. But they are different in status from ordinary observation and generalisation. They possess the highest degree of certainty which is humanly attainable. Still they may change if, as Hobhouse has said, the constitution of the world changeth. Hence the Nyaya conception of the self-evident validity of some knowledge is different from the Mimamsa and Vedanta view of the self-evident validity of all knowledge.

1 Pratyaksasabdavijnanayorna svato 'vyabhicaragraha iti, etc., Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika, ibid.