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The topics like nature of knowledge, means of aquiring knowledge and criterioa to determine truth of knowledge etc. consist of the subject-matter of the epistemological queries that lead to the formulation of a theory of knowledge. Knowledge is the basis of all practical activities. The function of 12 the knowledge is to illuminate things other than itself." Knowledge refers to an object that is known and it always belongs to a subject that knows. Knowledge can not be independent by itself without implying a knower and a thing known. Knowledge is a self- transcending property of the self. Different philosophical systems of India have adopted divergent attitude towards the theory of knowledge. Carvakas attempt to analyse knowledge and its means in their own way and took the view that the problem of knowledge is not beyond solution. According to Jainas, knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well as the objects that are known by 12. pratitih vastvantaraprakasasvabhava. Nyayaratnakara on Slokavartika Niralamvanavada. p.44.

57 13 us. Advaita Vedantins hold that knowledge is very stuff of the self. There is no difference between self and knowledge. According to Sarkara substance and its quality are identical as fire and its heat. Thus there is no difference According to Samkhya-Yoga, knowledge is a mode of buddhi. According to them Purusa or Self is unchangeable and conscious. Pain, pleasure etc. belong to buddhi which is an evolute of Prakrti. Knowledge is a mode of buddhi which transforms itself into the shape of the object that is cognising. Purusa becomes active due to the indiscrimination and intelligence of buddhi, and as a result the phenomenon of cognition arises. Vacaspati's view on knowledge is that the self is by nature inactive. All activity belongs to Prakrti. Yet the self due to its proximity is reflected in buddhi and through non-discrimination identifies itself to be the knower. When an object comes into contact with the sense-organ, it produces certain modifications in the sense-organ. These modifications are analysed by the mind and are presented to buddhi which becomes modified or transformed into the form of the object. Buddhi, being unconscious in nature, cannot by itself know the object. But as buddhi possesses an excess of sattva in it, it reflects the consciousness of the self and appears as if conscious. With the reflection of consciousness of the self in buddhi, the unconscious modification of buddhi into the form of the object becomes illumined into a conscious state of perception. This is called knowledge. Just as a mirror, due to reflection of light in it, appears to have the light within it, in the same manner, buddhi due to a natural excess of sattva in it, reflects the consciousness of the self or 13. A History of Indian Philosophy p.182.

58 Purusa and illuminates or cognizes the object. According to Vijnanabhiksu, however, when an object comes into contact with the sense-organ the buddhi becomes modified into the form of the object. Due to the preponderance of sattva in buddhi, it reflects the self and appears to be conscious, as a mirror reflects the light and becomes illuminating. Next, buddhi, which is modified into the form of the object is reflected back in the self, and the modification becomes manifested Without this mutual reflection, the apperant experiences of pleasure and pain in the self, which is pure consciousness and free from pleasure and pain, cannot be explained Nyaya defines knowledge (jnana) or cognition (buddhi) as apprehension (upalabdhi) or consciousness (anubhaba). Nyaya, being realistic, believes that knowledge reveals both the subjects and the object which are quite distinct from itself. All knowledge is a revelation or manifestation of objects (arthaprakaso buddhi). Just as a lamp manifests physical things placed before it. Gautama refers to knowledge through the term buddhih and states that the term upalabdhi and jnana are its synonyms. 14 It is pertinent to make an enquiry as to how knowledge itself is known. According to the Jainas, the Buddhist, Vijnanavadins, the Prabhakara Mimamsakas, the Advaita Vedantins and the Samkhya-Yoga thinkers, knowledge is known by itself. According to them knowledge is of the nature of light or illumination. Knowledge as the nature of light does not require 14. "buddhih" upalabdhirjnanamityanarthantaram. Nyayasutra 1.1.15

59 anything to manifest it. Knowledge is, by nature nature self-revealing (svayamprakasa) in the sense that it doesnot require anything to reveal it or to know it. According to this view, knowledge is never an object of knowledge, nor known by other knowledge. If knowledge is known as an object, then each individual knowledge may require another knowledge to know it, and so on. Kumarila Bhatta accepts the independent existence of external object. Every act of knowledge gives a certain relationship between the knower and the known. It involves some activity on the part of the knower. Knowledge reveals the object but cannot reveal itself. According to Kumarila Bhatta, knowledge is not self revealing because it is by nature non-perceptible and is known by means of an inference known as jnatalingakanumana. But, Prabhakara holds that knowledge is self luminous. It manifests itself and needs nothing else for its manifestation. According to Nyaya-Vaisesika, knowledge is known not by itself but by another knowledge known as anivyavasaya. According to them knowledge is like the eyes which illumine everything but itself remain in curtain. Bhatta Mimamsakas also accept this view regarding knowledge. The Nyaya view of knowledge is an attribute of soul. It copies reality and seems to common sense too simple to need any justification; yet this apparently innocent view involves assumptions that have been uncritically accepted In its hostility to Buddhist subjectivism the Nyaya insists that things are the ground of logical truth, that the external world exists apart from our knowledge of it and determines that knowledge that our ideas correspond to

60 things. It divides the real into two compartments of subjects and objects, and thus transforms the ordinary assumptions of common sense into a metaphysical theory which is inadequate to the facts of consciousness as well as the demands of logic. The main assumptions which vitiate the epistemology of the Nyaya are: 1. that self and not-self are sharply separated from one another, 2. that consciousness is the result of the causal action of the not-self on the self, 3. that knowledge is a property of the self. In spite of these metaphysical prejudices, the Nyaya contains fruitful suggestions by which its may be overcome. 15 defects Knowledge which is revelation of reality may do its function either in a true manner or in a manner which is false. When reality is revealed valid knowledge is called prama and when this revelation is faulty it is treated as aprama. Thus knowledge requires some factors or marks, the presence of which raises it to the status of prama. These factors or marks are variously interpreted by different schools of Indian philosophy as: practical value, novelty, certainty and definiteness. According to Samkhya-Yoga, marks of validity of knowledge are certainty, correspondence to object and novelty. The presence of these factors or marks may be technically called pramanya. Here, the question naturally arises as to how these factors or marks arise in a certain piece of knowledge. The first part refers to the conditions of their origin, while the second to that of their ascertainment. If they originate or are ascertained through totality of knowledge producing conditions themselves, pramanya or validity is technically called svatah (intrinsic) and if they originate or are 15. Indian Philosophy Vol.II p.134

61 ascertained through some conditions additional to those giving rise to valid knowledge, the validity is said to be paratah (extrinsic) because in this case the validity is caused by some other factor than the conditions giving rise to knowledge. Similarly, the same question arises about the factors leading to invalid knowledge as to whether invalidity originates and is ascertained by the same factors generating knowledge or by others additional to them. We are going to present a detail discussion on pramanyavada in fourth chapter. Kesava Misra's Concept of Knowledge According to Kesava Misra cognition is that which manifests objects.16 synonymous. 17 He also mentions that cognition (buddhi), understanding (upalabdhi), knowledge (jnana) and apprehension (pratyaya) these words are The term apprehension is generally used in the sense of perception. Accrding to the Samkhya philosophy, Buddhi or intellect, which is the first thing evolved out of primordial matter (Prakrti), is altogether different from knowledge, which consists in the reflection of external objects on the soul (Purusa). Commentators of Tarkabhasa say that to reject this Samkhya view the word 'pratyaya' is mentioned here. 18 All knowledge is a revelation or 16. 17. 18. arthaprakaso va buddhih. Tarkabhasa p.218. Ibid. prakrteh saksatparinamo buddhih, evam buddheh visayakaroparinamo jnanam, tathavisayakarena parinamamanayam buddhau pratibimbitasya cetanapurusasya buddhi-vrttyanukara upalabdhiriti samkhyamatamapakartum. Sri Kesava Misra pranita Tarkabhasa p.188. Also in Tarkabhasa-prakasika 'buddhadi......alam.' p.251.

62 manifestation of objects. According to Kesava Misra all cognitions are devoid of form. 19 No object reflects its own form in the cognition, because the theory that cognition arises with the form of the object reflected in it has been rejected For the same reason the inference of the object from its form reflected in the cognition is rejected as the existence of objects like a jar etc. is established by perception. All cognitions are fully defined by the objects presented in them and without being related to the objects no cognition can be perceived by the mind; because the knowledge that arises from any such appehention is of the form 'I have the cognition of the jar' and not merely of the form 'I have a cognition'. The definition of buddhi found in Tarkabhasa is more convenient in practice in many respects. Another definition of buddhi given by Annambhatta in the Tarkasamgraha is that cognition is the cause of all communication or intercourse, and it is the knowledge. The Tarkasamgraha-dipika supplies a better definition of buddhi.