Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories (Study)
by Diptimani Goswami | 2014 | 61,072 words
This page relates ‘Historical Survey of Vaisheshika System� of the study on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories with special reference to the Tarkasangraha by Annambhatta. Both Nyaya and Vaisesika are schools of ancient Indian Philosophy, and accepted in their system various padarthas or objects of valid knowledge. This study investigates how the Tarkasamgraha reflects these categories in the combined Nyayavaisesika school.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
Historical Survey of ղśṣi첹 System
The ղśṣi첹 system advocates Dualistic Realism. It is said that this system has been founded on a Ṛk ascribed to the Seer īٲ. The Ṛk narrates that two birds which are intimate friends, reside in the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruits, while the other without eating just looks on.[1] The dualistic philosophers are influenced by this Ṛk which implies the distinction between the individual self and the Supreme self.
The founder of this system is ṇād. The name ṇād has been variously interpreted. It is said that he had lived on grains of corn which are scattered in the field.[2] It is also assumed that ṇād is a nickname which he got because of his propagation of the theory of atoms. According to his name ṇād, this system is also known as ṇād ٲśԲ. The name of this system ղśṣi첹 is derived from the word վśṣa. վśṣa as a separate category is discussed broadly in this system.[3] We do not find this category in any other system of Indian Philosophy. So, ṇād’s philosophy has come to be known as ղśṣi첹 system.
Max Müller says:
“It may be that the name of Vaisheshika was given to ṇād’s philosophy from the differences, or Visheshas which he established between substances, qualities and action, or it may from Vishesha as a name of individual things is applicable, therefore, to atoms. But this, in the absence of decisive evidence must for the present remain undetermined.�[4]
ṇād was born in a śⲹ貹 family and he was the worshipper of Ś. His another name was ū첹. Therefore, this system is also known as Aulūkya ٲśԲ or śⲹ貹 ٲśԲ.[5]
Radhakrishnan states that:
“The ղśṣi첹 is essentially a philosophy of distinctions, since it does not tolerate any attempt at dissipating the independence of selves and objects in a supposed more perfect individually. Its standpoint is more scientific than speculative, more analytic than synthetic�.[6]
The ղśṣi첹 system gives stress on the plurality and distinctness of physical things and finite souls. The special feature of this system is the theory of atomism.[7]
The ղśṣi첹 Philosophy aims at theoretical understanding of the universe. This system starts as a natural philosophy. Its foundation is a doctrine of elements. Then it develops the theory of atoms which make it able to understand the whole world. The world is periodically created and destroyed by the conjunction and separation of atoms. As a result a mechanistic view of the world occurs. The main tenet of categories is developed to distinguish different kinds of existence.
There is a confusion regarding the date of ṇād. We do not find any direct information about the time when he flourished. According to Radhakrishnan, the date of the ղśṣi첹 system is about fifth century B.C.[8] Mahadeo Rajaram Bodas maintains that the date of this system is about fifth or fourth century B.C.[9] According to Nandalal Sinha, the date is between the sixth and the tenth century B.C.[10]
It is generally accepted that ղśṣi첹 system is older than ⲹ. Because the ղśṣi첹 ūٰs do not show any influence of the ⲹ system. But on the other hand the ⲹ ūٰs of Gautama and the ṣy of ٲⲹԲ are very much influenced by the ղśṣi첹 system.[11] The ղśṣi첹 ūٰ consists of ten chapters. In the first chapter the five categories, viz. substance, quality, action, generality and particularity are discussed. In chapter II we find the different substances. The mind along with the objects of the senses and the nature of inference are discussed in chapter III. The atomic form of the Universe is the main topic of chapter IV. In chapter V discusses about the nature and kinds of action. Chapter VI discusses the ethical problems. In chapter VII, there are discussions about quality, self and inherence. The last three chapters are logical and the problems of perception, inference and causality are treated here.[12]
It is said that 屹ṇa wrote a commentary on ղśṣi첹sūtra named 屹ṇabhāṣya. This work is not available now. Similarly another work called 屹Ჹṛtپ on ṇād’s ūٰ is also not found now.
The earliest available commentary on ղśṣi첹sūtra is ʲٳṃg by Praśastapāda. It is also known as ʰśٲ岹ṣy. This work does not conform to the nature of a commentary; it is like an independent work of philosophy. The date of Praśastapāda is about the end of 4th century A.D.[13] Praśastapāda specified the list of the six categories which is found in the ղśṣi첹sūtra.[14] According to him, to know about the categories, at first their similarities and dissimilarities must be known. Hence, he mentions about these in the beginning of his work. It is stated in the ղśṣi첹sūtra that there are nine substances[15], seventeen qualities[16] and five motions.[17] However, in Praśastapāda’s view, seven additional gunas (qualities) are to be added to the original seventeen. According to him, qualities are twenty-four. This view is accepted by all the later philosophers of this school. In this work Praśastapāda has discussed about the theory of creation and destruction of the world, the statement of fallacies, the nature of inference etc.
ṅk Ѿś wrote a commentary named 貹 on the Vaiśeṣīka ūٰ. He also wrote an independent work named ṇādrahasya. There are four main commentaries on ʲٳṃg. These are: Vyomaśivācārya’s ղdzī. Śī’s ⲹkaṇḍalī, Udayana’s ṇāaī and Śīٲ’s ī屹ī. ղdzī is probably the oldest of all the commentaries mentioned above. ղdzī, ṇāvī and ⲹkaṇḍalī are three well-known and excellent commentaries which contribute to the development of this system to a great extent.
It has already been mentioned that the earliest commentator on ʲٳṃg was ղdzś. The time of his work ղdzī is about 1000 A.D.[18] The name of ղdzś indicates that he was a follower of Ś. He was a resident of Kashmir. ղdzś has reviewed in his work the opinions of the different schools about Ѵǰṣa. Praśastapāda discusses six categories. According to him, non-existence is subordinate to the positive categories and as such he has not included it in the innumeration of categories. But ղdzś has discussed all the seven categories. The definitions of these categories and their subdivisions given by Praśastapāda are analysed and explained in this work. Moreover, there is a detailed discussion about non-existence. ղdzś proves the existence of atoms through inference. ղdzī was further commented upon by Paḍmanābha Ѿś (1600 A.D.) in the commentary named Setu. It has another commentary named ūپ by 徱ś Tarkālaṃkara (1700 A.D.).
Another important commentary on Praśastapāda’s ṣy is ⲹkaṇḍalī written by Śī. According to his own proof, he flourished in 991 A.D.[19] He was a native of the village of Bhurisṛsti in Bengal. Gopinath Kaviraj mentions that Śī wrote four works. These are: Advayasiddhi, a Vedāntic work, Tattvaprabodha, a īṃs work Tattvasaṃvādinī and ⲹ-Kaṇḍalī.[20]
Among the commentaries on ʲٳṃg,
�ⲹ-Kaṇḍalī of Śī on account of its simplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably the best for a modern student of ղśṣi첹.�[21]
Śī accepts the existence of God and the category of non-existence. He again mentions in his work that Yogins get knowledge through their internal organ. He made clear Praśastapāda’s view of the relation between an instrument of knowledge and its result. Perception is also an instrument of knowledge. In this work, detailed discussion of the seven categories is found. In the conclusion he states the name of the village in which he lived, the names of his parents and the date of the composition of his work.[22]
岹ⲹԲ’s ṇāvī is another important work on ʰśٲ岹-ṣy. The date of ṇāvī is about 10th century A.D.[23] ṇāvī was further commented upon by ղԲ (1400 A.D.) under the name of ṇāvīprakāśa and by ʲ峾 Ѿś under the name of ṇāvībhāṣya.[24] Udayana was contemporary of Śī. Unlike Praśastapāda who omitted non-existence, Udayana maintains that non-existence is a well-established category.Udayana does not accept the view of the ṃkⲹ, the Vijñānavādins and the ṭṭ about the concept of Ѵǰṣa. He discusses in detail seven categories and four ʰṇa. He gives arguments to prove the existence of God.
ٲś貹ٳī is another work of ղśṣi첹 system. Candramati is the author of this work. He adds in this work four new 貹ٳ to the six recognized in the ղśṣi첹sūtra. The 貹ٳ added by Candramati are: potentiality, nonpotentiality, commonness and non-existence.[25] He discusses in a systematic manner the categories from beginning to end.
The new additional four categories are:
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
[3]:
Ibid.
[4]:
Vide Bahadur, K.P., The Wisedom of ղśṣi첹 p. 32
[6]:
Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Vol.II, p.157
[7]:
Ibid., p. 158
[8]:
Ibid., p. 160
[9]:
Vide, Bahadur, K.P., The Wisdom of Vaiśeṣīka, p. 31
[10]:
Vide, Ibid., p. 32
[11]:
Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p.158
[12]:
cf. Ibid., p.159
[13]:
Sinha, Jadunath, Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 306
[14]:
dravyaguṇakarma峾Բⲹśṣasamavāyānā� padārthānā� sādharmyavaidharmyabhyā� � ղśṣi첹sūtra, 1.1.4
[16]:
[18]:
Sinha, Jadunath, Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 306
[20]:
Ibid
[21]:
Dasgupta, Surendranath, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 306
[22]:
[23]:
Sinha, Jadunath, Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 306
[24]:
Ibid., p. 307