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Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge

Author: Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy

This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.

Page 117 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge

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117 (of 404)


External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)


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TEST OF TRUTH AND ERROR 97 tions. Again, on the MÄ«mÄṃsä view, all knowledge being
intrinsically valid, the distinction between truth and falsehood
becomes insignificant. We should not speak of any knowledge
as invalid. It cannot be said that when any knowledge turns
out to be false, it altogether ceases to be knowledge or cognition.
A wrong knowledge is as good a cognition as a true one. So,
if cognition per se be true, there cannot be any wrong cognition.
But that there are wrong cognitions, illusions, and hallucinations
is an undeniable fact. So it must be admitted that both validity
and invalidity are externally conditioned."
Similarly, no knowledge is by itself known to be valid,
i.e. the validity of knowledge is not self-evident. Thus the
cognition of blue does not cognise its truth or validity at the
same time that it cognises the blue colour. It does not even
cognise itself immediately as a cognition of blue, far less as a
valid cognition of blue. On the BhÄá¹­á¹­a view, a cognition is not
immediately cognised, but is known mediately by inference.
If so, the validity of knowledge cannot be immediately known
by itself. Nor can we say that with every cognition there
follows immediately another cognition which cognises the
validity of the first. With the perception of blue, for example,
we do not find another cognition immediately following it and
cognising its validity or invalidity. There is no introspective
evidence for a secondary cognition of validity appearing imme-
diately after the primary cognition of an object. Even if there
were such, the validity of knowledge will not be self-evident
but evidenced by another knowledge. Further, if the invalidity
of knowledge be known from its contradiction, we are to say
that its validity is known from the absence of contradiction.
On the other hand, if we accept the PrÄbhÄkara view that
knowledge is self-manifest and guarantees its own truth with-
out reference to anything else, we do not see how there can be
doubt and suspicion, or how there can be any failure of practic-
al activity. Since validity is inherent and self-evident in
knowledge, every knowledge must carry in it an assurance of
¹ NM., pp. 170-71 ; SM., 131-36.
13-(O.P. 103)

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