Nature of 痴颈艣别峁 (particularity)

Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories (Study)

by Diptimani Goswami | 2014 | 61,072 words

This page relates 鈥楴ature of Vishesha (particularity)鈥� of the study on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories with special reference to the Tarkasangraha by Annambhatta. Both Nyaya and Vaisesika are schools of ancient Indian Philosophy, and accepted in their system various padarthas or objects of valid knowledge. This study investigates how the Tarkasamgraha reflects these categories in the combined Nyayavaisesika school.

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Nature of 痴颈艣别峁 (particularity)

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[Full title: 2. The concept of 痴颈艣别峁 (1): Nature of 痴颈艣别峁]

痴颈艣别峁 (particularity) is the fifth category according to 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁办补 philosophy. 痴颈艣别峁 as an independent category is recognized by the 痴补颈艣别峁办补蝉 and for this reason, it is said, the name of this philosophy is 痴补颈艣别峁办补.^[1] The philosophies like the 厂腻峁僰丑测补, the Yoga, the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 and the 痴别诲腻苍迟补 do not accept 惫颈艣别峁 as a separate category. 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 enumerates 惫颈艣别峁 as a separate category among the six categories, viz., dravya, 驳耻峁嘺, karma, 蝉腻尘腻苍测补, 惫颈艣别峁 and 蝉补尘补惫腻测补.^[2]

痴颈艣别峁 (particularity) is the opposite of 蝉腻尘腻苍测补 (generality). 痴颈艣别峁 is the differentiator of the eternal substances, while 蝉腻尘腻苍测补 is the cause of the notion of inclusion. 厂腻尘腻苍测补 is inclusive while 惫颈艣别峁 is exclusive.^[3]

According to the 碍补峁嚹乨补, 惫颈艣别峁 is the ultimate distinguishing factor of a nitya, dravya. All eternal substances are distinguished from one another and it is 惫颈艣别峁 which distinguishes these eternal substances from one another. 碍补峁嚹乨补 also maintains that it depends upon intellect for its existence.^[4] Pra艣astap膩da also defines 惫颈艣别峁 as the ultimate differentiating factor of an eternal substance. 鈥淭hey are called 惫颈艣别峁, because they are the causes of the ultimate distinction of their substrates from one another. They are the final distinctive characters of eternal substances.鈥�^[5] The composite things are differentiated from one another through their different parts. Actually everything in this world is differentiated from one another on account of their qualities, attributes and universals. For example, a jar is differentiated from a cloth account of its universal jarhood. Similarly one jar is differentiated from another jar by means of its colour, size etc. But in the case two jars which are quite similar having the same qualities and the same universal, it is not possible to distinguish them on the basis of quality and universal. In that case the differentiating factor is their parts. But when there are two atoms of the same class like those of earth, the differentiating factor here cannot be the quality or universal or parts. The atoms have no parts. The atoms of earth possess the same qualities and the same universal. Now, if the atoms are not distinguished, they will combine together forming are mass. And in that case the atomic theory of the 痴补颈艣别峁办补蝉 will not hold good. Hence, the 痴补颈艣别峁办补蝉 contend that there must be a special attribute in the atoms which causes the differentiation of one atom from another of the same class.^[6] This attribute resides in atoms and is not common to even two atoms. This is only exclusive and is called 惫颈艣别峁 or antya-惫颈艣别峁.^[7] In later 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁办补 works, 惫颈艣别峁 is regarded as residing in all the eternal substances. The eternal substances are the atoms of earth, water, fire and air and also ether, time, space, self and mind. There are different 惫颈艣别峁 in each of them. Hence, 惫颈艣别峁s are infinite in number.^[8]

Now, the question is: what will be the differentiator of the 惫颈艣别峁s? According to the 痴补颈艣别峁办补蝉, 惫颈艣别峁s do not require any other differentiating factor for distinguishing them from one another. If another 惫颈艣别峁 is admitted to be the differentiator of the 惫颈艣别峁, then that will lead to infinite regress. Hence, the 痴补颈艣别峁办补蝉 hold that the 惫颈艣别峁s are self-distinguishing (svato-惫测腻惫补谤迟补办补). They distinguish their substrates from one another and at the same time they also distinguish themselves from each other.^[9] This self-distinguishingness is the nature of the 惫颈艣别峁s and as such the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁办补s do not accept 惫颈艣别峁tva 箩腻迟颈, because that will contradict the very nature of 惫颈艣别峁.^[10]

痴颈艣别峁 is defined by the later 痴补颈艣别峁办补蝉 in different ways. 艢iv膩ditya defines it as that which remains in a single substance and which is devoid of universal.^[11] 痴颈艣惫补苍腻迟丑补 defines 惫颈艣别峁 as that difference which is ultimate (antya) and which belongs to the eternal substances.^[12] 痴颈艣惫补苍腻迟丑补 himself explains in his 惭耻办迟腻惫补濒墨 that antya or ultimate means occurring at the end, i.e., beyond which there is no further differentiation. All things starting from a jar to the dyad are differentiated from one another by differences in their parts. But the differentiator of the atoms is 惫颈艣别峁 only. This 惫颈艣别峁 is differentiated by itself and as such it does not require any differentiating factor.^[13] Hence, antya denotes self-differentiating. 搁腻尘补谤耻诲谤补 points out that it is sufficient to define 惫颈艣别峁 as 蝉惫补迟辞惫测补惫峁泃迟颈, because there is no other category which is self-differentiating. Therefore, the term existing in the eternal substances (苍颈迟测补诲谤补惫测补惫峁泃迟颈) is superficial.^[14]

础苍苍补峁僢丑补峁弓补 mentions that 惫颈艣别峁 subsists in the nityadravya (eternal substance) and it is innumerable.^[15] He also mentions in the 顿墨辫颈办腻 that 惫颈艣别峁 inheres in the atoms etc.^[16] The atoms of earth, water, fire and air are eternal substances. Moreover, ether, time, space, self and mind are also eternal substances. 痴颈艣别峁 distinguishes these nityadravyas from each other.

Siddh膩nta Candrodaya mentions the necessity of postulating 惫颈艣别峁 thus:

gha峁乨in膩m kap膩lasamavetatv膩dika峁僷a峁乨ibhedakamasti param膩峁噓n膩峁� tu paraspara-产丑别诲补办补峁� na ki帽cidastya-to鈥檔膩yatya 惫颈艣别峁 膩艣rayitavya岣�.

A 驳丑补峁璦 differs from 辫补峁璦 as the component parts of the jar is distinct from the component parts of the cloth. But one atom cannot be distinguished from another because atom has no parts. That is why 惫颈艣别峁 is accepted to distinguish from another atom.^[17]