Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 113 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
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External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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TEST OF TRUTH AND ERROR 93 neutral cognition and that validity and invalidity are its
adventitious characters. There is no such thing as a neutral
or characterless cognition. Every cognition must be either
valid or invalid. There is no third alternative here. A cog-
nition which is neither valid nor invalid is not a fact but a
fiction. As for doubt (samsaya), we are to say that it is not
a neutral cognition, but a form of invalid knowledge. Fur-
ther, if knowledge is not valid on its own account, it can
never be made valid on account of any external con-
dition. For the validating condition must itself be valid-
ated by other conditions, and these again by still other
conditions and so on ad infinitum. This means that the
validity of knowledge cannot be finally established. Hence
we must either say that knowledge is valid by its very
nature or deny that there is any valid knowledge at all. The
validity of knowledge must thus be conditioned by the con-
ditions of knowledge itself, i.e. it must be intrinsic to
knowledge. The only external condition for validity is the
negative one of the absence of vitiating factors (do峁Ｄ乥h膩va).
But this does not mean that validity is externally conditioned,
since the absence of a thing is not a positive factor that contri-
butes anything towards the validity of knowledge. The absence
of vitiating conditions accounts for the absence of invalidity
and not for the positive fact of validity. There is no evidence
for any positive external condition like special efficacy of the
conditions of knowledge (k膩rak膩tiriktatadgutagu峁嘺). So we are
to say that the validity of knowledge is due to the conditions of
knowledge itself (svarupasthitaheluja), i.e. it is intrinsic to
knowledge.'
Similarly, the validity of knowledge must be known from
the conditions of knowledge itself. A true knowledge is by
itself known to be true. It does not require anything else to
show its truth. In fact, the truth of knowledge cannot be known
from any external condition. We cannot know it from any
1 VP., Ch. VI ; SD., pp. 20, 21, 48.
