Tarkabhasa of Kesava Misra (study)
by Nimisha Sarma | 2010 | 56,170 words
This is an English study of the Tarkabhasa of Kesava Misra: a significant work of the syncretic Nyaya-Vaisesika school of Indian philosophy. The Tarka-bhasa is divided into Purvabhaga (focusing on pramanas) and Uttarabhaga (mainly covering prameya), with other categories briefly mentioned. The work was widely used as a beginner's textbook in southe...
6. Tarka or Hypothetical Reasoning or Ratiotination
In ordinary parlence 'tarka' means 'argument'. But, here, it is used in a highly technical sense. It is a type of implicative argument by which we may test the validity of the conclusion of any reasoning. It is defined as the 'prasanjana' of an inadmissible negation from the two negations having equal force on account of their being in the same space and time. 70 Tarka is a particular type of reasoning. It is not based on any perception. It is like this, we see a mass of smoke rising from distant house and say that the house has caught fire. A friend contradicts this and says that there is no fire. Now we argue: if there is no fire there cannot be smoke. Thus, with regard to the inference of fire from the perception of smoke, there are two alternative positions, namely, that the smoky object is fiery, and that it is not fiery. From the latter position we deduce the proposition that the object is not smoky 68. Tarkabhasa p.224. 69. Bhasapariccheda under k. 130. 70. anista-vyapaka prasanjam tarkah tulyatvenabha vayoh pratyabhava vacanam prasanjanam. Saptapadarthi p.81.
85 which is contradicted by our direct experience. This is expressed in the form of a hypothetical proposition, viz. if the object be fireless, it must be smokeless. Since reasoning like this is not to know the fire, but to confirm our previous inference of fire from smoke, it is not valid knowledge. Hence, Vatsyayana thinks that it does not give us determinate knowledge, but it leads indirectly to valid knowledge. He observes that tarka is neither included in any means of valid knowledge nor a distinct one but by knowing the reality it assists the pramanas." 72 According to Kesava Misra, tarka is a kind of hypothetical reasoning leading to an undesirable result. It consists in arguing that if, out of two concomitant things, the concomitant (vyapya) one is present, the presence of the other, its correlate vyapaka, should also be present; e.g. if a jar were to exist here it should be perceivable like the spot (where it stands). This kind of hypothetical reasoning helps instrument of valid cognition. It is in this way. Suppose someone includes that there is no fire in the hill after doubting about its existence (from seeing smoke issuing from it ). Then if another were to tell him 'if there is no fire in the hill there would be no smoke also', this kind of 71. a) na tvavadharayati, na vyavasyati, na niscinoti evam, evedam iti. Vatsyayana-bhashya under Nyayasutra 1.1.40. b) tarko na pramana samgrhito na pramanantaram/pramananamanugrahakastattva jnanaya kalpyate / Vatsyayana-bhashya under Nyayasutra 1.1.1. 72. tarko'nistaprasangah. Tarkabhasa p. 228.
86 argument is what is called tarka. It helps in establishing the presence of the probandum in the subject which is the object of the inference. Because it points out the absurdity of the hill being smoky in the absence of fire (its cause), it is an aid to inference. Someone says that tarka is included under doubt; but this is not correct as tarka has only one thing as its object and that too a definite one (while doubt objectifies two contradictory things in one 73 object). Commentator of Tarkabhasa, Rudradhar Jha also accepts this view.