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The cause of inference is a faultless reason (through which by virtue of its association anything can be ascertained). The nature of this association or concomitance is described by Jaya-迟墨谤迟丑补 as being inseparable concomitance (补惫颈苍腻产丑腻惫补). 痴测腻蝉补-迟墨谤迟丑补 urges in the Tarka-迟腻峁囜笉补惫补 that this inseparable concomitance ought really to mean contradiction of experience leading to inadmissible assumption or implication (anupapatti). When anything experienced in a particular space-time relation must be invalid except on the assumption of some other thing, in some other space-time relation, it must be admitted that such a particular relation subsisting between the two is a relation of concomitance (惫测腻辫迟颈), leading to the inference of the latter through the former^[1].

痴测腻蝉补-迟墨谤迟丑补 urges that this view of. inference has also been supported by Madhva in his 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺-濒补办峁�a峁嘺, where he says that the residual method (辫补谤颈艣别峁�a) is the essential method in all cases of valid inference^[2]. Reduction to absurdity in regard to any valid experience is what necessitates the supposition in an act of inference.^[3] Jaya-迟墨谤迟丑补 in his 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺-paddhati has indeed defined concomitance (惫测腻辫迟颈) as inseparability (补惫颈苍腻-产丑腻惫补); this inseparable concomitance cannot be described as being in all cases agreement in absence, i.e., the absence of the reason, hetu, in all cases of the absence of the probandum (蝉腻诲丑测补), or the inferred entity; for there are cases where, in spite of the absence of such negative instances, inference is possible, e.g., sound is expressible on account of its being an object of knowledge; now here no such negative instance is available where there would be no expression; hence in such cases of impossible-negative (办别惫补濒腻苍惫补测颈) inferences the above definition of concomitance, which requires the existence of negative instances for the ascertainment of concomitance, would not apply. Also no kind of spatial association of the reason and consequence (蝉腻诲丑测补) can be urged as being an indispensable condition of concomitance: for there can be the inference of rain in the upper part of a country from perceiving a rise of water in the river in the lower part, and there is no spatial contiguity between the reason and consequence. So the main point in concomitance determining inference is the reduction of an incontrovertible experience into an impossibility, which necessitates the assumption of the inferred entity. It is this which has also been described as the law of unconditional and invariable association (蝉腻丑补肠补谤测补-niyama). In the well-known example of fire and smoke what is described as the unconditional and invariable coexistence of the absence of smoke in all cases of the absence of fire is also a case of reductio ad absurdum (anupapatti). It would apply with equal force in the cases of impossibfe-negatives (办别惫补濒腻苍惫补测颈) ; for there also the impossible absence of the consequence would render the reason absurd; and hence the assumption of the consequence is necessary.

痴测腻蝉补-迟墨谤迟丑补 refutes at great length the definition of inference given by Ga峁単e艣a in his Tattva-肠颈苍迟腻尘补峁噄, where he explains concomitance as the coexistence of consequence and reason as qualified by the fact of the absence of the latter in each case of the absence of the former. Had it not been for the fact that in inferences of the type of impossible-negatives (办别惫补濒腻苍惫补测颈) no negative instances are available where we might have been acquainted with cases of absence of the consequence being also cases of absence of the reason (s膩dhy膩产丑腻惫补vad-av峁泃titvam), Ga峁単e艣a would have been glad to define concomitance (惫测腻辫迟颈) as unconditional and invariable non-existence of the reason in all cases of the non-existence of the consequence (s膩dhy膩产丑腻惫补vad-av峁泃titvam). But owing to the above difficulty Ga峁単e艣a was forced to define concomitance as coexistence (蝉腻尘腻苍腻诲丑颈办补谤补峁噛补) of the consequence and reason where the reason is also qualified as the repository of the negation of all possible conditions which could invalidate its unconditional and invariable relation to the consequence (蝉腻诲丑测补)^[4]. The insight of Ga峁単e艣a in formulating such a definition consists in this, that he thinks that universal existence of the reason in case of the consequence is alone sufficient for an inference of the latter from the former, provided that the reason is pure and unmixed by the presence of any other entity. It is the presence of other entities mixed with the reason that may invalidate its universal coexistence with the consequence; so, if that could be eliminated, then mere universal existence of the reason in cases of the consequence would be sufficient to establish a relation of concomitance between the former and the latter.

痴测腻蝉补-迟墨谤迟丑补, however, points out that the existence of the reason in cases of the consequence is not universally valid in all cases of inference. Thus in the inference of rain in the upper regions from perceiving a rise of water in the river in the lower regions there is no spatial coexistence of the reason in the consequence; so also in the inference that the constellation 搁辞丑颈峁嚹� will shortly rise in the east because the constellation 碍峁泃迟颈办腻 has already risen. In all such cases and in all cases of inference the view of reductio ad absurdum (anupapatti) can always define concomitance in the best possible way and therefore can also serve as the best ground for all kinds of inference, including the class known as impossible-negatives (办别惫补濒腻苍惫补测颈). For in the example given of that class, 鈥渢his is expressible because it is an object of knowledge鈥�, we can argue that the denial of non-expressibility is a necessary postulate for the validity of the incontrovertible experience of its being an object of knowledge^[5]. An objection may be raised that, non-expressibility being as fictitious an entity as a round square, there would be no meaning in further denying it. To this 痴测腻蝉补-迟墨谤迟丑补鈥檚 reply is that negation may apply even to the fictitious and the non-existent (补辫谤腻尘腻峁噄办补)^[6].

It is evident that this view of concomitance is a later development of theory by 痴测腻蝉补-迟墨谤迟丑补. For Jaya-迟墨谤迟丑补, in his 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺-paddhati, describes concomitance as being inseparable existence (补惫颈苍腻产丑腻惫补), which he explains as invariable coexistence (蝉腻丑补肠补谤测补-苍颈测补尘补) and also as invariable relation (avyabhicarita岣� sa峁僢andha岣�)^[7]. 闯补苍腻谤诲补苍补, however, in his commentary on the 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺-paddhati, holds that this 蝉腻丑补肠补谤测补-苍颈测补尘补 of Jaya-迟墨谤迟丑补 must be interpreted to mean the reductio ad absurdum of 痴测腻蝉补-迟墨谤迟丑补; otherwise it would be evident to all that his view of concomitance has been intended by the above definition of Jaya-迟墨谤迟丑补; and he supports his view by pointing out that both in the 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺-濒补办峁�a峁嘺 and in his commentary on the 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺-濒补办峁�a峁嘺 Jaya-迟墨谤迟丑补 has included inference by residues (辫补谤颈艣别峁�a) and implication (补谤迟丑腻辫补迟迟颈) within inference, as he thought that the methods of these are practically methods of inference itself^[8]. But this only proves that 辫补谤颈艣别峁�a and 补谤迟丑腻辫补迟迟颈 are also kinds of inference and not that the method of anupapatti involved in them should be regarded as being the only possible form of inference. Had he thought this to be so, he would certainly have mentioned it and would not have limited his definition of concomitance to invariable coexistence (蝉腻丑补肠补谤测补-niyama). Chalari-艣e峁Ｄ乧膩rya, who faithfully follows the footprints of Jaya-迟墨谤迟丑补, often repeating his language also, explains this invariable coexistence of Jaya-迟墨谤迟丑补 as 鈥渨here there is smoke, there is fire鈥�; but he remarks that this invariable coexistence means only the existence of an invariable relation of the reason to the consequence (atra s膩hacarya峁� heto岣� s膩dhyena sa峁僢andha-m膩tra峁� vivak峁�itam), and not merely existence in the same place (蝉腻尘腻苍腻诲丑颈办补谤补峁噛补). Coexistence therefore is said to mean here unfailing relation to the consequence (avyabhicarita-蝉腻诲丑测补-sa峁僢andho 惫测腻辫迟颈岣�), and this is 惫测腻辫迟颈 ^[9]. He also refers to Ga峁単e艣a鈥檚 definition of 惫测腻辫迟颈, noted above, and points out that this definition of 惫测腻辫迟颈 would be inapplicable in those instances of inference where there is no spatial coexistence (e.g., the inference of rain in the upper regions from the rise of water in the river in the lower regions)^[10]. He points out on the strength of such instances that concomitance cannot be defined as coexistence (蝉腻尘腻苍腻诲丑颈办补谤补峁噛补), but is an unfailing relation which may hold between a cause and an effect existing in different places. On the strength of these instances Chalari-艣e峁Ｄ乧膩rya argues in favour of concomitance without coexistence (vyadhikara峁嘺-惫测腻辫迟颈) as being possible, and therefore advocates the dropping of the coexistence as a necessary condition of concomitance. 痴测腻蝉补-迟墨谤迟丑补 seems to have profited by these remarks and, instead of remaining content with 鈥渦nfailing relation鈥� of Cha岣穉ri-艣e峁Ｄ乧膩rya, explained this 鈥渦nfailing relation鈥� as being the definite relation of reductio ad absurdum (anupapatti)^[11].

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

yad-de艣a-k膩la-sa峁僢addhasya yasya yad-de艣a-k膩la-sa峁僢addhena yena vin膩nupapattis tasyiva tena saha 惫测腻辫迟颈岣�.
      Tarka-迟腻峁囜笉补惫补 (MS., p. 1).

[2]:

pari艣e峁�o鈥檙th膩pattir amum膩nam ity avi艣e峁�a岣�.
      笔谤补尘腻峁嘺-濒补办峁�a峁嘺
      and 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺-濒补办峁�a峁嘺-峁�墨k膩, p. 27.

[3]:

anum膩nam api 膩va艣yak膩nupapattyaiva gamakam.
      Tarka-迟腻峁囜笉补惫补 (MS.,p. 2).

[4]:

pratiyogy-asam膩n膩dhikara峁嘺-yat-sam膩n膩dhikara峁嚹乼yant膩产丑腻惫补-pratiyogit膩-vacchedak膩vacchinna峁� yan na bhavati tena sama峁� tasya 蝉腻尘腻苍腻诲丑颈办补谤补峁噛补峁� 惫测腻辫迟颈岣�.
      Tattva-肠颈苍迟腻尘补峁噄, Part II, p. 100 (ed. 1888, Bibliotheca Indica).

[5]:

ida峁� v膩cya峁� j帽eyatv膩t keval膩nvayi anum膩nam.

[6]:

tatra s膩dhy膩产丑腻惫补sya asattv膩d eva s膩dhy膩bh膩ve sati s膩dhanasya yopapattis tad-a产丑腻惫补-r奴p膩nupapatte岣� sattv膩t; manmate鈥檖r膩m膩峁噄kasy膩pi ni峁�edha-prati-yogitv膩t.
      Tarka-迟腻峁囜笉补惫补 (MS., p. 6).

[7]:

笔谤补尘腻峁嘺-paddhati, p. 30.

[8]:

anupapatter 惫测腻辫迟颈tva峁� ca pram膩峁嘺-lak峁�a峁噀 pari艣e峁Ｄ乺th膩patti岣� anum膩-vi艣e峁�a ity atr膩rth膩pattir iva anum膩nam api 膩va艣yak膩nupapattyaiva gamakam ity uktatv膩t.
      Tarka-迟腻峁囜笉补惫补 (MS., pp. 1-2).
      Also 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺-濒补办峁�a峁嘺-峁�墨k膩, pp. 5-7.

[9]:

Cf. Ga峁単e艣a鈥檚 alternative definition of 惫测腻辫迟颈 in the section on Vi艣e峁�a-惫测腻辫迟颈:

yat-sa峁僢andhit膩vacchedaka-r奴pavattva峁� yasya tasya s膩 惫测腻辫迟颈岣�.
      Tattva-肠颈苍迟腻尘补峁噄, Part II, p. 156.

[10]:

na tu sam膩峁嚹乨hikara峁噛am eva.
      笔谤补尘腻峁嘺-candrik膩, p. 8 a.

[11]:

笔谤补尘腻峁嘺-candrik膩, pp. 8a, 9.