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Prasthanatrayi Swaminarayan Bhashyam (Study)

by Sadhu Gyanananddas | 2021 | 123,778 words

This page relates ‘Pramanas: Basic Introduction� of the study on the Prasthanatrayi Swaminarayan Bhashyam in Light of Swaminarayan Vachanamrut (Vacanamrita). His 18th-century teachings belong to Vedanta philosophy and were compiled as the Vacanamrita, revolving around the five ontological entities of Jiva, Ishvara, Maya, Aksharabrahman, and Parabrahman. Roughly 200 years later, Bhadreshdas composed a commentary (Bhasya) correlating the principles of Vachanamrut.

Go directly to: Footnotes.

1.3. ʰṇa: Basic Introduction

[Full title: Pramāṇamimāṃsā (Epistemology) (3): ʰṇa: Basic Introduction]

Here, we will discuss the principal means (source) of knowledge in the Indian Vedic tradition.

1. Perception

Annama ṭṭ defines perception as:

tatra pratyakṣajñānakaraṇa� ٲⲹṣa |
Իٳ󲹲ԲԾ첹ṣaᲹԲⲹ� ñԲ� ٲⲹṣa
[1]

Knowledge produced by proximity of sense and object is perception. Its instrumental cause is sense.

Gautama defines perception:

indriyārthasannikarṣotpanna� jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmaka� ٲⲹṣa� (ⲹ-ūٰ 1/1/4)

In this manner, sense perception is considered a direct means of knowledge. Therefore, almost every tradition in Indian 岹śԾ thought accepts it. In order to remove many epistemological issues, perception is considered a foundational source of knowledge.

2. Inference

Annama ṭṭ explains:

anumitikaraṇam anuԲm |[2]

An inference is the knowledge that emerges from the deduction. Anuman is dependent on first knowledge, the knowledge that follows another knowledge. To define the , they explain the medium of some mark that is called reason. The base of inference is invariable concomitance. The subject, where the lies is already defined with the 貹峾ś. When one perceives smoke on a distant hill, one recalls his or her experience on the common concomitance between smoke and fire. As a result, he concludes that there is fire on that hill.

82 ṭṭ Annama, op.cit., p. 95

83 ǰ ʳܰṣoٳٲ, Sabdaprarnaa: Word and Knowledge, Kluwer Academic Publishers, AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1988, p.14

84 ṭṭ Annama, op.cit., 2012, p. 158

3. Verbal Testimony

Ś岹 (Verbal Testimony) is a means to valid knowledge which is accepted by all bhakti traditions.[3]

Since there are a lot of definitions of verbal testimony but Annama ṭṭ puts it in a simple way:

ٲⲹ� ś岹� | āptastu yathārthavaktā | ⲹ� padasamūha� | yathā gām ānayeti | śٲ� padam | asmāt padād ayam artho boddhavya īśṃkٲ� śپ� ||[4]

Ś岹 is a statement of a trustworthy person (Āٲⲹ) and consists in understanding its meaning. That person may be human or divine. The scriptures are written or explained by the ancient sages. Hence, they are trustworthy. Vedas and Vedic literature fall into this category too. Even for human trustworthy persons, if their words are spoken in a particular sense are valid.

4. Analogy and Similarity

Upa� and �Բ� collectively express the meaning �upaԲ� (analogy and similarity). The word �upa� explains similarity and the term �Բ� means ‘cognition�. Therefore, upaԲ as a means of knowledge is derived from the resemblance between two objects. It is a means of knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation. When the knowledge emerges due to similarity, it falls in this stratum.

According to the ⲹ-ղśṣi첹 philosophy, which advocates, as we see in the words of Annam ṭṭ:

upamitikaraṇam upaԲm | saṃjñāsaṃjñisaṃbandhajñānam ܱ貹پ� | tatkaraṇa� sādṛśyajñānam |[5]

“Comparison or the recognition of likeness is the cause of an inference from similarity.�

5. Presumption

The Ѿṃs첹 and 屹īԲ claim ٳ貹ٳپ (presumption) as a special source of valid knowledge. Moreover, the 屹īԲ assume ٳ貹ٳپ as a right way of cognition: �ٲٰDZ貹ⲹñԱԴDZ貹岹첹-kalpanamٳ貹ٳپ� |[6] The term �ٳ貹ٳپ� is a group of two words; first �artha� and second �貹ٳپ�. Artha means fact and 貹ٳپ shows imagination.

Therefore, this means of knowledge removes the issue between fact and fact and imagination. For instance,

īԴ devadatta na bhuṅkte

Devadatta is a fat boy who never eats food during the day. In this example, two statements are shown which are against each other. In this case, presumption comes and solves the problem and leads us to the right knowledge that Devadatta eats food at night. The 貹Ծṣa reveals, �tarati śokam ٳ� (ԻDzⲹ-ܱ貹Ծṣa XII 7/1/3) ‘the knower of the soul transcends sorrow� indicates the perishable nature of the world by the implementation of postulation.[7]

6. Non-cognition

Գܱ貹ī (non-cognition) is the instant knowledge of the non-existence of things. The Advaitins and Kumārīla accept Գܱ貹ī but ʰ첹 refutes it.[8]

The Vedanta ʲṣ� defines Գܱ貹ī as:

ñԲ첹ṇājԲ屹Գܲ󲹱ṇa-karaṇamanulabdhirūpa� pramāṇam[9]

“The mean of valid knowledge known as non-cognition is the special cause of that apprehension of non-existence which is not due to knowledge as an instrument.�

Non-cognition was invariably used to refute other’s philosophical positions in ancient philosophical debates in India.

7. Suppositional Reasoning

Annama ṭṭ describes:

vyāpyāropeṇa vyāpakāropastarka� yathā yadi vahnir na syāt tarhi dhūmo'pi na iti ||[10]

If there is not the existence of fire means there is no possibility of smoke. Using positive correlations of invariable concomitance, the philosopher uses its negative correlations to refute others� positions. As a result, a doubt in the form of effect might arise without a cause. It is a kind of pure logic. For example, smoke and fire are positively related as far as their existence is concerned, but by saying if there is no fire means there is no smoke, they make it very difficult for the opponents to make put arguments right. This argument is also found in the -ūٰ and other works.[11]

In this way, epistemology in the Indian Vedic tradition has a profound and significant value in understanding the Vedic principles in their respective school of Vedanta. Before we proceed to analyze the 峾ⲹṇa ٲśԲ found in the ʰٳԲٰī 峾ⲹṇa ṣy on the basis of epistemology, the above-mentioned study is inevitable to understand, grasp and differentiate the 峾ⲹṇa School from others.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

ṭṭ Annama, Tarka Saṃgraha, with Hindī ղ -󳾲ṇ� ī Banarjī, Caukhambā վ Bhavanaa, ṇaī, 2012, p.80

[2]:

ṭṭ Annama, op.cit., p. 95

[3]:

ǰ ʳܰṣoٳٲ, Sabdaprarnaa: Word and Knowledge, Kluwer Academic Publishers, AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1988, p.14

[4]:

ṭṭ Annama, op.cit., 2012, p. 158

[5]:

ṭṭ Annama, op.cit., p.154

[6]:

Adhvarindra Dharmarājā, Vedanta ʲṣ�, Ed., Gajñāna na Śٰī, Caukhambā Vidya Bhavana, ṇaī, 2015, p. 466

[7]:

Adhvarindra Dharmarājā, op.cit., p.269

[8]:

Dāsaguptā Surendranātha, A history of indian philosophy vol-1, Motīlāla Banārasīdāsa, Varanasi, p.379

[9]:

Adhvarindra Dharmarājā, Vedanta ʲṣ�, op.cit., p.279

[10]:

ṭṭ Annama, op.cit., p. 172

[11]:

ⲹ-ūٰ1/1/1

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