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Vakyapadiya of Bhartrihari

by K. A. Subramania Iyer | 1965 | 391,768 words

The English translation of the Vakyapadiya by Bhartrihari including commentary extracts and notes. The Vakyapadiya is an ancient Sanskrit text dealing with the philosophy of language. Bhartrhari authored this book in three parts and propounds his theory of Sphotavada (sphota-vada) which understands language as consisting of bursts of sounds conveyi...

This book contains Sanskrit text which you should never take for granted as transcription mistakes are always possible. Always confer with the final source and/or manuscript.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of verse 3.8.1:

यावत� सिद्धमसिद्धं वा साध्यत्वेनाभिधीयत� �
आश्रितक्रमरूपत्वात� तत� क्रियेत्यभिधीयत� � � �

yāvat siddhamasiddha� vā ⲹtvenābhidhīyate |
āśritakramarūpatvāt tat kriyetyabhidhīyate || 1 ||

1. Whenever something, finished or unfinished, is presented as something to be accomplished, it is called ‘action�, because of its having assumed the form of sequence.

Commentary

The means or accessory (󲹲Բ) has been explained. As it depends upon the end or what is to be accomplished (), the definition of action accepted in the śٰ, is now being given.

[Read verse 1 above]

[In connection with the ancient’s definition of a root as that which denotes action, the objection is raised that in that case ‘√as�, �ū and �vid should be especially declared to be roots because they do not denote action (M. Bhā, I. p. 255, 1.1). We know that �pac denotes action because in reply to the question: ‘what is he doing?� we can say ‘he is cooking� (pacati). We cannot give bhavati as an answer to the same question. Thus as, ū and vid would not be expressive of action and they would not be called roots. Moreover all action is known to consist of movements but the meanings of as, ū, and vid do not consist of movements. Therefore such a definition of action has to be found as will fit in with the meaning of all roots. That is just what the ṣy has done in his statement : ṇāṃ ṛtپśṣa� (M. Bhā, I.p. 258, L. 11) = ‘Action is the special mode of behaviour of the accessories.� This has been interpreted differently by different scholars. Either all the accessories have the same activity or each has its own. Even if all the accessories have the same activity, it may be identical with the fruit or it may be different from it. All the accessories cannot have the same activity. That of the instrument (첹ṇa), for instance, cannot be identical with that of the agent (), nor that of the abode (adhi첹ṇa) with that of the recipient (Բ). There is no action resting upon many things. Therefore, action is an activity differing with each accessory. To say that the root is what denotes action is to say that the root expresses the activity of every accessory.

Objection:� The result would be that the verbal suffix () would express each and every accessory. It is only natural that the suffix which is added to the root should denote the accessory of the activity for which the root stands and it has been stated that the root stands for the activity of all the accessories.

Answer:—This is not really the case. ṇiԾ teaches that the verbal suffixes arc added in the sense of the agent and the object only. (P. 3.4.69) Therefore a word ending in a verbal suffix should denote only the activities of these two accessories. Secondly, as a matter of fact, we understand only the activities of the agent and the object from the verbal suffixes and it is only natural that ṇiԾ’s teaching should follow facts. It is true that according to this, a root would not stand for the activities of any accessory. Agreement (anvaya) and difference (vyatireka) are the only two methods which we have for determining what the meaning of the base and what the meaning of the suffix is and these two methods lead us to think that the root does not stand for the activities of all the accessories. Though in a sentence like: Devadatta� kāṣṭhai� sthālyām odanam pacati, the root docs seem to stand for the activities of all the accessories, primarily it stands for those of the agent and the object. Hence they are understood from the verbal suffixes (la) at the end of a verb.

Others believe that the statement ṇāṃ ṛtپśṣa� is meant to explain the nature of action and not to explain the meaning of a root. They argue as follows—The root cannot express the activity of the recipient etc. but it does express that of the instrument etc. That is why an instrument can be presented as independent (svatantra), as the agent, as in the sentence : asiś chinatti but not the recipient (Բ) or the starting point (Բ). The activities of all the accessories are action but of these only some are expressed by the root and the verbal suffixes are added to the root in order to denote those accessories the activities of which are expressed by the root.

Others, while explaining this definition of action, put all the emphasis on the word śṣa. They say that ṛtپśṣa� means ṛtī� śṣa�. They mean that action is a śṣa, a peculiarity or rather a distinct result of the activities of the accessories. The softness of the rice, after cooking, is the result achieved by the activities of all the accessories. Thus, to them action is the result.

For others still, by ṇāṃ only the is meant. The plural number is used keeping in mind the different agents of the different possible actions. There is a M. Bhā. sentence which may be taken as a proof that only the is meant. It is this: Բⲹٳ śuṣkaudane ṇi pravartante anyathā māṃsaudane (M. Bhā. I. p. 258, 1.11) = “Agents act in one way when there is only plain rice before them and act quite differently towards rice with meat�. Here there is talk of the agents acting with excitement in the presence of rice with meat and with indifference towards plain rice. Only a sentient being like the agent is capable of excitement or indifference. So ṇi here means the agents. The karma, object may also be meant. In one passage, the M. Bhā says that viklitti = ‘becoming soft�, is the chief meaning of the root �pac. This cannot be the activity of the agent. His activity is vikledanam = ‘making something soft� and not becoming soft. The conclusion seems to be that in this passage it is not the meaning of words which is explained but what is called action. Considered apart from words, viklitti = ‘becoming soft� may be the real nature of the action called cooking but the root �pac denotes primarily the activity of the agent, that is, vikledana = making something soft. The activity of the object can be expressed by the root when the suffix is added to it in the sense of the object.

Others still explain the whole thing differently. For them, is just activity in general and not any particular activity. Thus it would be found in every accessory. The bringing about of the ultimate result is the common thing found in the activity of every accessory. It is this common thing which is called ṛtپśṣa�. The śṣa consists in bringing about the ultimate result. This is their common feature. Each does it in its own way and hence gets a special name. If action had been defined as just ṛtپ, it would have meant mpvement because that is the accepted meaning of the word in the world. By adding the word śṣa, it now stands for something other than just movement. All ṛtپ differs from other ṛtپs and that constitutes its distinctiveness (śṣa). Thus, in the behaviour of every . there can be a distinctiveness. This can be from things of the same kind or from totally different things. When the M. Bhā. speaks about difference in the reaction to plain rice and to rice with meat, it has distinction from things of the same class in mind. The action of eating differs from person to person. Agents act indifferently towards plain rice but enthusiastically towards rice with meat. If acting enthusiastically alone makes something fit to be called action, then eating plain rice could not be called action at all. The lack of enthusiasm in eating plain rice is also a peculiar behaviour and so that is also . Distinction from things belonging to another class is quite clear in such examples as pacati, paṭhati and so on.

It is clear from all this that is different from dravya. All the accessories which are dravyas may be present and yet there may be no action. Sometimes, however, the idea of action arises in our mind when the accessories are present. The fact that the idea of action sometimes arises and sometimes not shows that action is something different from the accessories. Somebody might object that even when it does arise, it might be an error. Therefore, some other proof must be given to show that action is different from the accessories. We find that Devadatta is now here and later in ṭaٰܳ. Something is responsible for it. That is action. Reaching ṭaٰܳ is the result and it can’t come from substance only. It leads us to postulate the existence of some activity which produces this result. 1 hat is action and that is inferable only. It cannot be directly perceived. Some people object to this view that action is something to be inferred. We get the notion that somebody is cooking. From this can we infer the action called cooking? This notion itself may be an error and we can infernothing from an error. If it is not an error then we are perceiving action directly. It is not a case of inference. One might infer action from its effect, but how can the word express it? The answer to this objection is that in Grammar, we are not dealing with things as they are but as presented by words. The thing which is fixed as the meaning of the root by the method of agreement and difference cannot be directly perceived. That notion having sequence within it and which is understood from a verb is called action. That which is presented by the word as a process is called action and that which is a finished thing is a substance. Even things that are in the process of formation can be presented by words as finished things. In the sentence ṭa� kriyate, the jar is presented as a thing in the process of formation. The jar. before it is produced, goes through many stages, but this process is not understood from the word ṭa. It is understood from the verb kriyate. The meaning of a word is that which is understood from it without the help of another word. From the word ṭa alone, we understand the meaning of being (ٳ). That is why that meaning has been declared to be the meaning of a stem (پ貹徱첹). When a verb is used, sequence is understood and that is why things in a process of formation are said to be the meaning of verbs. From the sentence ṭa� kriyate, what we understand is this: The jar which is mentally conceived is being brought about. Thus action is something which is inferred from things.

But some say that even this conception of action does not cover the meaning of roots like �as. One of the characteristics of action mentioned above was that when all the accessories are present, sometimes the notion of action arises and sometimes it does not. But the idea denoted by the root as always arises when the accessories are present. Therefore the meaning of the root �as is not action. Secondly, the meaning of this root does not admit of degree as the meanings of other roots do. We cannot say پٲ峾 as we can say 貹پٲ峾. Nor can we give asti as an answer to the question: what is he doing? But we can give pacati as an answer. ‘Being� is the ultimate meaning of a verb also and it does not admit of degree. This objection is answered as follows: Action was defined as kārakāṇām ṛtپśṣa� = a distinctive mode of behaviour of the accessories. The behaviour ol the accessories in the case of asti is not the same as in the case of mriyate. In asti, they act with a view to the preservation of the body and in mriyate, they act for its destruction. Thus there is distinctiveness in the mode of behaviour (Pravṛttiśṣa�).

There is also a reason why the notion denoted by the root �as always arises when the accessories are present and not only sometimes. Being (ٳ), brought about by unexcited (Ṽ۲) accessories, always persists. That is why the notion expressed by as always arises when the accessories are present. There can also be degree in the meaning of �as or �vid. We do say: ⲹٱٲ峾ⲹ when somebody is always present. The suffix tarap expresses degree. Asti can sometimes become the answer to the question: what is he doing? For instance, in regard to someone who is about to die. As other actions, the action in as also produces its result, that of ‘not giving up oneself�. From ’s treatment of the six , or ٳ is the basis of all action. One cannot therefore question whether the meaning of as is action or not. Staying (پṣṭ󲹳پ) is not mentioned as one of the six, but it has all the characteristics of action. For example, one action cancels others. When one hears پṣṭ󲹳پ, it cancels such actions as growth and decay. Therefore, it is also a distinctive mode of the accessories (ṇāṃ ṛtپśṣa�). Secondly, it can be connected with different accessories, another proof that it is action. We can say: ūmau پṣṭ󲹳پ balena پṣṭ󲹳پ and so on. Similarly, in upa vasati, vinaśyati, apakṣīyate etc., the meanings would come under the definition of action, because they represent a special activity of the accessories having sequence. They arc different from the accessories themselves and they arc the meanings of roots. Something which is a finished thing cannot be the meaning of a root. Nor is 屹nā the meaning of a root, because there is no such thing apart from . The meaning of the root � is common to the meanings of all the roots That is why it can be in apposition to all roots. The idea of cooking is understood from both pacati and , but in one case, it is understood as a thing while, in the other, it is understood as a process. Pacati and 첹� karoti mean this: he causes to soften the rice which softens by itself. Vikledana = ‘making soft� is the activity of the agent and viklitti = ‘becoming soft� is that of the object and both are included in the meaning of the root �pac. Therefore there is no such thing as 屹nā, apart from . Yajeta does not mean : 岵Բ 屹yet = ‘One should bring about heaven through sacrifice.� It means a process by accomplishing which the result comes spontaneously].

The definition of action, given above, is made clear by means of an illustration.

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